Abstract
The paper analyzes the subsequent monetary regimes in Europe after the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system (which took place in 1971–1973). Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), and previous monetary arrangements
in Europe, can be seen as a particular example of international regimes.
They had geo-economic orientation. Apart from their economic aims, e.g.
those connected with the stabilisation of the exchange rates in Europe, there
were geopolitical presumptions, though. I look for answers to the question
of whether the subsequent monetary regimes show the same goals of the
main actors. I seek the causes of the difficulties and ineffectiveness of monetary
regimes. It is curious to observe a long political cycle in two research
perspectives. On the one hand, as an attempt to follow the phenomenon of
path dependency, occurring primarily in long-term historical trends in the
“statecraft” of the main political actor. On the other hand, I am interested
in the accumulation of positive and negative experiences associated with
monetary cooperation in Europe.