Abstract
The subject matter of the article is the analysis of the course of diplomatic
struggle for the institutional shape and character of the process of uniting
Western European countries in the years 1955–1960. It was a special period
in the history of the European integration. That was when the countries of
Western Europe formally split into two groups having two different ideas of
how to unite Europe. Creating the EEC and the EFTA was an institutional
manifestation of that division. The former had some incorporated mechanisms
of supranational integration requiring a cession of sovereignty. The
latter was heading for gradual abolition of trade restrictions and coordination
of sovereign countries’ economic policy. The differences in the interests and
stands of particular states that appeared then have not lost their importance until now.
The article presents an analysis and interpretation of the European integration
that differs strongly from the type dominating in science. It is not
aimed at characterizing the content and shape of the ready-made product of
the integration idea like the EEC and the EFTA. It shows the other side of
the picture, i.e. the course of long-lasting and very strong British diplomatic
struggle for halting the pace and range of supranational integration of Western
Europe and explains the reasons of British failures in the field. It turns
out that, in the British policy regarding the European integration, the factor
of continuity prevails over the factor of changes.