Abstract
The actual crisis in the euro zone results from the inconsistent attitude of
the members of the region towards the demands of the economic integration
process. Its extension towards the creation of an effectively functioning
financial and economic union is immanently connected with the need of
a bigger and bigger convergence of the economic policy adopted by the
participants of the integration actions, especially in the context of their fiscal
and budgetary policy. The lack of political will that made full implementation
of such a project possible together with a voluntary policy of accessing the
euro zone by the states that did not meet the necessary requirements and
criteria neither at the moment of accession nor later, and negligence in their
execution led to a deep crisis in the zone as well as the whole European
Union. The proposed methods of reforming the situation result from the
interests of the two European integration ‘engines’: Germany and France,
and they do not create conditions necessary for finding a final solution to
the existing problems.
On the other hand, Poland’s attitude towards the euro zone crisis
is determined by the state and perspectives of our economy, the quality
of the domestic political elite and the manner of economic management.
Confrontation with the problems of the euro zone crisis in the context of
accession is strictly determined by the ability to implement necessary reforms
in order to create economic conditions adequate to challenges.