

MYŚL EKONOMICZNA I POLITYCZNA

MYŚL EKONOMICZNA I POLITYCZNA

3(54) 2016



Uczelnia Łazarzkiego

ADVISORY BOARD

Wojciech Bieńkowski, Tadeusz Bodio, Jens Boysen (Germany), Andrzej Chodubski, Nathaniel Copey (Great Britain), Małgorzata Gałązka-Sobotka, Bogna Gawrońska-Nowak, Svetlana P. Glinkina (Russian Federation), Krystyna Iglicka-Okólska, Natalia V. Kulikova (Russian Federation), Krzysztof Łazarski, Krzysztof Miszczak, Daria Nałęcz, Bogdan Szlachta

EDITORIAL BOARD

Dariusz K. Rosati (deputy editor-in-chief), Józef M. Fiszer (editor-in-chief),
Paweł Olszewski (secretary), Andrzej Podraza, Zdzisław Puślecki,
Krzysztof Szewior, Janusz J. Węc, Konstanty A. Wojtaszczyk

LANGUAGE EDITORS

Natalia Artsiomenka – Belarusian, Russian, Grzegorz Butrym – English,
Martin Dahl – German, Adam Figurski – English, Maria Furman – Polish,
Ostap Kushnir – Ukrainian, Elwira Stefańska – Russian

STATISTICS EDITORS

Wojciech Bieńkowski, Bogna Gawrońska-Nowak, Paweł Najechalski

THEMATIC EDITORS

Economics – prof. dr hab. Dariusz K. Rosati
Political science, International relations, European studies – prof. dr hab. Józef M. Fiszer
Law and jurisprudence – prof. dr hab. Zbigniew Lasocik
Finance and banking – dr Piotr Stolarczyk
Statistics – dr Krystyna Bąk
Management – prof. dr hab. Jerzy Kisielnicki

FOREIGN REVIEWERS

Jens Boysen (Germany), Nathaniel Copey (Great Britain),
Natalia V. Kulikova (Russian Federation), Douglas E. Selvage (United States of America)

REVIEWER

Prof. dr hab. Krzysztof Łazarski

EDITOR

Prof. dr hab. Józef M. Fiszer

EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Anna Pietrzak-Borowska

TRANSLATION AND COPY EDITING

Marta Szymczak

The original version of the journal is the printed version.

Full texts of the articles along with the table of contents and summaries in Polish, English and Russian are published online under URL:

<http://www.lazarski.pl/pl/badania-i-rozwoj/oficyna-wydawnicza/Czasopisma-online/Mysl-Ekonomiczna-i-Polityczna/>

as well as in BazEkon service, available at: Virtual Library of Science (<http://vls.icm.edu.pl/>)
and the Cracow University of Economics server
(http://kangur.uek.krakow.pl/bazy_ae/bazekon/nowy/advanced.php).

Copyright © by Uczelnia Łazarskiego, Warszawa 2016

ISSN 2081-5913

Lazarski University Press
ul. Świeradowska 43, 02-662 Warszawa,
tel. (4822) 54-35-450
www.lazarski.pl
wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl



Typesetting and printed by:
Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA
ul. Inflancka 15/198, 00-189 Warszawa
tel./fax 22 635 03 01, 22 635 17 85,
e-mail: elipsa@elipsa.pl, www.elipsa.pl

CONTENTS

Editorial	11
-----------------	----

ARTICLES AND STUDIES

Bartłomiej Biga

The use of governance instruments in health policies of developed countries	17
--	----

Elżbieta Roszko-Wójtowicz

The analysis of the current state of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2002–2014	32
--	----

Maciej D. Kryszczuk, Michał Wenzel

Trade unions and the impact of technological changes on the labour market	59
--	----

Adam Rogala-Lewicki

European Intelligence Community – the unfulfilled pillar of the European Union	85
---	----

Anna M. Solarz

The Holy See's efforts towards reconciliation	134
---	-----

Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek

Areas of cooperation of Poland and the Holy See in the dimension of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy	156
---	-----

Șerban Olah, Gabriel Roșeanu

Religious giving in Romania	176
-----------------------------------	-----

Daria Orzechowska-Słowikowska

Assimilation – a worn theory? Muslims in Warsaw	190
---	-----

Marta Stempień

Jihadism expansion in Egypt after 2011 on the example of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Sinai Province and other structures	211
--	-----

Józef M. Fiszer

Shaping and development of Polish-German relations
in the years 1989–2005. An assessment attempt 227

Tomasz Paszewski

The credibility of NATO security guarantees from the Polish
perspective 269

Stanisław Koziej

National security strategic tasks of the Republic of Poland at the turn
of the second and third decade of the twenty-first century 292

REVIEWS

Tomasz Kamiński, *Sypiając ze smokiem. Polityka Unii Europejskiej
wobec Chin*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
[*Sleeping with the dragon. The European Union's policy towards
China*], Lodz University Press, Łódź 2015, 194 pp.
(Łukasz Świetnicki) 321

Karol Żakowski, *Decision-making reform in Japan. The DPJ's failed
attempt at a politician-led government*, Routledge,
London and New York 2015, 223 pp. (Mikołaj Kukowski) 326

Notes on the authors 331

SPIS TREŚCI

Od Redakcji 11

ARTYKUŁY I STUDIA

Bartłomiej Biga

Wykorzystywanie instrumentarium współzarządzania publicznego
w polityce ochrony zdrowia w krajach rozwiniętych 17

Elżbieta Roszko-Wójtowicz

Analiza stanu aktualnego wypadków przy pracy
w latach 2002–2014 32

Maciej D. Kryszczuk, Michał Wenzel

Związki zawodowe a wpływ zmian technologicznych
na rynek pracy 59

Adam Rogala-Lewicki

Europejska Wspólnota Wywiadowcza – niezrealizowany filar
Unii Europejskiej 85

Anna M. Solarz

Stolica Apostolska w służbie pojednania 134

Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek

Obszary współpracy Polski i Stolicy Apostolskiej w wymiarze
dyplomacji tradycyjnej i dyplomacji publicznej 156

Șerban Olah, Gabriel Roșeanu

Datki na kościół w Rumunii 176

Daria Orzechowska-Słowikowska

Asymilacja – zużyta teoria? Wyznawcy islamu w Warszawie 190

Marta Stempień

Ekspansja dżihadyzmu w Egipcie po 2011 roku,
na przykładzie działalności Ansar Bajt al-Makdis, Prowincji Synaj
oraz innych struktur 211

Józef M. Fiszer

Kształtowanie się i rozwój stosunków polsko-niemieckich
w latach 1989–2005. Próba bilansu 227

Tomasz Paszewski

Wiarygodność natowskich gwarancji bezpieczeństwa
z perspektywy Polski 269

Stanisław Koziej

Strategiczne zadania bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej na przełomie II i III dekady XXI wieku 292

RECENZJE

Tomasz Kamiński, *Sypiając ze smokiem. Polityka Unii Europejskiej
wobec Chin*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2015,
ss. 194 (Łukasz Świetnicki) 321

Karol Żakowski, *Decision-making reform in Japan. The DPJ's failed
attempt at a politician-led government*, Routledge, London
and New York 2015, ss. 223 (Mikołaj Kukowski) 326

Noty o autorach 331

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

От редакции 11

СТАТЬИ И ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ

Бартломей Бига

Использование инструментов совместного публичного управления
в области здравоохранения в развитых странах 17

Эльжбета Рошко-Войтович

Анализ актуального состояния несчастных случаев на производстве
в 2002–2014 годах 32

Мачей Д. Крыщук, Михал Вэнзэль

Профсоюзы и отражение технологических изменений на рынке
труда 59

Адам Рогалья-Левицки

Европейское разведывательное сообщество – незадействованный
оплот Европейского Союза 85

Анна М. Соляж

Ватикан на службе примирения 134

Агнешка Ожельска-Стончек

Сферы сотрудничества между Польшей и Ватиканом под углом
традиционной и публичной дипломатии 156

Сербан Олях, Габриэль Росеану

Церковные пожертвования в Румынии 176

Дария Ожеховска-Словиковска

Ассимиляция – утилизированная теория? Мусульмане в Варшаве 190

Марта Стэмпень

Экспансия джихадизма в Египте после 2011 года – на примере
деятельности «Ансар Бейт Аль-Макдис», «Провинция Синай»
и других группировок 211

Юзеф М. Фишер

Формирование и развитие польско-немецких отношений
в 1989–2005 годах. Попытка подведения итогов 227

Томаш Пашевски

Надёжность гарантий со стороны НАТО с точки зрения интересов
Польши 269

Станислав Козей

Стратегические задачи национальной безопасности Республики
Польша на рубеже II и III декад XXI века 292

РЕЦЕНЗИИ

Томаш Каминьски, *В постели с драконом. Политика Европейского
Союза в отношении Китая*, Издательство Лодзинского
университета, Лодзь 2015, с. 194 (Лукаш Сьветницки) 321

Кароль Жаковски, *Реформа правления в Японии. Неудачная
попытка ДПЯ образования правительства, управляемого
политиками*. Раутледж, Лондон и Нью-Йорк 2015, с. 223
(Миколай Куковски) 326

Примечания об авторах 331

EDITORIAL

We are handing to our readers the third issue of our academic quarterly in 2016 which is extensive, very interesting and published entirely in English. It contains as many as twelve valuable articles and two reviews. The presented quarterly should be of interest not only to social scientists, historians, economists but also specialists and experts, students, graduate students, teachers and journalists. We especially recommend it to politicians and decision makers whose wisdom, knowledge and decision-making skills largely determine the effectiveness of foreign policy and the role of each country – including Poland – in the international arena. This volume contains a number of original scholarly papers devoted to current economic, financial, social, political and international problems with which the European Union and the whole world is struggling today. There are also several texts devoted to Poland, its internal and foreign policy. This periodical shows how quickly today the situation on the international stage changes and that new social, political, economic and international phenomena and processes occur, which should be analysed by scholars and experts, as well as political elites in real time. We therefore hope that, just like all the previously published volumes of our „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” [‘Economic and Political Thought’] this volume will also be of interest to a wide range of readers at home and abroad, and will be welcomed, given its rich and interesting substantive content. On its pages – just like so far – we are publishing articles and academic studies of major theoretical and practical importance, often being the result of their authors’ several-year research. The presented issue of our quarterly, according to the previous practice and rules adopted by the editorial office, consists of two parts: the first one which is devoted to broadly understood economic issues, and the other pertaining to political issues and the international situation in Europe and in the world.

In the first part we are publishing four articles. It opens with an article entitled ‘The use of governance instruments in health policies of developed

countries' by Bartłomiej Biga, in which the author analyses important and valid issues related to human health and the protection of human life. Every health care system is characterized through the prism of how it fulfils three basic functions: financing, provision of services and regulations. According to the author, these three dimensions show the essential role of the state and the direction of its policy in different models.

The next article in this part entitled 'The analysis of the current state of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2002–2014' by Elżbieta Roszko-Wójtowicz shows the scale, causes and consequences of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2002–2014. The author proved that during this period working conditions in terms of accidents at work were not particularly improved. Work in Poland did not become safer. In the years 2002–2014 the number of accidents at work in general as well as the rates did not change.

Another study in this part is an interesting article by Maciej D. Kryszczuk and Michał Wenzel entitled 'Trade unions and the impact of technological changes on the labour market'. The authors analyse here a few important problems faced by the trade union movement today, and which go beyond the traditional discussion on the role and importance of trade unions in the free market economy.

The next, fourth article in this part in a text by Adam Rogala-Lewicki entitled 'European Intelligence Community – the unfulfilled pillar of the European Union'. The author emphasizes here that Europe needs a common sense of security, a uniform perception of threats, and thus a joint risk assessments. In this regard, the European Union should create new forms (a framework) of intelligence cooperation, something like an intelligence agency, from services of which all its Members would benefit. Unfortunately, as the author stresses, there is still no political will for this solution.

The other part, concerning political science, which consists of as many as eight scholarly texts, opens with a study entitled 'The Holy See's efforts towards reconciliation' by Anna M. Solarz. It is devoted to significant problems, namely to peaceful and conciliatory activities of the Vatican in the international arena. In international relations the Holy See functions using both classical diplomacy and so-called track two diplomacy. Its primary goal is to provide its followers with the possibility to freely practice their worship and to disseminate religious freedom in the world.

The next article by Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek entitled 'Areas of cooperation of Poland and the Holy See in the dimension of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy' corresponds to the above text. The author writes here

that the religious aspect has been absent so far in Polish public diplomacy for many reasons, and stresses that Poland should have excellent relations with the Holy See, at the same time it needs to strengthen its position in the European Union, although the teaching of the Church Catholic is in many areas contrary to the views of influential part of European elites.

Further in this part there is an interesting, synthetic text written by two Romanian scholars Serban Olah and Gabriel Roseau entitled 'Religious giving in Romania'. As the title indicates, the aim of this article is to answer the questions regarding the situation of different churches and religious denominations in Romania. The authors show here the still progressing secularization in Romania, and on the other hand, an increase in religiosity among the citizens of this state.

In the next article in this part by Daria Orzechowska-Słowikowska entitled 'Assimilation – a worn theory? Muslims in Warsaw' the author analyses the process of assimilation of the Muslim community in Poland on the example of the capital city of Warsaw. The author writes, among others, that as a result of the immigration crisis Poland, following Western countries, moves towards fairly restrictive immigration policy, basically opposing the influx of Muslim immigrants.

In turn, Marta Stempień in the article entitled 'Jihadism expansion in Egypt after 2011' writes about the reasons for the growth of activity of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the area of Egypt after the revolution of 25 January 2011. One of the main reasons of the expansion of jihadism in Egypt is – according to the author – frequent change of authorities and the general destabilization of the internal situation in the country after 2011, i.e. after the fall of Hosni Mubarak's regime.

Further in this part of our quarterly there is an extensive text by Józef M. Fiszer entitled 'Shaping and development of Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2005. An assessment attempt'. The main thesis of the article is the observation that in the years 1989–2005 in Polish-German relations had dealt with their difficult normalisation, continuation and at the same time significant changes, not always favourable for Poland, especially in the years 1998–2005. The author stresses here that the years 1989–2005, and especially the years 1998–2005 were a time of great international events in Europe and in the world which had a major impact on foreign policies of both countries and on Polish-German relations.

The last but one article by Tomasz Paszewski entitled 'The credibility of NATO security guarantees from the Polish perspective' shows the importance of NATO for the security of Poland. Referring to the theories of alliances and

deterrence, the author argues that the credibility of the alliance guarantees is always limited and is subject to significant fluctuations over time.

The last text in this part of our quarterly, written by Stanisław Koziej, a former head of the National Security Bureau, entitled ‘National security strategic tasks of the Republic of Poland at the turn of the second and third decade of the twenty-first century’ corresponds to the above text. This article presents the main tasks which Poland should undertake to strengthen its security in the next 5–10 years.

The presented issue of the quarterly – as always – closes with two reviews of the latest, very interesting and valuable scholarly books devoted to the EU policy towards China, and domestic and foreign policy of Japan, especially in the years 2009–2012, that is, in the era of the rule of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

We wish all our readers interesting reading and we encourage everyone to cooperate with our editorial board and Lazarski University, one of the best universities in Poland. And this year’s high school graduates are welcome to study at our university, including in the ‘international relations’ field of study which was awarded the highest rating – **outstanding** by the Polish Accreditation Commission on 16 June 2016. **It is not only a great award for us but also a great honour and a commitment to further academic, educational and organizational efforts.**

Prof. dr hab. Józef M. Fiszer

A R T I C L E S A N D S T U D I E S

Bartłomiej Biga

THE USE OF GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS IN HEALTH POLICIES OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES¹

INTRODUCTION

The health care system is sometimes characterised on the basis of how it fulfils three basic functions: financing, provision of services and regulations. These three dimensions allow you to capture the fundamental role of the state and the direction of its policies in individual models. Studies show, however, that over the last 40 years the models have become similar to one another. As a result, today it is hard to speak of pure – model – solutions because these are in fact hybrids based in varying degrees on individual basic versions².

According to OECD, health systems in the world are subjected to similar pressure but the response to this pressure is varied because in each country public policy makers and stakeholders conduct various debates concerning the organisation and financing. Sometimes they adopt the perspective of deliberation on the amount of expenditure for this purpose (as in the US), the government's role in co-financing of costs (as in Sweden or Canada), or the issue of restrictions in health care (Germany, the Netherlands). It is, however, only a certain cutting of very complex reality. Solving real problems must be preceded by an analysis of institutional issues in the context of the historical trajectory of development.


¹ The text is based on the material developed during the realisation of the project of the National Science Centre 'Application of the interactive governance method in shaping social policy of the state'.

² Rothgang, H. 2010. The converging role of the state in OECD healthcare systems. In Rothgang, H. et al. *The state and healthcare, comparing OECD countries*. London, p. 237.

As the OECD research shows³, citizens living in a centralised health care system or a model of national health systems are more likely to support greater government involvement in health care. Those who live in an insurance system are more sceptical in this respect. It seems that this can be explained by reluctance of societies to experiment in the field of such important public policies. Hence the commitment to the existing model and the consent to deepening it, which is seen as less risky than the introduction of elements of a foreign system. In the literature⁴ it is stressed that health care systems are complex adaptive systems (CAS), which results in their significant unpredictability and resistance to changes introduced by means of classic authoritarian tools.

Figure 1

Interactions in the process of building a quality assurance system in health care



FORMAL STRUCTURE OF HEALTH PROTECTION MANAGEMENT

Source: own study – expansion on the basis of Kodat, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

³ Kikuzawa, S., Olafsdottir, S., Pescosolido, B. 2008. Similar pressures, different context: public attitudes toward government intervention for health care in 21 nations. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, vol. 49, no. 4, December 2008, p. 386.

⁴ Brest, A., Greenhalgh, T., Lewis, S., Saul, J., Carroll, S., Bitz, J. 2012. Large-system transformation in health care: a realist review. *The Milbank Quarterly*, vol. 90, no. 3, September 2012, p. 423.

The area of social policies is very little susceptible to quantification, or even measurement of the quality of services because, for instance, there is no unified method for measuring the results of clinical procedures, or even widely accepted definition of their quality. What is more, universal social and health security is a rule in developed countries. The government must, therefore, on the one hand, enforce cost control and thinking oriented towards economic efficiency. On the other hand, it must take into account a key group – doctors – who passionately defend their professional autonomy. Then there are patients – often represented by their attorneys – who demand maximum space to make decisions about the treatment and often in the areas that require professional competence⁵.

The above diagram illustrates interactions that occur between the main actors in building a health care system ensuring the quality of services, albeit implemented with respect to economic efficiency. In order to obtain satisfactory results, it is therefore necessary to find a balance of power between the three entities mentioned above.

Reforms implemented in the spirit of governance focus primarily on strengthening the position of society which usually has been a too weak partner, in particular in relations with the administration acting in the field of the empire. This convention emphasises, however, also the participation of NGOs in co-management, which in the above diagram fit in the regions of its central point – a little closer to the public or the medical profession depending on the profile. They can primarily play the role of a relay of information, an aggregate of public sentiment, a support system, or an arbitrator in emerging disputes. Their place would be, however, in principle outside the area defined as a formal management structure. Depending on the intensity of the stimuli – the health care system in the given country is more oriented to the needs of the patient or general notions of clinical effectiveness.

At this point we should note that the above diagram shows that formal structures do not cover the entire space of interaction in this field. They leave a lot of space for non-formal interactions which affect the quality of the system to a similar extent. *Ergo*: it is impossible to build an effective health care system only on the basis of formal actions. It is necessary to perceive real interactions in their whole complexity and to use methods of soft law or informal channels of communication and decision-making. This, in turn,

⁵ Kodate, N. 2010. Events, public discourses and responsive government: quality assurance in health care in England, Sweden and Japan. *Journal of Public Policy*, no. 30, p. 264.

fits into the purpose of this article – i.e. into the search for manifestations of solutions using co-management in deciding about public issues in the area of social policies.

METHODOLOGY

This study is a legal analysis taking into account a broad economic context. Thus, an economic analysis of the law is a research perspective which was adopted here. This interdisciplinary convention assumes the treatment of the law just like any other object of research, which economics deals with, while recognizing its whole juridical complexity. The reference of the above assumptions to the thematic scope of the text implies its purpose – i.e. search for such solutions in the creation and application of the law, that will enhance the effectiveness (in terms of Kaldor-Hicks), and more generally contribute to the maximisation of social welfare.

It should be emphasised, however, that the limitation to only such assumptions would be insufficient, because this study concerns the protection of human health and life and a decent existence, which often escape the economic quantification. Hence the need to supplement the discussion with the context of non-economic values, allowing us to take into account the impact of public policies that are analysed here on wider social reality.

The preparation of this text was preceded by conducting comparative research in the field of the law system (normative acts, soft law) in the area of health policy in selected developed countries in terms of the level of implementation of the demands of the concept of governance in a dynamic perspective, taking into account the current direction of changes and projected trends.

The conducted analysis of public policies will focus on those elements that allow for the fullest realisation of interactive management. In order to show the context, the discussed practices will be also assessed from the perspective of implementation of the demands of New Public Management, understood as a modern form of managerial approach to administration. The central place in the analysis, however, will be occupied by the concept of governance (good governing), the essence of which is to make decisions and take actions which are characterised by engaging all stakeholders, the rule of law, transparency, responding to social needs, striving for consensus, taking into account voices of minorities, efficiency, as well as broad responsibility towards society. Eight countries characterised by high socio-economic

development were chosen for the analysis: Australia, France, Japan, Canada, Germany, the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The group chosen in this way allows us to observe differences between various traditions, to indicate characteristic solutions, compare the operation of the most important mechanisms in order to evaluate individual institutions in order to identify good practices. Only on this basis it is possible to correctly propose postulates *de lege ferenda*. Proposing such conclusions will be possible also because the analysis of health care and social systems of the above countries concerns not only the current state, but is made in a dynamic perspective, allowing us to observe the basic directions of reforms.

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED GOOD PRACTICES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Table 1

Overview of good practices in the context of the concept of New Public Management and Governance, own study

Dimension	Governance	NPM	Examples of good practice
Marketisation		+	<p>Australia – a system of incentives for taking out additional health insurance (1)</p> <p>Germany – a wide range of private insurance – alternative, supplementary and complementary (2)</p> <p>USA – a system of incentives for small entrepreneurs to take out health insurance policy for employees (3)</p> <p>United Kingdom – reforms that paved the way to outsourcing of non-core elements of hospital operation (feeding, cleaning) (4)</p>
Empowerment / participation of recipients of public policies	+		<p>Australia – e-health, remote consultations (5)</p> <p>France – the institution of a ‘preferred doctor’ which rewards the best doctors, and is not based only on the mechanical system of premiums per capita (6)</p>

Co-creation of public policies by external entities	+		<p>France – broad inclusion of representatives of all relevant stakeholder groups already in the early stages of work on reforms (7)</p> <p>Canada –inclusion of representatives of the medical community in preparing healthcare system reforms – including the implementation of changes also through formal agreements between public authorities and this professional group (8)</p> <p>Sweden – multidimensional and far-reaching decentralisation leaving Swedish local government units a lot of flexibility, while maintaining effective – albeit non-invasive – national coordination mechanisms (9)</p>
Responsiveness	+	+	<p>France – widely implemented programme of surveys of recipients of public policies, the aggregate results of which are publicly available (10)</p> <p>United Kingdom – Healthwatch, which constitutes a genuine opening to feedback from recipients of public policies and provides a convenient channel to communicate demands (11)</p>
Conducting public policies based on evidence	+	+	<p>Japan – Japanese Council of Health Care Quality and use of independent entities for broadly delineated evaluation of health care services and granting of certificates to distinctive entities on the basis of methodology developed by independent scientific communities (12)</p> <p>Canada – the project Knowledge to Action for System Transformation (KAST) providing fast and systematic information about the effects of healthcare system reforms (13)</p> <p>Germany – the quality management system implemented at the providers of public services, covering, among others, professional training of doctors, improving procedures, or the obligation to publish the results of 182 indicators defined at the federal level (14)</p> <p>Sweden – entities providing guidelines based on scientific evidence which share the responsibility for the realisation of public policies (15)</p>

/1/ According to the **Australian** government the private sector providing and funding medical services is a very important element of the health care system. Therefore, the government subsidises 30% of private health insurance to people who want to buy such insurance. Moreover, a number of other

incentives for people using private health care have been implemented. The majority of issues relating to private health insurance are regulated by the law on private health insurance of 2007. When the number of private insurance began to decrease local authorities introduced far-reaching financial incentives under the banner of lifetime health care which were particularly beneficial for person choosing private health protection at a young age – at the beginning of their career. It effectively restored the attractiveness of private insurance policies.

/2/ In connection with numerous **German** healthcare system reforms, which, among others, have introduced a wider range of patients' co-payment, a significant increase in the number of people opting for alternative insurance, or private insurance can be observed. The private insurance sector also includes supplementary insurance, under which the insured persons are guaranteed the right to choose a doctor and a higher standard of accommodation during hospitalisation (single or twin rooms). The third private insurance sector consists of complementary policies, in which the scope of protection covers surcharges to the services offered by the public sector. The rapid development of this sector began in 1996 when prosthetic treatment was excluded from the scope of services (re-added to the medical service basket in 1999) and surcharges for other areas of dental treatment were significantly increased⁶.

/3/ According to the assumptions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) adopted in the US, the law is designed to encourage employers to insure their employees. According to the reform entities that employ 50 people or more mandatorily have to insure their full-time employees, or they will be fined. This provision caused a lot of excitement and discussion among low-paid workers in the United States. They feared that employers in order to avoid paying health insurance could reduce their working time. Small enterprises employing less than 50 people, according to the law, are not required to provide health insurance for employees. However, the law provides substantial tax relief for employers in this respect. Since 2010, in the United States we can talk about the real sharing of responsibility for health care between the government, employers and individual entities. The aim is to provide all Americans with access to 'affordable and high-quality' health insurance. This system, however, is fragmented. There are still significant problems, for example, related to the issue of its universality.

⁶ Kruszewska, X. 2009. Niemcy – systemy opieki zdrowotnej na świecie. [Germany – health care systems in the world.] *Świat Lekarza*, no. 5.

/4/ Undoubtedly, the creation of space for the existence of business mechanisms on the **British** grounds were Griffiths' reforms, which outsourced some services from hospitals – initially cleaning and feeding, but it has led to significant functional privatisation.

/5/ **Australia** is one of the pioneers in the use of electronics in health assistance. E-health tools are mainly accessories recording medical parameters of the patient cooperating with the patient's smart phone. The data obtained in this way are much richer – measurements can be carried out very often – and they enable doctors quick and remote access. What is more, in cases of emergency the system can quickly and independently call for help. Australia is also a country in which the use of consultation using video conferencing was particularly needed as many people in fact live in rural areas far away from larger centres.

/6/ In 2004, a new approach to the management of public insurer liability was presented in **France** – mainly in the context of the financial condition of the health care system. Also the basket of medical services was defined, a framework for the amount of paid services was introduced and a space for collective negotiations with providers of health services was created. Moreover, a model of a 'preferred doctor' was introduced. A system of financial incentives was provided for physicians indicated by a greater number of patients, while limiting the simple principle of payment per capita. However, these reforms have failed to improve the efficiency of the system by reducing the number of unnecessary visits to specialists⁷.

/7/ The **French** Ministry of Social Affairs, Health and Women's Rights, which is responsible for the coordination of the local health care strategy, precedes the majority of its planning and regulatory activities with wide negotiations to which service providers, insurers, representatives of employees are invited. As a rule, a consensus worked out in such a group becomes the subject of legislation passed by the parliament. And although over the last two decades we have seen a rather expansive state policy in this area, its main purpose is to control the balance of revenues and expenses associated with health care⁸.

/8/ The **Canadian** primary health care reforms seem to be of particular interest. They were held on the basis of the deeply rooted tradition of autonomy and self-governance of the medical community, as well as strong

⁷ Naiditch, M., Dourgnon, P. 2009. *The preferred doctor scheme: a political reading of a French experiment of gate-keeping*. Working paper. March 2009, p. 11.

⁸ Mossialos, E., Wenzl, M., Osborn, R., Anderson, C. eds. 2015. *International profiles of health care systems 2014*. London, p. 53.

powers conferred to the authorities of each province. Hence, the fact that in principle all entities got involved in the reform process on a voluntary basis must be considered a major success. Key innovations in public policies were often built into a formal agreement between medical associations and the government or the minister of health. The scope of the activities covered therefore systems with various methods of payment, remuneration of doctors and functioning on the basis of non-uniform organisational models⁹.

/9/ The **Swedish** Law of 1982 on health and medical services specifies that the responsibility for providing adequate care to everyone who lives in this country is assigned to regional and municipal level authorities. This act also gives a relatively high degree of freedom to local government units in how to realise this task. This corresponds to the firmly established tradition of extensive local and regional government in this country. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs is responsible only in general terms for health policy. It is also worth mentioning that in this area a supportive role is played by eight government agencies involved in specific aspects of public policies related to health and social care. Most reforms in Sweden, however, have a regional or local character, and are implemented by local authorities. It is a natural implication of far-reaching decentralisation. The majority of reforms focus on improving primary health care and on better coordination of benefits for seniors¹⁰.

/10/ One of the most visible manifestations of the implementation of the model of public co-management in the field of health and social policy in **France** are programmes of nationwide surveys of patients conducted since 1998. They are organised twice a year and pertain to public perception of the availability and assessment of the quality of services. The aggregated results are public. The French model creates a large space to make choices by individual actors. Patients have considerable freedom in the choice of doctors and – within the limits of rationality – methods of treatment. Also, doctors and other staff can move freely between jobs, which opens the way for the flow of human resources on the basis of market mechanisms.

/11/ The **English** reform of 2012 played an important role from the point of view of principles of public co-management. It established the authority called HealthWatch England, whose task is to take care of patients' interests. This is done through local representatives who collect complaints on services and prepare reports submitted to the headquarters. As a result, it is possible

⁹ Hutchison, B., Strumpf, E., Coyle, N. 2011. Primary health care in Canada: systems in motion. *The Milbank Quarterly*, vol. 89, no. 2 (June 2011), pp. 262–263.

¹⁰ Anell A., Glenngard, A., Merkur, S. 2012. Sweden. Health system review. *Health Systems in Transition*, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. XIX–XX.

to initiate control measures and legislative changes. It is therefore a genuine opening to feedback from recipients of public policies and the creation of a suitable channel for the transfer of demands, and thus in effect also – indirectly – the inclusion in decision-making processes. From the perspective of the model approach, there is, however, the lack of the division of responsibilities, which does not let us regard this reform as complete.

/12/ In **Japan**, the Health Care Quality Council was established in 1995 and has functioned since then. The idea of the use of evaluations made by third parties was born there as a result of good experience with the activities of the group of volunteers – scientists who evaluated the quality of care in individual hospitals. They did it in over 100 categories, in order to grant the final evaluation in a five-point scale. In some environments the venture was accompanied by scepticism arising from contesting the methodology, or only partial availability of the results because this group published only the list of the best hospitals – to which they granted accreditation. The lack of experience in making peer reviews, typical for the Japanese medical community, also caused difficulties¹¹.

/13/ The realisation of the concept of co-management in the conduct of public policies undoubtedly requires properly organised knowledge resources. Hence, a very interesting **Canadian** project Knowledge to Action for System Transformation (KAST), which was to provide quick and systematic information about the effects of the reform of the Canadian health care system on the example of Saskatchewan province. The aim was to investigate four strategic initiatives: health care oriented towards an individual patient and family, the improvement of primary health care, the reduction of health administration and shorter waiting times for surgery. Four operational objectives were set up in this project:

1. The identification of the scope of successes and failures of the large system transformation (LST) in the context of the role of provincial authorities with regard to the implementation of national policies.
2. Deeper understanding of the mechanisms which determine the success of the reforms and their relation to different contexts.
3. The identification of barriers and challenges which should be solved by the government.
4. The determination of the possibility of monitoring and evaluation of processes and the effect of large systemic transformations¹².

¹¹ Kodate, N. *op. cit.*, pp. 279–280.

¹² Cf. Brest, A., et al., *op. cit.*

/14/ In **German** health care policy, quality in structural terms is guaranteed as a result of the requirement that each service provider has implemented a quality management system. In this framework, among other things, professional training of doctors, and improvement of procedures take place. Each new method must be thoroughly verified and approved in the formal procedure. Each hospital is obliged to publish the results of 182 indicators defined at the federal level, which is intended to make it easier for patients to compare these institutions¹³.

/15/ In **Sweden**, there are both public and private service providers in the field of health protection. Public funding is, however, the rule. The law of that country constitutes an obligation to apply the latest scientific knowledge, and formally accepted standards of conduct by medical personnel. National Board of Health and Welfare provides in this area evidence-based guidelines. It shares responsibility with other entities, in particular the Swedish Council on Technology Assessment in Health Care. This is undoubtedly an interesting manifestation of cooperation of entities which are not non hierarchically subordinated¹⁴. It is a model use of co-determination and co-sharing of responsibility.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A key aspect of reforms of the social and health security system is to seek a balance of power among stakeholder groups because if one wants to include into co-management entities standing outside the administrative structures, one is naturally exposed to excessive susceptibility to certain well-organised pressure groups. It is also easy to lead to a situation where the active minority will prejudge the fate of the silent majority. Naturally it is not possible to realise full egalitarianism and some stakeholders must be treated as a priority. The pathology begins where they have a dominant role and use it for serious undermining of the public interest.

It seems that in the area of health care efficient co-management can be introduced only where advocates of patients and their associations are well organised and if the government has already built some positive experience in cooperating with them. Associations representing the medical profession are in fact relatively strong in all the analyzed countries and without coun-

¹³ Mossialos, E. red. et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 68–69.

¹⁴ Anell, A., et al., *op. cit.*, p. XVI.

terweight in the form of lobbying of patients' representatives there is a significant risk of distorting the system.

We can put forward the thesis that reforms introducing privatisation of certain areas or outsourcing of services traditionally performed by the state in the area of health care may find fertile ground after breaking the mental resistance connected with risks of too far-reaching commercialisation moving the dignity of the human person out of sight. It is evidenced by the growing number of additional insurance, or deciding on treatment in private, commercially operating facilities. Thus, this type of reform would use the already occurring processes to build a coherent and effective model, in which public and private components are conducive to the maximisation of social welfare.

Demographic reasons are undoubtedly an aspect which increases negative effects of the existing dysfunctions of public policies in the social area. The process of aging of societies – typical of developed countries – highlights the need to reach for the most effective tools because even the richest countries are not able to increase the financing of this sector at such a rapid pace.

There is no denying that the implementation of reforms, an essential component of which are cuts in the availability and funding of services is very difficult. What is more, if we bring the theory of public choice to the fore, such changes are impossible to carry out in democratic systems. For example, it is difficult to expect that any Polish government in the next few years would decide to implement even small co-financing of certain benefits, although most commentators believe it is a much needed procedure for the Polish system. Due to the enormous social reluctance and the fact that a large part of citizens treat this area of public policy as a priority, you cannot expect to see such reforms unless politicians, in fact, are deprived of any other choice.

It seems, therefore, that skilfully introduced reforms based on the principles of New Public Management and governance are a reasonable alternative here because they make it possible to increase the efficiency of the system also by using other tools than just limiting the availability and lowering the quality of services. Some of these best practices have the character of general recommendations, the aim of which is to outline the general direction of changes. Most, however, are *de lege ferenda* postulates that after taking into account local contexts could be implemented to legal systems of other countries. Their general tone seems to affirm the methods of interactive public management and inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in the decision-making process, which should, however, be carried out with simultaneous sharing of responsibility because health policy, which is one of the areas so

crucial to the community, cannot be effectively managed in a centralised, bureaucratic and authoritative way.

Finally, the implementation of proposals of governance is an opportunity to build effective policies in the social area. As the experiences of the countries analysed in this text show, this approach favours the creation of a system giving society high satisfaction with rendered services without the destruction of public finances. Naturally, this is not a sufficient condition as there are examples of countries which despite the relatively high level of use of the concept of governance have a system of social and health care distant from efficiency and high quality. The question whether the implementation of these principles is a necessary prerequisite remains open.

The question of the possibility of establishing a system of public policies in the social area without the use of the concept of governance, however, remains outside the scope of this study. The analyses carried out in this report, however, entitle us to articulate the conclusion that reforms using interactive management solutions are conducive to the efficiency of health care systems in developed countries and are, therefore, worth a recommendation for other countries.

REFERENCES

- Anell, A., Glenngard, A., Merkur, S. 2012. Sweden. Health system review. *Health Systems in Transition*, vol. 14, no. 5.
- Brest, A., Greenhalgh, T., Lewis, S., Saul, J., Carroll, S., Bitz, J. 2012. Large-system transformation in health care: a realist review. *The Milbank Quarterly*, vol. 90, no. 3, September 2012.
- Hutchison, B., Strumpf, E., Coyle, N. 2011. Primary health care in Canada: systems in motion. *The Milbank Quarterly*, vol. 89, no. 2, June 2011.
- Kodate, N. 2010. Events, public discourses and responsive government: quality assurance in health care in England, Sweden and Japan. *Journal of Public Policy*, no. 30.
- Kruszewska, X. 2009. Niemcy – systemy opieki zdrowotnej na świecie. [Germany – health care systems in the world.] *Świat Lekarza*, no. 5.
- Mossialos, E., Wenzl, M., Osborn, R., Anderson, C. eds. 2015. *International profiles of health care systems 2014*. London.
- Naiditch, M., Dourgnon, P. 2009. *The preferred doctor scheme: a political reading of a French experiment of gate-keeping*. Working paper. March 2009.

Rothgang, H. 2010. The converging role of the state in OECD healthcare systems. In Rothgang, H. et al. *The state and healthcare, comparing OECD countries*. London.

THE USE OF GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS IN HEALTH POLICIES OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Summary

This text is an analysis of selected aspects of public policies in the field of health care in developed countries. They are tested for implementation of the Governance concept. The aim of the study is to show the results of this analysis as a catalogue of good practices, which can provide recommendations for other countries, because implementation of governance is an opportunity to create effective policies in the social area.

WYKORZYSTYWANIE INSTRUMENTARIUM WSPÓŁZARZĄDZANIA PUBLICZNEGO W POLITYCE OCHRONY ZDROWIA W KRAJACH ROZWINIĘTYCH

Streszczenie

Niniejszy tekst jest analizą wybranych aspektów polityk publicznych w obszarze ochrony zdrowia w krajach rozwiniętych. Są one badane pod kątem realizacji postulatów koncepcji *Governance*. Celem opracowania jest także ukazanie wyników ww. analizy w formie katalogu dobrych praktyk, które mogą stanowić rekomendacje dla innych państw. Realizacja postulatów *Governance* jest bowiem szansą na zbudowanie efektywnych polityk w obszarze społecznym. Jak pokazują doświadczenia państw analizowanych w niniejszym tekście, takie podejście sprzyja kreowaniu systemu dającego społeczeństwu wysoką satysfakcję ze świadczonych usług bez destrukcji finansów publicznych.

ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ ИНСТРУМЕНТОВ СОВМЕСТНОГО ПУБЛИЧНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ В ОБЛАСТИ ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ В РАЗВИТЫХ СТРАНАХ

Резюме

Предлагаемый текст содержит анализ некоторых аспектов государственной политики в области здравоохранения в развитых государствах. Они рассматриваются с точки зрения постулатов Governance (управления). Целью исследования является также представление результатов вышеупомянутого анализа в форме каталога передовой практики, которая может быть использована в качестве рекомендации для других государств. Реализация постулатов Governance представляет собой, в связи с этим, шанс для создания эффективной политики в социальной сфере. Как показывает опыт государств, анализируемых в данном тексте, такой подход благоприятствует формированию системы, обеспечивающей обществу высокую степень удовлетворённости оказываемыми услугами без разрушительных последствий для государственных финансов.

**THE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE
OF ACCIDENTS AT WORK IN POLAND
IN THE YEARS 2002–2014**

INTRODUCTION

According to the Central Statistical Office in 2014 the number of people injured in accidents at work increased by 0.4% compared to the previous year. On the form of the statistical card of an accident at work (Z-KW) 8,8642 accident events were reported, the dominant part of which were accidents with marginal effect. In 2014 they happened to 87,860 people, which means an increase of 0.5% compared to 2013. 520 people suffered serious accidents, that is 3.3% less than in 2013. In addition, 262 people died as a result of an accident at work, here we observe a decrease by 5.4% compared to the previous year. In 2014, accidents at work most often led to injuries of the upper limbs, lower limbs and the head. The largest number of accidents occurred in manufacturing (28,620 cases), wholesale and retail trade (11,970 cases), health care and social assistance (10,003 cases). In such a reality it is interesting to find an answer to the question whether work is safer for Poles today than in 2002, that is before Polish accession to the EU structures. What are the trends of individual indicators measuring accidents at work in Poland in the years 2002–2014? The subsequent pages of the article provide more detailed data on the changes which took place in relation to accidents at work in Poland in the period 2002–2014.

The main objective of the article is therefore to analyse the situation of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2002–2014. Its implementation consists of two specific objectives:

1. The analysis of the level, structure and changes of accidents at work over time in Poland.

2. The assessment of the causes and consequences of accidents at work in Poland in the analysed period of time.

The primary source of empirical data were statistical data of the Central Statistical Office (CSO), the results of research conducted by the Social Insurance Institution (SII) and reports and materials prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP) and Central Institute for Labour Protection – National Research Institute (CILP – NRI).

1. THE REGISTRATION OF ACCIDENTS AT WORK


1.1. The guidelines at the European Union level

Monitoring of the effectiveness of regulations on health and safety introduced and binding in the individual Member States compels companies to store the data on accidents at work resulting in sickness absence over three days. Nevertheless, the comparison of data from different countries is still not very effective mainly due to differences in the information that is recorded in the individual countries in respect to accidents at work. The Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) and the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs jointly coordinate the work on the European Statistics on Accidents at Work project (ESAW). The main objective of the project is to harmonise the rules of registration of accidents at work and the collection and storage of data on them at the level of EU Member States. The task of the Statistical Office of the European Union is the collection, compilation and dissemination of data on the most vulnerable employment groups, and the causes and costs of accidents at work. According to the definition adopted by Eurostat, an accident at work is a discrete occurrence in the course of work which leads to physical or mental harm. Performed work means engagement in an occupational activity or during the time spent at work¹. However, only those events that result in more than three calendar days' absence from work are registered. According to Eurostat a fatal accident is an accident which leads to the death of the victim within one year of the accident.

¹ European Union. 2013. *European Statistics on Accidents at Work (ESAW). Summary methodology*. Eurostat. Methodologies and Working Papers. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 5.

The circumstances and the course of the accident are described using a statistical model of an accident at work, developed by the European Statistical Office, Eurostat, as part of the European Statistics on Accidents at Work project (ESAW)². This model defines the overall scope of information that must be collected on accidents at work (Fig. 1).

Figure 1



Source: own study on the basis of Koradecka, D. ed. 2010. *Handbook of Occupational Safety and Health*. CRC Press, p. 439.

A statistical model of an accident at work proposed by Eurostat consists of the following phases:

- The pre-accident phase
- The accident phase
- The post-accident phase.

The pre-accident phase is connected with the working environment, that is the place in which the worker was before the accident. Performed work means specific task(s) realised by the worker, it corresponds to a specific physical activity and associated material agent of the physical activity. The last event which leads to the accident is a deviation, or a situation (circum-

² Hoła, B., Szóstak, B. 2014. Model of accident situation development in the construction industry. *Czasopismo Techniczne – Budownictwo*, 1-B/2014, p. 242. Available at: https://suw.biblos.pk.edu.pl/resources/i4/i4/i6/i3/i8/r44638/HolaB_ModelAccident.pdf [Accessed: 15 August 2015].

stance) incompatible with the terms accepted as the norm. A material agent is associated with the deviation.

At this moment the accident phase begins. What must be recorded in the way in which the worker came into contact with the material agent which caused the injury. At the same time it may be, but not necessarily, the same agent as the agents related to the physical activity or the deviation. In the last, post-accident phase information is collected about the type of injury, the body part injuries and lost days. The practical application of the model required from Eurostat also the preparation of a coding system with instructions.

1.2. The guidelines at the national level

The definitions adopted in the Polish legislation are consistent with those developed by the European Statistical Office. Art. 3 of the Act of 30 October 2002 on social insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases (Journal of Laws No. 199, item 1673, as amended) says that **an accident at work** is a sudden event caused by an external reason causing worker's injury or death. The accident suffered by the employee during a business trip, while training in universal self-defence, while performing tasks commissioned by trade union organisations operating at the employer's have **the same status as an accident at work**. In addition, accidents at work are also sudden events causing injury or death which occurred in the period of the accident insurance during: (1) practicing sports by a person receiving a sports scholarship; (2) performing paid work during imprisonment or detention; (3) holding the mandate of an MP (in the country or in the European Parliament) or a senator receiving the salary; (4) completing a training or internship connected with the collection of a scholarship by a graduate; performing of work for cooperatives by members of agricultural production cooperatives and other persons treated equally to members of the cooperative; (5) performance or cooperation in the performance of work under an agency contract, a special purpose contract or a contract for the provision of services; (6) performance of ordinary activities connected with conducting or cooperation in the conduct of non-agricultural activities; (7) performance of religious activities or activities connected with entrusted pastoral or monastic functions by a clergyman; (8) performance of substitute military service; (9) education at the National School of Public Administration by students who receive a scholarship.

It should be emphasised that despite the adjustment of the Polish systems to the European methodology, we can see some discrepancies. According to

the Polish legislation, a fatal accident at work is an accident which resulted in the death of the victim on site or within 6 months from the time of the accident.³ Eurostat, on the other hand, defining an accident at work accepted that the death of the injured person may take place within 12 months after the event⁴. It should be also remembered that the framework directive on health and safety in the workplace⁵ (Directive 89/391/EEC), though significantly influenced the improvement of safety and health protection level in the workplace⁶, also imposed on the employer the obligation to record these accidents which result in absence of the injured at work exceeding three days. According to the methodology adopted by the Central Statistical Office all accident events, therefore also these which do not lead to the victim's incapacity for work (e.g. due to the refusal to accept sick leave) are covered by the survey and thus are taken into account in statistical reports⁷. That is why, in 2012, the CSO recorded 90,650⁸ accident events (without fatal ones) in Poland, whereas the Eurostat statistics say that there were 67,432⁹ accidents at work in Poland.

In Poland, the legal basis for conducting research in the field of accidents at work is the Council of Ministers Regulation on the programme of statistical surveys of public statistics adopted for a specific calendar year.¹⁰ In accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy

³ CSO. 2014. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2013 r., Informacje i Opracowania Statystyczne*. [Accidents at work in 2013, Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa, p. 11.

⁴ European Union. 2013. *European Statistics on Accidents at Work (ESAW). Summary methodology*. Eurostat. Methodologies and Working Papers, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, p. 6.

⁵ Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, (Official Journal of the European Union L183 of 29 June 1989).

⁶ European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. Available at: <https://osha.europa.eu/pl/legislation/directives/the-osh-framework-directive/the-osh-framework-directive-introduction>

⁷ CSO. 2014. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2013 r., Informacje i Opracowania Statystyczne*. [Accidents at work in 2013, Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa, p. 8.

⁸ CSO. 2013. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2012 r., Monitoring Rynku Pracy*. [Accidents at work in 2012, Monitoring of the Labour Market.] Warszawa, p. 3. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PW_wypadki_przy_pracy_2012.pdf

⁹ Eurostat. *Accidents at work by sex and age*. (NACE Rev. 2, A, C-N), [hsw_mi01] Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=hsw_mi01&lang=en

¹⁰ Legal basis: year 2013 – the Council of Ministers Regulation of 9 November 2012 on the programme of statistical surveys of public statistics for 2013 (Journal of Laws of 2012, item 1391); year 2014 – the Council of Ministers Regulation of 9 November 2013

of 7 January 2009 on the statistical card of an accident at work (Journal of Laws of 29 January 2009), the identification and recording of accidents at work in Poland is the responsibility of the Central Statistical Office (CSO)¹¹. The source of data on accidents at work is a statistical card of an accident at work. The form Z-KW – statistical card of an accident at work – allows the registration of all accident events¹² that take place in connection with work, except for individual farms. The regulation¹³ specifies that the statistical card of an accident at work is filled in on the basis of the previously approved protocol in which the circumstances and causes of the accidents at work were determined (the accident protocol) or possibly on the basis of an accident card (it must be established that the occurred event is an accident at work or an accident treated equally to an accident at work).

The scope of the accident at work card, adapted since the 2005 to the European Methodology of Accidents Statistics at Work ESAW, takes into account international classifications, among others, in terms of¹⁴:

- Events causing the injury;
- Events which are a deviation from normality;
- Causes of accidents;
- Operations performed by the injured at the time of the accident;
- Material agents associated with the event.

The statistical card of an accident at work¹⁵ is a very valuable source of information about accident events in the workplace, allows to conduct

on the programme of statistical surveys of public statistics for 2014 (Journal of Laws of 2013 item 1159).

¹¹ Social Insurance Institution. *Analiza przyczyn i skutków wypadków przy pracy w latach 2008–2011*. [The analysis of causes and consequences of accidents at work in 2008–2011.] Resource – Pracownia Badań i Doradztwa. Available at: http://www.zus.pl/files/dpir/Wypadki_przy_pracy_analiza.pdf, p. 13. [Accessed: 10 August 2015].

¹² The statistical card of an accident at work is used to obtain information about an accident at work and the case treated equally to an accident at work, regardless of whether the victim's incapacity for work is specified in the card (e.g. the victim has the right to refuse to accept sick leave).

¹³ The Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 7 January 2009 on the statistical card of an accident at work (Journal of Laws of 29 January 2009).

¹⁴ CSO. 2014. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2013 r., Informacje i Opracowania Statystyczne*. [Accidents at work in 2013 r. Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa, p. 13.

¹⁵ The Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 8 November 2010 (Journal of Laws No. 218, item 1440 and No. 240, item 1612), Attachment 1 to the Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 8 November 2010 (Journal of Laws No. 218, item 1440 and No. 240, item 1612) – Z-KW form. Available at: <http://form.stat.gov.pl/formularze/2014/passive/Z-KW.pdf>

comprehensive analyses which are important from the point of view of taking preventive measures, both at the micro and macro levels. The Z-KW form consists of Part I and Part II (supplementary). The first one concerns the employer, the victim, and the consequences of the accident known at the moment of filling the card. In the section on the entity in which the event occurred, the following should be entered: the number of people working in it; the town (municipality) in which the entity is located; activity by the Polish Classification of Economic Activity; the form of ownership). The following information is submitted about the victim: gender, year of birth, citizenship, employment status, occupation, tenure in the workplace (in years); hours worked from starting work until the accident. The effects of the accident include the type and location of the injury; the number of people affected; consequences of the accident.

In Part II the information on the actual effects of the occurred accident are provided – the following information is taken into account here: (1) the number of days of incapacity for work; (2) loss of working time of other people (in man-hours); (3) estimated tangible losses caused by the accident – in thousands PLN, (without losses associated with the loss of working time); (4) the geographical location of the accident site; (5) the accident date: year, month, day; (6) the accident hour (0–23); (7) the place of the accident occurrence; (8) the working process; (9) the kind of accident place; (10) the activity performed by the injured at the time of the accident; (11) the material agent associated with the activity performed by the injured at the time of the accident; (12) the event which is a deviation from the normal state; (13) the material agent associated with the deviation; (14) the event causing the injury; (15) the material agent which is the source of the injury; (16) the causes of the accident; (17) the effects of the accident (known at the time of filling of Part II of the card); (18) the number of days of incapacity for work (known at the time of filling of Part II of the card).

The last part devoted to the mode of the accident is the most extensive. An integral part of the accident card are explanations, classifications and codes needed for its proper filling. They ensure the necessary standardisation of information that the employer submits on the statistical card of an accident at work. The codified system of filling the card enables the subsequent aggregation and comparability of the data collected on accidents occurring in the workplace.

The analyses of the national public statistics provide important information on accidents at work, the most important of them were included in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Basic statistical data on accidents at work

Risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risks connected with mechanical factors • Risks connected with arduousness of work • Risks connected with working environment • Persons employed in hazardous conditions
Victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Victims of accidents at work – rates • Victims of accidents at work in total and according to ownership sector, gender, accident results and activities of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity • Victims of accidents at work on individual farms in agriculture according to events causing accidents and accident results
Causes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Causes of accidents at work according to activities of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity • Events which are a deviation from the normal state, causing accidents at work according to activities of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity • Events causing accidents at work according to type, place and activities of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity • Events causing injuries according to activities of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity
Occupational diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identified occupational diseases

Source: own study on the basis of the European Parliament, Committee on Budgets. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 577/98 on the organisation of a labour force sample survey in the Community, (COM(2013)0155 – C7-0086/2013 – 2013/0084(COD)). Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&reference=PE-513.063&format=PDF&language=PL&secondRef=01>


2. ACCIDENTS AT WORK IN POLAND – QUANTIFICATION

Statistical data show that both the number and the incidence rate of accidents at work over the last 13 years have remained substantially unchanged. In 2002, nearly 80,500 accidents at work were registered (Figure 3), whereas in 2014, this number increased to 88,600, thus there was an increase of more than 10%. The biggest number of accidents was recorded in 2008 – exactly there were 104,402 events, and the smallest number in 2002 – 80,492 events. On average, the number of accidents at work in total in the analysed period increased year on year by 0.8%. In comparison to the base year in each subsequent examined period the number of accidents at work in total grew, the largest increase was in 2008 by nearly 30%. Similar trends are observed in relation to lighter accidents at work. The average annual growth rate amounted here to 0.9%. The number of lighter accidents at work increased in 2014 by 8,914 compared to 2002, an increase of 11.3%. In 2014, 87,860 lighter accidents at work were recorded. It is worth stressing that the proportion of lighter accidents in the total number of accidents at work in the analyzed period remained at a similar level with a delicate upward trend, it amounted

an average of to 98.6%, and in the last two years of the analysis this share exceeded 99%.

Figure 3

The number of accidents at work in total and lighter accidents in Poland in the years 2002–2014




Source: stat.gov.pl. Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.528939344920218# [Accessed: 11 September 2014]; CSO. 2014. *Accidents at work in 2014. Monitoring of the Labour Market*. Warszawa, 17 March 2015; CSO. *Accidents at work in 2013. Statistical Information and Summaries*. Warszawa.

In Poland in the years 2002–2014, both the number of fatalities and serious accidents at work gradually decreased, the average decline in both cases was 5.5%. The highest value of serious accidents was recorded in 2004 (1,040 cases) and of fatal accidents in 2008 (520 cases). We can observe a clear downward trend in serious accidents from 2006 to 2010 inclusive. In 2011, a nearly 10% increase in this type of accident was registered (Fig. 3), followed by a return of the downward trend. The number of fatal accidents in the past 13 years underwent slight changes. In 2014, compared to 2013, the number of fatal accidents decreased, totally 262 cases with fatal consequences were registered – the number of fatalities due to accidents at work was thus the lowest in the analyzed period of time.

Figure 4

The number of serious and fatal accidents in Poland in the years 2002–2014



Source: stat.gov.pl. Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.528939344920218# [Accessed: 11 September 2014]; CSO. 2014. *Accidents at work in 2014. Monitoring of the Labour Market*. Warszawa, 17 March 2015; CSO. *Accidents at work in 2013. Statistical Information and Summaries*. Warszawa.

The indicator ‘victims in total per 1,000 employees’ informs us about the number of people injured in light, serious and fatal accidents together (in total) per 1,000 employees (in the case of fatal accidents per 100 thousand employees). These figures do not include the injured in accidents while working on private farms in agriculture.

The rate of accidents at work (per 1,000 employees), as well as the number of accidents over the last 13 years changed only marginally, showing no clear increasing or decreasing trend (Fig. 4). In 2002, it amounted to 7.6, and 13 years later it dropped slightly to 7.53. The highest values of the index of accidents at work, close to 9, were recorded in the years 2006–2008. From 2011 to the present day a decreasing trend can be outlined. In 2014, on average 7.5 persons per 1,000 workers were injured in an accident at work.

Analysing the accident rate in territorial terms we observe clear differences between provinces. In 2014 the highest accident rate was recorded in Dolnośląskie (9.91), Wielkopolskie (9.53) and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (9.44) provinces and the lowest in Mazowieckie (5.39) and Małopolskie provinces (5.86).

We observe equally large variation in the rate of accidents in various sectors of the economy. The highest incidence of accidents pertains to *water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities* – 14.37 (in 2013 – 15.06; in 2012 – 14.87), *mining and excavation* – 13.56 (in 2013 – 13.97; in 2012 – 15.37), *health care and social assistance* – 12.48 (in 2013 – 11.26; in 2012 – 9.83), *industrial processing* – 11.70 (in 2013 – 11.64; in 2012 – 12.47). In other sectors the accident rate does not exceed 10. We deal with the lowest incidence of accidents in the following sections: *other service activities* – 1.50 (in 2013 – 2.13), *information and communication* – 1.96 (in 2013 – 2.15), *professional, scientific and technical activity* – 2.03 (in 2013 – 2.03).

Figure 5

The rate of accidents in Poland in the years 2002–2014 (per 1 thousand of workers)




Source: stat.gov.pl. Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.7254228880628943# [Accessed: 14 September 2014].

The index of fatal accidents at work improved significantly in the period 2005–2014. In 2005, nearly 4.5 employees per 100,000 workers had a fatal accident at work, while in 2014 only 2.2 people, thus the index value decreased by half (Fig. 5). From 2010 to the present time there is a decreasing trend.

Figure 6

The rate of serious and fatal accidents at work in Poland in the years 2004–2014 (per 100 thousand of employees)




Source: stat.gov.pl. Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.7254228880628943# [Accessed: 14 September 2014].; Central Institute for Labour Protection – National Research Institute. *Accidents at work. Statistics of accidents at work.* Available at: http://www.ciop.pl/CIOP-PortalWAR/appmanager/ciop/pl?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=P1401037871334841682883&html_tresc_root_id=11288&html_tresc_id=11288&html_klucz=10972; CSO. 2015. *Accidents at work in 2014. Monitoring of the Labour Market*, 17 March 2015; CSO. *Accidents at work in 2013. Statistical Information and Summaries.* Warszawa 2014, p. 1; CSO. *Accidents at work in 2013., Statistical Information and Summaries.* Warszawa 2014, p. 23.

Traditionally, men are the group in which the number of accidents at work takes higher values (Fig. 5). The number of accidents at work among working women is more than twice lower than in the population of working men. However, it should be stressed that since 2007 the share of women in the total number of people injured in accidents at work has increased. In 2014 this share amounted to 36.9 and in the previous year to 36.4% (33.4% in 2012). During the whole period the share of women in the total number of persons injured in occupational accidents increased by nearly 35% (comparing the data from 2014 with the data from 2002).

Figure 7

The number of accidents at work by gender in the years 2002–2014



Source: stat.gov.pl. Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.9829383126925677# [Accessed: 17 September 2014].

According to the model of an accident at work developed by Eurostat, every accident at work should be assessed from the point of view of the effects that occur in its wake. The type and location of the injury the victim suffered, incapacity for work, loss of material agents and lost days of work of other people are assessed. Thus, the victim's incapacity for work is one of the consequences of an accident at work. In 2014, 88,642 accidents at work were reported, they led to a total of 3,072,785 days of the victims' incapacity. Therefore, an average of 34.8 days of sickness absence fell on one victim. In the analysed period 2002–2014 it is one of the lowest index values, a lower one was recorded only in 2002. The years 2008–2013 were characterised by the greatest absenteeism due to accidents at work, with the record-breaking high incapacity for work in 2009 amounting to 42.4 days per victim. The average inability to work due to occupational accidents in the years 2002–2014 amounted to 3,509,902.8 days, 38.3 days per victim.

Table 1

**The number of days of incapacity for work caused by occupational accidents
in Poland in the years 2002–2014**

The number of days of incapacity for work caused by occupational accidents in Poland				
Year	In absolute numbers	2003 = 100	Per one victim	2002 = 100
2002	lack of data	x	34.4	100.0%
2003	3,073,107	100.0%	36.2	105.2%
2004	3,076,483	100.1%	35.5	103.2%
2005	2,840,576	92.4%	33.8	98.3%
2006	3,354,046	109.1%	35.3	102.6%
2007	3,433,185	111.7%	34.8	101.2%
2008	4,269,248	138.9%	41.1	119.5%
2009	3,670,903	119.5%	42.4	123.3%
2010	3,908,268	127.2%	41.7	121.2%
2011	3,996,121	130.0%	41.3	120.1%
2012	3,820,973	124.3%	42.1	122.4%
2013	3,603,139	117.2%	40.9	118.9%
2014	3,072,785	100.0%	34.8	101.2%
Average	3,509,902.8	114.2%	38.3	111.4%

Source: own study based on the annual reports of CSO *Accidents at work. Statistical Information and Summaries*. Warszawa 2009–2014; The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. *Information on accidents at work in 2003–2007*. Available at: <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/prawo-pracy/warunki-pracy/ocena-stanu-bhp-8211-dane-statystyczne/informacja-o-wypadkach-przy-pracy-w-2006-r-/>; Central Institute for Labour Protection – National Research Institute. *The state of occupational safety and health in 2003*. Available at: <http://archiwum.ciop.pl/428.html>

3. CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS AT WORK

According to the CSO, causes of accident are all deficiencies and irregularities which directly or indirectly contributed to the accident, they are related to:

- material (technical) agent;
- organisation of work in the workplace;


- organisation of the workstation;
- the employee, including his/her inappropriate behaviour.¹⁶

The next charts illustrate the causes of accidents at work and accidents treated equally to accidents at work in the years 2005–2013, without accidents on private farms in agriculture.

The sum of the causes of accidents at work is much higher than the total number of accidents recorded in the same period of time. This stems from the fact that most frequently an accident at work is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of several reasons of one event. In 2013, there were 88,267 accidents at work, they were the consequence of the occurrence of 171,097 reasons. On average, in the analysed period of time, nearly 2 causes (exactly 1.94) fall on one accident at work. In the years 2005–2013 the number of causes per one accident at work showed a rising trend. In 2005, an accident at work was a consequence of 1.88 causes, in 2013 there were 1.94 reasons, there was a growth of nearly 3%.

Figure 8

Causes of accidents at work in total and in industry (sections: B, C, D, E of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity) in the years 2005–2013



Source: Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.10485223680734634 [Accessed: 14 September 2014].

¹⁶ CSO. 2012. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2011r., Informacje i opracowania statystyczne. [Accidents at work in 2011. Statistical Information and Summaries.]* Warszawa, p. 11. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PW_wypadki_przy_pracy_2011.pdf

Accidents at work occur mostly due to inappropriate behaviour of the employee. During the whole examined period of time it was the main cause of accidents in the workplace and accidents treated on a par with them, it was indicated on the statistical card of accidents at work 95,003 times, which gives a share in the total number of causes of accidents at work at the level of 55.5%. In 2014, inappropriate behaviour of the employee was the cause of accidents even more frequently – its share increased to 59%. Taking into account the values registered in 2013 it is clear that other causes as the reason of an accident at work doubled in comparison to the base year. The growth was also recorded in the cases of inappropriate behaviour of the employee (18.3%) and non-use of protective equipment (1%). In 2013, other causes decreased when compared with 2005, the greatest decrease, by 20.7%, was in the case of the wrong condition of the material agent.


The most important causes of accidents at work in the period 2005–2014 were:

- inappropriate behaviour of the employee (the average 54.6%)
- inappropriate condition of the material agent (the average 9.4%)
- lack of or inappropriate use of the material agent (the average 7,7%).

The average values indicted at specific causes show the importance of preventive actions affecting employee behaviour in the workplace (Fig. 9–12).

Figure 9


Inappropriate behaviour of the employee as the main cause of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2005–2013



Source: Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.10485223680734634 [Accessed: 14 September 2014].

Figure 10


Selected causes of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2005–2013



Source: Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.10485223680734634 [Accessed: 14 September 2014].

Figure 11


Selected causes of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2005–2013



Source: Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.10485223680734634 [Accessed: 14 September 2014].

Figure 12

Selected causes of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2005–2013



Source: Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.10485223680734634 [Accessed: 14 September 2014].

This passage is dedicated to the events that are a deviation from the normal state and the factors that cause these events. The CSO defines an event incompatible with the proper conduct of the work process that caused the accident as an event which is a deviation from the normal state. Analysing accidents at work in terms of events that are a deviation from the normal state in 2013 it should be stated that the largest group of events consisted of slipping, stumbling, falling of the person (30.3%, mainly on the same level – 21.8% of the total number of cases being a deviation from the normal state). The next two deviations from the normal state which led to accidents at work are loss of control of: the machine, means of transport, transported cargo, tool, object, animal (17%) and breakage, bursting, splitting, slipping, fall, collapse of the material agent – in total (15%). In the examined period the major deviation from the normal state causing an accident at work was already mentioned slipping, stumbling, falling of the person (the average 28.5%). In comparison with the base period the biggest increase can be observed in the following events being a deviation from the normal state:


- shock, fright, violence, aggression, threat, presence (19.3%)
- slipping, stumbling, falling of the person – on the same level (16.1%)
- loss of control of: the machine, means of transport, transported cargo, tool, object, animal (14.6%).

Significant decreases were registered in the case of the following deviations from the normal state:

- breakage, bursting, splitting, slipping, fall, collapse of the material agent from above (24.3%),
- breakage, bursting, splitting, slipping, fall, collapse of the material agent not specified (23.7%),
- discharge, leakage, emission of hazardous substances (23.1%).

Figure 13

Events which are a deviation from the normal state causing accidents at work



Source: own study on the basis of Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/dane_podgrup.display?p_id=895839&p_token=0.10485223680734634 [Accessed: 14 September 2014].


3.3. Accidents at work in 2014

In the whole analysed period inappropriate behaviour of the employee was the primary cause of accidents at work. However, its share in the total

number of identified causes of accidents increased. In 2005 inappropriate behaviour of the employee accounted for half of all the reasons, at the moment it is already 59%. Compared to the base year, in 2014 only the share of other causes in the total number of reasons of accidents at work increased. The share of other categories of causes of accidents at work in 2014 fell in comparison with 2005.

Figure 14

The share of individual causes of accidents at work in the total number of causes in 2014




Source: own study on the basis of CSO. *Accidents at work in 2014. Monitoring of the Labour Market*, Warszawa, 17 March 2015, p. 2.

Looking more closely at the statistics on accidents at work in 2014 we can draw the following conclusions. The events that led to the injury were mainly a collision with / hitting an immobile object (25%) and collision with / hitting a moving object (21%). Accidents occurred most frequently when the employee was moving (35%) or operating objects (17%). As a result of accidents at work victims suffered mostly injuries of the upper limbs (44%) and lower limbs (34%).

Figure 15


Accidents at work



Source: own study on the basis of CSO. *Accidents at work in 2014, Monitoring of the Labour Market*, Warszawa, 17 March 2015, p. 2.

Figure 16

Parts of body injured



Source: own study on the basis of CSO. *Accidents at work in 2014, Monitoring of the Labour Market*, Warszawa, 17 March 2015, p. 2.

4. SUMMARY

In 2013 compared to 2012, the number of people who suffered from accidents at work decreased. The decline was recorded in most activities (11 sections of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity) in which there were 61,030 accident events in total, which accounted for 69.1% of all victims in 2013. 65.7% of the total number of employed persons in the country worked in these sections. The largest decrease was recorded in construction (the number of victims decreased by 17.6%) and in production and supply of electricity, gas, steam, hot water (the number of victims decreased by 14.4%). At the same time, the number of people working in construction (section F) decreased by 6.5% and in section D by 4.2%¹⁷. In the following year, although the decline in the number of people injured in accidents at work was also registered in 11 sections of the Polish Classification of Economic Activity, the overall number of accidents at work increased by 0.4%. It results mainly from the fact that in 2014 the decline in the number of accidents at work concerned the sections in which only 27.5% of all victims were employed (totally in these sections there were 24,410 accident events). In 2014, the number of accidents at work decreased the most in financial and insurance activities (by 29.5%) and in production and supply of electricity, gas, steam, hot water (20.1%) and other service activities (23%). At the same time, employment in financial and insurance activities (section K) decreased by 0.2%, and in section D by 5%¹⁸.

The conducted revision of the statistical data showed that work in Poland did not become particularly safer. In the years 2002–2014 the number of accidents at work in total (Fig. 3) and the incidence rate (Fig. 5) did not change significantly. Short periods of a decline in 2002 and 2005 were followed by a renewed increase in the number of accidents at work. Two consecutive periods of a decline in the number of accidents at work were the years 2012–2013. Then in 2014 the return to the upward trend was recorded again, 88,642 accidents at work were registered, that is 375 events more than in the year before and as many as 8,150 events more than in 2002. The average

¹⁷ CSO. 2014. *Pracujący w gospodarce narodowej w 2013 r., Informacje i opracowania statystyczne*. [The employed in the national economy in 2013. Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa, p. 11. Available at: file:///C:/Users/hp/Downloads/pw_pracujacy_w_gosp_narod_2013.pdf

¹⁸ CSO. 2015. *Zatrudnienie i wynagrodzenia w gospodarce narodowej w 2014 r., Informacje i opracowania statystyczne*. [Employment and wages in the national economy in 2014. Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa, p. 24. Available at: file:///C:/Users/hp/Downloads/zatrudnienie_i_wynagrodzenia_w_2014.pdf

number of accidents at work in the period 2002–2014 amounted to 91,021 events. A similar trend was observed in the case of the incidence rate of accidents. The only difference is that in this case the downward trend continued since 2012. The number of serious and fatal accidents was characterised by a relatively permanent downward trend in the period 2002–2014 (Fig. 4). The number of serious accidents at work over the last 13 years decreased gradually, reaching the total decrease of 49.6% compared to its level in 2002. In the same period of time, the number of fatal accidents at work was characterised by a decline at a similar level amounting respectively to 49.1%. The med-term rate of changes in the analysed period reached in both cases the same value equal to 5.5%. The incidence rate of fatal and serious accidents at work per 1,000 workers shows a less clear downward trend (Fig. 5). The rate of serious accidents is characterised by stagnation in short periods of time (2005–2007 – 0.09 2010–2011 – 0.06, from 2012 to 2013 – 0.05). The rate of fatal accidents at work in the years 2004–2011 showed a reverse trend year-on-year (than in the previous year) – a drop or increase was followed by a reversed trend in the next year. Only since 2011 we can observe a declining trend characterizing the frequency of accidents with serious consequences. In the longer period of time, both these indicators, however, show a clear downward trend: in 2014 the rate of fatal accidents at work decreased by 56% compared to 2004, while the rate of serious accidents declined by 60% in the same period.

The data published by the CSO show that most accidents at work are the fault of the person and the organisation of work. Accidents are most often connected with the performance of physical work. Careless performing of tasks or not complying with the Occupational Health and Safety leads to tragedies. Due to the development of technology over the last several years the unreliability of machines and equipment is much smaller. The statistics show that the largest number of accidents occur in manufacturing, agriculture, construction, wholesale and retail trade, health care and social assistance. In 2014, there were 88,642 accidents at work in total, but compared to the previous year there was growth in many sectors.

In such a reality preventive measures, raising awareness of employers and employees are very important. The necessary requirement is the participation of employers in training, adequate training of staff, attention to proper medical examination, familiarizing workers with hazards in the workplace. All these activities are extremely important because they can prevent accidents at work.

REFERENCES

- Central Statistical Office – Bank of Local Data. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/bdl/app/strona.html?p_name=indeks
- CSO. 2012. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2011r., Informacje i opracowania statystyczne.* [Accidents at work in 2011. Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa, Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PW_wypadki_przy_pracy_2011.pdf
- CSO. 2013. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2012 r., Monitoring Rynku Pracy.* [Accidents at work in 2012, Monitoring of the Labour Market.] Warszawa. Available at: http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PW_wypadki_przy_pracy_2012.pdf
- CSO. 2014. *Pracujący w gospodarce narodowej w 2013 r., Informacje i opracowania statystyczne.* [The employed in the national economy in 2013. Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa. Available at: file:///C:/Users/hp/Downloads/pw_pracujacy_w_gosp_narod_2013.pdf
- CSO. 2014. *Wypadki przy pracy w 2013 r., Informacje i Opracowania Statystyczne.* [Accidents at work in 2013, Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa
- CSO. 2015. *Zatrudnienie i wynagrodzenia w gospodarce narodowej w 2014 r., Informacje i opracowania statystyczne.* [Employment and wages in the national economy in 2014. Statistical Information and Summaries.] Warszawa. Available at: file:///C:/Users/hp/Downloads/zatrudnienie_i_wynagrodzenia_w_2014.pdf
- European Union. 2013. *European Statistics on Accidents at Work (ESAW). Summary methodology.* Eurostat. Methodologies and Working Papers. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- Eurostat. Accidents at work by sex and age (NACE Rev. 2, A, C-N), [hsw_mi01] Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=hsw_mi01&lang=en
- Hoła, B., Szóstak, B. 2014. Model of accident situation development in the construction industry. *Czasopismo Techniczne – Budownictwo*, 1-B/2014. Available at: https://suw.biblos.pk.edu.pl/resources/i4/i4/i6/i3/i8/r44638/HolaB_ModelAccident.pdf [Accessed: 15 August 2015].
- Koradecka, D. ed. 2010. *Handbook of Occupational Safety and Health.* CRC Press.
- Social Insurance Institution. *Analiza przyczyn i skutków wypadków przy pracy w latach 2008-2011.* [The analysis of causes and consequences of accidents at work in 2008-2011.] Resource – Pracownia Badań i Doradztwa. Available

at: http://www.zus.pl/files/dpir/Wypadki_przy_pracy_analiza.pdf [Accessed: 10 August 2015].

The Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, Official Journal of the European Union L183 of 29 June 1989.

The Council of Ministers Regulation of 9 November 2012 on the programme of statistical surveys of public statistics for 2013 (Journal of Laws of 2012, item 1391).

The Council of Ministers Regulation of 9 November 2013 on the programme of statistical surveys of public statistics for 2014 (Journal of Laws of 2013 item 1159).

The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. Available at: <https://osha.europa.eu/pl/legislation/directives/the-osh-framework-directive/the-osh-framework-directive-introduction>

The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Available at: <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/prawo-pracy/warunki-pracy/ocena-stanu-bhp-8211-dane-statystyczne/informacja-o-wypadkach-przy-pracy-w-2006-r/>

The Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 7 January 2009 on the statistical card of an accident at work (Journal of Laws of 29 January 2009).

The Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 8 November 2010 (Journal of Laws No. 218, item 1440 and No. 240, item 1612), Attachment 1 to the Regulation of the Minister of Labour and Social Policy of 8 November 2010 (Journal of Laws No. 218, item 1440 and No. 240, item 1612) – Z-KW form. Available at: <http://form.stat.gov.pl/formularze/2014/passive/Z-KW.pdf>

THE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF ACCIDENTS AT WORK IN POLAND IN THE YEARS 2002–2014

Summary

The aim of the paper is to elaborate the current state of accidents at work in Poland in the years 2002–2014. The emphasis is placed on the analysis of the level, structure and trends in accidents at work in Poland. In the article also causes and effects of the occupational accidents are discussed.

The article consists of 4 main parts: introduction, information in the field of registration of accidents at work – European and national context, occu-

pational accidents in numbers and conclusions. The main source of empirical data were statistics provided by the Central Statistical Office in Poland.

The Author has proven that in the considered time period working conditions in relation to the accidents at work did not improve significantly. Work in Poland did not become safer. In the years 2002–2014 the total number of occupational accidents and the overall ratio of accidents at work (the number of the injured persons per 1,000 of the employed) did not change a lot.

ANALIZA STANU AKTUALNEGO WYPADKÓW PRZY PRACY W POLSCE W LATACH 2002–2014

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest omówienie sytuacji wypadków przy pracy w Polsce w latach 2002–2014. Szczególny nacisk autorka kładzie na analizę poziomu, struktury oraz zmian w czasie wypadków przy pracy w Polsce. W artykule omówiono również przyczyny oraz skutki wypadków przy pracy w badanym okresie. Artykuł składa się z czterech części głównych: tj. wprowadzenia, informacji na temat rejestracji wypadków przy pracy, wypadków przy pracy w liczbach oraz zakończenia. Podstawowym źródłem danych empirycznych były dane statystyczne Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego (GUS). Autorka wykazała, że w badanym okresie warunki pracy z punktu widzenia wypadków przy pracy nie uległy widocznej poprawie. Praca w Polsce nie stała się szczególnie bardziej bezpieczna. W latach 2002–2014 liczba wypadków przy pracy ogółem, jak i wskaźnik częstości, nie uległy znacznym zmianom.

АНАЛИЗ АКТУАЛЬНОГО СОСТОЯНИЯ НЕСЧАСТНЫХ СЛУЧАЕВ НА ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕ В 2002–2014 ГОДАХ

Резюме

Целью статьи является анализ ситуации несчастных случаев на производстве в Польше в 2002–2014 годах. Особенный упор автор делает на определение уровня, структуры и динамики временных периодов несчастных случаев на производстве в Польше. В статье рассматриваются также причины и последствия несчастных случаев на производстве в исследуемый период. Статья состоит из четырёх основных частей: введения, информации

о регистрации несчастных случаев на производстве в количественном отношении, и заключения. В качестве основного источника эмпирических данных были использованы статистические показатели Главного статистического управления (GUS). Автор выявила, что в исследуемый период условия труда с точки зрения несчастных случаев на производстве не улучшились. Труд в Польше не является в достаточной степени безопасным. В 2002–2014 годах число несчастных случаев на производстве как в общей сложности, так и по показателям частотности, не претерпели значительных изменений.

Maciej D. Kryszczuk, Michał Wenzel

TRADE UNIONS AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON THE LABOUR MARKET

INTRODUCTION

Scientific and technological progress and the acceleration of economic processes on a global scale asymmetrically affect labour and capital. Capital is inherently more mobile than people who live – apart from economic conditions – also in the network of social relations. Processes of automation, replacing workers by more and more intelligent robots weaken the position of the working class to some extent (though they also offer significant opportunities). Our intention is to sketch a cause and effect sequence of these processes: to describe basic aspects of transformations of the labour market, their impact on trade unions and emerging prospects for change in the trade union movement (the seeds of their return).

In the text we present a few selected and in our opinion important problems currently faced by the trade union movement, and which go beyond the traditional discussion on the role and importance of trade unions in the free market economy (collective labour agreements, tripartite committees, labour code, etc.). Generally speaking, all social relations, which are included in the given management model, are also included in the cultural, political and civilizational context. Relationships, whether customary or institutional, among these spheres of life, are a complex mosaic of interests which – to make things even clearer – undergo constant changes in time and space. In this dynamic process of transformation of labour relations an important role is played today by scientific and technical development (e.g. robotics), the impact of which is global and relatively fast. The changes also affect traditional and labour relations, which influences the perception of professional activity itself.

‘More and more people in the course of their career jump from branch to branch, work according to the model of recurring orders and the autonomous negotiation of rates. The workplace also loses its meaning as the exclusive place of performance of professional duties, due to which there is no chance to create the ties of solidarity and the sense of community of interest which used to cement former union members. All attempts to create supranational union structures, which would be a sufficient counterweight to transnational corporations and employers, encounter great resistance¹. By the way, large multinationals are not necessarily the biggest enemy of trade unions, for example because of strong ties with the political environment, but also because of the similarity (obsolescence) of their own structures. It is worth noting that attempts to create international organisations of employers also fail – various conflicts of interests stand in the way.

The processes of globalisation – cultural, political, social or economic ones – force governments (if any at all are willing and able to deal with this issue) to search for solutions that would reconcile different interests (e.g. more flexible labour relations with the intention to maintain a high level of employment – often at the expense of its quality). Regardless of the decision-making role of politicians, who, however, are not deprived of needs – mechanisation, automation, computerisation, robotics or informationalisation (based on digital integration of various communication channels)²

¹ Woś, R. 2014. *Dziecięca choroba liberalizmu*. [Childhood illness of liberalism.] Warszawa: Studio Emka, p. 254.

² Generally speaking, it is a question of dependence of social relations on information, which is a process that we call informationalisation (See Kryszczuk, M. 2008. *Konceptualizacja i metody pomiaru pracowników sektora informacyjnego*. [Conceptualisation and measurement methods of the information sector employees.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne). With regard to the theory of stages of communication, the term *informationalisation* may be used as a synonym of the concept of *modernisation* (Cf. Goban-Klas, T. 2002. *Media i komunikowanie masowe*. [Media and mass communication.] Warszawa-Kraków: PWN, pp. 15–17 and 286–289). Castells uses this term when writing about the impact of ICTs on the socio-economic structure (See Castells, M. 2002. *The Internet galaxy*. Oxford University Press, p. 231). To avoid confusion, we can accept the following language conventions. The concept *informationalisation* is within the semantic field of the term *modernisation*. In this sense, *more modernised* society is also *more informationalised*. But the term *informationalisation* is wider than the concept of *computerisation*, because 1) it includes additionally phenomena of social sphere (i.e. a change in education leading to increased competence in information processing); 2) does not determine the type of technology (media and devices) by means of which information is handled. The process of computerisation (digitisation) is therefore one of the stages or factors (variations, elements) of the informationalisa-

have a huge impact on human labour, its organisation and labour relations, which take various forms depending on the economic model, and specific policies of the government. Such a generally outlined scheme, therefore, requires further refinement which needs to include, inter alia, the concept of re-industrialisation, regulations concerning wages and minimum rates, the innovation strategy, interventionist industrial, labour and social policy, and cultural changes: changes in the attitudes, lifestyles and the possibility of commercial emigration. Let us recall the truism that every society has its own specificity which condemns trade union or political activists to caution in the proposed recipes and undertaken actions. The mass media – including the ‘free internet’ play an important, opinion-forming role.

The liberalisation of the labour market postulated by the free market environment (with a rather vague opposition of workers themselves) stems from the belief that earlier this market has been somehow tamed/limited, which is not a typical or desirable phenomenon in the ‘liberal state of nature’, the current emanation of which is the increasingly globalised market of economic exchange. In this approach, you should try to weigh the balance of the influence of the increasing flexibility of the labour market on the level of unemployment, as well as the rationality of employees’ attitudes to ‘temporary contracts’ in the conditions of production ‘just in time’³. The below quotation focuses several problems around which a dispute takes place about the extent of state interference in the economy and the role of trade unions in their efforts to reduce market mechanisms leading, for example, to growing income inequalities: ‘Acemoglu and Robinson openly admit: yes, trade

tion process, as well as a characteristic feature of the ‘Third Wave’ of modernisation (See Cubitt, S. 2001. *Immediate consequences of the process of informationalisation*. Paper given at the Journalism and Regional Media in Europe Conference. September 2001. Volos, Thessaly, Greece.

³ It is often forgotten that the security or stability of work are the result of (or result from) a certain logic of development of capitalism, which when it was industrialising created demand for easily available workforce, gathered in one place and in large numbers. In this phase large workplaces depended on access to workforce, which contributed to the slightly more humanitarian sanctioning of this state – for instance, in the form of various labour codes, which are currently considered standard of civilisation (e.g. working time limits, protection against the loss of health or minimum hourly wage rates). Regardless of whether these regulations should be maintained or not, the changing methods of production and sales – among other factors – cause a change in the demand for workforce, which entails changes in the strategy of doing business (e.g. a general trend to a reduction of costs of human labour or more flexible forms of employment).

unions are a ballast from the economic point of view. If they were not there, companies would achieve better results, and the economy would spin faster. The truth of the economic argument does not alter the fact that excessive weakening of trade unions is a sign of bad policy of the state, because it leads to such negative consequences as economic weakening of the lower and middle class. This increases differences in income, and backfires in the sense of social justice and democracy⁴.

To be realistic, even radical economic liberals (*laissez-faire*) must recognise – though not necessarily accept – the direct (i.e. industrial policy) or indirect (i.e. fiscal policy) impact of the government on the sphere of human labour. Starting from extreme cases in which the authoritarian political system ‘has liquidated unemployment’ through various models of social states and ending with the most free-market economic systems – nowhere will we find the pure ‘free labour’ market which is based on spontaneous (and theoretically the most effective) self-regulation. There are plenty of reasons why the introduction of total economic freedom – understood as the total lack of interference of the government (or another political instance) in the operation of the market – is not possible, and the majority of them have been thoroughly described and explained. Sorting out the comprehensive set of arguments allows for the selection of three main positions on the role of the state in the sphere of work, whose popularity depends on the political situation and economic conditions⁵. We remind you of this because these three positions – 1) the maximum liberalisation of economic activity, its opposite 2) the maximum intervention (now rarely called socialism or communism⁶) and the most commonly occurring 3) intermediate position (between the market and permanent employment⁷) which takes into account both the role

⁴ Woś, R., *op. cit.*, p. 227.

⁵ To put it simply, when the free market (capitalist) economy does not cope well with the generation of new jobs (i.e. unemployment increases) – the public willingly increases the expectations towards the government and the acceptance of interventionist policies.

⁶ In the history of these political movements the attitude towards state institutions varied: from the vision of the state subjected to capital (an element of the superstructure of the system) to the practice of the authoritarian state with the leading role of the Communist Party. From our point of view it is important how decision-making centres on the line: the individual – society – the state are shaped in the practice of domination. Hence, socialism or communism will always be on the opposite axis to the individualistic sense of economic or moral freedom.

⁷ This is the title of a book edited by Mirosława Marody, in which certain aspects of political transformation are discussed from the market and statism perspective (See Marody, M. ed. 2000. *Między rynkiem a etatem. Społeczne negocjowania polskiej rzeczy-*

of the free market, and the ‘hand of the state’, depending on the specific socio-economic and cultural circumstances – are still the axis of the debate on the causes of unemployment, the role of trade unions or economic growth⁸.

Touching cultural issues – reinforced today by global mass media – we should mention the phenomenon of fashion, which – in the language of business psychologists – replaces needs with desires. At the time of the first waves of industrialisation – relatively permanent basic needs and groundbreaking inventions that satisfied them at that time corresponded to the model of large, stable companies with available and permanently employed staff. Currently, when the majority of consumer markets are increasingly variable, liquid and chimerical – it is not only profitable, but also necessary to produce not only ‘just in time’ or ‘on-demand’, but to commission parts of orders or even entire production processes outside (outsourcing) to small specialised companies. American business practitioners claim that a new ‘big thing’ will be ‘smart personal electronic machines’ that will eliminate the whole host of service professions⁹. Needless to say that this has an impact also on the organisation of work, and consequently, on the possibility and willingness of workers to unionise¹⁰.

1. SELECTED PROBLEMS OF THE LABOUR MARKET IN THE LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES

A number of factors contribute to the crisis of trade unions, such as ‘professional flexibility’, i.e. the need for relatively frequent retraining, conflicts of interest between countries, sectors, industries, companies. Paradoxically, technological progress itself plus the globalisation of economic processes

wistości. [Between the market and permanent employment. Social negotiations of Polish reality.] Warszawa: Scholar). At the high level of generality the alternative – statism versus market corresponds to the dispute of liberals with socialists and conservatives about the interference of the state in the sphere of work.

⁸ For the part of the liberal radicals (*laissez-faire*) any form of interventionism which limits freedom – be it German ordoliberalism (originally it was an attempt to reconcile the rules of the free market economy with the Catholic social doctrine and moral conservatism) or other attempts to find a ‘third way’ between efficient capitalism and just socialism – must necessarily lead to degeneration; while Communists see this as a betrayal of the ideals and an attempt to ‘smuggle’ basic principles of free-market capitalism.

⁹ Available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/robots-are-the-next-wave-of-computing-2016-1> [Accessed: 20 February 2016].

¹⁰ See Kessler, A. 2012. *Eat people. And other unapologetic rules for game-changing entrepreneurs*. London: Penguin Books.

bring another threat – or we should say – the need to reflect and change the existing solutions (also for white-collar workers representing so-called liberal professions). Long-term dominance of the so-called employer market (oversupply of workers in relation to the demand), the effect of which is the growing competition for jobs can lead to a situation in which human labour will not even protect against poverty and the employed will be forced to use social aid or family support¹¹.

Traditionally, in such a situation, trade unions and advocates of strengthening the domestic demand in unison postulate to legislatively regulate minimum wages, reduce working time or set minimum hourly rates (which in some countries is also connected with the acquisition of rights to additional social benefits). The traditional answer of ‘free market’ defenders to this is the argument about the potential and real redundancies caused by the increase of competitiveness in the given sector of the economy (higher labour costs – the wage bill increase). Besides the fundamental dispute about the extent of government interference in economic affairs (and the resulting rights and obligations towards citizens), there are numerous minor, even technical controversies that affect the success of fiscal and industrial policy of the country. For example, the multiplicity and complexity of labour markets – in the country, region or the world – differentiate workers’ wage situation, at the same time breaking professional or branch solidarity, and also greatly complicating the situation of the national legislature, which must ‘fairly’ take into account the interests of individual social groups. Privileges obtained by one labour market (an employment segment) can cause quite opposite effects in another. In an ideal model of the national economy, individual labour markets – as a system of communicating vessels connected by one law – rather *do not compete* with each other for legislation favourable for them, which would be an implicit element of redistribution policy.

Turning to the transnational or global scale, in which different segments of the national labour market participate, the ‘legislator’s’ situation, becomes even more complicated: different labour markets yield to autonomy and diversity of professional or branch interests to varying degrees (e.g. renewable energy labour markets versus traditional coal mining). In addition, depending on income, and also on life styles and cultural patterns, employees of different labour markets have – as consumers – different preferences and attitudes, which affects the size of the internal market, i.e. products manufactured and purchased in increasingly blurred ‘borders’ of the national economy.

¹¹ Cf. Phelps, E. 2013. *Placa za pracę. [Rewarding work.]* Warszawa: Kurhaus.

On the other hand, the need to adapt worker's organisations to new technological conditions is related to another socially important issue, namely the general redefinition of the role of human labour. Going beyond the purely economic aspect, Zygmund Bauman discussed this issue at length in a literary way: 'The apotheosis of employment as the highest vocation of man, a condition of moral decency, a law and order guarantee, and also a patented cure for poverty, was in harmony with the formerly labour-intensive industry in which the size of the product increased with the size of the crew. Today's lean, slim and slender, capital and knowledge absorbent factories and offices account the list of employees as the losses and burdens, as the negative factor in the calculation ("productivity"). In an open opposition to the concept of work as a source of wealth, the canon of political economy from the time of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Rocardo and Mill, numerous crews today are a nightmare for both practitioners and theoreticians of economics, and all strategies of further "rationalisation" (understood as an increase in profits in proportion to the invested capital) are focused on the search for further opportunities to reduce employment. These strategies represent economic growth and employment growth as mutually contradictory concepts and technical progress is measured by the amount of "living labour" which new technology makes redundant. Under these conditions, traditional commandments and teachings of work ethic ring hollow. They no longer express "industry needs", and it is difficult to associate them with the requirements of "national wealth". Their ongoing presence or rather their recent electroplating in the rhetoric of politicians can only be explained by means of quite new tasks with the work ethic is to fulfil in consumer rather than industrial society of our times'¹².

Also Castells came to similar conclusions, according to which increasing numbers of people will remain outside the essential logic of the new system, because global informative capitalism pushes them out of the labour market, and often also out of consumption. Therefore, a significant part of the population will not have the status of economically active persons (e.g. working 'full-time' or 'permanently' in a particular profession) or working – for a long time in the same profession – on the official labour market. According to Castells, it is a common process pertaining to both poorly developed countries, as well as – to a lesser extent – highly developed ones¹³. This process is

¹² Bauman, Z. 1998. Zawrotna kariera „podklasy”. [The stunning career of the 'underclass'.] *Przegląd Społeczny* [Online] no. 1/2, pp. 2–3. Available at: <http://portal.tezeusz.pl/cms/tz/index.php?id=354> [Accessed: 20 February 2016].

¹³ Highly developed economies produce a greater range of goods and services, especially those that require large amounts of knowledge, financial capital and human resources.

also not equal to the typical phenomenon of the seasonal or cyclical increase in unemployment. The fact is that in urbanised countries most people are still gainfully employed. However, we should ask: what kind of work it is, for what amount of money and in what conditions.

Thus, a growing group of people – mainly low-skilled workers – move around in search of any employment. Millions of people sometimes have and sometimes do not have paid work (usually badly paid, seasonal and part-time), which is sometimes also connected with its illegal (i.e. ‘gray economy’), and even criminal nature (i.e. ‘black economy’). All this adds up to a phenomenon which Castells calls a ‘black hole of information capitalism’, or simply the exclusion of large groups of unskilled workforce from ‘normal’ social life. In the nineties of the twentieth century sociologists talked about the underclass, currently the term precariat is fashionable. When we add cultural changes, e.g. increased professional activity of women and persons with disabilities – according to the theory of informationalisation – we can expect an overall degeneration of the traditional labour market, with its integral part, that is trade unions. In other words, a stable employment structure, understood as having a permanent job (mainly employment) by the majority of people of working age is superseded by a new, more flexible and independent of human labour management model.

The processes of individualisation of work and the prospect of replacement of human labour by machines and the possibility of relocation of production to where it is least expensive lead to a gradual break of the remnants of class solidarity from the era of industrialism. According to Castells’s concept of network society, class struggle from the industrial era – resulting from the inherent contradictions of economic interests and based on the existence of class ties and awareness¹⁴ – will be replaced by the conflict of various groups, i.e.: associations, socio-cultural movements, industry lobby, which are organised to defend various interests: economic, political or ideological ones¹⁵. Long ago, sociologists wrote about the transition from ‘society of relations’ to network ‘society of contact’, that is to the informationalisation and networking of human life and activity, the popularisation of new types of organisations, new articulation and new types of relationships. Recalling classic studies on informationalisation of work (Castells) it should be stressed emphatically that much has changed since then in the world economy – also

¹⁴ Lier suggests that the network organisation of production undermines the ritualisation of class identity, that it *de facto* eliminates class awareness (See Lier, H. *Nowy wiek*. [New age.] Warszawa: PIW, pp. 91–95.

¹⁵ See Castells, M. 2000. *The Internet galaxy*. Oxford University Press, pp. 345–346.

due to the consolidation, and significant enhancement of the possibility of practical application of new technologies¹⁶.

Another element of economic and technological changes is the growing importance of a system of licensing, which moves a portion of profits from the owners of the means of production to the holders of patents, licenses and copyrights¹⁷. In addition, savings of those who work are invested (e.g. by investment funds or pension funds) on international stock exchanges. In this system it is difficult to talk about the conflict of class interests as workers of the information era are also a 'collective owner', who together with the 'collective capitalist' become dependent on changes on the global financial market. This does not mean, however, that new forms of exploitation and conflict of interest do not take place. Some researchers argue that important features of the capitalist economy of the industrial era undergo changes, i.e. the property right and the principle of deriving profit from labour and capital. The right to 'intellectual property' and 'cultural capital' gains in importance, and it constitutes a clear axis of class divisions, and even – as suggested by Christopher Lasch – a return to quasi status societies, as the inheritance of position resulting from education is repeated in a similar way as it was the case of the 'state of birth' in feudal times¹⁸. However, this type of inheritance no longer brings 'nobility obliges', that is the defence of such values as honour, dignity and responsibility because 'rebellious elites' are detached from the time and place in which they function (Castells would say that this happens as a result of the annihilation of time and space). The current 'aristocracy of talent' (*feudal lords of education systems*) becomes cosmopolitan in the sense that they are more interested in global networks of capital and the international labour and leisure culture than in national and local issues among which they live physically.

¹⁶ In recent times, there have been numerous publications on the subject, among others: Brynjolfsson, E., McAfee, A. 2014. *The second machine age: work, progress, and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies*. W.W.Norton & Company; Pistono, F. 2012. *Robots will steal your job but that's OK*. Lexington: Createspace; Cowen, T. 2013. *Average is over. Powering America beyond the age of the great stagnation*. USA: Dutton.

¹⁷ Repeating old arguments of Schumpeter and Galbraith, Rifkin writes that the system of licensing changes the meaning of the classical understanding of the category of an independent enterprise. Possession of tangible assets and workforce, in the absence of intangible aspects (license, patent), is here a hybrid state between petty bourgeoisie and managers (Rifkin, J. 2003. *Wiek dostępu*. [*The age of access.*] Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, pp. 67–68).

¹⁸ Lasch, Ch. 1997. *Bunt elit*. [*The revolt of the elites.*] Liszki: Platan, p. 47.

Another factor is the renaissance of small and medium-sized enterprises, possible not only thanks to ICTs and the development of the global capital market, but also thanks to anti-corporate culture and policies of many governments favourable for this form of entrepreneurship. In this sense, in addition to the change in the system of allocation of capital profits, also the category of beneficiaries profiting from employment changes. Although still money is made mainly by employers who employ own workers for this purpose, the mechanism of accumulation of surpluses is much more complex. Apart from changes in the distribution role of the state and the bargaining power of trade unions, the relationships between the employer and the employee become gradually individualised, which entails a visible differentiation of obtained benefits, for example, instead of the rigidly fixed (the hierarchy) payroll – wages are increasingly varied on the basis of work results¹⁹. The share of workers (manufacturers) who control their own work (e.g. in the form of sole proprietorship or short-term contracts) grows in the economy. They form – together with employers and co-operators – a system of specific, personalised and horizontal relations; gaining in this way independence in planning of (their) market strategies. This way of thinking is shared by large groups of young people raised already in the era of social networking. In the post-socialist countries, apart from the above trends, there is also the issue of restructuring of industrial plants whose previous organisation and management did not cope with the new economic conditions. On their ruins, a number of small and medium-sized enterprises have been established, managed by private owners, who thanks to their knowledge and entrepreneurship have been able to ensure the survival and development of these new companies. On the other hand, due to the change of work methods and organisation of production, more and more people remain outside the labour market, keeping up

¹⁹ As Pańkowska notes, this phenomenon is described in the concept of *Business Process Reengineering* (BPR) of Hammer and Chapy. This concept has become a paradigm of changes in the economic organisation necessary to maintain the flexibility and competitiveness of the company. In this context, the work environment changes involve, among others: 1) the change of employees' roles (the transition from control to empowerment); 2) the change of the preparation of tasks (the transition from training to education); 3) the change of meters of execution and the change of the remuneration system (from evaluation of activities to evaluation of results); 4) the change of the criteria for promotion (the transition from assessment of performance to evaluation of capabilities and capacities); 5) the change of the management style (from supervision to coordination) and 6) the change of organisational structures (the shift from hierarchical structures to flat – horizontal ones) (See Pańkowska, M. 2001. *Zarządzanie zasobami informatycznymi. [Management of IT resources.]* Warszawa: Difin, pp. 71–73).

from benefits from either the state or non-governmental organisations, or working outside the official – legal labour market, and finally receiving basic income from other sources such as social assistance. This does not change the general trend which still rewards education and practical knowledge. Changes in values which society – by changes in culture *in toto* – assigns to different predispositions and practical skills significantly affect the processes of restructuring of essential systems of social life, i.e. the system of division of labour.

2. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE WORLD OF LABOUR FOR TRADE UNIONS

Summing up the first part – the world of work changes: it becomes more technically advanced, it moves to services, it becomes pluralistic (there are professions practised by few groups of employees), is unstable (the growing importance of atypical forms of employment), it becomes internationalised and loses its geographical features (the emergence of teleworking, the growing importance of subcontracting or the popularity of start-ups that gain access to international capital markets). The awareness of employees also changes (becomes individualised). The above-described changes in the world of labour almost without exception result in weakening of the position of trade unions in their current form and legal location. It should be noted, however, that the free market economy – by itself – does not contradict the idea of trade unions, which – taking into account other factors determining the quality of human life and the forms of workers' organisations – can be a factor stabilising labour and demand markets. A lot depends here on the competence and creativity of the persons concerned. The main factor disrupting the possibility of effective co-existence of employers and employees today is the lack of policy coordination on a global scale and difficult to standardise cultural differences. Local activists – presumably understanding the complexity of the modern world of work – often take advantage of local particularisms and political divisions. It seems that this is a tactic calculated for totally different – the nineteenth century's – political reality at the base of which authoritarian doctrines, whether right-wing or left-wing were born. Both trends tend to appeal to populist slogans, such as the 'nationalisation of capital' or 're-industrialisation of the national economy'. Their long-term effect can be easily predicted²⁰.

²⁰ Re-industrialisation policy realised without business innovations – conducted in the era of globalisation, technological and financial flows – means temporary (extensive) growth in employment and multiplier effects will be neutralised negatively in the

Traditionally speaking, there are several mechanisms of the influence of changes in the world of labour on workers' organisations. Firstly, the change in the workforce structure (and generally in the social and economic structure) eliminates professions which were previously unionised. 'We can observe a decrease in the share of classical trade unionists from the industrial era in the structure of employees – permanently (often for life), full-time employed men, the only breadwinners of families, employees with proletarian attitudes, characterised by class solidarity, and an increase in the number of employees working on temporary, part-time contracts, young people and women, people with instrumental attitudes towards work. At the same time a new level of technology and domestic and international competition leads to the deconcentration of crews of workers and the reduction of the requirements for knowledge: modern production, which in the industrial period until the seventies of the twentieth century required large companies and highly skilled working class, can now be transferred to the sector of small and medium-sized enterprises or to countries where labour costs are lower than in Western Europe, and the work is fragmented and individual operations are extremely simplified'²¹.

Secondly, the structural environment conducive to trade union activities vanishes. Workers' organisations have been strongest in the public sector, in industry, in large manufacturing companies, on which – as liberals rightly say – the market does not exert competitive pressure (see: the monopolisation of certain public services, which the market has successfully replaced). Shifting the centre of gravity of the economy toward the private sector has been particularly pronounced in technologically backward countries (e.g. in Poland): most jobs are now in private enterprises. A significant part of these are micro-enterprises employing up to 10 people and there are no workers' organisations there due to the insufficient number of employees. The share of the service sector in the economy grows, the share of industry declines²². It is worth noting here that such a schematic simplification of the vision of the world – resulting from the paradigm of the sectoral approach to economies in today's economics – creates the space for reactionary actions. In theory, modern agriculture – using natural resources in the given region of the world

long term by the public debt service. Moreover, the global nature of the corporation makes the concept of 'national capital' disputable (in fact we can reasonably speak of 'national fiscal policy' which aims, among others, to attract international capital).

²¹ Gardawski, J. ed. 2009. *Polacy pracujący a kryzys fordyzmu*. [*Working Poles and the crisis of Fordism*.] Warszawa: Scholar, p. 427

²² In 2013, the service sector employed 57.5% of all employees; 75% of employees were employed in the private sector (CSO 2013: 28, 97).

– does not automatically constitute an obstacle for the operation of trade union organisations.

Thirdly, the mechanisms of social dialogue, that is collective bargaining of employees and employers (sometimes with the participation of the government) at the level of the company, industry, region and state, which are well-known in developed social market economies, have not taken root in Poland. The existing institutions are often referred to as the facade, created only due to external requirements, e.g. in connection with the accession to the EU.

2.1. The decline of the unionisation level

In Poland, the political transformation has been connected with a sharp decline in union membership. In comparison with the year 1987, that is the declining period of state socialism, the unionisation of employees has fallen by more than two-thirds. In 2013, it was at the level of approximately 12% of employees. Poland, like most (though not all) post-communist countries belonging to the EU is poorly unionised. The decrease in membership is widespread in Europe, which anyway is a leader in this field – in combination with the Anglo-Saxon culture of work, not to mention other regions of the world. Trade union membership has been decreasing since the eighties of the twentieth century, which is the primary factor in determining the position of unions in collective bargaining with employers (Cf. *Industrial Relations in Europe 2012*: 24). In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe this fall is deeper than in Western European economies characterised by a well-shaped system of mediation of group interests. Let us add that the decline in unionisation has not been evenly distributed in occupational groups and various sectors of the economy. In Poland, trade unions remain relatively strong in the public sector (administration, health care, education, state-owned enterprises). They are weaker in privatised facilities, and they very rarely operate in private companies established after 1989.

The scale of the described process is evident when we compare the data from the final period of state socialism (almost all employees worked then full-time in state enterprises) and now. From a longer perspective, we can see that the loss of union protection least affected the most skilled workers: executives and specialists. In the previous regime, they were relatively poorly represented by trade unions, but now they are the best organised professional group. Unionisation of workers in manufacturing has fallen by three-quarters. A decline in the percentage of organised white-collar middle-level workers and employees in services has been even greater.

Table 1

Membership in trade unions²³

Data in %			
	1987	2013	Change
Total adult population	24	6	-75%
Men total	27	7	-74%
Women total	22	5	-77%
Total employees	38	12	-68%
Professional groups			
– Executives, clerisy, engineers	29	19	-34%
– Mid-level white-collars	46	9	-80%
– Blue-collars*	40	10	-75%
– Employees of trade and services	33	6	-82%
Ownership of the workplace			
– State or public	**	24	**
– Private and state joint venture	**	12	**
– Private (excluding agriculture)	**	4	**

* W 2013 ‘Skilled blue-collars’.

** Lack of data

The asymmetrical drop in unionisation and the strong position of workers’ organisations in the public sector and poor in the private one is the reflection of public opinion. According to the vast majority of the public, trade unions defend the interests of certain professional groups at the expense of other workers.

In the assessment of the dominant group of Poles the interests of people working in large workplaces, at least in part owned by the state, such as e.g. mines, are well-represented. Most believe, however, that trade unions cannot or do not want to represent people working in large private companies or chain stores, people working in small private companies, as well as the unemployed.

²³ Data of the Public Opinion Research Centre. In: Wenzel, M. 2009. Związki zawodowe w badaniach CBOS 1980–2008. [Trade unions in the studies of the Public Opinion Research Centre 1980–2008.] In: Gardawski, J. ed. 2009. *Polacy pracujący a kryzys fordyzmu. [Working Poles and the crisis of Fordism.]* Warszawa: Scholar, pp. 533–550 and Feliksiak, M. 2013. *Opinie o związkach zawodowych i protestach górników. [Opinions about trade unions and miners’ protests.]* Research Report 66/2015. Warszawa: CBOS.

Table 2

The perceived representation of interests by trade unions

Do trade unions operating in Poland ...	
Defend the privileges of certain professional groups at the expense of other workers	69%
Fight for the interests of all those who work	14%
Hard to say	17%

Data in % of adults

Source: Public Opinion Research Centre²⁴

Table 3

Groups represented by trade unions

Do trade unions currently operating in Poland represent well or badly the interests of:	Well	Badly
– people working in large workplaces at least in part owned by the state, such as e.g. mines	48%	30%
– people working in large private companies or chain stores	17%	57%
– people working in small private companies	9%	63%
– the unemployed, job seekers	8%	68%

'Hard to say' was omitted

Data in % of adults

2.2. Decline of social dialogue

One of the basic instruments of articulating the interests of organised worker's groups are negotiations with employers through social dialogue institutions. According to some researchers describing the initial period of the political transformation, 'the third way' between capitalism and socialism was a possible direction of changes. The destination of such a transformation would be a system in which workers would co-manage enterprises and trade unions – the state; Białecki and Heyns²⁵ claim that state corporatism is

²⁴ The source of data for both tables: Pankowski, K. 2013. *Czyje interesy reprezentują związki zawodowe. [Whose interests trade unions represent.]* Research Report BS/173/2013. Warszawa: CBOS.

²⁵ Białecki, I., Heyns, B. 1992. Democracy. Interests and corporatism in Poland. In: Adamski, W. ed. *Societal conflict and systemic change*. Warszawa: IFiS, p. 251.

a typical way of negotiating interests in post-communist societies. This kind of direction of changes seemed to be a logical consequence of the crucial role that trade unions played in the recent history of Poland. However, the first three governments after the fall of communism did not create systemic mechanisms for solving conflicting interests of employees and employers. The law on trade unions of May 1991 did not regulate many aspects of collective labour relations. Hanna Suchocka's government negotiated in 1993 the so-called Pact on State Enterprise. Its provisions guaranteed workers participation in the management of enterprises in the course of privatisation and created material incentives for employees of these companies. At the same time there was a decision to create the Tripartite Commission for Socio-Economic Issues which was to be henceforth an institutional forum for dialogue between organisations of employers, employees and the government. In 2001, its role was strengthened by a legal act, but in 2015 it was replaced by the Council for Social Dialogue.

The most far-reaching attempt to institutionalise 'state corporatism' was the so-called Draft of Civic Constitution, prepared by the Independent Self-governing Trade Union 'Solidarity' in 1996. Article 43 of the draft gave the Tripartite Commission consisting of representation of employees, employers and the government the right to decide on the minimum wage and the provisions of the Labour Code. A solution of this type would give unions the constitutional right of co-decision on economic policy of the state – omitting the parliament. This draft was not, however, put to the vote in a referendum although 'Solidarity' strived for it. Other central trade unions did not support it.

The existing social dialogue institutions should be assessed as weak. Effectiveness of the Tripartite Commission was low, according to experts in the cross-sectional audit of democracy²⁶. Collective labour agreements are usually concluded at the workplace level. Their reach is small – they cover 25% of workforce. It is not known exactly how durable the agreements are, but it is known that there are few new agreements, and it can be said that most of the agreements were concluded in the nineties of the previous century. Inter-company collective agreements cover a very small part of employees (approximately 3.5% of employees), primarily in sectors such as education, public administration, forestry, energy industry, mining, defence industry, as well as railways. Just like company agreements, most of them were concluded in the nineties²⁷.

²⁶ See Markowski, R., Kotnarowski, M., Wenzel, M., Żerkowska-Balas, M. 2015. *Democratic audit of Poland 2014*. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.

²⁷ See Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A., Czarzasty, J. 2012. *Trade unions in Poland*. Research Report. Brussels: ETUI.

The weakness of social dialogue results partly from the weakening of the number and position of trade unions – that is from internal reasons (as opposed to the phenomena described by us which have a global nature and are external to local legal regulations and customs). The decentralisation of labour relations is conducive to individual negotiations, not to collective ones. This is, however, not the only reason. Some researchers notice regional differences which are the late heritage of the differences in the culture of dialogue between the former partitions – it is better developed in the former lands under the of the Austrian and Prussian authority²⁸. According to researchers, another historical factor is the reproduction of the model of the action of early ‘Solidarity’ in the first years of the transformation. The principal strategy both before and after the turning point was extorting concessions from the unpopular, illegitimated authorities. Burawoy and Lukacs argued that socialism contributed to the weakness of social dialogue by the atomisation of social relations: ‘the working class in socialism was demobilised. It was deprived of its representation by institutions such as trade unions and political parties, and separated from intellectual elites, due to which only individual strategies of mobility were effective’²⁹.

Many observers of social dialogue perceive its superficiality. At the level of the workplace it manifests itself only in the formal functioning of workers’ councils (established in order to adjust Polish law to the EU), which is related to the reluctance of employees to participate³⁰. At the local level, social dialogue is often a tool of the legitimacy of pre-planned actions of local authorities³¹. At the central level social partners are divided by conflicts which do not reflect the interests and use negotiations for selfish purposes³².

²⁸ Cf. Wódz, K., Kulas, P. eds. 2010. *Dialog, demokracja, społeczeństwo obywatelskie.* [Dialogue, democracy, civil society.] Dąbrowa Górnicza: ESB.

²⁹ Burawoy, M., Lukacs, J. 1992. *The radiant past. Ideology and reality in Hungary’s road to capitalism.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 147.

³⁰ See Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A., Czarzasty, J. 2012. *Trade unions in Poland*, Research Report. Brussels: ETUI, p. 25.

³¹ See Zalewski, D. ed. 2001. *Dialog społeczny na poziomie regionalnym. Ocena szans rozwoju.* [Social dialogue at the regional level. Assessment of development opportunities.] Warszawa: IPiSS.

³² See Hausner, J., Marody, M. eds. 2001. *Polski talk show. Dialog społeczny a integracja europejska.* [Polish talk show. Social dialogue and European integration.] Kraków: Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej AE w Krakowie.

3. PERSPECTIVES

There is little doubt about the hitherto prevailing direction of changes when it comes to the position of trade unions. Experts agree³³ that they are on the falling wave, their position is weaker and – with few exceptions – they lose members almost everywhere. Our aim is to consider whether there are hypothetical scenarios for the return trade unions, where it would take place, how and in what circumstances and conditions. As Gardawski put it, ‘You can ask the question whether trade unions are in the long run doomed to marginalisation, just like so-called declining industry sectors? It now appears that unions of Fordist type will not disappear, but will serve these segments of the world of work which will have Fordist features in the future. (...) Basically, however, the challenge for trade unions will be new groups of workers employed in enterprises where flexibility will be required to stay on the market in the long term. Thus, the question is as follows – will the trade unions formed in the Fordist era be able to represent the interests of these groups? If it turns out impossible, trade unions are threatened with the decline, especially in new economies based on knowledge’³⁴.

In our opinion, there are three, not mutually exclusive, possible return paths for trade unions. Firstly, a strategy which can be called ‘reactionary’. The returning wave of nationalism can mean a retreat from globalisation and international free trade. It is connected with the postulate of re-industrialisation of Europe, the restoration of borders and increased state intervention, and therefore seeks to restore relations existing since in the eighties of the twentieth century. Secondly, internationalisation of labour relations and thus trade unions is possible, which would require the creation of appropriately strong supranational institutions. Currently, the most important manifestation of this phenomenon is the activity of European Works Councils. Thirdly, ‘trade unions’ can work out new, decentralised forms of action corresponding to the work situation of telecommuters, people without permanent contracts, freelancer, etc. Probably these will not be typical trade unions, but they can retain one of their basic functions, which is to represent the interests of employee groups.

³³ See Ebbinghaus, B., Visser, J. 2000. *Trade unions in Western Europe since 1945*. Oxford: Macmillan.

³⁴ Gardawski, J. ed. 2009. *Polacy pracujący a kryzys fordyzmu*. [Working Poles and the crisis of Fordism.] Warszawa: Scholar, p. 437–438.

3.1. 'Reaction': renationalisation and reindustrialisation

The first of the mentioned strategies is associated with global political changes. The years after the global financial crisis in 2008 were characterised by progressive weakening of faith in globalisation and the return of the fashion for political populism, whether left-wing or right-wing (communism versus nationalism in simplified and radical versions). This trend is particularly evident on the example of on the polarisation of the political scene in the United States (the case of 'Tea Party') and the European Union. After losing the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitution for Europe, scepticism about the European project deepens. It is deepened by the euro zone crisis and the rapid influx of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East. These phenomena reinforce the populist tendencies in politics. A common feature of many populist parties is a combination of policy aimed at increasing public expenditure (anti-austerity) with nationalism: euroscepticism, the postulate to restore internal borders, opposition to social assistance for immigrants from other EU countries. These proposals appear in various configurations: in southern Europe redistribution accents are stronger (also in terms of redistribution between EU countries – from the rich to the poor). Greek Syriza or Spanish Podemos present such a programme. Anti-immigrant slogans are stronger in the north (the National Front in France, the Sweden Democrats, the True Finns, etc.), usually combined with the strong state demand. A common feature of these various groups is opposition to contemporary global capitalism, as well as to economic freedom within the EU (issues such as the movement of workers, freedom to provide services outside the country of origin).

A manifestation of the retreat from globalisation is increasing scepticism about projects liberalising international trade. Protests against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are an example of resistance and fears aroused by building free trade zones. These concerns relate, among others, to job losses and the deteriorated quality of goods (i.e. the reluctance of Europeans to GMOs). This issue was raised previously by Western trade unions on the occasion of the EU enlargement by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (then they expressed fears of social dumping³⁵, that is, reducing labour standards and social protection in developed economies). Concerns of this kind appear not only in the EU, but also in the USA. Opposition to a similar agreement TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) connects main

³⁵ Cf. Bernaciak, M. 2012. *Social dumping: political catchphrase or threat to labour standards?* Brussels: ETUI.

candidates in the US presidential election in 2016: Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican Donald Trump.

Such changes of social awareness and changes on the political party scene are accompanied by political moves. In 2012, the European Commission set itself the objective of increasing the share of industrial production in the European economy from 16% to 20% by 2020. This action was a reaction to the diminishing role of industrial production in the last decade. The added value of industrial production decreased in the years 2000–2012 in almost all EU countries (although in Poland it increased slightly)³⁶. The decrease in the importance of industry can also be seen in the labour market: the share of industrial workers in employment fell in all Member States of the EU, although in Poland it was relatively small – a smaller decrease was recorded only in Austria and Germany³⁷. So far, the effects of this policy have not been clear. It seems that the relocation of industrial production outside the EU has slowed down, but we must remember that production from Western Europe has been normally transferred to Central and Eastern Europe³⁸. The ambition of the European Commission is to repeat the success of the US economy, where the process of reindustrialisation has started³⁹.

An argument which is most frequently cited in favour of reindustrialisation of economy in the twenty-first century – also in Poland – is the stability and security of employment and relatively high incomes of workers in conjunction with the efficiency of production (and profit). Innovativeness is also mentioned together with the apologetics of the restoration of industry. Jerzy Cieślik, a researcher of entrepreneurship at Koźmiński University, says: ‘We live with the belief that the biggest number of innovations are in the hi-tech industry, and we should concentrate our modest means on it. And that all the rest of the economy does not count. Meanwhile, nothing could be more wrong. There are also great opportunities in traditional sectors, e.g. in the food industry. Most of old industries are much more important for the economy than the Internet technology. Because there is a greater chance for a combination of sales growth, profits with employment. And hi-tech is such a domain which hardly generates jobs’⁴⁰. It is probably a regularity, although difficult to

³⁶ Heymann, E. 2013. *Europe’s re-industrialisation. The gulf between aspiration and reality*. Deutsche Bank Research Report. Frankfurt a.M., p. 4.

³⁷ Heymann, E. *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³⁸ Heymann, E. *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³⁹ Boston Consulting Group. 2011. *Made in America, again. Why manufacturing will return to the U.S.*

⁴⁰ Cited in *Polityka*, no. 14 (3003), p. 51.

capture empirically for many reasons, that new industries (not only services) do not generate mass employment, but one of the characteristics of most of business innovations, regardless of industry, has been employment reduction. New methods of production and work organisation have resulted in the diminution of agriculture and industry, but without a drop in their productivity, on the contrary – there is much more of everything, and industrial goods are cheaper and therefore more accessible (at least for those who have income).

3.2. Internationalisation of labour relations

The inverse of the reactive strategy is an attempt to adapt the operation model of workers' organisations to capital. The opposite of renationalisation of the economy (and labour relationships) is, therefore, the internationalisation of activities of trade unions. It is difficult because the legal bases of unions' operation differ greatly and their harmonisation is a matter of the future. In Europe, European Works Councils are a way of moving trade unions to the supranational level. Pursuant to Directive 94/45/EC they can be established in all enterprises employing more than 1,000 employees, of which at least 150 employees are in two or more EU member states. Their goal is to select the representation of employees from all countries where the company operates in order to obtain information and express their views on the strategies and decisions that affect the company and its employees. Of the 2,264 companies covered by the Directive, 828 (34%) have a Council, but the percentage of eligible employees covered by their representation is higher: 64% out of 14.5 million have this form of representation. The difference comes from the fact that Councils are established in many large international corporations⁴¹.

Polish workers had an opportunity to work in the Councils before their formal sanctioning in 2002. Employee representatives in the Councils are usually elected by trade unions, with the exception of the situation when unions cannot reach an agreement or when they do not exist. Studies show that their activities have a positive impact on labour relations in Poland – they are positively evaluated both by employers and employees. They disseminate good practices and a culture of dialogue⁴².

⁴¹ See Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A., Czarzasty, J. 2012. *Trade unions in Poland*. Research report. Brussels: ETUI.

⁴² See Gardawski, J. 2007. *Korporacje transnarodowe a Europejskie Rady Zakładowe w Polsce*. [Transnational corporations and European Works Councils in Poland.] Warszawa: SGH.

3.3. Unionisation of workers in atypical forms of employment

The third direction of the restoration of trade unions is the extension of their activities to workers in atypical forms of employment. In the Polish context, it concerns primarily covering workers on special purpose contracts with the union protection. The Constitutional Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to deprive people working on special purpose contracts and the self-employed of the right of association in trade unions. There are first attempts to unionise such workers: an inter-company union organisation was founded in the Gdansk shipyard. It associates totally approximately 150 self-employed persons and approximately 50 people on special purpose contracts. However, changing the law is not sufficient to enable the representation of these employees. There are cultural and even communication barriers. Trade unions were historically formed in clusters of workers in a similar situation and with similar interests. In the case of employees on special purpose contracts these conditions are rarely fulfilled.

At the end, let us add that we have to consider yet another scenario that goes beyond the traditional concept of labour relations, and which – quite likely – we are already observing *in statu nascendi*. It concerns the use by workers of new social media for the grassroots and informal – at this stage – realisation (organisation and protection) of their interests. All sorts of ‘employee internet forums’ perform now various functions: inform, advise, warn (i.e. black lists of employers) or provide free support through the popularisation of workers’ problems on the virtual public forum. The informal nature, loose and mobile ‘structures’ and supra-professionalism, supra-industry or supra-nationality are more suitable for many of today’s employees, as characteristics clearly distinguishing this type of activity from typical trade unions. Obviously, in such a situation it is much more difficult to achieve a ‘community of group interests’, though – when the role of the profession and the entire organisation of work change – the old organisational structures of employees are also no longer sufficient in bargaining processes and negotiations with employers. The strength of the collective impact of individualised media is evidenced, for example, by clients’ organised grassroots actions against financial institutions or large corporations⁴³. We can imagine that such methods or measures will be used by people to fight for

⁴³ Available at: <http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Czarne-listy-pracodawcow-hitem-internetu-7233707.html> [Accessed: 20 February 2016].

their workers' interests, and traditional trade unions – just like factory workers who will be replaced by robots – will disappear from the stage of history.

REFERENCES

- Bauman, Z. 1998. Zawrotna kariera „podklasy”. [The stunning career of the ‘underclass’.] *Przegląd Społeczny*, no. 1/2, pp. 2–3. Available at: <http://portal.tezeusz.pl/cms/tz/index.php?id=354> [Accessed: 20 February 2016].
- Bernaciak, M. 2012. *Social dumping: political catchphrase or threat to labour standards?* Brussels: ETUI.
- Białycki, I., Heyns, B. 1992. Democracy. Interests and corporatism in Poland. In: Adamski, W. ed. *Societal conflict and systemic change*. Warszawa: IFiS.
- Boston Consulting Group. 2011. *Made in America, again. Why manufacturing will return to the U.S.*
- Brynjolfsson, E., McAfee, A. 2011. *Race against the machine*. Lexington, Massachusetts: Digital Frontier Press.
- Brynjolfsson, E., McAfee, A. 2014. *The second machine age: work, progress, and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies*. W.W.Norton & Company.
- Burawoy, M., Lukacs, J. 1992. *The radiant past. Ideology and reality in Hungary's road to capitalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Castells, M. 2000. *The rise of network society*. 2nd ed. Cornwall, Padstow: T.J. International Limited.
- Castells, M. 2002. *The Internet galaxy*. Oxford University Press.
- Cowen, T. 2013. *Average is over. Powering America beyond the age of the great stagnation*. USA: Dutton.
- CSO. 2013. *Aktywność ekonomiczna ludności Polski, II kwartał 2013*. [Economic activity of Polish population, 2nd quarter 2013.] Warszawa: GUS.
- Ebbinghaus, B., Visser, J. 2000. *Trade unions in Western Europe since 1945*. Oxford: Macmillan.
- European Commission. 2013. *Industrial Relations in Europe 2012*. Brussels.
- Feliksiak, M. 2013. *Opinie o związkach zawodowych i protestach górników*. [Opinions about trade unions and miners' protests.] Research Report 66/2015. Warszawa: CBOS.
- Gardawski, J. ed. 2009. *Polacy pracujący a kryzys fordyzmu*. [Working Poles and the crisis of Fordism.] Warszawa: Scholar.
- Gardawski, J., Mrozowicki, A., Czarzasty, J. 2012. *Trade unions in Poland*. Research Report. Brussels: ETUI.

- Gardawski, J. 2007. *Korporacje transnarodowe a Europejskie Rady Zakładowe w Polsce*. [Transnational corporations and European Works Councils in Poland.] Warszawa: SGH.
- Goban-Klas, T. 2002. *Media i komunikowanie masowe*. [Media and mass communication.] Warszawa-Kraków.
- Hausner, J., Marody, M. eds. 2001. *Polski talk show. Dialog społeczny a integracja europejska*. [Polish talk show. Social dialogue and European integration.] Kraków: Małopolska Szkoła Administracji Publicznej AE w Krakowie.
- Heymann, E. 2013. *Europe's re-industrialisation. The gulf between aspiration and reality*. Deutsche Bank Research Report. Frankfurt a.M.
- Kessler, A. 2012. *Eat people. And other unapologetic rules for game-changing entrepreneurs*. London: Penguin Books.
- Kryszczuk, M. 2008. *Konceptualizacja i metody pomiaru pracowników sektora informacyjnego*. [Conceptualisation and measurement methods of the information sector employees.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne.
- Lasch, Ch. 1997. *Bunt elit*. [The revolt of the elites.] Liszki: Platan.
- Lier, H. *Nowy wiek*. [New age.] Warszawa: PIW.
- Markowski, R., Kotnarowski, M., Wenzel, M., Żerkowska-Balas, M. 2015. *Democratic audit of Poland 2014*. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
- Marody, M. ed. 2000. *Między rynkiem a etatem. Społeczne negocjowania polskiej rzeczywistości*. [Between the market and permanent employment. Social negotiations of Polish reality.] Warszawa: Scholar.
- Marody, M. ed. 2002. *Wymiary życia społecznego. Polska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*. [Dimensions of social life. Poland at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century.] Warszawa: Scholar.
- Mokrzycki, E. *Złudna władza ludu*. [Deceptive power of the people.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* no. 289 11–12 December 1999.
- Pankowski, K. 2013. *Czyje interesy reprezentują związki zawodowe*. [Whose interests trade unions represent.] Research Report BS/173/2013. Warszawa: CBOS.
- Pańkowska, M. 2001. *Zarządzanie zasobami informatycznymi*. [Management of IT resources.] Warszawa: Difin.
- Phelps, E. 2013. *Płaca za pracę*. [Rewarding work.] Warszawa: Kurhaus.
- Pistono, F. 2012. *Robots will steal your job but that's OK*. Lexington: Createspace.
- Rifkin, J. 2003. *Wiek dostępu*. [The age of access.] Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie.

- Wenzel, M. 2009. Związki zawodowe w badaniach CBOS 1980–2008. [Trade unions in the studies of the Public Opinion Research Centre 1980–2008.] In: Gardawski, J. ed. 2009. *Polacy pracujący a kryzys fordyzmu*. [Working Poles and the crisis of Fordism.] Warszawa: Scholar.
- Woś, R. 2014. *Dziecięca choroba liberalizmu*. [Childhood illness of liberalism.] Warszawa: Studio Emka.
- Wódz, K., Kulas, P. eds. 2010. *Dialog, demokracja, społeczeństwo obywatelskie*. [Dialogue, democracy, civil society.] Dąbrowa Górnicza: ESB.
- Zalewski, D. ed. 2001. *Dialog społeczny na poziomie regionalnym. Ocena szans rozwoju*. [Social dialogue at the regional level. Assessment of development opportunities.] Warszawa: IPiSS.

TRADE UNIONS AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON THE LABOUR MARKET

Summary

The scientific and technological revolution, as well as rapid acceleration in business processes on a global scale, affect labour and capital in an asymmetric manner. Capital is inherently more flexible than human beings, who, in addition to economic constraints, live in the network of social relations. The position of the working class is additionally weakened by process automation, replacing workers by increasingly intelligent robots. Our intention is to sketch a sequence of cause and effect of these processes: describe the basic aspects of the transformation of the labour market, their impact on trade unions and outline the future outlook for the trade union movement.

ZWIĄZKI ZAWODOWE A WPŁYW ZMIAN TECHNOLOGICZNYCH NA RYNEK PRACY

Streszczenie

W tekście przedstawiamy kilka wybranych – naszym zdaniem ważnych – problemów, przed którymi stoi obecnie ruch związkowy, i które wybiegają poza tradycyjną dyskusję na temat roli i znaczenia związków zawodowych w gospodarce wolnorynkowej (układy zbiorowe, komisje trójstronne, kodeks pracy itp.). Najogólniej rzecz biorąc, wszystkie relacje społeczne, które są

wpisane w dany model gospodarowania, wpisane są także w pewien kontekst kulturowy, polityczny oraz cywilizacyjny. Powiązania, zwyczajowe czy też instytucjonalne, między wymienionymi sferami życia, stanowią skomplikowaną mozaikę interesów, które – aby sprawę jeszcze bardziej doprecyzować – podlegają ciągłej zmianie czasowej i przestrzennej. W tym dynamicznym procesie przekształcania stosunków pracy niebagatelną rolę odgrywa dziś rozwój naukowo-techniczny (np. robotyzacja), którego oddziaływanie obejmuje skalę globalną i przyjmuje względnie szybkie tempo. Zmiany dotyczą także tradycyjnych relacji i stosunków pracy, co wpływa na postrzeganie samej aktywności zawodowej.

ПРОФСОЮЗЫ И ОТРАЖЕНИЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКИХ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ НА РЫНКЕ ТРУДА

Резюме

В тексте представлено несколько избранных, по нашему мнению, – важных проблем, которые в настоящее время стоят перед профсоюзным движением, и которые выходят за рамки традиционной дискуссии о роли и значении профсоюзов в условиях свободной рыночной экономики (ведение коллективных переговоров, трёхсторонние комитеты, трудовой кодекс и т.п.) В принципе, все социальные отношения, которые соотнесены с данной моделью управления, соотносятся также с определённым культурным, политическим или цивилизационным контекстом. Соотношения, обычные или же институциональные, между упомянутыми жизненными сферами, представляют собой сложную мозаику интересов, которые – с целью ещё большей конкретизации вопроса – подвержены непрерывным временным и пространственным изменениям. В этом динамическом процессе преобразования трудовых отношений в настоящее время немаловажную роль играет научно-технический прогресс (например, робототехника), значение которого приобретает глобальный масштаб и растёт в достаточно быстром темпе. Изменения касаются также традиционных взаимоотношений и трудовых отношений, что оказывает воздействие на восприятие самой профессиональной активности.

Adam Rogala-Lewicki

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY – THE UNFULFILLED PILLAR OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

INTRODUCTION

The subject of special services, in spite of being one of the most tantalising and mysterious spheres of human activity, remains a poorly implemented research challenge. This statement is particularly important in the light of the shortage of scientific studies. However, as shown by numerous examples from the political history of the world, special services have a significant position in modelling the socio-political reality. Regardless of the degree of their involvement in the processes of decision making, the model of organisation, and finally the controversy that accompanies their operations – special forces have been and will remain an important designatum of the fields of social activity and the space of the analysis of interested researchers. It should be noted, however, that the overwhelming majority of authors do not regard this form of activity as a separate field of science. An exception is Abram Shulsky's position, who calls intelligence a universal social science, the aim of which is to understand and forecast political, economic, social and military events¹. Undoubtedly, this is a position which takes into account the pragmatism associated with the function of intelligence. Intelligence is traditionally engaged in the collection, analysis and use of information from the perspective of the interests of the client.

¹ See more in: Shulsky, A., Schmitt, G.J. 1991. *Silent warfare: understanding the world of intelligence*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation; Shulsky, A., Alan, V., Stillion, J. 1997. *Preparing the U.S. Air Force for military operations other than war*. Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation.

Due to the exponentially changing information conditions, contemporary intelligence and its future cannot be perceived only through the prism of traditional definitions². The perception eliminating the perspective of a global network of information connections distorts the civilisational picture. The flow of information covers not only a growing number of state institutions, but also a growing number of countries. And thus the strengthening of information cooperation between countries, as well as within groups of countries, takes place not only at the level of overt procedures, e.g. in the administrative sphere, but also at the level of intelligence cooperation. Contemporary threats and the complexity of task influence the phenomenon of the approximation of different actors. The difference between internal and external threats disappears. New challenges require a comprehensive look and coherent approach to security. What is needed is greater than ever coordination and at the same time interrelation of various instruments of action. New actors of the political game are often unknown and do not fit the traditional pattern of national antagonisms. Their actions are not always preceded by an escalation of tension between easy to identify entities. Contemporary conflicts have a much more sophisticated character. Intelligence services need to constantly develop new methods of action and update them. It is necessary to increase the level of identification of tensions and their detection. Effective detection of so-called 'new threats' requires increased intelligence cooperation between various branches of intelligence. Such cooperation is essential for the implementation of multi-faceted activities responding to these challenges.

Undoubtedly, intelligence plays an important role in the development of a common security policy in Europe, being one of the elements of the European Security Strategy³. Appropriate intelligence support is necessary for the implementation of the European security policy. Europe needs a common sense of security, unified perception of threats, and thus joint risk assessments. For this reason, the EU must offer a natural framework for intensified cooperation, at least developing the so-called intelligence community – matched to the declared political ambitions of Europe.

² See more in: Zalewski, S. 2005. *Służby specjalne w państwie demokratycznym*. [Special services in a democratic state.] Warszawa; Zalewski, S. 2005. *Funkcja informacyjna służb specjalnych w systemie bezpieczeństwa RP*. [The information function of special services in the security system of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa; Herman, M. 2001. *Intelligence services in the information age – theory and practice*. London, Portland: Or.

³ See more in: Zięba, R. 1999. *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*. [The institutionalisation of European security.] Warszawa. Cf. Lach, A. *Europejskie prawo karne. Zarys wykładu*. [European criminal law. A lecture outline.] Toruń.

The question which should be asked concerns the architecture of the EU intelligence community. The starting point should be a modern interpretation of both the environment of threats and methods of counteracting them. Cooperation is a prerequisite for development, in particular for the preparation of complete analyses of the potential and intent. Currently this task is sometimes impossible for one agency. It is obvious that a more complete picture of the threat can be obtained using the informational and logistical potential of a larger number of agencies operating in the area of geographical or functional competences. Without sharing intelligence data security authorities operating in Europe may have different perspectives leading to a divergence in the risk assessment and, consequently, the reduction of the response effectiveness. Meanwhile, the EU is to formulate and implement a common and uniform security policy. It can be very difficult without a coherent intelligence support. Therefore, firstly, a security strategy formulated in a modern way cannot focus only on the state level. Secondly, it must have a multi-contextual dimension, covering different areas of overlapping threats. Thirdly, it must take into account security challenges in the transnational perspective, with regard to their effects and geographical location. It is necessary to synchronise national and European activities⁴, and the former European Communities⁵ are an undisputed and one of the most powerful players in the arena of global international relations. More and more often the region is viewed from the perspective of the whole family of nations rather than individual states. Foreign intelligence agencies must take this perspective into account. The European Community has been aware of it almost from its inception. It should be remembered that the timeline of tightening security cooperation in Europe covers subsequent initiatives over the years, including those initiated long before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. We have to mention such projects as: Interpol⁶, the TREVI

⁴ Since 7 February 1992, i.e. since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht the previous formula of integration has been expanded, basing it on three pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters – forming together an organisation called the European Union.

⁵ It is recognized that the European Communities were created when six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed: (1) the Treaty of ‘Paris’, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 (it entered into force on 23 July 1952), (2) ‘Roman’ treaties, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) concluded on 25 March 1957 (both entered into force on 1 January 1958).

⁶ In 1923, the International Criminal Police Commission was founded at the International Criminal Police Congress of Vienna. After World War II, during a conference

group⁷, the TREVI II group⁸, the TREVI III group⁹, the TREVI 92 group¹⁰, the Kilowatt group¹¹, the Pompidou group¹², Europol¹³. The culmination

in Brussels it was reconstituted, with its headquarters in Paris, and in 1965 it got the name: the International Criminal Police Organisation – Interpol, at the same time the headquarters of the General Secretariat were moved to Saint-Cloud. At present, Interpol includes 187 Member States. The organisational structure of Interpol is based on a network of National Bureaus of Interpol, coordinated by the General Secretariat with the headquarters in Lyon, reporting its actions to the General Assembly and the Executive Committee. The exchange of information takes place in four working languages: English, French, Spanish and Arabic. See Łoś-Nowak, T. ed. 2004. *Organizacje w stosunkach międzynarodowych: istota-mechanizmy działania-zasięg.* [*Organisations in international relations: the essence – mechanisms of action –range.*] Wrocław.

⁷ The TREVI group (*Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale*) established in Luxembourg in 1975 by the Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs of the then European Community. It established a foundation for the later creation of the third pillar of the EU. TREVI permanent secretariat was established in Rome in 1975. See Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2007. Implementacja współpracy policyjnej w sprawach karnych. [Implementation of police cooperation in criminal cases.] In: Góralski, W. M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca.* [*The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.*] Warszawa.

⁸ The TREVI II group was founded in 1976 mainly in order to launch joint training of police officers.

⁹ The TREVI III group was established in 1986 as an initiative to undertake the fight against cross-border organized crime.

¹⁰ The TREVI 92 group was established in 1989 in connection with the forthcoming abolition of controls at internal borders of the created Schengen zone.

¹¹ The Kilowatt group was created by 15 countries (the then EC, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel and the US) in the seventies for the cooperation of the security forces to combat terrorism (mainly Islamic).

¹² The Intergovernmental Group for Cooperation to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking (the Pompidou Group) was established in 1971 as a team, the aim of which was to solve drug problems. Since 1980 the Group has operated in the framework of the Council of Europe. Currently, it consists of 34 European countries. The Pompidou Group, among others, initiated the development of research on drug problems. See Czaplński, W., Łacny, J. 2006. Współpraca sądowa i policyjna w sprawach karnych. [Judicial and police cooperation in criminal cases] In: Barcz, J. ed. *Prawo Unii Europejskiej. Zagadnienia systemowe. Prawo materialne i polityki.* [*The European Union law. Systemic issues. Substantive and political law.*] Warszawa; Gruszczak, A. 2009. *Współpraca policyjna w Unii Europejskiej w wymiarze transgranicznym. Aspekty polityczne i prawne.* [*Police cooperation in the European Union in the cross-border dimension. Political and legal aspects.*] Kraków.

¹³ Europol (European Police Office) was mentioned for the first time in the Treaty of Maastricht. The agency began its operation on 3 January 1994 as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU). In 1998, the Member States ratified the Europol Convention. Europol,

of these activities was the inclusion of cooperation in the sphere of justice and internal affairs to the so-called third pillar of the European Union, modified by the Amsterdam Treaty into police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Some Member States, without waiting for the political will of the others, made efforts to strengthen cooperation in security matters above what the third pillar offered. In order to realise this closer cooperation such projects as the Tampere Programme¹⁴, the Hague Programme¹⁵, the

based in the Hague does not have any operating forces. It is a service preventing and combating organised crime of an international nature, and in this respect supports the relevant authorities of the Member States (e.g. helps to overcome language barriers). See Safjański, T. 2009. *Europejskie Biuro Policji Europol. Geneza. Główne aspekty działania. Perspektywy rozwoju.* [The European Police Office Europol. Genesis. The main aspects of the operation. Prospects for development.] Warszawa.

- ¹⁴ The Tampere Programme is a joint action plan of EU countries' governments within the development of the third pillar. It was adopted at the meeting of the European Council on 15–16 October 1999. The agenda covered such tasks as: (1) reduction of asylum proceedings and strengthening of the fight against illegal immigration – by unifying asylum procedures, (2) creation of a European legal space intended to ensure EU citizens freer access to justice systems, (3) common fight against organised crime through the creation of two new agencies Eurojust and the European Police College (4) cooperation with third countries. See more in: Grzelak, A. 2006. Współpraca państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej w ramach Eurojustu. [The cooperation of the Member States of the European Union within the framework of Eurojust.] In: Górski, A., Sakowicz A., eds. *Zwalczanie przestępczości w Unii Europejskiej – współpraca sądowa i policyjna w sprawach karnych.* [Combating crime in the European Union – judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters.] Warszawa; Grzelak, A. 2007. Współpraca instytucjonalna w sprawach karnych na przykładzie Eurojustu i Europejskiej Sieci Sądowej – problemy teoretyczne i praktyczne. [Institutional cooperation in criminal matters on the example of Eurojust and the European Judicial Network – theoretical and practical problems.] In: Czapliński, W., Wróbel, A. eds. *Współpraca sądowa w sprawach cywilnych i karnych.* [Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal cases.] Warszawa.
- ¹⁵ The Hague Programme (HP), attached to the conclusions of the European Council meeting (EC) in Brussels on 4–5 November 2004, concerned the strengthening of the so-called area of freedom, security and justice and included an action plan for the next 5 years. The programme defined ten priorities on the basis of which the Council invited the European Commission to translate them into concrete actions, including among others: (1) fundamental rights and citizenship, (2) combating terrorism, (3) migration, (4) internal and external borders and visas, (5) a common asylum area, (6) the integration of foreigners, (7) privacy protection and information security, (8) organized crime, (9) administration of justice in civil and criminal matters, (10) the area of freedom, security and justice. The Hague Programme for the first time clearly stated that the political objective of the EU is the abolition of border checks at internal borders with the new Member States. See Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2007. Implementacja

Stockholm Programme¹⁶ were subsequently initiated and finally the Treaty of Prüm¹⁷ was signed.

* * *

We should be aware that the acceleration of the activities of certain countries should be associated with the emergence of a real terrorist threat in the world and in Europe (bombings in Madrid and London). Therefore, intelligence cooperation mainly covers this type of danger¹⁸. It is obvious that

współpracy policyjnej w ramach III Filaru Unii Europejskiej. [The implementation of police cooperation under the third pillar of the European Union.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca.* [The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.] Warszawa.

¹⁶ The Stockholm Programme defined the European Union's priorities in the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010–14. The activities were aimed at the interests and needs of citizens. It was stressed, among others, that European citizenship must be transformed from an abstract idea into a concrete reality.

¹⁷ Germany proposed the adoption of an international agreement allowing, among others, access to police databases of the EU countries. In the absence of a convergence of views of all EU Member States, the Treaty of Prüm was signed on 27 May 2005 only by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria. Since the Treaty of Prüm is a Treaty of International law, adopted outside the framework of the European Union, the German Presidency in the first half of 2007 initiated the integration of the Prüm treaty into the EU legal framework. On 6 August 2008 two Prüm decisions were published in the Official Journal of the EU: the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime and the Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime. The provisions of the decisions provide for direct exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration data between the EU Member States, and in this respect are the reconstruction of the architecture of the SIS and VIS systems. See more in: Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2007. Główne kierunki realizacji Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The main directions of implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.] In: Góralski, W. M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca.* [The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.] Warszawa.

¹⁸ In 2003 the European Security Strategy was adopted. Javier Solana stressed then that the joint assessment of threats, as the most effective element of the security strategy requires the improvement of the exchange of information between individual states. At the beginning of December 2005, at a meeting ending the British Presidency the European Union the Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted. The document is based on the concept of 4P consisting of such activities as: (1) prevent, (2) protect, (3) pursue,

the EU must coordinate a wide range of security policy tools. That is why it requires support. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, apart from Europol, the structural framework of security policy includes, among others:

- The Club de Berne;
- The High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Defence Policy (HR CFSP), acting within the Secretariat of the European Council, together with the subordinated Policy Planning and Early Warning Team;
- The European Council's Working Party on Terrorism, meeting 6 times a year,
- The Counter-Terrorism Coordinator with the so-called Counter Terrorism Group (EU countries, Switzerland and Norway);
- The Intelligence Division of the European Military Staff (INTDIV);
- The European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), formerly (SitCen – EU Situation Centre) at the General Secretariat of the Council supporting the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and responsible for providing information about the conditions of adaptation to crisis management;
- The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) – an agency operating since January 2002 with the headquarters in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain, responsible for processing and delivering information from the analysis of satellite images, supporting decision-making processes in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

The above EU bodies have different responsibilities and are engaged in the so-called security production. The division of duties is based on the instrumental and geographical logic. With regard to instruments we can outline the schematic division into five areas of activity: (1) military (2) judicial, (3) civil and humanitarian, (4) economic, (5) political/diplomatic. In geographical terms we can make a clear distinction between internal and external

(4) prepare. A few days later the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was adopted. It stressed the importance of the fight against root causes of terrorism consisting in breaking the existing network of terrorist cells and organisations, and cutting them off from the possibility of recruiting new members. See more in: Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2004. Mechanizm podejmowania decyzji w zakresie Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [Decision-making mechanism in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.] In: Parzymies, S., Zięba, R. eds. *Instytucjonalizacja wielostronnej współpracy międzynarodowej w Europie*. [The institutionalisation of multilateral international cooperation in Europe.] Warszawa.

dimensions of functioning of the EU, and within these dimensions in each of them also a division into the activity of nation states and the European Union as a whole.

The objective scope of the EU's activity is impressive and permanently increases together with the broadening of the harmonised space. A natural relationship appears here: the greater competence autonomy at the European level, the proportionately greater need for support at this level. It concerns common mechanisms of protection against surveillance and safe keeping of the interests of this political organism¹⁹. With this in mind it is certain that the European Union needs both intelligence and counterintelligence protection. Services should primarily strengthen and contribute better programming and consequently improve the quality of European policies. 'In the case of the European Union, interest of foreign intelligence services stems in a large part from the enormous economic importance and geopolitical potential. The EU should have its own institutions, legislative and executive bodies and its own budget. The need to protect information held by EU institutions and bodies grows as a result of closer integration covering subsequent areas. Wide powers of the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament generate the threat of infiltration and attempts to influence decisions taken in the Union by foreign special services. Transparency and openness characterising the functioning of EU institutions, as well as common in the contemporary world access to information through modern ICT tools facilitate the acquisition of desired information by foreign intelligence. (...) The global position of the European Union, legal acts created in the EU have a significant impact on the shape of the law of many countries, not only the EU members. (...) The scale of the phenomenon may be evidenced by German estimates according to which about 80 percent of economic acts enacted by the Bundestag today have their origin in EU directives'²⁰.

A still valid question is, therefore, whether the European Union needs specially dedicated EU intelligence agencies in this regard, or if the institutions functioning at the level of individual Member States are sufficient. The current counterintelligence model is multidimensional. 'The counterintel-

¹⁹ Cf. Borowiecki, R., Kwieciński, M. eds. 2006. *Informacja w zintegrowanej Europie. Koncepcje i narzędzia zarządzania wobec wyzwań i zagrożeń*. [Information in integrated Europe. Management concepts and tools in the face of challenges and threats.] Warszawa.

²⁰ Wróbel, P. Czy Unia Europejska potrzebuje służb kontrwywiadowczych. [Does the European Union need counterintelligence services?] *Portal Spraw Zagranicznych*. Available at: <http://intl.feedfury.com/content/18595929-pawe-wr-bel-czy-unia-europejska-potrzebuje-s-u-b-kontrwywiadowczych.html> [Accessed: 1 May 2014].

ligence protection, the safe keeping of data held by EU's institutions with the headquarters in Brussels is the responsibility of Belgian services – the State Security Service (*Veiligheid van de Staat, SV/Surete de l'Etat, SE*) and the Main Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid ADIV/Service Général du Renseignement et de la Sécurité, SGRS*), which do not have a very good opinion. The EU agency Europol is partially engaged in tasks connected with the protection of access to classified data. However, its competences cover only criminal intelligence (...) On the other hand, at the intergovernmental level EU countries are obliged to protect common interests, including counterintelligence protection. The membership in the EU imposes on the states the duty to increase the level of protection of common interests, also in the scope of counterintelligence safeguarding²¹.

Despite the clearly defined counterintelligence needs inside the Union, the need to support EU activities carried out outside is even more prominent. It should be noted that civilian (support, humanitarian) and military missions carried out in various regions of the world are an important tool for strengthening the EU's international position. Due to the protection of influence zones, of course, countries of Europe, of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions, as well as Africa (due to post-colonial interests) enjoy the greatest interest of the EU.

* * *

The so-called Petersberg Declaration, signed on 19 June 1992 in Bonn, was a cornerstone of the construction of a defence arm of the EU, including the creation of the possibility of sending foreign contingents. Its signatories were the Member States of the so-called Western European Union. The WEU Ministerial Council decided to set up a European army called Forces Answerable (FAWEU). In addition to defence tasks, the Petersberg Declaration gave the WEU Member States' military units the possibility of (1) participation in humanitarian missions, (2) participation in the process of restoring peace in areas of conflict, (3) joint crisis management. The composition of forces was established on 19 May 1993 in Rome and approved on 22 November 1993 by the WEU. These military forces consisted of more than 2000 units. However, their real use was small²². In 1996, Germany proposed the incorporation of

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² In 1992–1995 naval forces monitored the waters of the Adriatic enforcing the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the years 1993–2001 there were policing operations on the

the WEU into the EU. France supported the German proposals. The UK opposed it suggesting the establishment of a special European division in NATO. At the European Council meeting in Cologne on 3–4 June 1999 EU leaders adopted a declaration on strengthening the common European policy in the sphere of security and defence, which stated that if the EU is to be able to conduct its operations of conflict prevention and crisis management it should have its own forces. The EU was to take over from the WEU operational functions, including Petersberg tasks. On 10–11 December 1999 in Helsinki the next European Council meeting took place, during which the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy was officially announced. Although the summit was aimed at the autonomisation of Europe's position, the North Atlantic Alliance remained the basis for common defence. Increased cooperation with NATO and better use of the EU's potential were declared. Currently, in accordance with Art. 17 paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (in the version of the Nice Treaty of 26 February 2001) the Community can carry out humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (previous Petersberg tasks).

In the context of UE-NATO relations, the European Security and Defence Identity should be mentioned, the concept of which was born in 1991 as an attempt of the conceptual connection of the established European Union foreign and security policy with the role of NATO as the basis for the European system of collective defence. Countries which were members of both the EU and the WEU were promoters of the ESDI. The term European Security and Defence Identity was accepted in the discourse of NATO only in the Declaration of the Heads of State and Governments at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 11 January 1994²³.

In the calendar of events in the EU security sphere we cannot omit the information on the institution named the Headline Goal 2010. The document adopted in June 2004 defines the military aspect of the EU's crisis response

Danube, in Mostar, and in Albania; in 1998–1999 they were carrying out observations of the state of security in Kosovo, and in 1999–2001 fields in Croatia were demined.

²³ In 1992–1993, the Council of Western European Union was restrained in the use of the term ESDI. In the Petersberg Declaration the WEU Council of Ministers expanding the role of the WEU as a defence component of the European Union and the European pillar of NATO, in line with the Declaration adopted by the WEU Member States at the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991 (point 9) does not refer explicitly to the concept of the ESDI. See Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2001. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa UE. [The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.]* Warszawa.

capabilities²⁴. The Headline Goal is a continuation of the Helsinki Headline Goal, also known as the European/Main Goal, which was developed at the Helsinki summit of the European Council of 1999, and already foresaw the creation by 2003 of EU rapid response forces in the number of 60,000 soldiers. These forces were to be self-sufficient and composed of elements of all types of forces (Army, Air Force, Navy). Due to the fact that these ambitious plans were not realised in the prescribed period, the Goal realisation was prolonged by means of a document in 2009. As part of the implementation of the Objective the European Defence Agency and the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and its operational division, that is Battle Groups were established²⁵. The above mentioned armed forces of the EU are a foundation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)²⁶. The launch of EU missions abroad in the framework of the Common Policy does not require a UN mandate. An exception is the intention to use military force, for which the approval of the UN Security Council is needed. The rule is that foreign missions of the EU are undertaken with the approval and participation of only the countries concerned²⁷. In the CSDP framework, we can

²⁴ The main goals are: (a) to improve the EU's defence capabilities, (b) to promote European armaments cooperation; (C) to strengthen the European defence industry and technological base and to create a competitive European defence market (d) to support research in order to strengthen the industrial and technological potential in the field of defence capabilities. See. Zięba, R. 2008. Bezpieczeństwo obszaru WNP. [Security of the CIS] In: Zięba, R. ed. *Bezpieczeństwo państw zrzeszonych w NATO i Unii Europejskiej.* [Security of members of NATO and the European Union.] Warszawa.

²⁵ The latter are rapid response units equipped by the Member States, including 1,500 soldiers each, capable of sustaining themselves in the area of operations and deployed in the area of operations within 10 days of the decision made by the EU. Battle Groups are either purely national or multinational units commanded within the concept of the so-called rotary and largest contribution command (framework nation). For example, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain create separate national groups. Since 2009 Poland has been a member of a multinational group with Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia. See more in Górka-Winter, B. 2006. Grupy bojowe Unii Europejskiej – koncepcja, proces formowania, perspektywy. [EU battle groups – the concept, the formation process, perspectives.] *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 69 (409), p. 1719; Panek, B. 2007. Operacje reagowania kryzysowego w europejskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony. [Crisis response operations in the European security and defense policy.] *Zeszyty Naukowe AON*, no. 4(69), pp. 119–125.

²⁶ Until the Lisbon Treaty its name was the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

²⁷ Military and police forces of the European Union have been involved so far in 17 missions abroad, including in: South Sudan (EU Aviation Security CSDP Mission), Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania (EU Capacity Building Mission in the

distinguish four types of conducted missions: (a) police missions, (b) advisory missions and tasks of civilian-military support, (c) advisory missions on legal matters/monitoring missions, (d) military missions.

In the CSDP framework, the most important decisions are made at meetings of the EU Council in the rank of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defence Ministers. Strategic directions of cooperation in the EU in the area of security and defence are determined unanimously by the Member States at meetings of the European Council. This body meets at least twice a year at the level of Heads of State and Governments. Apart from the EU Council, the institutional division of the CSDP consists of: (a) the Political and Security Committee, (b) the EU Military Committee, (c) the EU Military Staff, and (d) the Politico-Military Group. On 12 July 2014 the European Defence Agency was established. On 3 November 2005 a NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff was created, and on 1 March 2006 an EU planning Cell located at the NATO Headquarters. On 18 July 2005 the European Security and Defence College was established, which is composed of cooperating national institutions of the EU Member States. In addition, also agencies taken over from the WEU work for the CSDP: the above mentioned European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), that is formerly the EU Situation Centre and the European Union Institute for Security Studies²⁸.

Horn of Africa), Niger (EU Capacity Building Mission in SAHEL Niger), Israel and Palestine (EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories; (EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories), Moldova and Ukraine (EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine), Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Iraq (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission in Iraq), Georgia (EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia), Afghanistan (European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan), Congo (European Union Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo; EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Kosovo (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo), Somalia (European Union Naval Force ATALANTA; EU Training Mission in Somalia), Mali (EU training mission in Mali), and Libya (EU Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya). See Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Operacje i misje UE. [EU operations and missions.]* Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa/operacje_nato_i_ue/operacje_ue/ [Accessed 22 September 2014].

²⁸ The above description of the main institutional pillars of the Common Security and Defence Policy should be supplemented with information that apart from forces built on the basis of the CSDP, covering all Member States, in parallel narrower initiatives of certain Member States are formed to coordinate their actions in a way beside the Common Policy. In 2006 military police units – the European Gendarmerie Force

In the case of the European Union, known for its bureaucracy, undertaking action in crisis management requires a lot of political and administrative coordination. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the primary operational decision-making body in the field of security policy. On a regular basis the Committee works out decisions of the EU Council as the most important body of the CSDP and politically supervises their implementation²⁹. In turn, the highest military body of the EU is still the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which is a forum linking military representatives of the

(EUROGENDFOR, EGF), were established with the headquarters in Italian Vicenza. They were established under an agreement of five EU countries (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands). The proposal to create these forces was put forward on 3–4 October 2003 by the then Minister of Defence of France, Michèle Alliot-Marie. The agreement was signed by defence ministers of the five countries on 17 September 2004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. On 17 December 2008, the Romanian gendarmerie became the sixth full member of the organisation. It is provided that further countries may join it. The structure consists of 800–900 police officers, with the possibility to quickly resupply the manpower mainly on the basis of the French *Gendarmerie* and Italian *Carabinieri*. Another and at the same time earlier military initiative is so-called Eurocorps, also called European Corps. The organisation was founded in 1992 by Germany and France, as part of the so-called Elysée Treaty of 1963. It is a joint multinational rapid response military unit based in Strasbourg, formed to take part in crisis, humanitarian, rescue and peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Eurocorps headquarters are located in Baden-Württemberg. It is worth noting that in April 2000, Eurocorps took command of the peacekeeping force KFOR in Kosovo. The members of Eurocorps fall into two categories: the so-called ‘framework nations’ which include Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and ‘associated nations’ (observers) which currently include: Greece, Poland, Italy and Turkey. In November 2011 Poland was invited to the negotiations on accession to the Eurocorps as a ‘framework nation’. Poland’s accession date has been fixed for 1 January 2016. See Mojsiewicz, C. ed. 1998. *Leksykon współczesnych międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych*. [The lexicon of contemporary international political relations.] Wrocław; Polska państwem ramowym euro korpusu. [Poland as a framework nation of Eurocorps.] Available at: http://www.sgwp.wp.mil.pl/pl/1_659.html [Accessed 20 September 2014].

²⁹ Meetings of the Committee, held in principle twice a week, are attended by national representatives in the rank of ambassador. The Committee also receives substantive support in the sphere of the civilian dimension of crisis management in the form of opinions and analyses from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). In turn, the Politico-Military Group (PMG) is responsible for politico-military aspects of the CSDP, including the preparation of plans and instruments in the field of military and civil-military operations of the Union. The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), the youngest of the permanent CSDP structures, established in 2009, is responsible for planning of civilian and military operations in the political dimension. All the committees can count on the support of other EU

member countries. The Committee provides recommendations on military matters directly to the Political and Security Committee³⁰.

Every activity of the bodies listed above needs information support. They receive the greatest support from the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (UE INTCEN), a cell previously belonging to the space of the General Secretariat of the EU Council, and currently co-creating the European External Action Service (CPCC). This agency is the most far-reaching and the most practical instrument of EU security policy, and is also one of few community and at the same time ready tools of the classic intelligence provenance. Therefore, more attention should be devoted to it.

The EU INTCEN was established in 1999 with the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (headed by Javier Solana as the EU High Representative). Initially, the agency was known as the Joint Situation Centre, and from 2005 officially as the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN). Finally, in 2012 it was given its currently name, i.e. the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN). In 2010 the INTCEN became a part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, the agency has a longer history since its origins date back to the Western European Union (WEU), when without formal structures it was a part of the General Secretariat of the Council. The personnel coming from seven intelligence services of the Member States assigned to the centre gathered confidential intelligence data in the framework of the so-called 'insiders club', consisting of analysts of intelligence of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK (functioning in a way outside the framework of the EU and the Club de Berne). Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 a decision was made to use the existing Centre to create a forum for the exchange of classified information on a wider scale. In June 2004 within the SITCEN a special counter terrorist cell was established (the Counter Terrorist Group) composed of representatives of Norway and Switzerland in addition to the analysts form the so-called 'insiders club'.

structures, which previously were subordinated directly to the General Secretariat of the Council and are now part of the European External Action Service (CPCC).

³⁰ The Committee's work is supported by the Working Group of the Military Committee (EUMC), meetings of which are held regularly once a week with the participation of senior military representatives of the Member States and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as the body responsible for the strategic planning process at the political level, having the possibility of creating an Operational Centre in a short time, capable of independent command of a selected operation.

It should be noted that the legal basis for the establishment of the INTCEN remains unclear. According to a report prepared in 2009 by Jelle van Buuren – a Dutch analyst of the EUROWATCH Institute (Stichting EUROWATCH), the transfer of the organisation from the WEU to the General Secretariat of the Council was not made on the basis of a decision of the Council, but on the sole initiative of Javier Solana³¹. There is no publicly available document defining the mandate for the activities of the Centre. This is explained by the fact that the Centre was subordinated to the administrative autonomy of the Secretariat, therefore, formally the SITCEN (then Joint Situation Centre) was established with the parent Political Cell pursuant to the Decision of the EU Council of 22 January 2001 introducing the legal order of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and was functionally subordinated to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy³². It is worth noting that in the document establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS), despite the shift of the SITCEN to this structure, there is still no provision formally legalizing the Agency. It mentions the functioning of the Centre as such – treating it as an existing fact. All employees were moved *en bloc* to the European External Action Service (with the exception of employees supporting the Security Accreditation Office). The issue of doubts connected with the legal basis for the functioning of the INTCEN remains open.

³¹ This means that the agency initially operated only on the basis of political, not formal legitimisation. At that time, the Centre's mission was, among others,: (a) contribution to early warning on the basis of open source materials, military intelligence and diplomatic reporting, (b) monitoring and evaluation of the situation, (c) providing support for crisis management, (d) providing the operational contact point for the High Representative. See. Van Buuren, J. 2009. *Secret truth: The EU joint situation centre*. Amsterdam: Eurowatch, p. 9.

³² The European External Action Service supports the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in performing his/her duties. The legal basis of this service is Article 27 paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the European Union. Its organisation and functioning were established by a decision of the Council. In October 2009, the Council adopted guidelines on the role and functioning of the service. In accordance with the guidelines the European External Action Service comes under the authority of the High Representative. It assists the High Representative in preparing proposals for the Union' foreign policy and implementation of the decisions adopted by the Council in this field. The European External Action Service can also support the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and individual Commissioners in the activities connected with the EU foreign policy. See Council Decision (2010/427/UE) of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, (Official Journal of the European Union L 201 of 3.08.2010).

The Centre is comprised of the members of the Political cell and the EU Military Committee (EUMC), as well as representatives of the European Commission. Moreover, officers of intelligence agencies of the Member States of the EU are delegated to the INTCEN. The Centre is responsible for gathering information on potential and existing crises and international conflicts, preparing analyses and providing them to the Political and Security Committee (COPS), the EU Military Committee and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (as the European Union body responsible for the management and supervision of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its integral parts, i.e. the European Security and Defence Policy).

The INTCEN monitors and assesses international events, focusing especially on sensitive geographical areas, with a focus on the detection of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats. Officially, it is stated that the Centre is responsible for: (a) providing exclusive information, (b) providing assessments and briefings and a range of products based on intelligence, (c) acting as a single entry point in the EU for classified information coming from the Member States' civilian intelligence and security services, (d) supporting and assisting the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations.

Organisationally since 2012 the EU INTCEN has been composed of two divisions: (1) the analysis division – responsible for providing strategic analyses based on data from the security and intelligence services of the Member States and (2) the general and external relations division divided into legal, administrative, and open source analysis departments.

In the years 2001–2010, British diplomat William Shapcott was the director of the Centre. Currently, the Agency is headed by Ilkka Salmi, previously head of the Finnish intelligence agency (*Suojelupoliisin*), with earnings of approximately 180,000 EUR per year, who directly reports only the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy³³. At the

³³ The Amsterdam Treaty established the Office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (colloquially *Monsieur PESC*), and the post of the Secretary General of the Council was incorporated into it. Under the Treaty of Lisbon a function of a single High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created, whose role is to conduct the European Union foreign policy. Jürgen Trumpf, a German, was the first, and now this function is performed by Federica Mogherini, an Italian, who in turn is a successor of Catherine Ashton, a Briton, (in office since 1 December 2009). According to the Art. 5 of the Protocol

turn of 2012 and 2013 the INTCEN employed 67 people (out of about 3,500 employees in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy), including 47 employees in the analytical division and 15 in the division of foreign relations plus Ilkka Salmi and four directly subordinated agents. It should be noted that human resources of the INTCEN are small compared with the national intelligence services. For example, the British MI5 employs about 4,000 people at its headquarters. However, they increase systematically. In December 2010 the ‘EU observer’ reported that the organisation had a team of just 15 analysts. This means that the number of employees of the Agency has multiplied in recent years.

In 2007, the functional capability of the Centre was strengthened by the establishment of uniform standards for the analysis of intelligence and counterintelligence data (both of the civil and military divisions). Since 2007 INTCEN has been a part of a platform called Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) which combines the civilian space (UE INTCEN) and the military one (the Military Staff of the European Union – EUMS)³⁴. This formalised the cooperation between the two sectors, which in practice had already existed before. In 2010 the EU Military Staff was, just like the INTCEN, incorporated into the European External Action Service (EEAS).

It should be emphasised that the two structures are the main clients of the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), an agency with the headquarters in Torrejón de Ardoz near Madrid, responsible for processing and delivering

annexed to the EU Treaty the mandate of the High Representative is linked to the term of office of the European Commission. The European External Action Service supports them in performing their duties. The representation of the EU outside is not an exclusive duty of the High Representative. In the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council President is authorized in his scope to represent the EU to the outside (not limiting the powers of the High Representative). The treaty does not specify, however, how the work should be divided between the two offices, leaving the question of this division to be determined in practice. See Zięba, R. 2007. *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej*. [Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.] Warszawa.

³⁴ The European Union Military Staff is a body of the European Union established on 22 January 2001 by the EU Council, acting in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. It is a department of the Secretariat of the EU Council. It is composed of military experts delegated by the Member States. Only at least a three-star general can be elected the chairman. See. Góralski, W.M. 2007. *Koncepcja ustrojowa i instytucjonalna II filara Unii Europejskiej*. [The systemic and institutional concept of the 2nd pillar of the European Union.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca*. [The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.] Warszawa.

information coming from the analysis of satellite images. The Centre was established on the basis of the Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001³⁵, then amended by the Council Joint Action 2009/834/CFSP of 10 November 2009 amending Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre³⁶. The Centre operates under the political supervision of the Political and Security Committee, and operational leadership of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and it reached its full operational capacity in 2002. The Member States, the European Commission, selected third countries (European members of NATO not belonging to the Union and other countries applying for membership) and international organisations (mainly the UN, the OSCE, NATO) may direct inquiries to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who – if they are executable by the EUSC – assigns the tasks and orders their execution³⁷.

The proposed support for the tasks undertaken by various units of the EU relates in particular to the shortage of information. However, the range of the use of the Centre is small. This results, among others, from the lack of habits, good practices and procedures in this regard. For example, the European Commission usually undertakes itself the tasks of obtaining information (usually imagery intelligence – IMINT). This means that instead of being a decision-making centre and acting as the main recipient of such products, in most cases, it provide itself with this kind of support. As you might guess it is not systematically prepared for this kind of activity, particularly in terms of

³⁵ Official Journal of the European Union L 200 of 25.7.2001.

³⁶ Official Journal of the European Union L 297 of 13.11.2009.

³⁷ The Political and Security Committee provides the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the guidelines concerning the priorities of the EUSC. The latter determines the directions of the EUSC activity, without prejudice to the competence of the Administrative Board and the Director, as well as reports to the Political and Security Committee. The Administrative Board adopts annual and long-term work programmes and budgets, and also discusses issues related to the functioning, staff and equipment of the EUSC. The chairperson of the Administrative Board is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who presents reports on the work of the Administrative Board to the Council of the European Union. Each Member State and the European Commission delegate one representative to the latter. The EUSC Director participates as a rule in the meetings of the Administrative Board, in which the CEO of European Union Military Staff and the Chairman of the Military Committee of the European Union can participate. Currently, Tomaž Lovrenčič is a director of the Centre. See European Union Satellite Centre. Available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/regulatory_agencies_bodies/security_agencies/eusc/index_pl.htm. [Accessed 20 September 2014].

technical, analytical intelligence, not to mention obtaining personal sources (HUMINT). But the benchmark are areas that may constitute priceless value added. It can be assumed that within the competence of the EU the minimum range of space in which intelligence support is essential boils down to the following areas of activity:

1. Interventions and military missions of the EU – where intelligence aid is of key importance. It allows to avoid unnecessary losses and errors, both in strategic planning, as well as at the stage of undertaking individual operations. The area of action must be thoroughly examined by analytical centres. Currently the INTCEN supports strategic planning of the EU Military Staff, which begins immediately after the occurrence of a crisis. Currently, Member States aim to achieve political objectives in the field of security and defence creating so-called ‘coalitions of the willing’. Intelligence support must be directed at the preparation of the potential and the conduct of activities in geographically and politically different territories. We must remember that the architecture of the military part of the CSDP cannot go beyond its material competences.
2. Civil protection and humanitarian assistance – treated on the same logistic and operational level. It concerns the assessment of the potential disaster occurrence, the scale of the event that has already occurred, and the type and amount of required assistance. The analysis of the situation in the case of politically unstable regions outside the EU must be supplemented by the assessment of threats to the EU mission on the spot, including the assessment of risks to EU employees. Since the humanitarian aid decisions must be taken only in accordance with the needs and interests of the victims, humanitarian and aid interventions often cover the geographical areas beyond those covered by the activities in the field of EU crisis management.
3. Trade and development, including the protection of economic interests with regard to the actual diagnosis of the economic, financial, commodity and legal situation of partners, as well as the protection of own resources, including in particular trade secrets. The European Union as one of the richest areas of the world and does business with various countries and economic entities from all over the world. Intelligence is to examine whether the declarations submitted by contractors before concluding agreements are compatible with the facts.
4. Diplomacy based on intelligence reports recommending political solutions, and serving as a point of reference and an inherent component of decision-making processes. External intelligence must provide decision-

makers with basic assessments of the situation (reviews of entities and their interests in a particular area, forecasts, scenarios, threat assessment), verifying the true intentions of the parties³⁸.

At the moment, reports and briefings which the INTCEN produces are primarily available to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to working groups of the Council, in particular the Counter Terrorism Working Group (COTER)³⁹. Access to them is also available for senior officials of the European External Action Service (EEAS), senior Commission officials and representatives of the EU Member States sitting in the Political and Security Committee. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex are institutions which fall within the scope of entities that can receive the reports.

The main principle applicable in the process of making the INTCEN products accessible is called 'the need to know principle' and safety reasons. Intelligence knowledge is to be located in such a way that it follows the needs. In addition, access to the information possessed by the Council is available for members of the European Parliament (in line with the agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council) positively verified and holding a security clearance in the area of classified information (labelled 'restricted', 'confidential', 'secret', 'top secret' depending on the level of access), but only in 'matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy, which is relevant in order for the European Parliament to exercise its powers and function'⁴⁰. EU classified information (EUCI) means any information or materials covered by the EU security classification, the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the interests of

³⁸ See more in: Müller-Wille, B. 2004. For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU. *Occasional Papers*, no. 50. European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 21–31.

³⁹ According to declassified documents of March 2007 the Counter Terrorism Working Group adopted 75 guidelines of the Centre, including on such issues as the threat to aviation security from Islamist terrorism, terrorists' access to weapons and explosives, anatomy of a terrorist network, the threat from North African extremists in Europe. See Doc. 15062/11 (24.10) (OR. en) Brussels LIMITE JAI 702 ECOFIN 656 EF 132 RELEX 991 ENFOPOP 336 COTER 7 of 17 October 2011. Cf. Doc. REV 4 REV4 LIMITE JAI 423 ECOFIN 353 TRANS 234 RELEX 639 ECO 136 PESC 1010 COTER 72 COSDP 810 PROCIV 174 ENER 172 ATO 103, of 30 November 2005.

⁴⁰ At the same time we should note that classified information provided to the Council by the Member States or third countries or international organisations and labelled with a national secrecy clause have the same status as one of the labels of secrecy clauses used in the EU.

the European Union or the interests of at least one Member State⁴¹. Only in a ‘having a need-to-know’ situation, access is also provided to other people who obtained a security clearance in accordance with the security regulations of the European Parliament, or who, due to their role, have been granted an appropriate authorisation in accordance with national laws and regulations. Regardless of the above, information bearing the clause ‘EU confidential’, or an equivalent clause, can be accessible also to those MEPs who in accordance with security regulations of the EP have been provided with instructions on the responsibility for its disclosure and have signed a solemn declaration that they will not reveal it⁴². An agreement on access of the Members of Parliament to classified information in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU is still under discussion. Access of the Members of the European Parliament to classified information held by the Council and the European External Action Service in the field of the CFSP is regulated by general provisions⁴³. The Council specifies the conditions under which it

⁴¹ See more in: Hoc, S. 2006. *Ochrona informacji niejawnych i innych tajemnic ustawowo chronionych*. [Protection of classified information and other secrets protected by law.] Opole; Gałach, A. 2004. *Bezpieczeństwo systemów teleinformatycznych w Unii Europejskiej*. [Security of IT systems in the European Union.] Gdańsk; Piątek, S. 2003. *Prawo telekomunikacyjne Wspólnoty Europejskiej*. [Telecommunications law of the European Community.] Warszawa.

⁴² The last consensus is the agreement signed on 12 March 2014 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy (Official Journal of the European Union C 95 of 01.04.2014). It concerns in particular: (a) proposals subject to a special legislative procedure or to another decision-making procedure under which the European Parliament is to be consulted or is required to give its consent, (b) international agreements on which the European Parliament is to be consulted or is required to give its consent pursuant to Article 218(6) TFEU, (c) negotiating directives for international agreements referred to in point (b), (d) documents on the activities of those Union agencies in the evaluation or scrutiny of which the European Parliament is to be involved. See. European Parliament Decision of 13 September 2012 on the conclusion of an inter-institutional agreement of 12 March 2014 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy 2012/2069 (ACI) (Official Journal of the European Union C 353 of 3.12.2013).

⁴³ The Council Decision (2013/488/UE) of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (Official Journal of the European Union L 274 of 15.10.2013) which substituted the (2011/292/UE) of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (Official Journal of the European

can exchange EUCI at its disposal with other institutions, bodies or agencies of the Union⁴⁴.

It should be noted that kinds of reports produced by the INCTEN differ in terms of their substantial scope and updating frequency. The general assessment of the situation in the form of long-term strategic papers based on intelligence is updated every six months. Long term reports are created with regard to hazards and risk assessment in all places where the EU personnel is stationed. In addition, short-term special reports provide observation of a specific crisis situation or a specific event or have a nature of a thematic analysis focusing on the relevant issue. The third type of products are information summaries with a narrow range of intelligence scope dealing with a specific matter submitted for the analysis (current important events with a short intelligence based analysis). The basic sources for the INTCEN are: (a) reports provided by the security and intelligence services of the Member States, (b) open sources (press, media, websites, blogs, etc.), (c) diplomatic reports, (d) data coming from the network of consular posts, (e) reports from international organisations, non-governmental organisations, missions and operations, (f) finally, data from the European Union Satellite Centre. An important source of information are also documents and evaluations provided internally by other EU agencies, particularly within the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. It should be noted that the INTCEN,

Union L 141 of 27.5.2011), and previous act: 2005/571/: Council Decision of 12 July 2005 amending Decision 2001/264/EC adopting the Council's security regulations (Official Journal of the European Union L 193 of 23.7.2005), and the one of 2001 (Official Journal of the European Union L 101 of 11.4.2001). As far as universal access to public information of the EU is concerned, the following regulations are in force: Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (Official Journal of the European Union L 145 of 31.5.2001).

⁴⁴ A proper framework can be provided for this purpose, including through accession to the inter-institutional agreements or other arrangements to that end. EUCI is to be protected according to its classification of secrecy and in accordance with the basic principles and minimum standards which are equivalent to those set out in Decision 2013/488/EU. If the Council finds that there is a need to exchange EUCI with a third country or an international organisation, it establishes an appropriate framework for such an exchange. According to the regulation in order to establish such a framework and define mutually applicable rules for the protection of exchanged classified information the Union concludes agreements on security procedures with third countries or international organisations. See Art. 12 and 13 the Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (2013/488/UE), (Official Journal of the European Union L 274 of 15.10.2013).

although it is the only institution within the EU whose nature is closest to classic intelligence, does not work on the basis of methods and techniques characteristic for intelligence. Information that comes to the Centre is not developed for, e.g., early warning and urgent evaluation. These are rather general data on the basis of which the INTCEN designs its own, usually equally general reports. William Shapcott, former director of the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) stated that ‘the SITCEN can write a respectable analysis of the overall threat in Europe and the types of features that it has, but it will not help you much in judging what next week’s threat in Paris or London will be. There are other people better placed to do that’⁴⁵. Much later, Catherine Ashton echoed stressing that ‘contributions depend on the availability of intelligence in the Member States’ services and the willingness to share them. Member States are not obliged to provide INTCEN with information or intelligence, leaving INTCEN subject to the whims of various Member State agencies’⁴⁶.

Another issue is the matter of transparency in the functioning of the INTCEN. Transparency in the area of security is a necessity in democratic countries of law and their international associations, giving security authorities (including intelligence) legitimacy to act⁴⁷. Taking into account the fact that INTCEN reports are intended for use in decision-making, a greater degree of democratic accountability and oversight is justified. Statewatch, a non-profit organisation founded in 1991, dedicated to monitoring of the public sector in the EU, exposed the problem of a lack of open notification of the public about the activities of the INTCEN. The European Ombudsman was notified about this issue. In the face of further complaints (and lawsuits) for failing to publish the data about the products of the Centre, the EU Council published an index of documents generated by the INTCEN. The table contains a list of produced documents. And so in the framework of the European External Action Service, in the first six months of 2012 166 documents were

⁴⁵ Jones, Ch. 2013. *Secrecy reigns at the EU’s Intelligence Analysis Centre – Analysis*. London: Statewatch Analysis, p. 2.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

⁴⁷ See more in: *Parlamentarny nadzór nad sektorem bezpieczeństwa. Zasady, mechanizmy i praktyki*. [Parliamentary oversight of the security sector: principles, mechanisms and practices.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2004; Żebrowski, A. 2001. *Kontrola cywilna nad służbami specjalnymi III Rzeczypospolitej (1989–1999). Zagadnienia politologiczno-prawne*. [Civilian control over the secret services of the Third Republic of Poland (1989–1999). Issues of political sciences and law.] Kraków; Zalewski, S. 2003. *Służby specjalne (programowanie, nadzór, koordynacja)*. [Special services (programming, supervision, coordination).] Warszawa.

prepared, including 17 reports classified as 'secret', 129 'confidential' and 20 as 'restricted'. It is worth noting that 11 of the 20 documents classified as 'restricted' were purely internal. No document was marked 'top secret'⁴⁸. The EU Council still does not publish thematic areas which the documents cover. It motivates the refusal to provide information on the issues covered by the INTCEN documents with a legal argument and common institutional practice of the EU. Providing information stumbles because of the limitation resulting from Art. 9 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents which states that 'sensitive documents shall be recorded in the register or released only with the consent of the originator'⁴⁹. Therefore, the institution may decide not to register sensitive documents, and thus not reveal their existence. It should be noted, however, that we can get to know their contents from the very title. For example, one of the documents bears the following description: 'the document contains information concerning the Syrian Revolutionaries Front – a group closely aligned with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood that sprung up to coordinate weapons deliveries to the opposition')⁵⁰. The General Secretariat of the Council, invoking Art. 9 of the Regulation believes that the disclosure could constitute a threat for persons described in the document. In addition, due to the sensitive content of the document, its disclosure would impede the EU's diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a solution to the ongoing crisis in Syria. The described case, however, gives us an insight into the subject of reports produced by the INTCEN.

It should be highlighted that the INTCEN works not only on the basis of its own sources, but also directly using analysts delegated from national intelligence agencies – as a result becoming a permanent point of coordination. The EU Council defines the general course of the activity of the INTCEN every six months. It most frequently comes down to monitoring global tensions and crises. The clarification of priorities takes place in the course of consultations within the working groups. Several interrelated parameters are crucial. Firstly, tasks of the Centre must have their order corresponding to the seriousness of challenges and the established schedule of activities. Secondly, the activity of the Centre should meet the needs of intelligence support for the Common Security and Defence Policy. Thirdly, the Centre

⁴⁸ See Jones, Ch. *Secrecy reigns at the EU's...*, pp. 3–5.

⁴⁹ Official Journal of the European Union L 145 of 31.05.2001.

⁵⁰ Jones, Ch. *Secrecy reigns at the EU's...*, p. 4.

must have sufficient resources and tools necessary for the preparation of accurate and reliable products. Fourthly, the agency must have a ‘multi-task’ nature. Fifthly, the INTCEN must have sufficient mobility and flexibility to be able to adjust the direction of the analysis to the development of current events in real time.

Taking into account the above criteria we must conclude that the INTCEN in the present form does not completely meet any of the above postulates. Though it manages to prepare analyses, reports and assessments of the international situation, the Agency still has much more modest resources than any serious national intelligence. However, its structure already deserves the label of an intelligence agency, at least due to the fact that its function corresponds to the essence of intelligence operation⁵¹. In this sense, the architecture of the functioning of the INTCEN can be a starting point for the initiation of a European debate. Further solutions can be proposed on the basis of the model of the operation of the Centre (the entity that already exists and is inscribed in the institutional order of the EU), its past experience and developed good practices.

Thus in the context of designing the architecture of intelligence cooperation in Europe whether in the widest perspective – of building a common intelligence policy, we should consider different variants of the system, from the most enhanced cooperation to modest coordination. In the most courageous scenario we are talking about a new European supranational agency equipped with the powers to regulate intelligence policy, with the possibility of assigning tasks to individual national bodies (objectively, subjectively and territorially) – as an instrument for developing foreign and defence policy which would be uniform for all Member States. One-direction policy, which would eliminate the possibility of its national sabotaging. The *sine qua non* condition would be the participation of all countries. National tasks could not be contrary to the Community tasks and activities would have to be centrally coordinated and accounted for. All agencies could ultimately work only for the common EU target.

In the most modest option the organisational model would be limited only to the coordination of the flow of certain information among countries

⁵¹ More on the topic of the INTCEN see Oberson, F. 1998. Intelligence cooperation in Europe: the WEU Intelligence Section and Situation Centre. In: Politi, A. ed. *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Papers, no. 34. Paris: Institute for Security Studies; Molard, B. 1998. How the WEU Satellite Centre could help in the development of a European Intelligence Policy. In: Politi, A. ed. *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Papers, no. 34. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.

wishing to jointly pursue specific policy objectives. It would not be possible to enforce the 'EU' will or assign tasks to national agencies. National intelligence agencies could continue to operate for the benefit of national political or economic objectives standing in evident contradiction with EU-wide objectives. The will to start intelligence cooperation with another country (exchange of information, a joint action) would result from its own volition or a response to the initiative of another state – *a contrario* it would not be in any way a legally binding bond. Between one model and the other there is a whole range of possibilities, methods and systems for carrying out intelligence cooperation⁵². In this respect, for theoretical needs, we can differentiate three main levels of a hypothetical coupling of intelligence at the European level. Each of these options represents a degree of the communitarisation of the intelligence system, understood as a conglomerate of all national and EU services. Their shape would depend on adopted policy assumptions. In practice, these systems can cross, being merely a form approximate to those presented below.

A model maintaining the status quo with the necessity to expand the INTCEN

In the model, the most modest situation would amount to the continuation of what exists today with minor changes aimed to improve the efficiency and rationalisation of the used means. Currently, the Member States retain full responsibility for their national security. Main contact channels would still be realised at the national level on the basis of political blocs, and in practice on the basis of the bilateral and multilateral exchange. The cooperation would take place alternately: (a) within the framework of existing alliances, (b) for a specific operation, (c) as a common, long-term initiative, (d) as a new alliance. The main determinant would be national interests of the Member States, not European solidarity. Joint intelligence decision making would take place only in the situation of convergence of interests. National agencies would provide only basic support for EU institutions in the area of relevant activities. Intelligence – as assigned to support the government of the EU – would work in a minimum scope; EU intelligence – understood as a common intelligence space of all Member States – would not exist at all. Due to the need to enable the INTCEN to develop its competence capacity,

⁵² On the topic of models of a European intelligence community see Müller-Wille, B. *op. cit.*, pp. 37–44.

minimum minimorum backstage demands would be realised. Thus, it is obvious that the level of employment would be increased. The extended INTCEN would probably include analysts from all Member States. The double-track system of supplementing human resources would be preserved. The current model of analysts delegated from national agencies, cooperating with permanent employees of the INTCEN would be maintained and expanded⁵³. The distribution of intelligence products would be improved. Finally, perhaps, efforts would be undertaken to increase the legal legitimacy of the INTCEN operation. It is no secret that the Centre is poorly legally fixed. The opinion that it is a loose association of analysts is not far from the truth. It should also be assumed that at the discussion forum there would be a question of democratic control over the functioning of the operationally expanding ‘gray zone’ of the INTCEN. The deficit of rules governing the assignment of tasks and control (what the agency is allowed to do and how) is in the long run unacceptable in democratic countries. It concerns the problem of centring of two overlapping and conflicting philosophical values of ‘security’ and ‘privacy’. While the skilful combination of these two systems is extremely difficult at the state level, you can imagine the scale of the challenge for the community of a number of countries with very different legal and philosophical traditions (from Scandinavia where privacy was born, to the UK where security issues in the Euro-Atlantic system are crucial).

A model of increased coordination

In this model, the Member States, aware of geopolitical security requirements and the need for the implementation of increased coordination of political blocs, would decide to resign from intelligence competition at the national level. In return, benefiting from economies of scale, they would receive larger geostrategic security, in practice obtaining greater efficiency in return. Due to the fact that more powers would be transferred to the

⁵³ This system has two main advantages. Firstly, a national official could be used by EU structures, at the same time retaining national competences. In this way it is possible to achieve the effect of dual utilisation of the same analyst. Secondly, it is decided at the national level what scope of access to classified information the national officer has, what authority he obtains in this sphere and finally what support from the national agency he can count on. This model would allow to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings in the scope of responsibility for the hierarchy and assigning tasks to individual agents, and in consequence it will not only directly increase the support of national bodies but will also in return eliminate political difficulties.

EU level, it would mean strengthening the protection of EU institutions themselves. The construction of such a system would require a redefinition of awareness of European decision-makers and Europeans themselves. We cannot talk about enhanced cooperation without a greater level of confidence in partners and the unanimous consent to the existence of European sovereignty. This sovereignty would have to be protected by the conscious, sincere and responsible participation of the Member States. Customers for products of domestic intelligence agencies would be not only national authorities, but also EU bodies and national agencies in other Member States.

In the context of shaping the architecture of this model, a primary task would be to plug European intelligence (cooperation/coordination) officially in the functioning of the EU. This would mean going beyond the zone of the EU, because it would include not only counterintelligence but also intelligence. All agencies should be associated with each other in such a way which would enable them to give and receive the necessary intelligence support. What is more, they should be in constant contact with potential customers. Necessary institutionalisation of cooperation would require making a decision – whether it would take place in the framework of expansion of the existing structures, or would be based on the creation of new mechanisms. The way of connecting EU agencies, the Member States and third parties, namely the architecture of the model – would have to be analysed. Measures covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy would in practice mean wider coordination of activities, including, among others, approximation of positions, staff exchange, joint actions, elimination of discrepancies, synchronisation, optimisation, allocation of responsibilities, mitigation of internal tensions, strengthening of the EU dimension, rationalisation of funds, etc.

Assuming that radical reforms would not be necessary, it would be worthwhile to consider the renewal and reorganisation of existing institutions which would facilitate the increase of operational functions and especially strengthen the harmonisation, re-territorialisation and rationalisation of activities. What should be also considered is the issue of the structural incorporation of Europol into the intelligence structure of the European Union, which could function according to the same principles as the American FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation. Although the FBI is in fact federal police and deals mainly with criminal matters, it is also equipped with intelligence competences⁵⁴. The FBI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence

⁵⁴ This community gained special importance after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the entry into force of the Act entitled 'Uniting and Strengthening America

Agency (CIA) and several other agencies co-create the so-called Intelligence Community system⁵⁵. The EU intelligence capability could be easily increased by the functional and geographical extension of the powers of Europol. At the moment, the activity of Europol is allowed in the case of pursuing of crimes which materially cover two or more Member States. This means that Europol officers do not have the possibility to participate in joint investigation teams when a criminal activity concerns only one Member State, or if the criminal organisation covers only third countries. The institutional lack of support for Europol is all the more incomprehensible when you consider the fact that, in contrast to the INTCEN, Europol already has the necessary resources. At the moment approximately 800 officers are employed at the headquarters in the Hague⁵⁶.

However, in the model of increased cooperation, regardless of the level of the involved funds and institutions, the principle of harmonisation of activities of national agencies at the EU level would apply consistently. It would still not be European intelligence in the full sense of the word, which would result in *de facto* impossibility of accountability for insubordination.

by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001', that is the 'Patriot Act', which not only gave significant new measures and competences to all services but also demolished the so-called information wall. See Rogala-Lewicki, A. *Slużby specjalne a organy władzy państwowej – relacje instytucjonalne*. [Special services and state authorities – institutional relations.] Forum Studiów i Analiz Politycznych im. Maurycego Mochnackiego, [ISSN 2082-7997]. Available at: http://www.fsap.pl/documents/publications/Slużby_Specjalne_a_organy_władzy_panstwowej.pdf [Accessed 20 January 2015].

⁵⁵ See Rogala-Lewicki, A. *Czy polskie służby specjalne potrzebują formuły Intelligence Community*. [Do the Polish special services need a formula of Intelligence Community?] Forum Studiów i Analiz Politycznych im. Maurycego Mochnackiego, [ISSN 2082-7997]. Available at: http://www.fsap.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21%3Aczy-polskie-suby-specjalne-potrzebuj-formuy-intelligence-community&catid=7%3Acommenents&Itemid=9&lang=pl [Accessed 20 January 2015].

⁵⁶ Europol, for example, cannot lend its expertise to fight organised crime to Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Meanwhile, people involved in international crime or terrorism do not know territorial boundaries. Europol's competence in the field of criminal intelligence and security might be needed for the proper assessment of threats. For this purpose Europol should cooperate closely with the INTCEN. What is more, it could take on the task of developing the intelligence support capacity for international police forces. For example, it could provide support for measures in the fight against terrorism at the request of a third country. Such an extension of Europol's capabilities would give the EU unique features.

A model of full European intelligence (European Intelligence Agency)

If national interests of the Member States were on one scale and European solidarity on the other – the latter would always have to be more important, regardless of whether the community means a convergence of interests of all countries. Such an approach would have to constitute the backbone of the communitised intelligence system. It is in fact a question about what is primary and more important. In the case of the two previous models, despite different levels of cooperation and coordination, national agencies would still be a decision-making axis. In this model, the European interest would be structurally above individual national interests. The Member States would have to subordinate themselves to the goals and objectives defined from the European perspective. A system built in this way would have to provide appropriate tools to crush any attempts of insubordination. A condition for the creation of a full European intelligence model would be European unanimity. Only then common intelligence would be able to provide support for the Union's unidirectional activities. Contradictory and politically multidirectional actions would effectively torpedo the operational functionality of intelligence. They would lead to overlapping and transversing of directions of activities. We would deal with a kind of intelligence paranoia or schizophrenia. Intelligence can serve and act in the interest of only one entity which has clearly defined priorities. The threat of the occurrence of any discrepancies would eliminate the implementation of this model. The second condition would be the establishment of a structurally uniform European intelligence agency, which would not only coordinate activities at the EU level, but would be an entity assigning tasks, defining goals and preparing tactics. National agencies would be institutionally and hierarchically subordinated to it. They would subjectively and locally realise tasks determined by the headquarters. National intelligence agencies would not be able to carry out any own tasks if the European agency did not know about them.

These are of course theoretical assumptions. The practice suggests that problems would accumulate already at the level of the implementation of the first of the above models. Most European politicians operating in the domain of defence and foreign policy give an affirmative answer to the question of whether it would be advisable to strengthen the competence and resources of the INTCEN. Almost all of them recognise benefits coming from the expansion of the information base of the European Union. Difficulties appear at the moment of the clarification of positions and general declarations – and that happens when the institutional framework already exists.

How then to explain the reluctance of the Member States to exchange information with other partners and with European institutions? How to explain the discrepancy between the general diplomatic declarations and the practice in the area of cross-border intelligence cooperation? Why for so many years of the functioning of the European community have countries failed to lead to the harmonisation of this dimension of EU activity? It is worth analyzing the nature of these dilemmas and obstacles⁵⁷.

(A) The first reason is certainly the lack of trust. It is obvious that all intelligence agencies fear the disclosure of sources and methods of gathering information. Openness means a direct threat. The disclosure of operating methods means for the intelligence agency undermining of the foundations of its functioning and *de facto* its liquidation in the operational sense. Intelligence institutions must act covertly. ‘Trust and security are needed to protect the sensitiveness of information, the methods used to obtain it and, especially, the source. There is no ready-made, universal recipe for security. The multiplicity of cooperating agencies causes the multiplication of threats’⁵⁸. Any form of cooperation means widening of access and thereby a circle of potential weak points of the system of protection of sources, methods of work and, finally, the information itself. Individual services are afraid that so-called ‘Trojan horses’ might be placed in their ranks. The level of trust among European Union countries, in spite of maintaining very close relations, is not high enough to ensure individual agencies the comfort of declassify their own resources. Therefore, although they recognise the benefits of cooperation, they are currently able to cooperate only in individual operations, or within a narrow and strict bloc of partners with a similar political-intelligence culture.

(B) The second motive is closely related to the first one and also concerns trust. In this case, however, it does not concern ‘internal’ but ‘external’ confidence. The practice shows that no European country wants to undermine its credibility in relation with a stronger partner with which it exchanges intelligence data. The United States, as the most important and the most powerful actor of the international political scene, remains a point of reference. Alessandro Politi, an expert in this subject, gives an example of British-American relations. ‘Another potent obstacle is the fear of spoiling

⁵⁷ On the obstacles blocking the formulation of a common European intelligence policy, see Politi, A. 1998. Why is European Intelligence Policy necessary? In: Politi, A. ed. *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Papers, no. 34. Paris: Institute for Security Studies; Cf. Müller-Wille, B. op. cit., pp. 15–20.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

privileged relationships with significant partners through increased European cooperation. The US agencies themselves have felt a sort of ambivalence vis-à-vis the relationship that the UK services have had with their European counterparts⁵⁹. This syndrome applies to virtually all European countries. The United States pursues a policy of maintaining mainly bilateral relations with individual European countries. Thus it does not allow the formation of a solid European superpower bloc. All the other leading countries in the world behave similarly. Consequently, even the richest European countries are not in a position to independently obtain the international position which they had in the past. They are forced to maintain relations with the US which first and foremost guarantees their security. It is clearly visible every time in conflict-crisis situations. Then Europe relies on its bigger and stronger ally. Ultimately the US, which prefers to conduct an individual dialogue, determines to a large extent the cooperation model in the European Union. The lack of a European intelligence agency is in a way in the interests of the US. As long as there is no credible alternative to the US intelligence, the Europeans cooperating closely with the United States (receiving intelligence support from the Americans) will not create their own institutions of collective acquisition of information if it is contrary to the interests of the United States. European solidarity loses to the reality, i.e. to the fear of losing information liquidity and the decrease of the quality of own intelligence. Such a situation is not conducive to the independence of decision-making. This is a mechanism of a closed circle. As long as the Member States, maintaining close intelligence relations with the US, do not obtain the guarantee that support provided by a European intelligence agency will be more effective, or equally effective as that which their national agencies receive from the United States, they will not decide to establish it. The problem is that it is hard to ascertain this in a situation where the decision on its establishment is subject to the possession of experience in this field.

(C) The third explanation of the problem can be assigned to the ‘finance’ category. The creation of European intelligence administration is impossible without the participation of national agencies. However, differences in the amount of budgets of individual intelligence institutions in Europe are significant. As a result of this opening of the scissors richer parties may question the distribution of financing of the entire project. The richer may in fact not want to bear the cost of the ‘European project’, which would have other, more serious consequences for them. This would mean the necessity

⁵⁹ *Ibidem.*

of providing access to resources developed for years for milliards of pounds or euro. Countries with fewer resources and capabilities would gain these fruits in a way for free. It is a question of the unequal level of contribution. Stronger countries might not wish to exchange resources with entities which in their opinion may contribute little to the project. On the other hand, institutional, national or substantive exclusions would mean a breach of the principle of European solidarity and would *de facto* nip the project in the bud.

(D) The fourth reason are practical dilemmas, in particular technical and logistical conditions. Modern threats require an immediate response in real time. Very often the situation becomes outdated within a minute. The findings made at the wrong time can have no operational value. Special services must be able to immediately adjust their resources and activities. The idea is to develop a functional and institutional model of cooperation which would be effective and meet the needs of the integration of activities of a dozen of agencies. It is possible to imagine the size of logistic obstacles of different provenance. The problem of the language would be the most characteristic. Transmission of information does not make sense if the recipient cannot understand it. Meanwhile, it is impossible to make a perfect translation, especially in terms of nuances, cultural and meaning contexts, unique to a particular language. Translation of reports at the time when they are produced into languages of other agencies would constitute a serious additional cost and lengthen the priceless time. On the other hand, this complaint can be repelled by means of the argument that currently in the EU 24 languages have the official language status and the institutions operate smoothly, although it requires considerable outlays⁶⁰. National agencies may not have the resources allowing them to maintain linguistic interoperability with all other intelligence entities operating in the European Union.

In the context of maintaining an effective level of communication and interoperability we should also mention the obstacles of a technical nature. A single ITC system is also needed to effectively fasten together the range of diverse intelligence agencies. It also concerns software facilitating common, trouble-free operation, while maintaining technological neutrality and ensuring security against attacks from outside. Considering the fact that individual national agencies may have their technical preferences, use ‘their’ proven IT systems (based on their ‘own’ codes), making a coupling allowing for effective cooperation could prove to be a very difficult task.

⁶⁰ In 2007 the last of them – the Irish language – obtained this status, with the reservation that the Irish side will finance the translations.

(E) The fifth determinant pertains to legal and institutional factors. Suffice it to say that within the intelligence community states with very different traditions of legal systems would have to function: from common law systems to statutory law ones. National legislation would be an element which would rather impede cooperation. All of these components, which from the normative point of view would remain outside the sphere of harmonisation – would lead to practical discrepancies. An example can be national legislation in the sphere of access and exchange of classified information. Another exemplification can be the organisation of national intelligence systems (different in terms of the general competence distribution).

(F) Another barrier can be broadly understood cultural differences. In the worst case, the conduct of the operation can be torpedoed by misunderstanding of partners' intentions. Societies, ethnic groups operate on the basis of cultural codes, often unique to them. It concerns a system of values, traditions, norms, experience, history. A striking example are the same gestures which have a completely opposite meaning in different societies. Cultural differences affect the work culture. It is worthwhile to recall the example of differences existing between the north and the south and the east and the west of Europe.

(G) Another barrier that may be important in the perspective of building a European intelligence community is the widely occurring natural tendency to maintain the existing institutions. Max Weber, a German sociologist, economist, lawyer and political theorist⁶¹, formulating the classic definition of bureaucracy (professionalism, specialisation, hierarchy, general standards) stressed that in practice administration is a structure which is inefficient and dysfunctional by its nature (just like Michel Crozier and William Niskanen⁶²) because it constantly grows and responds with increasing difficulty to varied needs of society⁶³. Once created, institutions have a natural tendency to sprawling, inertia, appropriation of areas of activity, and finally, survival.

⁶¹ The author of famous works: *Etyka protestancka a duch kapitalizmu*. [*The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*.] and *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo* [*Economy and society*].

⁶² Niskanen, W. 1994. *Bureaucracy and public economics*. Cheltenham; Niskanen, W. 1971. *Bureaucracy and representative government*. Chicago; Crozier, M. 1964. *The bureaucratic phenomenon*. London.

⁶³ In turn, Robert K. Merton, an American sociologist, one of the most eminent representatives of functionalism, describing this dysfunctionality used the term 'syndrome of trained incapacity'. See Robert Merton, K. 2002. *Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna*. [*Social theory and social structure*.] Warszawa, pp. 60–69.

None of the existing national intelligence agencies would be pleased with the prospect of losing competences, privileges, or sovereignty.

(H) The last but it seems that the most important barrier is a political issue. It concerns mainly ensuring the influence and importance of the country. This is a historic but still widely prevalent view of the practice of international politics. The competition and rivalry between nations dominates in it. It is characterised by the focus on achieving goals only from the point of view of the realisation of own interests, mostly in opposition to the interests of others. The given state does not want other countries to have information it has at its disposal. It is perceived by many as a threat and a negative balance of losses and benefits. This traditional selfishness often does not take into account the perspective of new civilisational conditions, including the globalisation of information transfers. This is a game of a ‘win-lose’ type. The superiority of intelligence is regarded not just as an important component of operational success, but as strengthening of the position and status of the country. The aim of intelligence is to mislead others, pervert, hide true intentions, fake intentions, deceive – all in order to gain advantage. Cooperation in this area is synonymous with the loss of influence, credibility, selling out sources, information failure. Cooperation is not treated in terms of resource optimisation based on the ‘win-win’ principle, but as a risk⁶⁴. Taking into account the fact that the majority of intelligence agencies were established in Europe during the Cold War or earlier and over the years have developed their *esprit de corps* without the need for cooperation, the organisation of intelligence involving the transfer of competence would be not so much a reform but a revolution⁶⁵.

Other threats of a political nature, which cannot be overlooked are risks associated with: (a) ideologies (national populism and nationalism), (b) changes of governments and political leaders (political instability), (c) disregard for smaller players (no opportunities to defend their positions).

We should agree with the opinion of Antoni Podolski, a researcher of security systems, who stresses that ‘insufficient information exchange in the EU is largely the result of difficulty in combining security structures occurring everywhere, it is also the confirmation of the fact that EU integration in the sphere of foreign, defence and security policy (CFSP and ESDP) is the

⁶⁴ This principle, usually seeing a wider and long-term perspective, provides the satisfaction of all parties and is widespread among entrepreneurs, and rarely occurs in politics. It can be assumed that it is a more sophisticated formula of coexistence on the stage where there are a lot of actors.

⁶⁵ Cf. Friedman, G., Friedman, M., Meredith, M., Chapman, C. 1997. *The intelligence edge: how to profit in the information age*. New York.

weakest⁶⁶. It can be assumed that the most important barrier is the desire to maintain the advantage by the biggest states. We cannot forget that one of the biggest, yet most frequently unsaid secrets of classified intelligence institutions is spying on own friends. It concerns in particular technological and economic espionage. Intelligence agencies often operate balancing on the edge of the law.

In summary, the transfer of competences of services to the level of Brussels would mean, firstly, the disclosure of the truth concealed for years (i.e. English intelligence imposes on its employees the clause of one-hundred-year secret protection under the threat of loss of pension rights), and secondly – the necessity to deal with the problem of exercising democratic control, thirdly – questioning of good relations with the US, as a guarantor of European security. Antoni Podolski aptly outlines these issues. ‘Unofficially, the question of relations with the US also appeared as an obstacle to European integration, specific Europeanisation, of intelligence. For the UK the establishment of a European agency with the participation of France could mean exposure to the risk of losing the confidence of the Americans and weakening the quality of bilateral cooperation between MI6 and the CIA. For the same reason the French feared a British Trojan horse in the European intelligence community, which could provide some information to the Americans.

It should also be emphasised that an objective reason for the difficulty in closer integration of intelligence, security or police services at the EU level is the lack of such coordination, often already at the national level. There is no single European model of organisation and coordination of security and intelligence services. These services not only have different tasks and powers, but also different formal placement – as independent agencies or agencies subordinated to the ministries of justice, internal affairs, foreign affairs, defence, as civil or military services, as information-operational or operational-investigative services, centralised in the state or even partially decentralised (Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution in Germany). What is also different is the range of formal and informal cooperation and exchange of information between them and coordination of their work by higher instances⁶⁷.

⁶⁶ Podolski, A. 2004. Europejska współpraca wywiadowcza – brakujące ogniwo europejskiej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa? [European intelligence cooperation – a missing link of European foreign and security policy?] *Raporty i Analizy*, no. 10. Warszawa: Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 5. Cf. Herman, M. 2002. *Potęga wywiadu*. [The power of intelligence.] Warszawa; Kessler, R. 1994. *CIA od środka*. [Inside the CIA.] Warszawa; De Villemar-

Therefore, in the space of European security we are dealing with the still existing problem of the lack of trust in official European partners. Moreover, it is a question of the organisational structure and cooperation model. The point is that the realisation of the concept of common intelligence would enforce the necessity to combine different intelligence cultures (countries spying on each other), with still different interests (usually mutually exclusive). These conflicting mechanisms and institutions would have to form one body.

Using a paraphrase – security space, just like life, does not tolerate a vacuum. Despite the occurrence of the above obstacles of varying provenance, which most often cross-penetrate one another, practitioners more boldly mention the formally unrealised dimension of the Common European Intelligence Policy. The voices calling for the establishment of a future European Intelligence Agency cease to be political science fiction.

In 2004, Austria officially raised the idea of establishing a European Intelligence Agency. But it was not the inauguration of such initiatives. ‘The idea of a European Intelligence Agency was not born after the tragedy in Madrid or even after 11 September 2001. It was present in the long-term discussion on the mechanisms of formation of European foreign policy, security policy (CFSP) and defence policy (ESDP), in deliberations conducted in particular within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). One of the reasons was the experience of complete vulnerability and dependence of European countries on the US intelligence during the first Gulf War (1990-1991) and the intervention in Bosnia in the mid-decade (IFOR). The forecasts that the first High Representative for the CFSP, former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, would want to have intelligence information at his disposal were confirmed. (...) It was clear both for analysts and politicians that if the common foreign, security policy and defence policy should not remain a paper record, they would require the introduction of, among others, instruments such as information and analytical facilities using, among others, intelligence information’⁶⁸.

We should be aware that it is the reality, or rather needs that trigger specific reactions. If we cannot talk about the European common intelligence policy in institutional terms, it is just because there is no political will yet. This does not mean, however, that such a political intention will not appear in the future. We can definitely talk now about the constantly developing coopera-

est, P. 1998. *GRU – sowiecki super wywiad. [GRU – Soviet super-intelligence.]* Warszawa; West, N. 1999. *MI-5.* Warszawa; Westerby, G. 2001. *Na terytorium wroga. Tajemnice Mosadu. [In hostile territory: business secrets of a Mossad combatant.]* Warszawa.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 3–4.

tion and expansion of information factors in Europe. On the horizon there is a prospect of responding to more and more serious challenges. The European Union has participated for years in many military and police operations, has taken part in multilateral peace and stabilisation negotiations, finally has undertaken its own stabilisation activities, including disarmament, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and support, or conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Certainly, over time, the catalogue of these measures will expand both geographically and materially.

Despite difficulties and many obstacles Alessandro Politi from the European Union Institute for Security Studies⁶⁹ boldly concludes that in the near future the Member States will have to move away from a narrow national attitude also in the field of intelligence security if they want to continue to play an important role in the international arena⁷⁰. This is a kind of political necessity. Politi suggests that the establishment of European intelligence policy is a necessity if the EU wants to be successful in the competition with such global players as the US, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Other political circumstances point to the irreversible need for coordination of intelligence goals and objectives at the European level. Only in this formula, it is possible to eliminate unnecessary disturbances and duplication of activity⁷¹.

Politi notes that 'the EU member countries will have to break away from their narrow concept of national sovereignty if they are to become influential international actors. (...) In this context it appears necessary to re-think the role of national intelligence agencies in the EU context and the possibility

⁶⁹ The European Union Institute for Security Studies, with the headquarters in Paris, is an agency of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its main tasks encompass promoting a common security culture in Europe, participation in the development and shaping of the CFSP and in the discussion on key issues relating to security in Europe. The Institute conducts research on the EU's relations with the United States, Western Balkans, Africa, the Mediterranean countries, the Middle East, Russia, Eastern Partnership countries, Asia, as well as examines issues such as fight against terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, conflict prevention, development and globalisation as well as the EU enlargement. See Council Joint Action 2001/554/CFSP of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies (Official Journal of the European Union L 200 of 25.07.2001), Council Joint Action 2006/1002/CFSP of 21 December 2006 amending Joint Action 2001/554/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies (Official Journal of the European Union L 409 of 30.12.2006).

⁷⁰ See Politi, A. op. cit., p. 17.

⁷¹ Cf. Wetzling, T. 2006. Europejskie zarządzanie wywiadem. [European intelligence governance.] *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny*, no. 4 (16).

of enhancing multilateral intelligence cooperation. So far each crisis faced by the countries of EU demonstrates not only that effective intelligence is a pre-requisite for devising and implementing appropriate solutions, but that, when intelligence efforts have been uncoordinated, these countries have often faced the prospect of utter impotence. European intelligence agencies are not able to on a purely national basis, manage an ever increasing workload of crises that erupt both on their doorstep and in far-flung places⁷². Now, when the information revolution has reached its shape and has gained wide acceptance, intelligence is facing the task of adapting to new realities. It must find answers to the challenges of globalisation, digitisation, tabloidisation and massification of information. Politi sees new functions of intelligence. 'Intelligence has acquired considerably more importance than it had during the Cold War. Whereas before it was needed to maintain the balance of terror, prevent a war in Europe, its tasks now are much wider and more varied, since it helps politicians to steer their national course towards a new world order, new power constellations and economic developments, while avoiding new and old risks'⁷³.

It is a fact that despite audible objections Europe every day permanently follows the path to deeper and deeper economic and political unification. Hence, the questions about integration of the European area of intelligence are more distinctly posed. Perhaps it is almost time to start thinking about this concept more seriously.

SUMMARY

Paradoxically, what constitutes an obstacle to the launch of European intelligence policy may be its advantage. Common intelligence means team security management, better control of flows of supplies (including weapons), more effective fight against terrorism and organised crime, more efficient conflict prevention, it is the result of accumulated knowledge and experience, effective support for the European diplomatic corps, unified economic intelligence, and finally combined counterintelligence forces. Each of these tasks can be reasonably divided 'targeting' specific duties, assigning threats to individual sites and services, specialising activities, and consequently splitting the risk. When a reaction is tailor made in relation to threats its effective-

⁷² Politi, A. op. cit., p. 17.

⁷³ Politi, A. op. cit., p. 17.

ness increases. We cannot forget about cost savings. Why spend (as Europe) money on the same thing? Each agency pays for gaining specific information. In the model of joint intelligence its specialised cell will obtain information and pass it to the others.

European countries must understand that in the face of global challenges only as a single entity they can successfully compete with other, increasingly stronger players. It is a matter of a pragmatic synergy. Politi has no illusions as to the needs in this sphere. 'Since intelligence objectives and methods are not determined by some abstract political requirement but are driven by an individual intelligence service that is trying to anticipate and satisfy the needs of its political masters, a European intelligence policy need not be a highly formalised and institutionalised affair. It should be perceived and practised rather as an alternative culture which may shape the collective behaviour of the services concerned. However, the word "policy" implies more than simply a different *modus vivendi et operandi*, because a choice in the sharing of information is linked to specific security and strategic assessments'⁷⁴.

Björn Müller-Wille from the training centre of officer corps of the British Army (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst) thinks that a common intelligence agency is a prerequisite for increased coordination at the operational level. No European state will decide to provide its own intelligence agencies, acting on the basis of national rules. Therefore, a separate European body should be established, which could regulate the flow of information between European partners. This body would also have the opportunity to incorporate the results of work of others entities, or European initiatives, including Europol, into the intelligence information package. Müller-Wille envisions the establishment of the so-called European Intelligence Communication Network, mechanisms of which would allow for a successful launch of transfer of classified information in Europe⁷⁵.

In turn, Antoni Podolski's summary is more realistic. 'As due to purely practical, logistical and financial obstacles individual European countries are not able to conduct comprehensive, total intelligence according to the model of world powers, allowing them – both as the entire Union and its individual members – to better respond to the threats of the modern, globalised world – from terrorism to economic crises, a logical solution would be at least an attempt to create something like a Common European Intelligence Policy (ECIP) as the technical base of the Common Foreign and Security

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 17–18.

⁷⁵ See Müller-Wille, B. *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Policy (CFSP). A causative condition should be here the Europeanisation of national intelligence agencies – similar to the definition of Europeanisation of foreign policies of the Member States described in the literature. A next step in the Europeanisation of intelligence agencies and the creation of the Common European Intelligence Policy would be the division of tasks depending on the operational-information potential of the national service – e.g. French intelligence is traditionally interested in Africa and Spanish in South America, intelligence agencies of the new Member States also have some experience in the field of post Soviet Union countries and the Balkans or the Middle East. What is also possible is the wider use by the EU analytical-intelligence structures of information and analyses of non-governmental, private, scientific and related to the economy research centres based on the so-called white intelligence⁷⁶.

Regardless of the degree of progressivity of views of individual theorists, we can obviously see the natural need to strengthen coordination and collaboration of the intelligence division in the European Union. In the face of new needs and challenges, it seems that this process will proceed exponentially. It will be impossible to realise this strengthening without a decision of an institutional nature. What is needed is the development and formal implementation of the European intelligence policy – regardless of the area of competence of entities falling within its scope.

REFERENCES

- Albright, M.K. 2005. Think Again: The United Nations. *Foreign Policy*, no. 138.
- Barcz, J. ed. *Prawo Unii Europejskiej. Zagadnienia systemowe. Prawo materialne i polityki*. [The European Union law. Systemic issues. Substantive and political law.] Warszawa.
- Beck, U. 2005 *Władza i przeciwwładza w epoce globalnej: nowa ekonomia polityki światowej*. [Power in the global age: a new global political economy] translated by J. Łoziński, Warszawa.
- Borowiecki, R., Kwieciński, M. eds. 2006. *Informacja w zintegrowanej Europie. Koncepcje i narzędzia zarządzania wobec wyzwań i zagrożeń*. [Information in integrated Europe. Management concepts and tools in the face of challenges and threats.] Warszawa.

⁷⁶ Podolski, A. op. cit., pp. 12–13.

- Castells, M. 2007 *Spoleczeństwo sieci*. [*Network society*.] translated by M. Marody, K. Pawluś, J. Stawiński, S. Szymański, Warszawa.
- Centrum Satelitarne Unii Europejskiej. [*The European Union Satellite Centre*.] Available at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/regulatory_agencies_bodies/security_agencies/eusc/index_pl.htm [Accessed 20 September 2014].
- Cross, M.K.D. 2013. A European transgovernmental intelligence. Network and the role of IntCen. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, no. 3 (14).
- Czapliński, W., Łacny, J. 2006. Współpraca sądowa i policyjna w sprawach karnych. [Judicial and police cooperation in criminal cases] In: Barcz, J. ed. *Prawo Unii Europejskiej. Zagadnienia systemowe. Prawo materialne i polityki*. [*The European Union law. Systemic issues. Substantive and political law*.] Warszawa.
- De Villemarest, P. 1998. *GRU – sowiecki super wywiad*. [*GRU – Soviet super-intelligence*.] Warszawa.
- Faligot, R., Kauffer, R. 1998. *Służby specjalne*. [*Special services*.] Warszawa.
- Friedman, G., Friedman, M., Meredith, M., Chapman, C. 1997. *The intelligence edge: how to profit in the information age*. New York.
- Galicki, Z. 1996. *Status prawny służb specjalnych w wybranych państwach zachodnich*. [*The legal status of special services in selected western countries*.] Warszawa.
- Gałach, A. 2004. *Bezpieczeństwo systemów teleinformatycznych w Unii Europejskiej*. [*Security of IT systems in the European Union*.] Gdańsk.
- Góralski, W.M. 2007. Koncepcja ustrojowa i instytucjonalna II filara Unii Europejskiej. [The systemic and institutional concept of the 2nd pillar of the European Union.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca*. [*The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation*.] Warszawa.
- Górka-Winter, B. 2006. Grupy bojowe Unii Europejskiej – koncepcja, proces formowania, perspektywy. [EU battle groups – the concept, the formation process, perspectives.] *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 69 (409).
- Górski, A., Sakowicz A., eds. *Zwalczanie przestępczości w Unii Europejskiej – współpraca sądowa i policyjna w sprawach karnych*. [*Combating crime in the European Union – judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters*.] Warszawa.
- Gruszczak, A. 2009. *Współpraca policyjna w Unii Europejskiej w wymiarze transgranicznym. Aspekty polityczne i prawne*. [*Police cooperation in the European Union in the cross-border dimension. Political and legal aspects*.] Kraków.

- Grzelak, A. 2006. Współpraca państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej w ramach Eurojustu. [The cooperation of the Member States of the European Union within the framework of Eurojust.] In: Górski, A., Sakowicz A., eds. *Zwalczanie przestępczości w Unii Europejskiej – współpraca sądowa i policyjna w sprawach karnych*. [Combating crime in the European Union – judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters.] Warszawa.
- Grzelak, A. 2007. Współpraca instytucjonalna w sprawach karnych na przykładzie Eurojustu i Europejskiej Sieci Sądowej – problemy teoretyczne i praktyczne. [Institutional cooperation in criminal matters on the example of Eurojust and the European Judicial Network – theoretical and practical problems.] In: Czapliński, W., Wróbel, A. eds. *Współpraca sądowa w sprawach cywilnych i karnych*. [Judicial cooperation in civil and criminal cases.] Warszawa.
- Herman, M. 2001. *Intelligence services in the information age – theory and practice*. London, Portland: Or.
- Herman, M. 2002. *Potęga wywiadu*. [The power of intelligence.] Warszawa.
- Hoc, S. 2006. *Ochrona informacji niejawnych i innych tajemnic ustawowo chronionych*. [Protection of classified information and other secrets protected by law.] Opole.
- Jabłoński, M. 2002. *Dostęp do informacji i jego granice: wolność informacji, prawo dostępu do informacji publicznej, ochrona danych osobowych*. [Access to information and its limits: freedom of information, the right of access to public information, protection of personal data.] Wrocław.
- Jones, Ch. 2013. *Secrecy reigns at the EU's Intelligence Analysis Centre – Analysis*. London: Statewatch Analysis.
- Kessler, R. 1994. *CIA od środka*. [Inside the CIA.] Warszawa.
- Kulesa, Ł. Europejska Agencja Obrony. [European Defence Agency.] *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 57 (245).
- Lach, A. 2008. *Europejskie prawo karne. Zarys wykładu*. [European criminal law. A lecture outline.] Toruń.
- Łoś-Nowak, T. ed. 2004. *Organizacje w stosunkach międzynarodowych: istota – mechanizmy działania – zasięg*. [Organisations in international relations: the essence – mechanisms of action – range.] Wrocław.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Operacje i misje UE*. [EU operations and missions.] Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa/operacje_nato_i_ue/operacje_ue/ [Accessed 22 September 2014].
- Mojsiewicz, C. ed. 1998. *Leksykon współczesnych międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych*. [The lexicon of contemporary international political relations.] Wrocław.

- Molard, B. 1998. How the WEU Satellite Centre could help in the development of a European Intelligence Policy. In: Politi, A. ed. *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Papers, no. 34. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- Müller-Wille, B. 2004. For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU. *Occasional Papers*, no. 50. European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Oberson, F. 1998. Intelligence cooperation in Europe: the WEU Intelligence Section and Situation Centre. In: Politi, A. ed. *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Papers, no. 34. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- Ockrent, Ch., de Marenches, A. 1992. *Sekrety szpiegów i książąt*. [*Secrets of spies and princes*.] Warszawa.
- Panek, B. 2007. Operacje reagowania kryzysowego w europejskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony. [Crisis response operations in the European security and defense policy.] *Zeszyty Naukowe AON*, no. 4(69).
- Parlamentarny nadzór nad sektorem bezpieczeństwa. Zasady, mechanizmy i praktyki*. [*Parliamentary oversight of the security sector: principles, mechanisms and practices*.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2004.
- Piątek, S. 2003. *Prawo telekomunikacyjne Wspólnoty Europejskiej*. [*Telecommunications law of the European Community*.] Warszawa.
- Podolski, A. 2004. Europejska współpraca wywiadowcza – brakujące ogniwo europejskiej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa? [European intelligence cooperation – a missing link of European foreign and security policy?] *Raporty i Analizy*, no. 10. Warszawa: Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych.
- Politi, A. 1998. Why is European Intelligence Policy necessary? In: Politi, A. ed. *Towards a European Intelligence Policy*. Chaillot Papers, no. 34. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- Polska państwem ramowym euro korpusu*. [*Poland as a framework state of Euro-corps*.] Available at: http://www.sgwp.wp.mil.pl/pl/1_659.html [Accessed 20 September 2014].
- Porębski, L. 2004. *Elektroniczne oblicze polityki – demokracja, państwo, instytucje polityczne w okresie rewolucji informacyjnej*. [*Electronic face of politics – democracy, the state, political institutions during the information revolution*.] Kraków.
- Posel-Częściak, E. 2004. Strategie bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, Stanów Zjednoczonych i Polski. [Security strategies of the European Union, the United States and Poland.] *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 49 (237).

- Puchala, D., Laatikainen, K., Coate, R. 2006. *United Nations politics: international organisation in divided world*. Prentice Hall.
- Roberts, A., Kingsbury, B. eds. 1993. *United Nations, divided world: the UN's roles in international relations*. Oksford.
- Rydlewski, G. 2009. *Rządzenie w świecie mega zmian*. [Governing in the world of mega changes.] Warszawa.
- Rydlewski, G. ed. 2011. *Decydowanie publiczne*. [Public decision-making.] Warszawa.
- Safański, T. 2009. *Europejskie Biuro Policji Europol. Geneza. Główne aspekty działania. Perspektywy rozwoju*. [The European Police Office Europol. Genesis. The main aspects of the operation. Prospects for development.] Warszawa.
- Staniszki, J. 2006. *O władzy i bezsilności*. [About power and powerlessness.] Kraków.
- Staniszki, J. 2003/4. *Władza globalizacji*. [The power of globalisation.] Warszawa.
- Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2004. Mechanizm podejmowania decyzji w zakresie Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [Decision-making mechanism in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.] In: Parzymies, S., Zięba, R. eds. *Instytucjonalizacja wielostronnej współpracy międzynarodowej w Europie*. [The institutionalisation of multilateral international cooperation in Europe.] Warszawa.
- Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2007. Główne kierunki realizacji Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The main directions of implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca*. [The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.] Warszawa.
- Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2007. Implementacja współpracy policyjnej w ramach III Filaru Unii Europejskiej. [The implementation of police cooperation under the third pillar of the European Union.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca*. [The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.] Warszawa.
- Starzyk-Sulejewska, J. 2007. Implementacja współpracy policyjnej w sprawach karnych. [Implementation of police cooperation in criminal cases.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Unia Europejska. Tom II. Gospodarka – Polityka – Współpraca*. [The European Union. Volume II. Economy – Politics – Cooperation.] Warszawa.

- Stawecki, T. 2005. *Rejestry publiczne. Funkcje instytucji.* [Public registers. Functions of institutions.] Warszawa.
- Symonides, J. ed. 2006. *Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych. Bilans i perspektywy.* [Organisation of the United Nations. Balance and perspectives.] Warszawa.
- West, N. 1999. *MI-5.* Warszawa.
- West, N. 2000. *MI-6, Operacje brytyjskiej Tajnej Służby Wywiadu 1909–1945.* [MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909–1945.] Warszawa.
- Wetzling, T. 2006. Europejskie zarządzanie wywiadem. [European intelligence governance.] *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny*, no. 4 (16).
- Wróbel, P. Czy Unia Europejska potrzebuje służb kontrwywiadowczych. [Does the European Union need counterintelligence services?] *Portal Spraw Zagranicznych.* Available at: <http://intl.feedfury.com/content/18595929-pawe-wr-bel-czy-unia-europejska-potrzuje-s-u-b-kontrwywiadowczych.html> [Accessed 1 May 2014].
- Van Buuren, J. 2009. *Secret truth: The EU joint situation centre.* Amsterdam: Eurowatch.
- Zalewski, S. 2003. *Ewolucja modelu polskich służb specjalnych.* [The evolution of the model of Polish special services.] Warszawa.
- Zalewski, S. 2005. *Funkcja informacyjna służb specjalnych w systemie bezpieczeństwa RP.* [The information function of special services in the security system of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.
- Zalewski, S. 2005. *Służby specjalne w państwie demokratycznym.* [Special services in a democratic state.] Warszawa.
- Zięba, R. 1999. *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego.* [The institutionalisation of European security.] Warszawa.
- Zięba, R. 2008. Bezpieczeństwo obszaru WNP. [Security of the CIS] In: Zięba, R. ed. *Bezpieczeństwo państw zrzeszonych w NATO i Unii Europejskiej.* [Security of members of NATO and the European Union.] Warszawa.
- Żebrowski, A. 2001. *Kontrola cywilna nad służbami specjalnymi III Rzeczypospolitej (1989–1999). Zagadnienia politologiczno-prawne.* [Civilian control over the secret services of the Third Republic of Poland (1989–1999). Issues of political sciences and law.] Kraków.
- Żebrowski, A., Kwiatkowski, W. 2000. *Bezpieczeństwo informacji III Rzeczypospolitej.* [Security of information of the Third Republic of Poland.] Kraków.

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY – THE UNFULFILLED PILLAR OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Summary

Taking into account wider autonomous competences at the European level and the appreciation of the information phenomenon – the need for a redefinition of the role, function and place of intelligence is outlined (not only in the structure of the state but also in the global transnational alliances). Europe needs a common sense of security, unified threat perception, and thus joint risk assessments. For this reason, the EU must provide a framework for intensifying cooperation, at least by developing intelligence community – matched with declared political ambitions of Europe. The question is whether the EU needs specially dedicated intelligence agencies in this regard, or if intuitions operating at the level of the EU and the Member States are sufficient. And if so, which agencies – and how constructed and communitarised. If the European Common Intelligence Policy cannot be treated in institutional terms, it is only because of the lack of political will. Obstacles are among others: lack of trust, finances, loss of foreign partners, technical and logistical issues, legal and institutional aspects, cultural differences, politics and ideology. In the case of a change of political will, and preparing proposals for solutions, one can talk about the extension of the current model retaining the *status quo* or an increased cooperation model, or a model of full European intelligence with the European Intelligence Agency at the helm.

EUROPEJSKA WSPÓLNOTA WYWIADOWCZA – NIEZREALIZOWANY FILAR UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Streszczenie

Biorąc pod uwagę zjawiska: poszerzania autonomii kompetencyjnej na poziomie UE oraz aprecjacji znaczenia uwarunkowań informacyjnych – wyraźnie zarysowuje się potrzeba dokonania redefinicji roli, funkcji i miejsca wywiadu nie tylko w strukturze państwa, ale również w przestrzeni globalnych aliansów ponadnarodowych. Europa potrzebuje wspólnego poczucia bezpieczeństwa, jednolitego postrzegania zagrożeń, a tym samym wspólnych ocen

ryzyka. Z tego względu UE winna zaoferować ramy zintensyfikowanej współpracy, co najmniej rozwijając tzw. społeczność wywiadowczą – dopasowaną do deklarowanych ambicji politycznych Europy. Pytaniem pozostaje kwestia tego, czy UE potrzebuje pomocy specjalnie dedykowanych, wspólnotowych agencji wywiadowczych, czy wystarczają jej instytucje już funkcjonujące na poziomie unijnym i poszczególnych państw członkowskich. A jeżeli tak, to jakich agencji – jak skonstruowanych i jak uwspólnotowionych. Jeżeli o europejskiej wspólnej polityce wywiadowczej nie można mówić w kategoriach instytucjonalnych, to tylko dlatego, że nie ma na razie takiej woli politycznej. Przeszkodami są m.in.: brak zaufania, finanse, utrata partnerów zagranicznych, kwestie techniczno-logistyczne, aspekty prawno-instytucjonalne, różnice kulturowe, polityka, czy ideologia. W przypadku zmiany woli politycznej, w kontekście propozycji rozwiązań można mówić o rozbudowywaniu dotychczasowego modelu zachowującego *status quo*, modelu zwiększonej współpracy, bądź modelu pełnego wywiadu europejskiego z Europejską Agencją Wywiadowczą na czele.

ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЕ СООБЩЕСТВО – НЕЗАДЕЙСТВОВАННЫЙ ОПЛОТ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА

Резюме

Принимая во внимание следующие явления: расширения автономии полномочий на уровне ЕС, а также оценки значимости информационных обусловленностей, – заметно вырисовывается потребность осуществления переопределения роли, функции и места разведслужб не только в структуре отдельного государства, но и на уровне глобальных транснациональных альянсов. Европа нуждается в наличии общего ощущения безопасности, единого восприятия угроз, и, таким образом, совместных оценок степени риска. Исходя из этого, ЕС должен представить границы усиленного сотрудничества, как минимум с учётом развития так называемого разведывательного сообщества – применительно к заявленным политическим амбициям Европы. Открытым остаётся вопрос о том, нуждается ли ЕС в помощи специальных подготовленных для нужд сообщества разведслужб, или для него достаточно наличие институтов, которые уже функционируют на уровне ЕС и отдельных государств-членов ЕС. А если нуждается, то в каких службах – каким образом организованных и в какой степени выдержанных в рамках и интересах сообщества. Если о европейской единой разведывательной политике

нельзя говорить с институциональной точки зрения, то только потому, что пока не существует соответствующая политическая воля. Среди препятствий можно, в частности, назвать: отсутствие доверия, финансы, потеря иностранных партнёров, вопросы технического и логистического характера, правовые и институциональные аспекты, культурные различия, политика, идеология. В случае изменения политической воли, в контексте предложенных решений можно говорить о расширении прежней модели, сохраняющей *status quo*, модели усиленного сотрудничества, или же модели европейской разведки в её совокупности и во главе с Европолом.

Anna M. Solarz

THE HOLY SEE'S EFFORTS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation, as the basic condition for true peace between people and nations, has been included in the mission of the Catholic Church since its beginnings. The Holy See, which should be regarded as an emanation of the Church in international politics, carries the baggage of two thousand years of history. As with any religion, also in Christianity spiritual matters are interwoven with temporal affairs. The teaching of the Gospel, interpreted by popes, councils and important figures in the history of the Church, has intertwined with the history of the Mediterranean region, Europe and the whole world. One cannot analyse the activities of this entity in international relations without considering its historical baggage and spiritual-temporal specificity. It should be remembered that although the Vatican City State (established under an international agreement of 11 February 1929) remains in close relation with the Holy See and the Catholic Church, however, its dominion over this small territory is not the basis of the international and legal personality of the Holy See. This personality was also recognised in the period 1870–1929, when the Pope did not have sovereignty over any territory. It should be assumed that the basis for the action of the Holy See in international relations on an equal footing with other states is rather the spiritual dominion (spiritual sovereignty) of the Pope over the faithful gathered in the Catholic Church¹. As Józef Krukowski rightly observes, in fact it concerns the spiritual sovereignty of the Catholic Church over its members, the supreme authority of which the Holy See is².

¹ Cf. Bierzanek, R., Symonides, J. 2005. *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. [Public international law.]* Warszawa, p. 137.

² Józef Krukowski claims that 'in international relations the Catholic Church is an entity of spiritual sovereignty. This sovereignty should not be equated with secular – territo-

Analyzing the behaviour of states in international relations we consider the interests that guide their foreign policy. Due to the specificity of the Holy See the only 'interest' of this entity is to provide the Church with the widest possible opportunities to operate. It concerns therefore the realisation of the right to religious freedom, which – as the Church and the international community recognise – is a universal right of every human being, no matter which religion they profess. This means that the diplomatic activity of the Holy See also serves other religions and denominations which do not have such tools to act in international relations. First of all, for the realisation of the right to religious freedom, the Holy See establishes bilateral diplomatic relations with states and also participates in conference diplomacy and acts in international organisations. Its primary objective is reconciliation and peace between people and nations, which correlates with the Catholic Church's parallel bottom-up activity of evangelisation on all continents. Only the perception of this broad perspective allows us to understand and explain the activity of the Holy See in international relations.

The undertaken considerations are part of the current research on the cultural context of foreign policy of modern states and international relations. It seems to be a burning issue in the face of challenges faced by the international community in the twenty-first century. Culturally conditioned ideas and values incorporated in national interests, or culturally conditioned behaviour of countries and other actors in the international arena, increasingly become the subject of discussion, but still there is no common conviction about the need to prepare appropriate theoretical tools for such an analysis. In this context, it is important to study the activity of the Holy See in international relations, especially its commitment to reconciliation, which is one of the most important goals of faith-based diplomacy (FBD, religiously motivated diplomacy)³. It connects it with non-state actors which often use informal diplomacy to achieve their objectives in international relations. The Holy See

rial sovereignty which states have'. State sovereignty is limited to a specific territory (in a specific case according to a custom or under an international agreement it may be specified otherwise). The sovereignty of the Church involves people in many different countries. This entity operates in international relations through its supreme authority, i.e. The Holy See. Cf. Krukowski, J. 1993. *Kościół i państwo. Podstawy relacji prawnych*. [Church and State. Fundamentals of legal relations]. Lublin, p. 136.

³ Cf. Kulska, J. 2014. Faith-based diplomacy i transnarodowi aktorzy religijni. [Faith-based diplomacy and transnational religious actors.] In: Burgoński, P., Gierycz, M. eds. *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki*. [Religion and politics. An outline of the problem.] Warszawa, p. 581.

remains a quasi-state entity using also the classical form of diplomacy, which makes it an even better subject for the analysis of the presence and influence of the cultural factor on the international reality.

1. FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY (FBD), RECONCILIATION AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Since the end of the Cold War many scholars of international relations have emphasised the importance of the cultural factor, including the religious one, in the development of relations crossing state borders. The role of religious actors (such as the Catholic Church – its various institutions, especially popes) and actors motivated by religion (especially so-called religious non-governmental organisations or RNGOs and others) is noticed in resolving disputes and conflicts, in preparing the ground for truly peaceful relations between states and other actors on the international scene. It very often pertains also to internal conflicts and tensions, the duration of which becomes a pretext for external intervention or simply weakens the country on the international forum. The aim is not only the resolution of the dispute or conflict, but much deeper, broad reconciliation. FBD is a form of informal diplomacy ('track two' diplomacy⁴), which is based on religious faith⁵ and uses methods unusual for policy (i.e. acts of love of God and neighbour, for example, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, forgiveness, repentance, etc.)⁶. It is assumed that the appeasement of the dispute, which at any moment could explode with renewed force, does not, in fact, constitute its solution – only a change in thinking ensures this. It concerns not only politicians and soldiers

⁴ 'Track two' diplomacy is diplomacy practiced by non-state actors, NGO activists, religious leaders and individuals. What makes it different is its rootedness in religions – their sacred texts, beliefs, traditions and practices. According to Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott, this type of diplomacy is characterised by two-vector, spiritual orientation on which all actions are based, namely, first, the 'proper orientation' of politicians to transcendence, and secondly – 'the active role of the divine in human affairs'. For practitioners of FBD, even though they operate on the basis of their secular knowledge and experience, faith remains a basic compass. Cf. Cox, B., Philpott, D. 2012. Faith-based diplomacy. An ancient idea newly emergent. In: Hoover, D.R., Johnston, D.M. eds. *Religion and foreign affairs. Essential readings*. Waco, p. 251.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 252.

⁶ Kulska, J. Faith-based diplomacy i transnarodowi... [Faith-based diplomacy and transnational...] op. cit.

fighting with each other – this change must be connected with *metanoia* experienced by whole conflicting groups, communities, and nations⁷.

From the purely human perspective, this matter seems to be unachievable. In this case, religion comes to the aid, which – honestly professed by many people – could be a sufficient motivation to change hearts and minds. As we know, Mahatma Gandhi was a practitioner of FBD, who with his method of ‘holding onto truth’ (*satyagraha*) without the use of force led to the liberation of India from British colonisation. To this day, these countries have been in good relations with each other.

Joanna Kulska is one of the main Polish researchers of FBD. In her numerous articles devoted to this issue she systematises, promotes and develops existing knowledge on the subject⁸. It is worth noting that it has been difficult for Western scholars of international relations to take up the issue of the influence of religion on reconciliation and consequently peace between nations because of the belief about only a divisive nature of religion in relations between nations, which has been deeply rooted in the mentality of these people, but also politicians, diplomats and many other international

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 581.

⁸ Cf. especially *ibidem*. Cf. also by this author: 2012. Faith-based diplomacy. Religia jako czynnik funkcjonalny w stosunkach międzynarodowych. [Faith-based diplomacy. Religion as a functional factor in international relations.] In: Solarz, A.M., Schreiber, H. eds. Religia w stosunkach międzynarodowych. [*Religion in international relations.*] Warszawa, pp. 137–154; 2013. Faith-based diplomacy jako instrument rozwiązywania sporów i konfliktów międzynarodowych. [Faith-based diplomacy as an instrument for resolving international disputes and conflicts.] *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politycznohistoryczne*, no. 38, pp. 9–25; 2013. Ambiwalencja świętości jako przejaw czynnika religijnego w stosunkach międzynarodowych. [The ambivalence of holiness as a manifestation of the religious factor in international relations.] *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, no. 48, pp. 85–100; 2013. Organizacje religijne i motywowane religijnie wobec problemów rozwoju i pomocy humanitarnej. [Religious organizations and religiously motivated ones and the problems of development and humanitarian aid.] In: Dobrowolska-Polak, J. ed. *Polityka budowy pokoju. Pomoc humanitarna i rozwojowa.* [Peace-building policy. Humanitarian and development aid.] WSNHiD – Instytut Zachodni, pp. 147–174; 2013. Wspólnota Świętego Idziego jako przykład organizacji pozarządowej motywowanej religijnie. [The Community of St. Egidio as an example of a religiously motivated NGO.] In: Gizicki, W. ed. *Religia w polityce światowej. Dylematy narodowe i międzynarodowe.* [Religion in world politics. National and international dilemmas.] Instytut Sądecko-Lubelski, pp. 79–95; 2015. A balanced perception of religion in international relations. 9 July 2015. Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/09/a-balanced-perception-of-religion-in-international-relations>, pp. 85–100.

practitioners⁹. Meanwhile, the lack of references to religion in the analysis of international reality has not eliminated the real meaning of this sphere in social relations. A consequence of this approach has been, however, depriving the West of efficient tools to explain and predict the development of events, the best proof of which was the question of the collapse of the Eastern bloc or the development of international terrorism associated with religious fundamentalism¹⁰.

The book entitled 'Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft' by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson published in 1994 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies was a groundbreaking work of Western scholars, which noticed a positive and profound impact of the religious factor on building peaceful international relations. The authors analyse in it, among others, practical examples of the impact of the religious and spiritual factor on overcoming mistrust and reconciliation between different social groups and nations¹¹. In 2003 another book edited by D. Johnston entitled 'Faith-based diplomacy. Trumping realpolitik'¹² was published, which emphasises the need to replace power politics with the culture approach, especially based on religion¹³.

FBD has been considered by many other Western scholars. We should in particular remember about publications by Scott Appleby, Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott¹⁴. From the position of the practitioner of diplomacy, also

⁹ It was, as it seems, the result of the generalisation of the Eurocentric analysis of international reality, which since the mid-seventeenth century (Peace of Westphalia in 1648) has eliminated the religious factor from this sphere in the name of ending religious wars. Theoretical assumptions, however, do not affect the practice of social life, which, especially in the non-European world, is greatly influenced by religion.

¹⁰ These conclusions lead to even greater generalization. E.g. a report of the Transatlantic Academy of April 2015 says explicitly that the high degree of secularization in Europe weakens its 'soft power', especially in relation to its neighbors – i.e. Russia, Turkey and the Arab world, which in turn translates into transatlantic relations. Cf. *Faith, freedom, and foreign policy. Challenges for the transatlantic community*. Available at: http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TA%202015%20report_Apr15_web.pdf [Accessed: 5 June 2015]. Cf. also Johnson, D. ed. 2003. *Faith-based diplomacy*. New York, p. XI.

¹¹ The book discusses examples, among others, of Philippines, East Germany, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, South Africa, South Sudan, and the post-war Franco-German relations. Cf. Johnston, D., Sampson, C. 1995. eds. *Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft*. New York.

¹² Johnston, D. ed. *Faith-based diplomacy*, op. cit.

¹³ Cf. Kulska, J. op. cit., p. 579.

¹⁴ Cf. Cox, B., Philpott, D. *Faith-based diplomacy*, op. cit.

former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright draws attention in her works to the need to refer to the religious factor¹⁵. The book entitled 'Faith-based diplomacy. The challenge to development' by John Chikago, Mali ambassador in Japan, is an exceptional study in which the author coming from the non-Western circle attempts to introduce a new optics to analyse international reality as wanted and created by God, referring to specific passages of the Scripture¹⁶.

The activity of the Catholic Church, especially popes and institutions connected with the Church, is part of the circle of activities associated with FBD. On the other hand, diplomacy of the Holy See also uses traditional methods, appropriate for governments, because of its quasi-state character. Due to all this, this entity has a very wide range of means and methods of 'soft' influence in international relations (though, what needs to be emphasised exclusively on the principle of 'soft power'), and therefore its responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the world is enormous. Popes and church representatives themselves emphasise that this institution derives from its special 'experience in humanity'¹⁷ and becomes a kind of 'conscience of humanity'¹⁸. All activities of the Holy See and representatives of the Church towards the world are based on the Gospel and the ensuing social teaching, therefore it is worthwhile to devote some attention to it.

2. RECONCILIATION IN CHURCH TEACHING

As I emphasise in the introduction, reconciliation has been related to the mission of the Catholic Church since its beginnings, as it is related to the mission of Jesus Christ. Through truth, repentance and forgiveness mankind is to achieve reconciliation, which is a prerequisite for true peace. The logic of these actions often has little in common with the so-called purely human

¹⁵ Cf. inter alia, Albright, M. 2006. Faith and diplomacy. *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, vol. 4, issue 2.

¹⁶ Chikago, J. 2005. *Faith-based diplomacy. The challenge to development*. Bloomington.

¹⁷ Cf. Paul VI. 1996. Encyclical letter *Populorum progressio*. No. 13. In: *Dokumenty nauki społecznej Kościoła*. [Documents of Church's social teaching.], vol. II. Rome-Lublin, p. 13. Cf. also: <https://zenit.org/articles/church-is-an-expert-in-humanity-says-pope/> [Accessed: 10 April 2016].

¹⁸ Casaroli, A. 1987. The unique role of the Holy See in international community. No. 045. In: *Path to peace. A Contribution. Documents of the Holy See to the international community*. New York, p. xxxi.

logic. In chapter 10 of the Gospel of St. Matthew Christ's words are quoted: 'Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth: it is not peace I have come to bring, but a sword'¹⁹. This statement may seem surprising, because otherwise we know that the teaching of Christ concerns just this true peace achieved through reconciliation between man and God and between people. These words indicate, however, that we often misunderstand the word 'peace' – most commonly understood as the 'absence of war'. In fact, evangelical peace is not identical with 'apparent peace', which prevails 'in peaceful times' in the live of people and nations. Evangelical peace is primarily 'peace of heart' – the internal order in the soul of every man which is contrasted with the 'moral disorder' or sin. What then is the relationship between 'peace of heart' and wars in the world? The teaching of the Church, from the Gospel through the Apostles, the Fathers and writers of the Church and the whole theological and historical tradition widely develops this idea, which is also the basic theme of the presence of the Holy See in international relations. The Church emphasises that only true 'peace of heart' (conditioned by truth, justice, forgiveness and reconciliation) resulting from selfless love for God and another human being (which is a consequence of selfless and God's perfect love for man) can be the basis for lasting peace between people and nations²⁰.

In the 'Compendium of social doctrine of the Church' we read that '(...) true peace is made possible only through forgiveness and reconciliation. (...) Mutual forgiveness must not eliminate the need for justice and still less does it block the path that leads to truth: justice and truth represent the concrete requisites for reconciliation'²¹. In the message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace on 1 January 1997, which started the three-year direct period of preparation for the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000, St. John Paul II emphasises that 'no process of peace can ever begin unless an attitude of sincere forgiveness takes root in human hearts'²². In this document the Pope appeals to people to 'seek peace along the paths of forgiveness' thought

¹⁹ Mt 10, 34.

²⁰ 'Building true peace is an expression of Christian faith in God's love for every human being'. Cf. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. 2005. *Kompedium nauki społecznej Kościoła*. [Compendium of social doctrine of the Church.] Kielce, no. 516, p. 339.

²¹ *Ibidem*. No. 517–518, pp. 339–340.

²² John Paul II. 2003. *Przebacz, a zaznasz pokoju. Orędzie na Światowy Dzień Pokoju, 1 stycznia 1997 r.* [Offer forgiveness and receive peace. Message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace, 1 January 1997.] In: John Paul II, *Świat nie jest zamęt...* [The world is no chaos...] Warszawa, no. 1, p. 248.

at the same time he stresses 'that forgiveness can seem contrary to human logic, which often yields to the dynamics of conflict and revenge'. Forgiveness however is inspired by this special 'the logic of love', which 'God has for every man and woman, for every people and nation, and for the whole human family'. Later in the document he emphasises that 'God is rich in mercy and full of forgiveness for those who come back to him'²³. This merciful love of God for man should be the basis for brotherhood among human beings, including their mutual forgiveness and reconciliation as a consequence. This does not diminish the importance of truth and justice, but puts them in a different light.

It is worthwhile to note the commitment of the Holy See to building peaceful international relations after the Cold War. The Vatican's 'strategy of reconciliation', which the Catholic Church proposes to the world in the utterances of popes and other representatives, is a part of this. This is the basis of Catholic 'faith-based diplomacy', but it is also the foundation of traditional Vatican diplomacy. It seems that, among other things, due to the positive reception of this 'strategy' by the international community, in the twenty-first century the Holy See has strengthened its position in the international arena, despite fierce opposition from liberal-leftist circles.

3. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ACTIVITY OF THE HOLY SEE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War rivalry in the late eighties and early nineties of the twentieth century is an important turning point in international relations, as well as in the pontificate of Polish Pope John Paul II covering the period 1978–2005. It seems that after the collapse of the Eastern bloc the Pope together with all the diplomacy of the Holy See got particularly intensely involved in co-creating 'ethical foundations of the new world community'²⁴. Due to deep reflection of the Church on totalitarian regimes, the still emerging conflicts and wars in the world, based on its 'experience in humanity' –

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 248–249.

²⁴ *Osservatore Romano – Polish Edition*, no. 3. 2002. Wystąpienie abpa Martina na konferencji w Durbanie. [Speech by Archbishop Martin at the conference in Durban.], pp. 35–37. Cf. Solarz, A.M. 2003. „Strategia pojednania” – propozycja Stolicy Apostolskiej dla stosunków Północ-Południe w XXI wieku. [‘The strategy of reconciliation’ – a proposal of the Holy See for North-South relations in the twenty-first century.] *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, no. 1–2, p. 159.

a long tradition of moral teaching and the conviction and beliefs of the Pope himself (former professor of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin), the Holy See felt compelled to increase its activity on the international forum on an unprecedented scale²⁵. This manifested itself in various ways, among others, by establishing diplomatic relations with many countries, further intense apostolic trips, involvement in resolution of disputes and conflicts in various parts of the world. But in a special way it was connected with the presence in the UN system, which – as the church believed – will play a special role in building of ethics for the united world at the time of accelerated globalisation processes²⁶.

Among other things, the Holy See had a significant share in the preparation, conduct and implementation of so-called global conferences, which were devoted to important international issues (such as the environment, demography, women, nourishment, housing, the development of the poorest regions, diseases and others)²⁷. Moral solutions proposed by the Church met with acceptance of the international community (especially those related to aid for the poorest countries of the world or the environment), but also with opposition (it concerned primarily opposition to the concept of so-called reproductive health and methods of preventing HIV/AIDS, and in a broader sense – the redefinition of the whole concept of human rights in a spirit contrary to natural law). In many issues the attitude of the Holy See, entering into temporary alliances with countries of different cultures, not only Catholic ones, turned out to be an important factor blocking international consensus, which was to be the basis of this ‘new ethics’. The Catholic Church became the target of attacks in the UN and elsewhere, and their most famous example was the international campaign ‘See Change’ initiated by the organisation ‘Catholics for a Free Choice’, not recognised by Vatican.

²⁵ The second period of the pontificate in terms of commitment to peace is analysed, among others, by Christiansen, D. Catholic peacemaking, 1991–2005. The Legacy of Pope John Paul II. In: Hoover, D.R., Johnston D.M. eds., op. cit., pp. 281–287.

²⁶ Cf. Solarz, A.M. 2003. *Stolica Apostolska wobec problemów globalizacji*. [The Holy See in the face of globalization problems.] In: Haliżak, E., Kuźniar, R., Symonides, J. eds. *Globalizacja a stosunki międzynarodowe*. [*Globalization and international relations*.] Bydgoszcz-Warszawa, pp. 316–333.

²⁷ *Serving the human family. The Holy See at the major United Nations conferences*. 1997. New York City. Cf. also Solarz, A.M. 2009. Jan Paweł II i dyplomacja watykańska wobec globalnych konferencji ONZ. [John Paul II and Vatican diplomacy towards global UN conferences.] In: Wilk, M., Donaj, Ł. eds. *Jan Paweł II – w kręgu myśli politycznej i dyplomacji*. [*John Paul II in the circle of political thought and diplomacy*.] Łódź, pp. 110–123.

The aim of the campaign was to change the status of the Holy See in the UN system from an observer state to an NGO, which in turn was supposed to stop it from blocking changes in the issues of abortion, contraception and sex education. This plan, however, failed because there appeared a Catholic movement defending the current position of the Church, led the organisation C-Fam (Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute) and which received broad support from institutions associated with other religions, as well as many neutral ones in this respect. Consequently, this led to the extension of the privileges of the Holy See in the UN in the General Assembly resolution of 1 July 2004 and strengthening of the position of the entity in the international community²⁸.

4. JOHN PAUL II AND THE 'PURIFICATION OF MEMORY'

As can be expected, the strengthening of the Church's presence in the UN system was a consequence of, among others, its contribution to breaking the stalemate that occurred during the first global conference in the twenty-first century dedicated to racism, which took place in August and September 2001 in Durban. While the range of issues that were to be discussed at the meeting was wide, the debate was dominated by two topics. The first concerned the settlement of colonialism and slavery – the states affected by such actions expected an apology, which would be followed by high financial compensation, especially from rich European countries. The other issue was the conflict in Palestine, where since September 2000 the Second Intifada had lasted after the collapse of the peace process, a part of which was the propaganda struggle in the international arena and an attempt to introduce anti-Israeli rhetoric to the final documents of the Durban conference (it concerned, among others, the recognition of Zionism as a form of racism and omission of the problem of anti-Semitism). As a consequence of this latter topic Israel and the United States supporting it withdrew from the proceedings, which significantly reduced the importance of the meeting in Durban. A compromise was achieved in the first issue, to which the Holy See and its 'strategy of reconciliation' ('purification of memory') contributed.

Pope John Paul II for the first time used the term 'purification of memory' on 31 May 1980 at the ecumenical meeting in Paris. As observers emphasise

²⁸ See more on this topic, among others, in Kulska, J. Faith-based diplomacy i transnarodowi... [Faith-based diplomacy and transnational...], op. cit., p. 589.

over time it became the ‘central motto’ of this pontificate²⁹. It concerns the confession and mutual forgiveness, which is aimed at genuine reconciliation and peaceful cooperation not burdened with the past³⁰. Forerunners of this way of thinking in contemporary international relations were Protestants who already in the twenties of the twentieth century expressed regret and remorse because of divisions in Christianity³¹. The Catholic Church joined these activities during the Second Vatican Council – during the opening of the second session the newly elected Pope, Paul VI, addressed the representatives of other Christian denominations, asking for forgiveness for the sins of Catholics, and ensuring forgiveness from his church (*veniam damus petimusque vicissim* – ‘we forgive and ask for forgiveness’). The consequences of this gesture were significant, as can be seen in the conciliar documents, as well as in the practice of international life. As we know, Polish bishops used the same phrase in the letter to German bishops of 18 November 1965. A defender of this letter, in the face of fierce anti-Church Communist propaganda in reaction to this event, was, among others, Karol Wojtyła³².

Even as Pope, John Paul II often used this kind of strategy of ‘purification of memory’. It was ascertained that in the years 1978–1996 he expressed sorrow for sins committed by Catholics in as many as 94 different ways, including he used the words ‘I ask for forgiveness’ and similar ones 25 times³³. In the above mentioned message for the celebration of the 1997 World Day of Peace John Paul II explained the need to take this type of action in every aspect of human life: ‘one cannot remain a prisoner of the past, for individuals and peoples need a sort of “healing of memories”, so that past evils will not come back again. This does not mean forgetting past events; it means re-examining them with a new attitude and learning precisely from the experience of suffering that only love can build up, whereas hatred produces devastation and

²⁹ Accatoli, L. 1999. *Kiedy papież prosi o przebaczenie. Wszystkie „mea culpa” Jana Pawła II. [When a pope asks forgiveness. The mea culpa’s of John Paul II.]* Kraków, p. 100.

³⁰ Cf. Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], op. cit., p. 160.

³¹ Cf. Accatoli, L., op. cit., pp. 23–84. Cf. Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], op. cit., p. 161.

³² 50 rocznica orędzia biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich. [50th anniversary of the address of Polish bishops to German bishops.] Available at: http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/temat_dnia/x94260/rocznica-oredzia-biskupow-polskich-do-biskupow-niemieckich/ [Accessed: 5 April 2016].

³³ Accatoli, L., op. cit. Cf. Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation ...’], op. cit., p. 162.

ruin. The deadly cycle of revenge must be replaced by the new-found liberty of forgiveness³⁴.

The specificity of 'purification of memory' is exemplified in the subsequent sentences of the Message in which the Pope calls for 'learning to read the history of other peoples without facile and partisan bias, making an effort to understand their point of view'³⁵. At the same time he clearly states that 'this is a challenge for civilisation' but 'if we agree to set out on this journey, we shall come to see that mistakes are not all on one side; we shall see how history has sometimes been presented in a distorted and even manipulated way, with tragic results. A correct reading of history will make it easier to accept and appreciate the social, cultural and religious differences between individuals, groups and peoples'³⁶. It is these actions that lead to genuine reconciliation and consequently build 'lasting peace'. Truth and justice become the prerequisites of forgiveness³⁷.

The papal proposal contains also specific mechanisms of reconciliation suggested to the international community. It primarily concerns building strong 'desire for peace' to which religions can specifically contribute. According to the Pope, also the activities of governments and the international community are of key importance; they should establish 'solid structures capable of withstanding the uncertainties of politics' – ensuring 'to everyone freedom and security in every circumstance'. The Pope points in particular to the United Nations – as one of such structures – although in the present condition requiring 'strengthening' and similar institutions at the continental, regional and local level³⁸. Moreover, John Paul II stresses that 'lasting peace is not just a matter of structures and mechanisms'. It concerns primarily a fundamental change in 'a style of human coexistence' which should be 'marked by mutual acceptance and a capacity to forgive from the heart'. Everyone needs forgiveness and thus 'asking and granting forgiveness is something profoundly worthy of man'³⁹.

The Pope's own initiative was the proposal of confession of all the sins of the Church committed in the past millennium, associated with the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000. 'The examination of conscience at the end of the

³⁴ *Przebacz, a zaznasz pokoju...* [Offer forgiveness and receive peace....], op. cit., no. 3, p. 250.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, no. 4–5, pp. 251–253.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, no. 4, pp. 251–252.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, no. 4, p. 252.

second millennium' was also announced in the Apostolic Letter *Tertio Millennio Adveniente*, although not all cardinals were in favour of this idea⁴⁰. The initiative was implemented, however, and its particular expression was the document 'Memory and reconciliation: the Church and the faults of the past', which was presented in the Vatican City on 7 March 2000. Several days later (12 March) expiatory Sunday was held – during the solemn liturgy the representatives of the various dicasteries of the Roman Curia under the leadership of the pope confessed faults of the Church concerning particular issues and asked for forgiveness. Local churches, sometimes with the participation of the state, took similar actions⁴¹.

5. THE VATICAN'S 'STRATEGY OF RECONCILIATION' DURING THE CONFERENCE IN DURBAN

The Holy See therefore joined the conference in Durban armed with the 'strategy of reconciliation' and its own experience with its use. The Vatican's diplomacy turned out to be very active during the preparations of the Conference and its duration. A particularly important expression of the participation of the Holy See became a document of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace presented just before the opening of the meeting of 29 August 2001 entitled 'The contribution of the Holy See to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance'⁴². The problem of Zionism as a form of racism is not included in the document at all. It seems that for the Holy See this issue had a purely political and propaganda character and should not be included in the final provisions from Durban. At the same time representatives of the Church noticed the need to include the Palestinian problem to the agenda of the conference, but in a way that was compatible with the spirit of the meeting⁴³.

⁴⁰ John Paul II. 1994. *Tertio millennio adveniente*. Wrocław, no. 33 ff. Cf. Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], op. cit., p. 161.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 163.

⁴² Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. *Contribution to World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*. Available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20010829_comunicato-razzismo_en.html [Accessed 11 April 2016]. More detailed discussion of the document cf.: Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], op. cit., pp. 167–173.

⁴³ Cf. Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], op. cit., p. 167.

Particular importance of the Vatican document is associated with a proposal to break the deadlock in North and South relations. The Holy See stresses the role of religion in leading to 'purification of hearts' from the spirit of domination and fear, and opening people to brotherhood and solidarity. If evil through its consequences lives longer than the perpetrator, becoming a burden which pushes apart the next generations, 'purification of memory' becomes necessary, that is 'the elimination from personal and collective conscience of all forms of resentment or violence left by the inheritance of the past'⁴⁴. This 'purification of memory', which is an external expression of 'purification of hearts' is a prerequisite for forgiveness which will stop the desire for revenge. The Church proposes to re-read history in the spirit of a 'culture of peace' (without resorting to war to resolve problems), which should be reflected in the education proposed by governments with the participation of churches and religion. At the international level it assigns the United Nations and regional structures a large role in the dissemination of such an approach and taking practical mediation actions in favour of peace. The Holy See stresses, however, that the basis for peace – mutual forgiveness – has its own requirements: committed evil must be recognised and, if practicable, repaired. Everything should be done in the spirit of 'respect for truth', that is why procedures approximating it are so important. All activities must be accompanied by justice and respect for fundamental human dignity. This is not about revenge or retaliation⁴⁵.

The Vatican's proposal to address the issue of compensation demanded by the post-colonial countries proved to be crucial for the conference in Durban. The document of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace mentions restitution for 'moral injuries', because the calculation of actual losses associated with the history is basically impossible. From the ethical point of view it is important that the victim feels 'satisfied' with the granted compensation. The Holy See did not support exorbitant claims made especially by the environment connected with the black population, which made attempts, among others, to calculate the costs of slavery. It stressed, however, that the states which in the past violated human rights had a moral obligation to take responsibility for those actions. In its opinion, this should take the form of an apology and specific development aid, which will be gratuitously granted by the country that benefited from colonialism and slavery, in order to help postcolonial coun-

⁴⁴ Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *op. cit.*, no. 6. Cf. also Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], *op. cit.*, pp. 167–168.

⁴⁵ Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *op. cit.*, no. 11. Cf. also Solarz, A.M. „Strategia pojednania”... [‘The strategy of reconciliation...’], *op. cit.*, p. 169.

tries break the barrier and enter onto the path of sustainable development⁴⁶. Strong emphasis should be placed on aid in the development of education since 'illiteracy is a kind of daily slavery in a world that presupposes education'. The education should in the first place lead to the development of humanity and should not be exclusively targeted to achieve temporary success⁴⁷.

The analysis of the documents adopted at the first global conference of twenty-first century in Durban leads to the conclusion that the recommendations of the Holy See were reflected in them. A lot of attention is devoted to the role of religion and the need to eradicate manifestations of evil in the world and the situation of developing countries in the face of intensified globalisation. In point 100 it is stressed that some countries have taken the initiative to apologise and have paid reparation, where appropriate, for grave and massive violations committed⁴⁸. It is also known that representatives of European states expressed their apologies during the conference⁴⁹.

What was however lacking from the point of view of the Vatican's 'strategy of reconciliation' was the absence of loudly expressed forgiveness by the victims, which should be one of the conditions of 'purification of memory' within the international community. A few days after the meeting in Durban, the world was shaken by September 11 attacks on New York and Washington DC. In the Message for the World Day of Peace 2002 Pope John Paul II emphasised that 'there is no peace without justice' and also 'there is no justice without forgiveness'⁵⁰. These seemingly alternative values, according to the Pope, are in fact inextricably linked: 'Forgiveness is in no way opposed to justice, as if to forgive meant to overlook the need to right the wrong done. It is rather the fullness of justice, leading to that tranquillity of order which is much more than a fragile and temporary cessation of hostilities, involving as it does the deepest healing of the wounds which fester in human hearts. Justice and forgiveness are both essential to such healing'⁵¹. In his message, John Paul II observes that international terrorism attacks peace based on

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 170.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 171.

⁴⁸ The analysis of the final document: *ibidem*, pp. 174–175.

⁴⁹ Among others the Germany's representative apologized for slavery and colonial exploitation. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 167.

⁵⁰ John Paul II. 2002. Nie ma pokoju bez sprawiedliwości, nie ma sprawiedliwości bez przebaczenia. Oędzie na Światowy Dzień Pokoju, 1 stycznia 2002 r. [There is no peace without justice, no justice without forgiveness. Message for the World Day of Peace, 1 January 2002.] In: John Paul II. *Świat nie jest zamęt...* [*The world is no chaos...*], op. cit., pp. 305–312.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, no. 3, p. 306.

justice and forgiveness, and because it is 'built on contempt for human life' it leads not only to crime but is 'itself a true crime against humanity'. In no case can the injustices existing in the world be used to justify terrorist attacks, and the terrorist claim to act on behalf of the poor is, according to the Pope 'a patent falsehood'⁵².

6. THE HOLY SEE IN THE SERVICE OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN RELIGIONS AND CIVILISATIONS

As follows from the above quoted message, the events of 11 September 2001 that took place immediately after the meeting in Durban, and in addition in the year which was declared by the United Nations the 'Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations', were alarming for the Holy See also because they constituted 'a profanation of religion'⁵³. The teaching of the Church stresses that 'forgiveness has a divine source and criterion' although 'its significance can also be grasped in the light of human reasoning'⁵⁴. In his reflection on the attacks in the US, justice and forgiveness, John Paul II also turned towards the conflict in the Holy Land and stressed the urgent need to solve it: 'The continuous recourse to acts of terror and war, which aggravate the situation and diminish hope on all sides, must finally give way to a negotiated solution. The rights and demands of each party can be taken into proper account and balanced in an equitable way, if and when there is a will to let justice and reconciliation prevail'⁵⁵.

Special responsibility, however, lies on prominent religious figures. In his message, John Paul II urged 'Jewish, Christian and Islamic religious leaders' to start from 'the public condemnation of terrorism' and deny 'terrorists any form of religious or moral legitimacy'. The effort on the part of religion would be conducive to 'the pursue of the path of forgiveness'. The pope stressed that 'the help that religions can give to peace and against terrorism consists precisely in their teaching forgiveness, for those who forgive and seek forgiveness know that there is a higher Truth, and that by accepting that Truth they can transcend themselves'⁵⁶.

⁵² *Ibidem*, no. 4–5, pp. 307–308.

⁵³ Nie ma pokoju bez sprawiedliwości... [There is no peace without justice...], op. cit., no. 6, p. 308.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, no. 11, p. 311.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, no. 12–13, p. 311.

Even before 11 September 2001 the Holy See undertook a number of ecumenical and interreligious initiatives aimed at forgiveness, reconciliation and peace between religions and civilisations. On 27 October 1986 at the invitation of Pope John Paul II more than 130 representatives of different Christian traditions, and 13 other religions gathered in Assisi during the World Day of Prayer for Peace. It was an unprecedented event, supported by almost all the most important religious leaders, as well as various international organisations and world public opinion. Certain representatives of the Church were, however, quite reserved, e.g., Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger who stressed the danger of blurring the differences between religions⁵⁷.

John Paul II also used this particular message of peace, serving reconciliation between people and nations after 11 September, announcing in the above quoted Message for the World Day of Peace, that it will be held on 24 January 2002. It is worth stressing that Cardinal Ratzinger did not have any objections then – he personally took part in it, recognizing it as important and constructive, and as Pope Benedict XVI he himself convened a similar prayer meeting in 2011, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the first one⁵⁸.

The ‘spirit of Assisi’ also accompanies the pontificate of Francis, who has frequently met with representatives of other Christian denominations and religions. His meeting with the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Kirill I, on 12 February 2016 in Cuba is memorable. The joint declaration signed then says a lot about the common roots, understanding and reconciliation in the face of challenges of the modern world, but it does not mention the word ‘forgiveness’, which may indicate that it is more inspired by the Orthodox side than by Catholic ‘purification of memory’. A very important event of the pontificate of Francis was also the organised at his request prayer meeting in the Vatican gardens attended by Israeli President Shimon Peres, leader of the Palestinians Muhammad Abbas and the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew. Among the prayers separately said by Jews, Christians and Muslims there was also a request for forgiveness. Pope Francis drew

⁵⁷ Cf. Michałek A, SVD, 2014. Spotkanie międzyreligijne w Asyżu (1986) – szczególne orędzie pokoju. [The interreligious meeting in Assisi (1986) – a special message of peace.] In: Lizak, W., Solarz, A.M. eds. *Z problematyki pokoju w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. [On the issue of peace in international relations.] Warszawa, p. 95.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 95.

attention in a special way to the need for forgiveness in his speech, calling for 'the courage of peace'⁵⁹.

7. SUMMARY

For traditional Vatican diplomacy as well as diplomacy of representatives of the Church defined in science as 'faith-based diplomacy' the most important task is service for peace. However, its establishment and maintenance in the world requires *metanoia* in the current approach to interpersonal and international relations and this needs to be done by overcoming limitations in people's hearts. That is why, the Holy See pays so much attention to reconciliation, which in the Catholic tradition is based on truth, justice and forgiveness. Disregarding any of these conditions means building peace on sand and not on rock and explains why interpersonal wars and conflicts are so persistent in international relations. This can be an important clue for states and their foreign policy. It turns out that culture and religion, underestimated by scholars of international relations, can provide an important inspiration in this regard.

REFERENCES

- 50 rocznica orędzia biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich. [50th anniversary of the address of Polish bishops to German bishops.] Available at: http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/temat_dnia/x94260/rocznica-oredzia-biskupow-polskich-do-biskupow-niemieckich/ [Accessed: 5 April 2016].
- Accatoli, L. 1999. *Kiedy papież prosi o przebaczenie. Wszystkie „mea culpa” Jana Pawła II.* [When a pope asks forgiveness. The mea culpa's of John Paul II.] Kraków.
- Albright, M. 2006. Faith and diplomacy. *The Review of Faith and International Affairs*, vol. 4, issue 2.
- Bierzanek, R., Symonides, J. 2005. *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne.* [Public international law.] Warszawa.

⁵⁹ Górzyński, O. Abbas, Peres i Franciszek modlili się o pokój. [Abbas, Peres and Francis prayed for peace.] <http://www.rp.pl/artukul/1116323-Abbas--Peres-i-Franciszek-modlili-sie-o-pokoj.html#ap-2> [Accessed: 11 April 2016].

- Casaroli, A. 1987. The unique role of the Holy See in international community. No. 045. In: *Path to peace. A Contribution. Documents of the Holy See to the international community*. New York.
- Chikago, J. 2005. *Faith-based diplomacy. The challenge to development*. Bloomington.
- Christiansen, D. Catholic peacemaking, 1991–2005. The Legacy of Pope John Paul II. In: Hoover, D.R., Johnston D. M. eds.
- Cox, B., Philpott, D. 2012. Faith-based diplomacy. An ancient idea newly emergent. In: Hoover, D.R., Johnston, D.M. eds. *Religion and foreign affairs. Essential readings*. Waco.
- Faith, freedom, and foreign policy. Challenges for the transatlantic community*. Available at: http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TA%202015%20report_Apr15_web.pdf [Accessed: 5 June 2015].
- Górzyński, O. Abbas, Peres i Franciszek modlili się o pokój. [Abbas, Peres and Francis prayed for peace.] <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1116323-Abbas--Peres-i-Franciszek-modlili-sie-o-pokoj.html#ap-2> [Accessed: 11 April 2016].
- John Paul II. 1994. *Tertio millennio adveniente*. Wrocław.
- John Paul II. 2002. Nie ma pokoju bez sprawiedliwości, nie ma sprawiedliwości bez przebaczenia. Orędzie na Światowy Dzień Pokoju, 1 stycznia 2002 r. [There is no peace without justice, no justice without forgiveness. Message for the World Day of Peace, 1 January 2002.] In: John Paul II. *Świat nie jest zamęt...* [*The world is no chaos...*].
- John Paul II. 2003. Przebacz, a zaznasz pokoju. Orędzie na Światowy Dzień Pokoju, 1 stycznia 1997 r. [Offer forgiveness and receive peace. Message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace, 1 January 1997.] In: John Paul II, *Świat nie jest zamęt...* [*The world is no chaos...*] Warszawa.
- Johnston, D., Sampson, C. 1995. eds. *Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft*. New York.
- Krukowski, J. 1993. *Kościół i państwo. Podstawy relacji prawnych*. [*Church and State. Fundamentals of legal relations*]. Lublin.
- Kulska, J. 2012. Faith-based diplomacy. Religia jako czynnik funkcjonalny w stosunkach międzynarodowych. [Faith-based diplomacy. Religion as a functional factor in international relations.] In: Solarz, A. M., Schreiber H. eds. *Religia w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. [*Religion in international relations*.] Warszawa.
- Kulska, J. 2013. Ambiwalencja świętości jako przejaw czynnika religijnego w stosunkach międzynarodowych. [*The ambivalence of holiness as a manifestation of the religious factor in international relations*.] *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, no. 48.

- Kulska, J. 2013. Faith-based diplomacy jako instrument rozwiązywania sporów i konfliktów międzynarodowych. [Faith-based diplomacy as an instrument for resolving disputes and international conflicts.] *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne*, no. 38.
- Kulska, J. 2013. Organizacje religijne i motywowane religijnie wobec problemów rozwoju i pomocy humanitarnej. [Religious and religiously motivated organizations towards the problems of development and humanitarian aid.] In: Dobrowolska-Polak, J. ed. *Polityka budowy pokoju. Pomoc humanitarna i rozwojowa. [Peace-building policy. Humanitarian and developmental aid.]* WSNHiD – Instytut Zachodni.
- Kulska, J. 2013. Wspólnota Świętego Idziego jako przykład organizacji pozarządowej motywowanej religijnie. [The Community of St. Egidio as an example of a religiously motivated NGO.] In: Gizicki, W. ed. *Religia w polityce światowej. Dylematy narodowe i międzynarodowe. [Religion in world politics. National and international dilemmas.]* Instytut Sądecko-Lubelski.
- Kulska, J. 2014. Faith-based diplomacy i transnarodowi aktorzy religijni. [Faith-based diplomacy and transnational religious actors.] In: Burgoński, P., Gierycz, M. eds. *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki. [Religion and politics. An outline of the problem.]* Warszawa.
- Kulska, J. 2015. A Balanced perception of religion in international relations. 9 July 2015. Available at: <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/09/a-balanced-perception-of-religion-in-international-relations>.
- Michałek, A. SVD, 2014. Spotkanie międzyreligijne w Asyżu (1986) – szczególne orędzie pokoju. [The interreligious meeting in Assisi (1986) – a special message of peace.] In: Lizak, W., Solarz, A. M. eds. *Z problematyki pokoju w stosunkach międzynarodowych. [On the issue of peace in international relations.]* Warszawa.
- Osservatore Romano – Polish Edition*, no. 3. 2002. Wystąpienie abpa Martina na konferencji w Durbanie. [Speech by Archbishop Martin at the conference in Durban.]
- Paul VI. 1996. Encyclical letter *Populorum progressio*. No. 13. In: *Dokumenty nauki społecznej Kościoła. [Documents of Church's social teaching.]*, vol. II. Rome-Lublin. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. 2005. *Kompendium nauki społecznej Kościoła. [Compendium of social doctrine of the Church.]* Kielce.
- Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. *Contribution to World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance*. Available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/

- justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20010829_comunicato-razzismo_en.html [Accessed 11 April 2016].
- Serving the human family. The Holy See at the major United Nations conferences.* 1997. New York City.
- Solarz, A.M. 2003. Stolica Apostolska wobec problemów globalizacji. [The Holy See in the face of globalization problems.] In: Haliżak, E., Kuźniar, R., Symonides, J. eds. *Globalizacja a stosunki międzynarodowe. [Globalization and international relations.]* Bydgoszcz-Warszawa.
- Solarz, A.M. 2003. „Strategia pojednania” – propozycja Stolicy Apostolskiej dla stosunków Północ-Południe w XXI wieku. [‘The strategy of reconciliation’ – a proposal of the Holy See for North-South relations in the twenty-first century.] *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations.*
- Solarz, A.M. 2009. Jan Paweł II i dyplomacja watykańska wobec globalnych konferencji ONZ. [John Paul II and Vatican diplomacy towards global UN conferences.] In: Wilk, M., Donaj, Ł. eds. *Jan Paweł II – w kręgu myśli politycznej i dyplomacji. [John Paul II in the circle of political thought and diplomacy.]* Łódź.

THE HOLY SEE’S EFFORTS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION

Summary

The Holy See uses two kinds of diplomacy in international relations – classical (similar to that used by each state) and so-called ‘track two’ diplomacy (specific for non-state actors). In both cases the most important ‘interest’ of Catholic Church remains ensuring its followers the freedom of practice of religion, which at the same time serves to disseminate the religious freedom all over the world. Reconciliation is a part of the Vatican strategy of the ‘purification of memory’ that was proposed to the international community by John Paul II. But only by keeping its own basic principles, which are truth, justice, forgiveness and reconciliation, the strategy can give real and sustainable peace in the world.

STOLICA APOSTOLSKA W SŁUŻBIE POJEDNANIA

Streszczenie

Stolica Apostolska działa w stosunkach międzynarodowych posługując się zarówno klasyczną dyplomacją, jak i tzw. dyplomacją drugiego toru. W obu przypadkach najważniejszym „interesem” Kościoła pozostaje zapewnienie swoim wiernym możliwości nieskrępowanego praktykowania swojego kultu, co służy upowszechnianiu wolności religijnej w świecie. Pojednanie stanowi element watykańskiej strategii „oczyszczenia pamięci”, którą zaproponował światu Jan Paweł II po zakończeniu zimnej wojny. Tylko zachowanie jej podstawowych warunków, którymi są prawda, sprawiedliwość, przebaczenie i pojednanie może zapewnić w świecie trwałą i prawdziwą pokój.

ВАТИКАН НА СЛУЖБЕ ПРИМИРЕНИЯ

Резюме

Святейший престол (Ватикан) ведёт свою деятельность на международной арене, опираясь и на классическую дипломатию, и на так называемую дипломатию второго пути. В обоих случаях самым важным «интересом» Католической церкви остаётся обеспечение своим мирянам возможности свободно практиковать вероисповедание, что служит распространению религиозной свободы в мире. Примирение представляет собой элемент Ватиканской стратегии «очищения памяти», которую предложил миру Иоанн Павел II после завершения холодной войны. И только соблюдение её основных принципов, к которым относятся правда, справедливость, прощение и примирение, может гарантировать человечеству устойчивый и настоящий мир.

Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek

**AREAS OF COOPERATION OF POLAND
AND THE HOLY SEE IN THE DIMENSION
OF TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY
AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy of the Holy See is focused on the religious mission, the spiritual and moral dimension, while the priority of Polish foreign policy is to defend the interests of the state, in particular its security. The objectives of these two countries cover a certain common area, but focus on different issues. In the sphere of traditional diplomacy their concrete cooperation is restricted to a narrow range of issues relating to the defence of religious freedom and the promotion of values in international politics¹ (e.g. the protection of the rights of Christians in the world). In the case of many issues they are divided by discrepancies, e.g. in the sphere of ecology and how to help the refugees, though, even in these areas we can see some possibilities of cooperation.

A huge untapped potential for cooperation between Poland and the Holy See is in the field of public diplomacy. Religiosity of Poles is a factor distinguishing Poland among other countries and affecting its international posi-

¹ Foreign Minister W. Waszczykowski underlines the importance of the following values: ‘These values include Roman law, Greek philosophy and Christian ethics, rationalism, common good, and respect for human rights. The protection of these values and tenets of our civilisation will be the sense of our diplomacy’. *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2016 r.* [Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Polish Government’s foreign policy in 2016.] Warszawa, 29 January 2016. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/ministerstwo/minister/wystapienia/informacja_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_o_zadaniach_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej_w_2016_roku

tion. In relations with the Holy See it is an asset, but from the point of view of states promoting other religions or value systems it may be perceived negatively. Among a large part of European elites religiosity is associated with backwardness and a progress hindrance. However, it can be also presented in a positive way – as an element of tradition cultivation, strengthening the identity of the nation, and at the same time opening it up to other cultures. An example may be World Youth Days in 2016 when young people from all over the world will come to Poland. It is a chance to promote the country.

The religious aspect has been absent so far in Polish public diplomacy for several reasons. Firstly, it has been modelled on patterns of public diplomacy of countries which do not have a similar religious potential. Secondly, it has been based on the assumption of strict separation of religious affairs from secular affairs, which in many cases has proved to be difficult due to the strong permeation of both these spheres. Thirdly, according to a part of Polish elites, Catholicism does not carry any positive potential for building the country's image, can even only weaken it. Fourthly, a reasonable question is whether Poland's position is strong enough to deal with a negative reaction of certain elites in the country and abroad in the case of the use of religious aspects in its public diplomacy.

THE AREA OF TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY

Diplomatic cooperation of Poland and the Holy See formally dates back to the sixteenth century when the nuncio sent by Pope Julius III was accredited by the king Sigismund II Augustus. For more than five centuries these relations have undergone various phases. In 1945, the Provisional Government of National Unity unilaterally terminated the Concordat of 1925, leading *de facto* to breaking of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Holy See. Their diplomatic relations were resumed only in 1989². For many years,

² The Holy See did not recognize the Provisional Government of National Unity established on 28 June 1945 in Warsaw and maintained diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile in London until 1958. In July 1974 an agreement establishing permanent working contacts between the government of the People's Republic of Poland and the Holy See was concluded, which was in force till the establishment of full relations in 1989. See more on this topic in: Grajewski, A. 2014. Długa droga do normalizacji. [The long road to normalisation.] In: *25-lecie wznowienia stosunków dyplomatycznych między Stolicą Apostolską a Polską*. [The 25th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland.] Warszawa, pp. 45–50.

relations between the two countries had a special nature due to the fact that a Pole was the pope, and therefore the head of state and the most important diplomat of the Holy See. He enjoyed a unique authority. It was not a coincidence that the first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki made his first foreign visit to the Vatican (19–20 October 1989).

During the pontificate of John Paul II Polish politicians often visited the Vatican. The Pope was an active participant of international politics during the Cold War and after its completion. He supported the efforts of Polish authorities to obtain membership in the EU and NATO. In the years 1989–2005 diplomatic relations of Poland and the Holy See were characterised by a large number of meetings. Some of the visits were official and many were unofficial – they were associated with such celebrations as beatifications, canonisations, or the Holy Year Jubilee, the 25th anniversary of the pontificate of John Paul II. The Pope visited Poland eight times in total, and each such event apart from a religious dimension had also a strictly diplomatic dimension.

After 2005 diplomatic cooperation between Poland and the Holy See has changed its character – ‘after the death of John Paul II, Poland lost this special relationship with the Vatican, as well as the possibility of discrete impact on international politics’³. Representatives of the highest Polish authorities were present at the inaugurations of the pontificates of Pope Benedict XVI and Francis, President Lech Kaczyński made his first foreign visit to the Vatican (26 January 2006), but the national factor which previously connected these two countries disappeared. Pope Benedict XVI visited Poland once, in 2006, and Pope Francis will arrive to Poland in 2016 on the occasion of World Youth Days.

Visits of heads of state are only one of the planes of the development of diplomatic relations. In the sphere of traditional diplomacy the main bodies responsible for foreign policy are on the Polish side the president, the prime minister and the government, with the special role of the Foreign Ministry and the parliament, and in the case of the Holy See – the Pope, the Roman Curia, which includes the Secretariat of State of the Holy See with the Secretary at the forefront⁴. In addition to the tasks pertaining to diplomatic relations with state authorities, diplomats of the Holy See perform tasks relating to the Church itself, for example, a nuncio submits to the pope a list of candidates for diocesan and auxiliary bishops. This dual dimension

³ Strzałka, K. 2007. Stosunki Polski ze Stolicą Apostolską. [Polish relations with the Holy See] *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej* 2007, p. 127.

⁴ Sutor, J. 2012. *Prawo dyplomatyczne i konsularne*. [Diplomatic and consular law.] Warszawa, pp. 115–118, 159–161.

of diplomacy should be emphasised as it clearly distinguishes the Holy See from international activities of secular countries – its activity is expressed in the first place in the spiritual dimension, that is at the plane of relations with local churches and Catholics, and secondly – in the secular dimension, that is in the sphere of traditional diplomatic relations with states⁵.

The basic question, however, concerns not the form, but the area of cooperation between Poland and the Holy See. In the concrete dimension of international affairs this area is narrow, but it deserves attention. For example, during the work on the so-called EU Constitutional Treaty the convergence of views of Poland and the Holy See on the vision of united Europe was clearly visible, particularly in the protection of life, the so-called reproductive rights and reproductive health, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the definition of the protection of life contained therein, and also in the effort to include the record about the Christian roots in the preamble of this document⁶ (this goal has not been achieved). As previously mentioned, security plays a key role in Polish foreign policy. For years, the emphasis has been put on the relations with the EU and NATO, as well as member countries of these organisations. The Holy See does not belong to them, nor is it a member of the United Nations (it has an observer status) and does not comment on many issues concerning the current problems. Under the Lateran Treaty of 1929 it is obliged to maintain neutrality in temporal matters, which means that ‘it will refrain from direct interference in internal affairs concerning national security, the territory or borders of the given state. It will not take part in international interventions of a military or police nature, or in operations aimed at maintaining or restoring peace. This of course does not exclude the fact (...) that the Holy See reserves the right to freely exercise its moral and spiritual mission, which – in some cases – requires taking a moral position on various situations and people’⁷.

⁵ ‘A papal diplomat cares about spiritual matters, which include: matters concerning the Church, human rights, moral problems, universal values. His essential task is to make a contribution to the expansion and implementation of the Gospel message, while protecting the interests not only of the Church but also the state in which he is accredited. Taking care for the development of human and religious values, he serves all citizens of the country. In this way the Church uses more moral than material diplomacy means’. – Cardinal A. Sodano, secretary of state, said in 1998. Cited in: <http://nuncjatura.pl/dzialalnosc/5784.1,index.html>

⁶ I would like to thank dr. K. Strzałka for suggestions on this article, especially this passage.

⁷ Apostolic Nuncio to Poland, Archbishop Celestino Migliore. 2014. *Organizacja i funkcjonowanie dyplomacji Stolicy Apostolskiej*. [The organization and functioning of

In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the first in the history of Poland long-term foreign policy strategy entitled ‘The priorities of Polish foreign policy in the years 2012–2016’, adopted by the Council of Ministers chaired by Donald Tusk. This document consists of 29 pages. Neither the Holy See, nor the Vatican, nor the pope are mentioned there⁸. Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna’s first speech of 9 November 2014 also did not mention them⁹. Usually, however, speeches of similar importance contained a reference to the Holy See. For example, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in 2014 mentioned that ‘Recently, together with hundreds of thousands of pilgrims we have celebrated in the Vatican the canonisation of John Paul the Great, a teacher of responsibility’¹⁰, and in 2013. he said: ‘We thank Benedict XVI for continuing the mission of John Paul the Great, for his memorable pilgrimage to Poland in 2006, and for his kind approach towards our country. We congratulate Pope Francis – the first Pontiff from the New World – on his election. We count on further seminal cooperation with the Holy See, also in the area of protecting Christians’ rights around the world’¹¹. In his speech in April 2015 G. Schetyna stated that ‘In the spirit of close cooperation with the Holy See, we are supporting preparations for the organisation of World Youth Days in Krakow in July 2016’¹². Minister

the diplomacy of the Holy See.] Krajowa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej. Warszawa, 28 May 2014. Available at: http://nuncjatura.pl/nuncjusz/celestino_migliore/wystapienia/6133.1,Organizacja_i_funkcjonowanie_dyplomacji_Stolicy_Apostolskiej.html

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2012. *Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej w latach 2012–2016.* [The priorities of Polish foreign policy in the years 2012–2016.] Warszawa. Available at: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/aa1c4aec-a52f-45a7-96e5-06658e73bb4e:JCR>

⁹ Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Schetyna. 2014. *Informacja Rady Ministrów o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w latach 2014–2015.* [Address by the Council of Ministers on the tasks of Polish foreign policy in 2014–2015.] Warszawa, 6 November 2014. Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/minister_grzegorz_schetyna_o_prioritetach_polskiej_dyplomacji

¹⁰ Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorski. 2014. *Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2014 roku.* [Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the tasks of Polish foreign policy in 2014.] Warszawa 8 May 2014. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/informacja_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_o_zadaniach_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej_w_2014_roku

¹¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorski. 2013. *Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o założeniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2013 r.* [Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2013.] Warszawa, 20 March 2013. Available at: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=36&dzien=1&wyp=002>

¹² Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Schetyna, *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2015 r.* [Address by the Minister of Foreign

W. Waszczykowski referred to the same event in January 2016, recognizing that ‘The promotion of Poland connected with World Youth Day organised in Kraków will also be an important task for the MFA. We will show Poland as an important and inspiring country that has played a significant role in the history of Christianity and Europe. May the involvement of the Polish state in this event be an element which can be defined in terms of diplomacy of values – defence and promotion of the values of the Latin civilisation, which connects the citizens of our continent. (...) In 2016 we will strengthen Polish historical diplomacy. We will effectively promote the history of our country, nation and state in connection with this year’s celebrations of the 1050th anniversary of the Baptism of Poland and the upcoming 100th anniversary of regaining our independence’¹³. Diplomatic cooperation of Poland and the Holy See in 2016 concentrated around these two events – World Youth Days and the celebration of the anniversary of the Baptism of Poland.

Polish foreign policy emphasises the importance of the interests of the state, *raison d’etat*, while moral issues are a priority in the activities of the Holy See. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that from the perspective of both countries the assessment of specific international events, even in ethical terms, is sometimes different, e.g., in 2003 John Paul II appealed to stop the US invasion of Iraq, while Poland supported the actions of Americans, recognising them as legitimate. Even today these two countries differ in the assessment of some events – e.g. according to the Polish authorities there has definitely been Russian aggression in Ukraine, while the Holy See avoids defining what is happening there.

Virtually all issue which are of interest to both countries may belong to the areas of their cooperation in a wider dimension. Despite the fact that this cooperation will not take typical forms known from relations with other countries (e.g. the economic exchange or military cooperation), its importance should be appreciated because apart from traditional diplomatic tools, the Holy See has specific means of influencing public opinion – e.g. papal encyclicals and messages are of great importance. News about its international policy rarely hit the headlines (except for official papal visits or exceptional, spectacular achievements, e.g. the contribution to the establishment of dip-

Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2015.] Warszawa, 23 April 2015. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2012_2016/expose2/expose_2015/expose_2015

¹³ Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Waszczykowski, *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2016 r.* [*Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Polish Government’s foreign policy in 2016.*], op. cit.

lomatic relations between Cuba and the USA). According to the message issued after Pope Francis's meetings with heads of state, currently during these talks such issues as the conflict in Ukraine, the war in Syria, the situation in the Middle East, especially in the Holy Land are discussed.

While during the Cold War, communism was the main barrier to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland, today on the way to developing these relationships there are discords arising from different assessments of certain events and phenomena. An axiological dimension should be emphasised – in this sphere Western Europe moves further and further away from its Christian roots, which involves social and political changes. In many areas the countries of Central and Eastern Europe follow these trends, at a rate dependent largely on the results of democratic elections. In simplified terms it can be stated that the views of left-wing parties are more distant from the position of the Holy See than those of right-wing parties. This indirectly translates into the state of cooperation between the authorities of the country with the Holy See.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY – AN UNTAPPED AREA OF COOPERATION

The concept of 'public diplomacy' gained popularity in the nineties of the twentieth century, although it appeared much earlier. Among many attempts to define this concept it is worth noting the works of prof. B. Ociepka who defines public diplomacy as 'a bilateral, dialogue form of political international communication, addressed to the audience abroad, realised through the media and through direct channels. Its goal is to shape or promote a positive image of the country, society abroad, to shape positive attitudes to the addresser'¹⁴. Public diplomacy is one of the tools of soft power, defined as the opposite of military and economic power, and based on the ideological and cultural potential of the state¹⁵. In the scientific literature the area of public diplomacy as a rule does not include religious aspects. In studies of

¹⁴ Ociepka, B. 2008. Dyplomacja publiczna jako forma komunikowania. [Public diplomacy as a form of communication.] In: Ociepka, B. ed. *Dyplomacja publiczna*. [Public diplomacy.] Wrocław, p. 12. See also Ziętek, A. 2010. Dyplomacja publiczna Polski. [Public diplomacy of Poland.] *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 65–83.

¹⁵ Ociepka, B. 2012. Nowa dyplomacja publiczna – perspektywa teorii stosunków międzynarodowych i komunikowania politycznego. [New public diplomacy – the perspective of the theory of international relations and political communication.] *Przegląd*

soft power this element is also omitted, and in many rankings of the size of soft power of individual states the Holy See is not taken into account at all.

According to the definition of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 'Public diplomacy pursued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of a set of strategic, conceptual, analytical, coordinating and executive actions seeking to impact social attitudes and public opinion abroad and thereby to secure the principal interests of the Republic of Poland across the globe. This is done by using tools and methods from outside the realm of traditional diplomacy, essentially confined to intergovernmental relations. The primary aim of public diplomacy is to foster understanding and support for the national interest and policies of the Polish government. Supplementing traditional diplomacy, it is targeted at foreign institutions, organisations and societies'¹⁶.

Polish public diplomacy covers many areas whose activities are coordinated by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy. The report of the Foreign Ministry entitled 'New dimensions of diplomacy. Public diplomacy – 2013–2014' refers to activities in the following areas:

- economic diplomacy
- cultural diplomacy
- historical diplomacy
- scientific diplomacy and promoting the Polish language
- sports diplomacy
- in the dimension of local government and civil public diplomacy

Public diplomacy understood in this way does not take into account the fact that in the case of Poland the religious aspect plays a very huge role in shaping the image of the country and society abroad. Undoubtedly, a large percentage of Catholics among Poles is important for Polish relations with the Holy See. According to the statistical yearbook it is 87% (33.5 million people), and according to the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) it amounts to 93%¹⁷ and therefore in the EU it is lower only than in Malta.

Strategiczny, vol. 1, p. 130; Nye, J.S. 2007. *Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*. [Soft power: the means to success in world politics.] Warszawa.

¹⁶ Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/dyplomacja_publiczna/czym_jest_dp/czym_jest_dp

¹⁷ *Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015*. [The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2015.] Warszawa 2015, p. 196; Public Opinion Research Centre Report Report. 2012. *Zmiany w zakresie wiary i religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II*. [Changes in the faith and religiosity of Poles after the death of John Paul II.] April 2012. Available at: <http://PublicOpinionResearchCentreReport.pl/SPISKOM>.

Worldwide, the number of Catholics amounts to about 1.2 milliard – most of them live in Central and South America. In Europe their share declines steadily. Against this background, religiosity is a factor distinguishing Poles – in this group declarations of faith are almost universal, and a large part of citizens regularly participate in religious practices. ‘Celebration of the most important religious holidays is invariably primarily religious in nature – the participation in religious ceremonies of Lent and Easter and Christmas and nurturing of the tradition are still quite common. In this respect, the secularising processes taking place in Poland is much slower than in Western European countries’¹⁸. The large share of Catholics among Poles probably influenced the decision of Pope Francis on the selection of Kraków as the venue for World Youth Days in 2016. Pope John Paul II introduced this form of meeting of young people in 1985, and since then they have been organised every few years in a different country. A record number of young Catholics – as many as 3.7 million gathered at the recent World Youth Days in Rio de Janeiro. According to estimates, about 2 million pilgrims can come to Poland. It will be therefore much more than 600 thousand foreign fans who came to the European Championships UEFA Euro 2012 in Poland. It is worth recalling that this sporting event belonged to the priorities of Polish public diplomacy in 2012.

World Youth Days undoubtedly also fit into the objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the sphere of building the image of Poland in the world. It is worthwhile to pay attention to the actions of Irish diplomacy, which effectively promotes 17 March as St. Patrick’s Day, the patron saint of Ireland, recalling that in the fifth century he converted the country to Christianity. This day is celebrated as a global festival of Irish culture, heritage, creativity and openness to the world. In the case of Poland, image research shows that St. John Paul II remains one of the most recognizable Poles in the world. His cult affects the expansion of knowledge about Poland and the Holy See. Although the Polish pope is noticed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is difficult to find any information about other Polish saints, especially St. Faustina, in the materials of the Ministry. Her figure is widely present in the media and in popular culture in many countries, particularly in the Phil-

POL/2012/K_049_12.PDF, p. 25.; CSO. 2015. O liczbie katolików na świecie: *Rocznik Statystyki Międzynarodowej 2015*. [The number of Catholics in the world: *the International Yearbook of Statistics 2015*.] Warszawa, p. 45. Available at: <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-statystyki-miedzynarodowej-2015,10,3.html>

¹⁸ Public Opinion Research Centre Report Report, op. cit., p. 25.

ippines, which surprises even some Poles going there. Her 'Diary' has been translated into dozens of languages. Łagiewniki – the place of St. Faustina's worship – is visited annually by more than 2 million pilgrims, many from abroad. In Poland there are many other places visited by pilgrims who on this occasion use tourist services and increase their knowledge about Poland. Poles' devotion to the Catholic religion is expressed in various forms – you can mention the power of tradition nurtured by immigrants, the role of the Polish Catholic Mission in different parts of the world, the commitment to religious practices of Polish tourists abroad, etc., but this broad topic deserves a separate analysis.

The Foreign Ministry report on public diplomacy rightly noted that 'the image of Poles around the world and the prevalent stereotypes depend to a large extent on how the Polish diaspora, Polish ethnic groups, Polish minorities and even individuals are perceived in their places of residence – what they represent by social status, their political influence and their prestige'¹⁹. To Poles active abroad we can undoubtedly include clergymen and missionaries. Currently in 97 countries (mainly in Africa and Latin America) there are more than two thousand missionaries from Poland. These are priests (including 21 bishops), and religious brothers, sisters, as well as approximately 50 lay missionaries²⁰. Since 1991, at the missionary stations 10 Poles have been killed, among them two missionaries in Peru, beatified in December 2015. The daily operations of hundreds of Catholic clergymen remains widely unknown. On the other hand, scandals which sometimes occurs with the participation of the clergymen are widely publicised – it also has a major impact on shaping the image of Poland and the Holy See.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs report entitled 'New ways of diplomacy. Public diplomacy report 2013–2014' almost completely ignores the religious aspect in public diplomacy. The report emphasised the activity of Polish Institutes operating in various countries, the activities of the network of Regional Centres of the International Debate (in each of the 16 provincial cities), cooperation with non-governmental organisations, the media, etc. Much space was devoted to Polish-Jewish relations and the role of Jan Karski in connection with the 100th anniversary of his birth. Especially noteworthy are interesting initiatives in the field of promotion of the Polish economy, for example, the Polish product of the year, the campaign 'eat

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2012. *Dyplomacja publiczna 2012*. [Public diplomacy 2012.] Warszawa, p. 30.

²⁰ Data from the website: http://episkopat.pl/kosciol/kosciol_w_swiecie/duszpasterstwa_polonijne/0.1,index.html

apples', etc. In principle this document does not refer to the religious sphere except for the following passages. We learn that 'in 2014, the Polish Embassy in London organised a study visit to Poland for 15 Jewish community representatives. The four-day trip was a combination of religious pilgrimage to the country of ancestors, a study of modern Polish-Jewish relations, and political objectives. The list of visitors consisted of politicians, journalists and rabbis from major synagogues in London'²¹. The report mentions the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed a Polish-Russian conference on cooperation between Roman-Catholic Church and Russian Orthodox Church. It also refers to the work of Polish scientists who restored priceless medieval paintings in the churches of northern Lebanon over the course of 10 years. There is no reference to Christianity in the report for 2013–2014. It is worth noting that in the public diplomacy report of 2012 the word Christian appears once and Catholic three times.

It is worth consideration, especially given that the above-mentioned report of 2014 refers to the year in which the canonisation of John Paul II took place. Besides religious dimension this event had also a political, diplomatic and social dimension. More than 60 national delegations from 54 countries, including 19 heads of state and 24 prime ministers took part in the canonisation ceremony. Delegations of Anglican and Orthodox churches, representatives of the Islamic and Jewish community from around the world were present. Some called this ceremony the 'canonisation of the century', because for the first time two popes (the current and the retired one) took part in it, and the canonisation involved two Popes – John XXIII and John Paul II. Because of this millions of pilgrims came to Rome, gathered in front of large outdoor screens in various places around the world or used other forms of media broadcast. It can be said that the event fitted into the assumptions of public diplomacy specified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular into 'a broad spectrum of information and communication activities aimed at shaping the positive image of Poland among foreigners, promoting improved and objective knowledge and understanding of Poland and its history, as well as the contribution of Poland and Polish citizens in European and global development, strengthening Poland's prestige as a global actor'²².

The promotional documents prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed an inexpressive picture of Poland, combining economic success, rich

²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2014. *Nowe wymiary dyplomacji. Dyplomacja publiczna – raport 2013–2014*. [New ways of diplomacy. Public diplomacy report 2013–2014.] Warszawa, p. 70.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 20.

history, tradition, etc. The report entitled ‘Opinion survey. Determination of the image which Poland should promote abroad’ prepared at the request of the Foreign Ministry pointed to the fact that the problem was not so much the image of Poland but the lack thereof. With regard to the religious sphere, according to the authors, ‘from the perspective of the West until recently Poland has been seen as a dull, gray, gloomy and backward country with strong traditionalism and influence of the Catholic Church’²³ and ‘in the minds of Britons there is a stereotype of Poland as a country affected by corruption, bureaucratic, with low-economic growth and significant influence of the Catholic Church’²⁴. The authors recognised prof. W. Olins’s words as a good summary of the analysis of brand promotion of Poland and of what is still to be done: ‘I would like to tell the story of a country. (...). After years of military dictatorship and a devastating civil war it was poor and distant from the rest. Additionally, it remained under a huge, development inhibiting influence of the Catholic Church and the extreme right. And now a riddle: what country is it? It is Spain from the seventies, before any process of re-branding started there, that is, conscious work on changing the image. (...) Now Spain can be proud of world-known brands such as Zara, Repsol, Telefonica, has recognizable politicians, José Maria Aznar and Javier Solana, as well as people of culture, Pedro Almodóvar and Santiago Calatrava. Strong points of Spain have been diagnosed and the bull has been taken by the horns. And Poland has to do the same’²⁵. In May 2014 a promotional campaign prepared at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realised by Saatchi & Saatchi began under the slogan ‘Poland. Spring into’ (the slogan by Wally Olins)²⁶. Its budget amounted to more than 8 million PLN. The aim of the campaign was to strengthen the position of Poland in the world, its competitiveness and to attract investors and tourists. The slogan which was

²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. *Badanie opinii. Określenie wizerunku, który Polska powinna promować za granicą. Raport Końcowy*. [Opinion survey. Determination of the image which Poland should promote abroad. Final report.] – a project executed at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Konsorcjum Laboratorium Badań Społecznych sp. z o.o. and Mands Badania Rynku i opinii. Warszawa, November 2013, p. 14.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

²⁵ Wally, O. 2012. Teraz jest czas na Polskę. [Now it is time for Poland.] In: *Patriotyzm: między dumą a odpowiedzialnością*. [Patriotism: between pride and responsibility.] *Zeszyty Instytutu*. Warszawa: Instytut Obywatelski, cited in: *Badanie opinii...*, [Opinion survey...], op. cit., p. 24.

²⁶ Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/polska__spring_into__kampania_wizerunkowa_przyciaga_uwage_polakow_i_obcokrajowcow

supposed to be fascinating and intriguing, proved to be too difficult to understand, and in the opinion of many recipients incomprehensible. At the same time it initiated a stormy debate over the shape of the next action promoting Poland. The question about what image best serves its interests returned.

The Polish authorities' approach to public diplomacy changed after the takeover of power by the Peace and Justice (PiS) in 2015. The rules of the tender entitled 'Cooperation in the field of public diplomacy 2016' announced on 5 November 2015 for projects in the area of public diplomacy realised in 2016 originally contained such rules, as in previous years, namely: concerning the promotion of Polish contribution to building of a new order in Europe after 1989; promotion of its international efforts in aid of democratisation, intercultural dialogue and strengthening civil society; promotion of creative industries, the development of Polish cities and learning the Polish language²⁷. The projects were to be aimed at, among others, the development of contacts between societies of Poland and partner countries, conducive to, among others, the development of economic cooperation; support for the development of civil society and democratisation processes, in particular in the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy; interest in and gaining understanding for the Polish point of view and overcoming stereotypes in historical and intercultural dialogue; strengthening the positive image of Poland, including countering negative stereotypes²⁸.

On 4 December 2015 the substantive scope and the deadline for submission of bids in that tender was changed. In the rules, a new, sixth point appeared as follows: 'The promotion of Polish contribution to the development of civilisation and culture of Europe in the context of the 1050th anniversary of the Baptism of Poland and World Youth Days 2016, including in particular Christian identity and a system of democracy, freedom, solidarity and tolerance shaped over the centuries on its basis. The aim of this priority should be the construction of a positive image of Polish history as a country which: brought its own original contribution to the history of Europe thanks to a strong identity and promoting the Latin civilisation based on Christian values; developed the concept of freedom and solidarity, becoming an example for other nations of Central and Eastern Europe; promotes the values

²⁷ The notice about the initiation of the grant procedure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting pursuant to the Act of 27 August 2009 on public finances, Dz. U. of 2013, item 885 as amended. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/ministerstwo/konkursyministra/konkurs_na_realizacje_zadania_publicznego__wspolpraca_w_dziedzinie_dyplomacji_publicznej_2016_

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

underlying its identity in relations with other countries and in international politics'²⁹.

As a result of the competition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pertaining to public diplomacy, which was adjudicated on 26 February 2016, 36 projects received grants totalling 3.99 million PLN. Sums exceeding 150 thousand PLN were granted to projects of, among others, the ArtAnimacje Association, India Games Poland, the Romincka Forest Foundation, the Polish Scouting Association, the Polish Association of International Studies, etc. The largest sum – 200 thousand PLN – was awarded to the Catholic foundation 'Lux Veritatis' for the project 'To make the memory about them last' (commemorating Poles who rescued Jews during the war), and among the winners there were also the Pontifical University of John Paul II (74.4 thousand PLN) and the Roman Catholic Parish of Our Lady Benefactor of Christians in Warsaw (79.9 thousand PLN). This has sparked strong criticism of some media. There have been allegations of informal links between the ruling party and the Catholic institutions. This is part of the heated debate on the role of the Catholic Church in the Polish political life ongoing for many years, which also affects the Polish relations with the Holy See.

SUMMARY

Diplomacy of the Holy See has a long and rich tradition, uses the centuries-old attainment of the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy. It clearly defines its goals in international politics, placing an emphasis on the moral and religious dimension. On the other hand, Polish diplomacy is developing, but it is burdened with difficult historical experiences – especially the years of partitions and heritage of the Polish People's Republic. In Poland there is still no scientific institution specialising in the training of diplomats. It affects the problems encountered, e.g. when trying to improve Polish public diplomacy.

Defining the importance of religion in Polish foreign policy is of great importance for the determination of the prospects of diplomatic cooperation of Poland with the Holy See. On the one hand, in many countries, religion has been almost completely eliminated from the diplomatic sphere, but on the other hand, for some countries it has become an important part of their

²⁹ Available at: http://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/ministerstwo/konkursyministra/zmiana_zakresu_merytorycznego_oraz_terminu_składania_ofert_w_konkursie__wspolpraca_w_dziedzinie_dyplomacji_publicznej_2016_

international activity, e.g. the Russian president is perceived in some circles even as a defender of Christians. In Poland, after each successive parliamentary elections we can expect a change in the approach to the religious sphere. An exemplification of such a change is an attempt to establish cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Catholic institutions within Polish public diplomacy, initiated at the turn of the years 2015 and 2016.

World Youth Days are a unique opportunity for the development of cooperation between Poland and the Holy See in the dimension of traditional and public diplomacy. The influence of the Holy See on international politics is difficult to measure – it does not have military or economic power, but is based on instruments classified as soft power. Regardless of its specific character it remains a major participant of international politics. Poland can have excellent relations with the Holy See, at the same time strengthen its position in the EU, despite the fact that the teaching of the Catholic Church in many areas is contrary to the views of influential part of European elites.

REFERENCES

- Adamczewski, W. ed. 2000. *Z papieżstwem przez dzieje: w osiemdziesiątą rocznicę wskrzeszenia Nuncjatury Apostolskiej w Polsce*. [With the papacy through history: the eightieth anniversary of the resurrection of the Apostolic Nunciature in Poland.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe.
- Chynczewska-Hennel, T., Wiszowata-Walczak, K. ed. 2012. *Nuncjatura apostolska w Rzeczypospolitej*. [The Apostolic Nunciature in the Republic of Poland.] Białystok.
- Gizicki, W. 2009. *Ład międzynarodowy w dokumentach Stolicy Apostolskiej*. [International order in the documents of the Holy See.] Toruń: Wyd. A. Marszałek.
- Grajewski, A. 2014. Długa droga do normalizacji. [The long road to normalisation.] In: *25-lecie wznowienia stosunków dyplomatycznych między Stolicą Apostolską a Polską*. [The 25th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland.] Warszawa.
- Kulska, J. 2006. *Stolica Apostolska w międzynarodowych stosunkach kulturalnych od Jana XXIII do Jana Pawła II*. [The Holy See in international cultural relations from John XXIII to John Paul II.] Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego.
- Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Schetyńska. 2014. *Informacja Rady Ministrów o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w latach 2014–2015*. [Address by

- the Council of Ministers on the tasks of Polish foreign policy in 2014-2015.*] Warszawa, 6 November 2014. Available at: https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/minister_grzegorz_schetyna_o_priorytetach_polskiej_dyplomacji
- Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Schetyna. 2015. *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2015 r.* [Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2015.] Warszawa, 23 April 2015. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2012_2016/expose2/expose_2015/expose_2015
- Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorski. 2013. *Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o założeniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2013 r.* [Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the goals of Polish foreign policy in 2013.] Warszawa, 20 March 2013. Available at: <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=36&dzien=1&wyp=00>
- Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorski. 2014. *Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2014 roku.* [Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the tasks of Polish foreign policy in 2014.] Warszawa, 8 May 2014. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/informacja_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_o_zadaniach_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej_w_2014_roku
- Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Waszczykowski. 2016. *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2016 r.* [Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Polish Government's foreign policy in 2016.] Warszawa, 29 January 2016. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/ministerstwo/minister/wystapienia/informacja_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_o_zadaniach_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej_w_2016_roku
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2012. *Dyplomacja publiczna 2012.* [Public diplomacy 2012.] Warszawa.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2012. *Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej w latach 2012–2016.* [The priorities of Polish foreign policy in the years 2012–2016.] Warszawa. Available at: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/aa1c4aec-a52f-45a7-96e5-06658e73bb4e:JCR>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. *Badanie opinii. Określenie wizerunku, który Polska powinna promować za granicą. Raport Końcowy.* [Opinion survey. Determination of the image which Poland should promote abroad. Final report.] – a project executed at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Konsorcjum Laboratorium Badań Społecznych sp. z o.o. and Mands Badania Rynku i opinii. Warszawa, November 2013.

- Ociepka, B. 2008. Dyplomacja publiczna jako forma komunikowania. [Public diplomacy as a form of communication.] In: Ociepka, B. ed. *Dyplomacja publiczna*. [Public diplomacy.] Wrocław.
- Ociepka, B. 2012. Nowa dyplomacja publiczna – perspektywa teorii stosunków międzynarodowych i komunikowania politycznego. [New public diplomacy – the perspective of the theory of international relations and political communication.] *Przegląd Strategiczny*, vol. 1.
- Olejarz, T. 2010. *Polityka wschodnia Stolicy Apostolskiej: idee, kierunki ewolucji, instrumenty realizacji*. [Eastern policy of the Holy See: ideas, directions of evolution, implementation instruments.] Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.
- Public Opinion Research Centre Report. 2012. *Zmiany w zakresie wiary i religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II*. [Changes in the faith and religiosity of Poles after the death of John Paul II.] April 2012. Available at: http://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2012/K_049_12.PDF
- Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015*. [The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2015.] Warszawa 2015.
- Stolarek, A. 2011. Polityka zagraniczna a rytuał religijny. [Foreign policy of a religious ritual.] In: Jarosz, A., Olszewski, K. ed. *Polityka zagraniczna III RP*. [Foreign policy of the Third Republic of Poland.] vol. 1. Toruń: Wyd. Naukowe Uniwersytetu M. Kopernika.
- Strzałka, K. 2007. Stosunki Polski ze Stolicą Apostolską. [Polish relations with the Holy See] *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej* 2007.
- Tokarz, G. Stosunki dyplomatyczne między Stolicą Apostolską a Polska Rzeczpospolitą Ludową i Rzeczpospolitą Polską podczas pontyfikatu Jana Pawła II. [Diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Polish People's Republic and the Republic of Poland during the pontificate of John Paul II.] In: Wolański, M. S. ed. *Polityka Polski wobec organizacji i państw europejskich 1990–2002*. [Polish policy towards organisations and European countries 1990–2002.] Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Ziętek, A. 2010. Dyplomacja publiczna Polski. [Public diplomacy of Poland.] *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, vol. 17, no. 1.

AREAS OF COOPERATION OF POLAND AND THE HOLY SEE IN THE DIMENSION OF TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Summary

In the realm of traditional diplomacy, cooperation of Poland and the Holy See is limited to a narrow range of issues relating to the defence of religious freedom and the promotion of values in international politics (e.g. the protection of the rights of Christians in the world). In the case of many issues they are divided by discrepancies, e.g. in the sphere of ecology and how to help the refugees. A huge untapped potential for cooperation between Poland and the Holy See is in the field of public diplomacy. Religiosity of Poles is a factor distinguishing Poland among other countries and affecting its international position. In relations with the Holy See it is an asset, but from the point of view of states promoting other religions or value systems it may be perceived negatively. In public diplomacy conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the religious aspect was absent until the end of 2015, but after the takeover of power by the PiS the role of Christian identity in the sphere of building the image of the country was stressed. In this context, World Youth Days in 2016 in Kraków will be a particular opportunity to promote the country. Defining the importance of religion in Polish foreign policy is of great importance for the determination of the prospects of diplomatic cooperation of Poland with the Holy See. On the one hand, in many countries, religion has been almost completely eliminated from the diplomatic sphere, but on the other hand, for some countries it has become an important part of their international activity (e.g. the Russian president is perceived in some circles even as a defender of Christians). In Poland, after each successive parliamentary elections we can expect a change in the approach to the religious sphere. An attempt to establish cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Catholic institutions within Polish public diplomacy, initiated at the turn of the years 2015 and 2016, causes some controversy. This is part of the heated debate on the role of the Catholic Church in the Polish political life ongoing for many years, which also affects the Polish relations with the Holy See.

OBSZARY WSPÓLPRACY POLSKI I STOLICY APOSTOLSKIEJ W WYMIARZE DYPLOMACJI TRADYCYJNEJ I DYPLOMACJI PUBLICZNEJ

Streszczenie

W sferze tradycyjnej dyplomacji współpraca Polski i Stolicy Apostolskiej jest ograniczona do wąskiego zakresu spraw dotyczących obrony wolności religijnej i promocji wartości w polityce międzynarodowej (np. ochrona praw chrześcijan na świecie). W wielu kwestiach dzielą je rozbieżności, np. w sferze ekologii i sposobu pomocy uchodźcom. Duży niewykorzystany potencjał współpracy między Polską a Stolicą Apostolską tkwi w sferze dyplomacji publicznej. Religijność Polaków jest czynnikiem wyróżniającym Polskę wśród innych państw i wpływa na jej pozycję międzynarodową. W relacjach ze Stolicą Apostolską jest to atut, ale z punktu widzenia państw promujących inne religie lub systemy wartości może być postrzegane negatywnie. W dyplomacji publicznej prowadzonej przez MSZ aspekt religijny był do końca 2015 r. nieobecny, ale po przejęciu władzy przez PiS podkreślono rolę chrześcijańskiej tożsamości w sferze budowania wizerunku kraju. W tym kontekście szczególną okazją do promocji kraju będą Światowe Dni Młodzieży w 2016 r. w Krakowie. Dla określenia perspektyw współpracy dyplomatycznej Polski ze Stolicą Apostolską duże znaczenie ma zdefiniowanie znaczenia religii w polskiej polityce zagranicznej. Z jednej strony w wielu krajach religia została wręcz całkowicie wyeliminowana ze sfery dyplomatycznej, ale z drugiej dla niektórych państw stała się ważnym elementem ich aktywności międzynarodowej (np. prezydent Rosji stał się postrzegany w niektórych kręgach wręcz jako obrońca chrześcijan). W Polsce po każdych kolejnych wyborach parlamentarnych można oczekiwać poważnych zmian w podejściu do sfery religijnej. Próba nawiązania współpracy MSZ z instytucjami katolickimi w ramach polskiej dyplomacji publicznej, zapoczątkowana na przełomie lat 2015 i 2016, wywołuje pewne kontrowersje. Wpisuje się to w burzliwą debatę na temat roli Kościoła katolickiego w polskim życiu politycznym, toczącą się od wielu lat, co wpływa również na relacje Polski ze Stolicą Apostolską.

СФЕРЫ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА МЕЖДУ ПОЛЬШЕЙ И ВАТИКАНОМ ПОД УГЛОМ ТРАДИЦИОННОЙ И ПУБЛИЧНОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ

Резюме

В сфере традиционной демократии сотрудничество Польши и Ватикана ограничено узкими рамками вопросов, которые касаются защиты религиозной свободы и пропаганды ценностей в международной политике (к примеру, защита прав христиан во всём мире). По многим вопросам их разделяют разногласия, как, например, в области экологии или формы помощи беженцам. Огромный незадействованный потенциал сотрудничества между Польшей и Ватиканом лежит в сфере публичной дипломатии. Религиозность поляков является фактором, отличающим Польшу от других государств, и определяющим её международную позицию. С точки зрения взаимоотношений с Ватиканом это является преимуществом, однако с точки зрения государств, пропагандирующих другие религии или системы ценностей, это может быть воспринято негативно. В публичной дипломатии, которой придерживалось польское внешнеполитическое ведомство (МИД), религиозный аспект до конца 2005 года отсутствовал, однако после прихода к власти PiS (Право и Справедливость) акцентируется роль христианского самосознания в области формирования имиджа страны. В этом контексте особенную возможность для продвижения страны представляют Всемирные Дни Молодёжи, которые будут проходить в 2016 году в Кракове. Для обозначения перспектив дипломатического сотрудничества Польши с Ватиканом большое значение имеет определение места вопроса о религии в польской внешней политике. С одной стороны, во многих государствах религия была почти полностью элиминирована из дипломатической сферы, а, с другой стороны, для некоторых государств она становится важным элементом их международной активности (например, президент России воспринимается в определённых кругах ни много ни мало как защитник христиан). В Польше после каждых очередных выборов в Парламент можно ожидать серьёзных изменений в подходе к религиозному вопросу. Попытка завязать сотрудничество между МИД и католическими институтами в рамках польской публичной дипломатии, берущая своё начало на рубеже 2015 и 2016 годов, воспринимается неоднозначно. Это является элементом жарких дебатов о роли Католической церкви в политической жизни Польши, которые продолжаются на протяжении многих лет, что отражается также на взаимоотношениях между Польшей и Ватиканом.

RELIGIOUS GIVING IN ROMANIA

INTRODUCTION

Religious giving is a topic which was studied almost exclusively in the North-American sociological space. We found a lot of research of American social scientists regarding charitable giving to secular and religious non-profit organizations. But we found fewer articles on this topic in Europe and in Romania in particular. That is why we chose to focus on the practice of religious giving in Romania.

It is very curious that such a complex phenomenon was studied relatively less until recently in our country. There are many articles of Romanian scholars regarding religious participation, belief in God, belief in After Life, the linkages between the church and the state, the religious market, the ethnic minorities' religious participation but searching the internet we didn't find any article on religious giving. The only article on this topic we know about it is the contribution of one of the two authors of this paper. Olah (2016) studied religious giving using the social data from a local research in the city of Oradea, Romania.

We could ask what would be the motivation of those who offer money to the church. This is a very provocative question for the social scientists. The first explanation that we have in our mind is connected to beliefs about the After Life. Money offered to the church would be a good investment when one would like a place in Heaven. But maybe people offer money to

¹ Oradea University, Department of Sociology and Social Work, PhD, Associate Professor, Oradea, University Street, no. 1, ROMANIA, 410087, Phone: +40 740 211 551, e-mail: serbanolah@gmail.com

² Oradea University, Department of Psychology, PhD, Lecturer, Oradea, University Street, no. 1, ROMANIA, 410087, Phone: +40 770 677 182, e-mail: gabiroseanu@gmail.com

the church for a better life on the earth. They believe that this money would be an investment which would attract luck, better health for them and their families and also professional success. But the image of one who gives money to the church could be important in the eyes of the community as well.

The aim of our paper is the building of an explanatory model of religious giving in Romania. In our analysis we will explore a data base corresponding to a Romanian national sample from 2011. In this research Romanians were questioned regarding their religious behavior and between the many questions there was one regarding religious giving. This was the starting point for our analysis.

1. RELIGIOUS MARKET AND RELIGIOSITY IN ROMANIA

Romania is a country with a Greek-Orthodox affiliation for the most part of the population. In the 2011 national census 86% of Romanians declared themselves as Orthodox. The rest of 14% of our national religious market are shared by the Roman-Catholics, Greek-Catholics, Protestants and Neo-Protestants. There are also small percentages of Muslims and Jewish people. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the Romanian religious market is around 0.7462 indicating a high degree of concentration and it could be considered less competitive (Ungureanu, 2014). We would like to mention that this index has values between 0 and 1 where 0 indicates a free market and 1 a market with a very weak competition.

Under the rule of the Romanian Communist Party after the Second World War all religious denominations were affected. Quite a few churches and monasteries were closed and the religious practice decreased significantly. But the Orthodox Romanian Church had a special situation because it found a *modus vivendi* with the communist power which assured it the survival without many losses (Voicu, 2007).

In the first decade after the fall of Communism Romania had the highest increase of religious practice in Europe, the variation between 1993 and 1999 being 15%. In this period the religious practice increased from 30% (almost similar to other communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe) to 45% (Voicu, 2007).

The place of Romania is not between the European champions of religious practice in the public space. But if we look on the other dimension, that of religious practice in the private space Romania has one of the highest places in Europe. In 2000, 76% of Romanians used to pray one time a week.

Values close to that of Romania had only been recorded in Malta, Poland and Ireland (Voicu, 2007).

2. EXAMINING THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE ON RELIGIOUS GIVING

There are a lot of research papers focused on religious giving but these are circumscribed to the North-American social science space. One of the most quoted authors in the economic literature of religion, Laurence Iannaccone formulated the model of strictness, which considers that strictness (the prohibition of alcohol and smoking, dressing with distinctive clothes) makes churches stronger by eliminating the free-riders, those who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who remain (Iannaccone, 1994).

In a similar way, using structural equation models, Finke, Bahr and Scheitle consider that exclusive congregations generate higher levels of financial contributions through belief, requirements and networks of monitoring. When combined with the size of the congregation, income and denomination affiliation the theoretical model fits the data quite well and explains a high level of the variance (Finke, Bahr & Scheitle, 2006).

In a book published in 1996, Dean Hoge considered that high family income, the high level of church commitment, the evangelical theology, the planning of annual contribution and the small size of the congregation influence positively the absolute contribution.

In another book on the same topic, Sharon Miller discovered that those who speak on contributions behind the feeling of responsibility and obligation to their church contribute less than those who offer the love for God behind obedience and scripture, or to meet the needs of others (Miller, 1999).

In a research paper published in 2007, Jared Peifer tested hypotheses derived from the religious meaning of the giver, a rational choice perspective and the sense of solidarity one feels. He found that high levels of religiosity have a strong impact of giving, rational choice hypotheses produce mixed results and the solidarity impact is confirmed.

In an article published in 2007, James and Sharpe tested the U-shaped income-giving profile, where those in the lower and higher income brackets give higher percentages of income to charity. Examining the data from 16,442 American households the authors found clear evidence of a U-shaped relationship. The author found the explanation that the highly committed, lower income households are wealthier than other members of their income

classification, in part reflecting the presence of lower-income, higher-asset, retirement-aged households (James and Sharpe, 2007).

In another article from 2008, Francesca Borgonovi examined to what extent religious context influences giving. Using a sample of counties in the United States of America and a multi-level analysis model Borgonovi found that religious pluralism is directly and positively associated with religious volunteering, while the association is not statistically significant for giving.

In a research paper from 2013, Corcoran applied the principles from social exchange theory to religious behavior arguing that the same mechanisms that reduce uncertainty in social exchanges also reduce uncertainty in religious exchanges resulting higher levels of religious commitment. Corcoran found a positive relationship between certainty and religious giving and showed that evangelical Protestants have higher levels of contribution compared to most religious affiliations.

In a draft paper from 2016, Olah used a logistic regression model analyzing the data from an urban sample in a North Western Romanian city. He found that the only predictor which is significant with religious giving is the income, but there is a reversed U-shape between income and religious giving. There is a big difference between the Romanian situation and the American results. Those from the middle deciles of income seem to contribute more than those from lower and higher deciles (Olah, 2016).

In this study we investigated the practice of religious giving at a higher scale, using a larger sample from all regions of Romania. We considered that religious practices such as church attendance and variables regarding religious beliefs would have a significant linear relationship with religious giving in Romania. Also, we looked at the relationship between religious giving and several demographic variables.

3. METHOD

In this study we hypothesized that religious giving is adequately explained by demographic variables, most important of which are age, background, and income level. Also, we hypothesized that religious giving would be linearly linked to religious practices and beliefs, most important of which are church attendance and importance of God in people's lives. Finally, we considered that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculated for the religious marketplace would play a significant role in religious giving.

Our data is derived from the Soros Foundation Romania (<http://www.fundatia.ro/baze-de-date/religie-și-comportament-religios>, 2016).

In our study we were only interested in analyzing Cristian confessions, thus we excluded participants from the database that were non Cristian and also followers of Cristian confessions that were poorly represented (less than 20 participants). Also we excluded participants who had missing values for the dependent variable (religious giving).

Overall we used a total of 2088 participants with a mean age of 47.98 years, and a standard deviation of 17.93 (the minimum value was 18 years and a maximum 93 years). The age means and standard deviations by gender are presented in table 1 and detailed demographic data regarding our final sample are offered in Tables 2 through 7.

Table 1

Distribution of participants by gender

Gender	N	percent	mean	s.d.
1. Male	969	46.41%	47.02	17.39
2. Female	1119	53.59%	48.82	18.35

The variables of interest in our study were: (1) importance of God, (2) religious attendance, (3) belief in hell, (4) income level, (5) gender, (6) age, (7) educational level, (8) marital status, (9) number of children, (10) background, (11) religious confession, and (12) HH index. The exact manner in which the participants were asked to respond to items regarding each of these variables is presented in Appendix.1.

Table 2

Description of participants by religious confession

Religious confession	n	percent
1. Orthodox	884	42.34%
2. Neoprottestant	355	17.00%
3. Roman-catholic	314	15.04%
4. Greek-catholic	272	13.03%
5. Protestant	263	12.60%

Table 3

Description of participants by level of education

Level of education	n	percent
1. low	435	21.06%
2. medium	1232	59.63%
3. superior	399	19.31%

Table 4

Description of participants by marital status

Marital status	n	percent
1. married	1240	60.34%
2. unmarried	815	39.66%

Table 5

Description of participants by region

Region	n	percent
1. Ardeal	734	35.15%
2. Banat Crisana MM	555	26.58%
3. Bucuresti	75	3.59%
4. Dobrogea	48	2.30%
5. Moldova	309	14.80%
6. Muntenia	235	11.25%
7. Oltenia	132	6.32%

Table 6

Description of participants by religious attendance

Religious attendance	n	percent
1. more than once a week	421	21.79%
2. once a week	666	34.47%
3. at least once a month	373	19.31%
4. at holydays	472	24.43%

Table 7

Description of participants by background

Background	n	percent
1. Rural	910	43.58%
2. Urban	1178	56.42%

4. RESULTS

Based on our hypotheses we constructed a regression model in which we included all our predictor variables for religious giving. This model (Model 1) was statistically significantly better than the null model (table 8), however several regression coefficients for the predictor variables were not (table 9).

Table 8

Model fit indices for Model 1

chi-square	df	p
223.16	18	<0.0001

Our results reveal that for the Romanian population a series of variables, such as belief in hell, income level, gender, number of children and religious confession are not important predictors of religious giving. For us the biggest surprise perhaps is the fact that income does not significantly predict whether a person will practice religious giving. Based on the previous findings of the North-American researchers and the findings of Olah (2016) we expected some sort of relationship between these variables, however none was found. It would seem that for all levels of income the proportion between those who give money to the church and those who do not is the approximately the same.

Also, it was found that in the case of the major Christian confessions there is no difference in the practice of religious giving. The proportion between those who participate and those who do not is statistically similar for all of them. This was somewhat a surprise since some confessions require a monthly payment or some sort of fee in order to be considered a member of that confession and others do not. It may be possible however that in the case of those who do not require fees of participation some sort of payment to be done by means of charity actions or on major holydays or events such as marriages and funerals.

Table 9

Regression coefficients for all the predictor variables in the model

	Coef.	S.E.	Wald Z	p
1. Intercept	-0.3954	0.5734	-0.69	0.4904
2. Importance of God	1.0152	0.1783	5.7	<0.0001
3. Religious attendance: once a week	-0.3795	0.2623	-1.45	0.1479
4. Religious attendance: at least once a month	-0.6137	0.2901	-2.12	0.0344
5. Religious attendance: at holydays	-0.6982	0.2853	-2.45	0.0144
6. Belief in hell	0.3735	0.234	1.6	0.1104
7. Income level	0.0437	0.0474	0.92	0.3565
8. Gender of respondent	-0.0545	0.1606	-0.34	0.7345
9. Age of respondent	0.0338	0.0056	6.06	<0.0001
10. Medium educational level	0.7516	0.2331	3.22	0.0013
11. Superior educational level	0.8166	0.2933	2.78	0.0054
12. Marital status	0.4441	0.1735	2.56	0.0105
13. Number of children	0.0709	0.0734	0.97	0.3342
14. Background	-0.4632	0.1692	-2.74	0.0062
15. Religious confession: Neoprottestant	-0.2666	0.2995	-0.89	0.3735
16. Religious confession: Roman-catholic	-0.3854	0.2606	-1.48	0.1392
17. Religious confession: Greek-catholic	-0.0531	0.3053	-0.17	0.862
18. Religious confession: Protestant	-0.1444	0.3015	-0.48	0.632
19. HHI index	-1.7717	0.3725	-4.76	<0.0001
Notes: The reference level for Religious attendance was: more than once a week				
The reference level for Educational level was: Low educational level				
The reference level for Religious confession was: Orthodox				

Our next step was to construct a new model (Model 2) in which we retained only the statistically significant predictor variables from Model 1. This new model is also statistically significant compared to the null model, which indicates a good model fit (table 10), and all of the retained predictor variables have statistically significant regression coefficients (table 11).

Table 10

Model fit indices for Model 2

chi-square	df	p
257.61	9	<0.0001
McFadden's pseudo R ²		0.16
Nagelkerke pseudo R ²		0.224

Based on the pseudo R² of the model we can conclude that the predictor variables account for between 16% and 22.4% of religious giving in the case of the Romanian population. The most important predictor was the HH index which has a negative relationship with the dependent variable followed by the importance of God, which has a positive relationship with the criterion variable.

Table 11

Regression coefficients for Model 2

	Coef.	S.E.	Wald Z	p
1. Intercept	-0.0016	0.3349	0	0.9962
2. Importance of God	1.0196	0.1506	6.77	<0.0001
3. Religious attendance: at least once a month	-0.5411	0.1803	-3	0.0027
4. Religious attendance: at holydays	-0.5585	0.1734	-3.22	0.0013
5. Age of respondent	0.0324	0.0046	6.97	<0.0001
6. Medium educational level	0.6242	0.2129	2.93	0.0034
7. Superior educational level	0.6823	0.255	2.68	0.0075
8. Marital status	0.5321	0.1462	3.64	0.0003
9. Background	-0.423	0.1508	-2.81	5.00E-03
10. HHI index	-1.7402	0.2659	-6.54	<0.0001
Notes: The reference level for Religious attendance was: more than once a week				
The reference level for Educational level was: Low educational level				
The reference level for Religious confession was: Orthodox				

In our final step of the analysis of the predictor variables we looked at the odds ratios in order to estimate the increase or the decrease in the chance of religious giving (table 12). Our results suggest that if people responded that God has an increased importance in their life (compared to those who

responded that God had only some importance in their life) the chance that they would participate in religious giving was increased by 177%.

Table 12

Odds ratios for the coefficients in Model 2

	Change factor	Chances of change	Direction of chance
(Intercept)	0.998412		
1. Importance of God	2.7721573	177%	increase
2. Religious attendance: at least once a month	0.5821072	41.8%	decrease
3. Religious attendance: at holydays	0.5720796	42.8%	decrease
4. Age of respondent	1.0329475	3.2%	increase
5. Medium educational level	1.8666767	86.6%	increase
6. Superior educational level	1.9784642	97.8%	increase
7. Marital status	1.7025162	70.2%	increase
8. Background	0.6550717	34.5%	decrease
9. HHI index	0.1754902	82.5%	decrease
Notes: The reference level for Religious attendance was: more than once a week			
The reference level for Educational level was: Low educational level			
The reference level for Religious confession was: Orthodox			

A religious attendance of at least once a month compared to that of more than once a week decreased the chance of participation to religious giving by 41.8% and an attendance of only at holydays decreased the chance of participation to religious giving by 42.8%.

Each additional year of age increased the probability of religious giving by 3.2%. In the case of educational level, it was revealed that the chance of participation to religious giving increased by 86.6% if the educational level was medium compared to that of low level and it increased by 97.8% if the educational level was high compared to that of low level. The marital status of the person was associated with an increase in the chance of religious giving, being married increased this chance by 70.2%. Background was also associated with the chance of participating in religious giving in the sense that being from an urban background decreased these chances by 34.5% (compared to the rural background).

Finally, the HHI index corresponding to the 'religious market' of the various regions in Romania was also associated with the chance of participating in the practice of religious giving. Thus for each increase of a unit of the HHI index there is an 82.5% chance of decrease in the participation to religious giving. This indicates that the more a region is dominated by a certain religious confession the less people will participate in religious giving.

CONCLUSIONS

What is very surprising in our logistic regression model is the lack of correlation between income and religious giving. Another surprise is the lack of significant association between religious confession and religious giving. The results are very different than those found by the North-American scholars proving that Romania (Eastern Europe) and North-America are very different social soils. The most important predictors of religious giving in Romania seem to be 'The Importance of God', the 'Herfindahl-Hirschman Index' and the 'Educational level'. The social portrait of the religious giver in Romania could be summarized as superior or medium educated, attending the religious service weekly, married, from a rural background and for whom God is very important. If the medium American religious giver seems to be from the lower level income deciles the Romanian case looks different. Our case indicates that Romanians from the middle deciles are the most important religious donors. The high level of correlation between the HH index and religious giving could be interpreted in the sense that a high degree of religious market concentration is associated with a lower level of religious giving and a free religious market is associated with a higher level of religious giving. This is a very interesting conclusion and we believe that this HHI index could be successfully tested on different other markets. But the most important result is that market counts even regarding religiosity. The fact that Transylvania and Banat-Crisana regions are the champions of religious giving in Romania could be associated with the fact that in these regions there is a higher ethnic and religious diversity and pluralism in comparison with other regions from Eastern and Southern Romania.

The major limitation of our study is the fact that it is transversal (not longitudinal) and that the data corresponds to the year 2011. Unfortunately it was the only data base where a question regarded religious giving was present. Another limitation is that we do not have qualitative data for a deeper understanding of this very complex phenomenon of religious giving.

Perhaps the most surprising and interesting finding is the high level of correlation between the HHI and religious giving. This finding reinforces the idea that religious markets based analyses are not only limited to North America where there is a separation between Church and State but even in Romania where the historical alliance between the Greek Orthodox Church and the State is very important in the social landscape and where Churches benefit from important finance resources from the State.

REFERENCES

- Borgonovi, F. 2008. Divided we stand, united we fall: religious pluralism, giving and volunteering. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 73.
- Chaves, M., Miller, S. 1999. *Financing of American religion*. Altamira Press
- Corcoran, K. 2013. Divine exchanges: applying social exchange theory to religious behavior. *Rationality and Society*, 25(3).
- Finke, R., Bahr, M., Scheitle, C. 2006. Toward explaining congregational giving. *Social Science Research*, vol. 35, issue 3.
- Iannacone, L. 1994. Why strict churches are strong? *The American Journal of Sociology*, 99(5).
- Hoge, D., Zech, C., McNamara, P., Donahue, M. 1996. *Money Matters. Personal Giving in American Churches*. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press.
- James III, R., Sharpe, D. 2007. The Nature and Causes of the U-Shaped Charitable Giving Profile. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 2.
- Olah, Ș. 2016. *Religia ca piață. Un studiu cantitativ despre viața religioasă din Oradea. [Religion as a market. A quantitative study on religious life in the city of Oradea.]* draft paper.
- Peifer, J. 2007. *Religious Giving as a Response to Community*. CSES Working Paper Series, Paper #41. Center for the study of Economy and Society. Cornell University.
- Ronsvalle, J., Ronsvalle, S. 2008. *The State of Church Giving through 2006. Global Triage MDG4 and Unreached People Groups*. Empty Tomb Inc.
- Ungureanu, M. 2014. *Instituții, alegeri individuale, acțiune colectivă. [Institutions, individual choices, collective action.]* Iasi: Polirom Publishing House.
- Voicu, M. 2007. *România religioasă. [The religious Romania.]* Iasi: Institutul European Publishing House.
- <http://www.fundatia.ro/baze-de-date/religie-și-comportament-religios>, accessed in 02.15.2016.

APPENDIX 1

Response modalities for items that measure the variables in the study

Variables	Responses	
1. Importance of God	categorical variable	two categories
2. Religious attendance	ordinal variable	four levels
3. Belief in hell	categorical variable	two categories
4. Income level	ordinal variable	ten point scale
5. Gender	categorical variable	two categories
6. Age	numerical variable	–
7. Educational level	ordinal variable	three categories
8. Marital status	categorical variable	two categories
9. Number of children	numerical variable	–
10. Background	categorical variable	two categories
11. Religious confession	categorical variable	five categories
12. HHI Index	numerical variable	–

RELIGIOUS GIVING IN ROMANIA

Summary

The paper analyzes the practice of religious giving in Romania. In the first part the authors examine the recent scientific literature regarding the predictors of religious giving. Secondly, they quantitatively explore a data base of religious behavior corresponding to a Romanian national sample from 2011 using the R statistical software. Interpretation of the obtained results and conclusions are presented in the last part of the study.

DATKI NA KOŚCIÓŁ W RUMUNII

Streszczenie

Artykuł analizuje praktykę datków kościelnych w Rumunii. W pierwszej części autorzy analizują nową literaturę naukową dotyczącą predyktorów datków na kościół. Następnie, ilościowo badają bazę danych zachowań religijnych odpowiadających rumuńskiej próbie krajowej od 2011 roku przy użyciu oprogramowania statystycznego R. Interpretacja uzyskanych wyników i wnioski zostały przedstawione w ostatniej części opracowania.

ЦЕРКОВНЫЕ ПОЖЕРТВОВАНИЯ В РУМУНИИ

Резюме

В статье содержится анализ практики церковных пожертвований в Румынии. В первой части авторы проводят анализ новой научной литературы, касающейся предикторов церковных пожертвований. Затем производится количественный анализ базы данных религиозного поведения, которые соответствуют национальному румынскому эксперименту за 2011 год. Данный анализ проводится при помощи статистического программного обеспечения R. Истолкование полученных результатов и выводы представлены в заключительной части исследования.

Daria Orzechowska-Słowikowska

ASSIMILATION
– A WORN THEORY? MUSLIMS IN WARSAW¹

INTRODUCTION

Assimilation is the oldest term describing the process of adaptation of immigrants in the host society. In the twenty-first century it is still the subject of numerous studies, although Chicago school researchers dealt with it throughout the twentieth century, starting from 1901 and ending in 1993. Currently assimilation arouses much controversy and is the subject of many media discourses. They are the result of an old dispute in sociology on the relevance of assimilation and its definition. Due to numerous modifications introduced throughout the twentieth century this term is still ambiguous and difficult to define. Equipped with a pejorative label, developed on the ground of the Chicago School, even in the late nineties of the twentieth century it was doomed to failure. Currently in the approach of American researchers²

¹ The article is the result of a research project aimed at the development of young scientists, funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, implemented at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Science in the years 2015/2016.

² The pioneering conceptual apparatus and the basics of the theory aimed to explain the mechanisms of inclusion of immigrants in the host society were developed by researchers from the Chicago School, among others, Sarah E. Simons, Robert Park, Milton Gordon, Ernest Burgess, Rogers Brubaker. Throughout the twentieth century they were developed and modified by their successors. European researchers contributed little new to their achievements. In European migration research this term is less often used due to the associated negative connotations, such as lack of tolerance for otherness of immigrants. Thus, in Europe, the term ‘integration’ is usually used. In countries such as the United States, Canada or Australia, where nations have immigrant origins, it is natural to use the concept of assimilation to describe interactions occurring on the line the immigrant – the host society. Adaptation of newcomers and their relations with the host society are perceived in them as phenomena taking

assimilation has gained a new meaning, or even a new life. Recognised by Nathan Glazer in 1993 as a ‘threadbare, and consequently dead’³ theory, nearly 10 years later it was restored to life by Rogers Brubaker. Defined as ‘having nothing to do with the old, discredited analytically and politically infamous assimilation’⁴ it is again used to describe the wider adaptation of immigrants to the host group, otherwise known as the dominant one.

place largely in a natural and spontaneous way. In terms of European researchers – Adrian Favell, Stephen Castles and Steven Vertovec, assimilation is a long process that requires immigrants’ work and effort in order to fully absorb values and culture of the dominant group. American researchers’ attempt to unify the definitions of the terms ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’ is not applicable in the study of the process of assimilation in Europe, both in theoretical and empirical dimensions. Even the term assimilation means something different in French, English, German or Dutch policy. Assimilation of immigrants in France proceeds differently than e.g. in the UK and in Germany differently than e.g. in the Netherlands. It results from the concepts of models of inclusion of immigrants into the dominant group, based on different or even opposing logics of each of these countries. Apart from this, the shapes of assimilation models in these countries have been also affected, among others, by the concept of nation and nationality and previous experience in managing social diversity, including the colonial experience, attitudes to the indigenous ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities and models of relations between the state and the Church. Rogers Brubaker in the article ‘The return of assimilation? The changing perspectives on assimilation and its sequels in France, Germany and the United State’ published in *Ethnic and Radical Studies* [vol. 24, no. 4, 2001, p. 533] states that in Germany the word ‘assimilation’ has been ‘contaminated’ and ‘disqualified’ as a result of forced Germanisation, just like in France it has been tainted by the association with the Jacobins’ violent homogenisation aspirations and practices. Assimilation cannot be equalled with integration. Assimilation is different from integration because it is always a unidirectional process. To confirm this, I will add that in 2003, the European Commission defined integration as a ‘two-way process based on mutual rights and accompanying obligations of legal residents and the host society. The responsibility of the society is to ensure formal rights of immigrants in such a way that they are given the opportunity to participate in economic, social, cultural and civil life. In contrast, immigrants should respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, without forgoing their own identity’ [Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Access to European Union Citizenship. Own Initiative opinion, European and Social Council, 2003, Brussels, pp. 17–18].

³ Glazer, N. 1993. Is assimilation dead? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 530, pp. 122–136.

⁴ Brubaker, R. 2001. The return of assimilation? The changing perspectives on assimilation and its sequels in France, Germany and the United State. *Ethnic and Radical Studies*, vol. 24, no. 4, p. 531–548.

The subject of the article is the analysis of the process of assimilation of the Muslim community in Poland on the example of the capital city of Warsaw. The research problem was to determine the degree of assimilation of the Muslim community with the residents of Warsaw and an attempt to find out if assimilation is the right term to describe the current interaction that takes place between the Muslim community and Christian inhabitants of Warsaw. Such an approach required defining the barriers and difficulties and showing the cause and effect relationships hindering the process of assimilation. It was possible to define these problems thanks to the use of the quantitative method – carrying out a survey in order to scientifically analyse the subject specified in the study, that is the Muslim community living in Warsaw. Answers of the respondents, on the one hand, became the key to solve the research problem, on the other hand, they made it possible to create something similar to the *curriculum vitae* of the Muslim community in Poland.

Examination of the Muslim community in Warsaw is difficult for many reasons – for instance due to the specificity of the subjects themselves and the character of the city, and therefore the application of only a quantitative approach would be insufficient. Firstly, by means of the quantitative method – the questionnaire – the researcher does not receive the ready set of variables, and he/she has yet to develop them. The possibility of collecting appropriate material depends on this stage of the research procedure. Secondly, the anonymity of the persons participating in the quantitative study does not give you a chance to include the emotional element, which is added value in gaining knowledge about the specifics of that community. Thirdly, when we conduct a survey only, there is a risk of receiving a blank survey page, which effectively hinders the process of the study. It was assumed that the increase in the value and reliability of the study can be obtained also through the use of a qualitative method⁵, consisting in this case in interviews with employees of institutions acting in support of immigrants. In the case of the study in which unforeseen events and phenomena may occur, a lot can be gained from the combination of both methods.

In this case, the turning point of the research turned out to be the terrorist attacks carried out by militants of the Islamic State on 13 November 2015 in Paris. These events led to the reluctance of Muslims to participate in the study, although previously they had declared their readiness. As a result, the

⁵ More on the quantitative and qualitative method in: Podemski, K. 2009. *Metody badań jakościowych. [Qualitative research methods.]* vol. 1, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 34–36. On the qualitative method: ibidem, vol. 2, p. 325, pp. 351–353.

research covered a group of 63 people, not a hundred as envisaged in the initial phase of the study. It seems, however, that despite these difficulties the presented material both shows a picture of the Muslim community in Warsaw, and encourages further research and analyses in this area.

THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN POLAND, ANNO DOMINI 2016

What have I found out about the Muslim community from the analysis of the survey results? The majority of respondents are determined and want, despite difficulties encountered in Poland, a homogeneous country where public knowledge of Islam and Muslims is minimal, and prejudices are substantial, to make a life for themselves in the new country. Not much and often only in the form of contributions has been written about Muslims living in Poland, with the exception of Tatars. The uncontrolled influx of Muslims into Europe since 2010 and the attitude of Poles related to this unprecedented event have become an impetus to undertake interdisciplinary research on the Polish scientific ground⁶.

The social situation of the Muslim community in Poland is unusual, because, first, it is very small, or even negligible, compared with the number of Muslims living in the capitals of Western Europe (among others, in Berlin, Paris, London or Rome). It is estimated that in Warsaw the number of Muslims does not exceed ten thousand, and in Poland thirty thousand. The statement that ‘it is possible to live the whole life in Poland and not meet a Muslim’ is no longer so valid today as fifteen or twenty years ago, but it still testifies to a small share of Muslims in Polish society.

The precise estimation of the number of Muslims in Poland is still, however, quite difficult. The question about religion appeared for the first time in a post-war census in the last National Census of Population and Housing con-

⁶ Among others: Stefaniak, A. 2015. *Postrzeżenie muzułmanów w Polsce. Raport z badania sondażowego.* [*The perception of Muslims in Poland. The report of the survey.*] Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami; Stefaniak, A., Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M. 2015. *Uprzedzenia w Polsce.* [*Prejudices in Poland.*] Warszawa: Liberi Libri; Bilewicz, M., et al. 2014. *Mowa nienawiści. Raport z badań sondażowych.* [*Hate speech. The report of the survey.*] Warszawa: Fundacja Stefana Batorego i Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami; Soral, W. 2013. *Stosunek do imigrantów oraz jego korelaty.* [*Attitude to immigrants and its correlates.*] Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami; Bilewicz, M. 2012. *Stosunek do uchodźców. Możliwości zmiany.* [*Attitude to refugees. The possibility of changes.*] Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.

ducted by the Central Statistical Office in Poland in 2011⁷. In the final report, presenting the demographic and social status and structure of the population, words such as ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ did not even appear – apparently this minority was classified among ‘other’, unidentified denominations. Persons belonging to them constituted then 0.15% of the total Polish population⁸. According to the data of the report prepared for the European Parliament, the number of Muslims in Poland ranges from 5 to 30 thousand, although Polish demographers regarded this calculation as exaggerated⁹. According to Arabist Agata Skowron-Nalborczyk, Muslims in Poland constitute only 0.06–0.08% of the Polish population, less than a 0.1%¹⁰.

Secondly, the Muslim community in Warsaw is heterogeneous. The biggest number of the surveyed persons came from Arabic countries. 36 people from countries of Northern Africa and North-Eastern Africa, including 12 respondents from Tunisia, 8 from Morocco, 7 from Algeria, 6 from Egypt and 3 from Libya. 16 people came from the Middle East, that is 5 from Syria, 4 from Lebanon, 5 from Iran and 2 from Saudi Arabia. In addition, 15 people participating in the study were Turks. 2 people were from Afghanistan and 2 from Pakistan. The study covered also 4 Chechens.

Thirdly, in the case of immigration of Muslims to Poland it hard to talk about the typical Muslim divisions into the old and new Muslim immigration, which is encountered in post-colonial countries, e.g. France, Britain or the Netherlands. Poland has never been a coloniser of any Arab state, so in the case of Poland the division of immigrants into the old, post-war immigration and the new, postcolonial one is not applicable. Three events were turning points in the history of immigration to Poland: (1) the opening of the Polish borders after 1989, (2) Polish accession to the European Union on 4 May 2004, and (3) the accession to the Schengen zone on 21 December 2007.

⁷ The National Census of Population and Housing was conducted on 1 April – 30 June 2011.

⁸ CSO. 2013. *Ludność. Stan i struktura demograficzno-społeczna. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011.* [Population. The demographic and social status and structure. The National Census of Population and Housing 2011.] Warszawa; 2012. *Raport z wyników.* [The report of the results.] Warszawa: The National Census of Population and Housing, p. 105.

⁹ Dassetto, F., Ferrari, S., Maréchat, B. 2007. *Islam in the European Union: What's at stake in the future.* Brussels: European Parliament, p. 147.

¹⁰ Kim są muzułmanie w Polsce? [Who are Muslims in Poland?] Wojciech Tymowski's interview with Agata Skowron-Nalborczyk. Available at: http://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/1,34889,7653076,Kim_sa_muzulmanie_w_Polsce_.html [Accessed: 22 February 2016].

This does not mean, however, that each of them is connected exclusively with the increased influx of Muslim immigrants into Poland. The increased influx of Muslims into the country occurred mainly after 1989¹¹. In turn, the Polish membership in the European Union and the resulting presence in the Schengen area, just like pull and push factors – on the one hand, has attracted Muslims to Poland, on the other hand, has facilitated the outflow to Western Europe. As is clear from the survey, an increase in the inflow of Muslims to Poland took place in the nineties of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. As many as 52 respondents arrived in Poland at the end of the twentieth century. Only 2 surveyed persons came to Poland in 2000, and 9 people after 2000, including 6 after 2004 and 3 in 2013.

Fourthly, the migration decisions of Muslims are affected by different variables, and therefore considering them solely on the basis of typical pull and push migration factors is a mistake. According to the study of the Centre of Migration Research, economic considerations are the main reason for the arrival of immigrants to Poland particularly after 2004. The answers to the question included in the survey, ‘What was the reason for your arrival in Poland’ showed that economic issues were not always the main motivating factor. 25 people indicated in the survey that they had come to Poland in order to ‘attend to business matters’. Also, educational and cultural considerations proved to be strong pull factors. As many as 18 respondents came to Poland to study at one of Polish universities, and for 12 of them visiting family or friends was the reason for the arrival in Poland. Personal reasons are another motive for the influx of Muslims to Poland. The survey clearly shows that as long as the arrival of the first family member, usually a man, has a purely economic ground, then after achieving at least a partial economic and housing stabilisation in the country of destination, he brings subsequent members of the family who come mainly for personal reasons. Family reunification or chain immigration also appeared in answers of the respondents.

As emphasised by employees of Polish institutions dealing with immigrants, decisions of Muslim immigrants to come to Poland should be considered in terms of ‘difficult’ and ‘untraditional’. Studies have confirmed

¹¹ Rynkowski, M. 2006. *Churches and religious communities in Poland with particular focus on the situation of Muslim communities*. State and Religion in Europe. Legal System, Religious Education, Religious Affairs. Istanbul: Center for Islamic Studies, pp. 259–260; Nalborczyk, A. S. 2005. Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego. [The legal status of Muslims in Poland and its impact on the organization of religious life.] In: Parzymies, A. *Muzułmanie w Europie*. [Muslims in Europe.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, p. 229.

the widespread thesis that knowledge of the language of the host country is crucial in the process of assimilation. The most important factors influencing the difficulty of adapting to a new location, apart from economic issues, include the lack of knowledge of the language of the host country. The results of the survey showed that the Polish language is very difficult for 40 people, difficult for 10, moderately difficult for 9, and only for 3 it is easy to learn, especially at the conversational level. 2/3 of the people answered that lack of fluency in speaking Polish affects their quality of life in Warsaw. Learning the Polish language is a challenge for foreigners, many times impossible to realise. The responses indicate that very often the knowledge of the Polish language is limited to the assimilation of several basic words or simple sentences. The answers clearly indicate that lack of time, life among compatriots, universal access to the Internet and the ability to speak the English language at the conversational level (including that of the host society) lead to the fact that the willingness to learn Polish weakens month after month, until in the end it totally disappears. According to the respondents, currently the lack of knowledge of the Polish language is no longer such a problem as 20 years ago. It is still, however, a significant hindrance when they have to attend to matters at a post office, an employment office and so on.

Interestingly, according to the respondents weather conditions and a changing landscape belong to the most important factors influencing the process of assimilation. For 12 people, 'long winter, relatively cool and short summers and lack of sunshine most days of the year', are the real reason for the change of residence. In practice, however, these statements were not reflected in reality, the subjects absorbed by daily life in Poland, from year to year postponed their plans of relocation.

Only 11 respondents who came to Poland in the nineties of the twentieth century confirmed that during their entire stay they took only one trip with their family to their homeland. A trip for a family consisting of a few people to their homeland is a considerable expense. From a few to several thousand PLN must be allocated for buying plane tickets. As the respondents emphasise, this amount exceeds their financial means, therefore very often only one person goes on the journey, the man – the head of household. The main tool for contacting relatives in the homeland are still the Internet and Skype – one of the most popular instant messengers in the world to make phone calls. In the case of the respondents coming from the Middle East, especially Syria¹²

¹² About the situation of Syrians: Bauer, W. 2016. *W. Przez morze. Z Syryjczykami do Europy.* [Crossing the sea: with Syrians on the exodus to Europe.] Wołowiec: Wydawnic-

and Lebanon, travel to their homeland is simply impossible due to the current internal situation in these countries. The effects of the Arab Spring in the countries of the Middle East have enforced a change in life priorities of immigrants coming from that region. For the majority of them the return to their homeland will be probably never possible. Military action in Syria has lasted for more than four years now. As a result of it more than a quarter million citizens of this country are dead, and more than 11 million people have been forced to leave their homes due to the fight between the government forces, the opposition and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). According to the report of the European Council on Foreign Relations published in 2014, ‘the Syrian economy lies in ruins, assets and infrastructure have been destroyed, half of the population lives below the poverty line and the human development index has fallen back to where it stood 37 years ago. It is estimated that even with an average annual growth rate of 5 percent it would take nearly 30 years to recover Syria’s 2010 GDP value’¹³. Currently, the most important goal of the Syrian respondents is to help to bring their loved ones living in detention centres for refugees to Europe.

FEAR MAKES STRANGERS OF PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE FRIENDS

On 15 September 2015, the Polish government decided to accept 7,000 refugees, mainly from Syria and Eritrea, out of 120,000, which got to the European Union from countries covered by military operations. The government decision divided Polish society into two opposing camps – ‘for’ and ‘against’ taking refugees to Poland. The opposition to taking immigrants by Poland was the main theme of speeches of the organisers of the March of Independence on 11 November 2015. Adam Andruskiewicz, the leader of the All-Polish Youth and member of the movement Kukiz’15 chanted that we must build a country without any immigrants, which will defend its own borders by itself. ‘We are here hosts and we will decide whom we will admit here,’ informed Tomasz Dorn from the National Radical Camp. Demonstra-

two Czarne, *passim*; Skowron-Nalborczyk, A. 2015. Syria gaśnie. Jak do tego doszło? [Syria is dying. How did this happen?] *Więź*, 4 (662), pp. 26–35.

¹³ Yazigi, J. 2014. *Syria’s war economy*. European Council on Foreign Relation – Policy Brief 97, April 2014, p. 1; Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR97_SYRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf [Accessed: 3 March 2016] cited in Skowron-Nalborczyk, A. 2015. Syria gaśnie. Jak do tego doszło? [Syria is dying. How did this happen?] *Więź*, 4 [662], 2015, p. 35.

tors of the independence march carried, amongst others, banners with slogans such as 'We prefer a pork chop to Muhammad' with a photo of a pork chop and shouted 'It is Catholic Poland, not Islamic, not secular'¹⁴.

Poles perceive the influx of foreigners as a threat rather than a potential for the development of the state. Is it correct? Poland, with the population of Muslims amounting to 30 thousand (although these figures are only an estimate and are probably an overestimation) remains a homogeneous European country. The inclusion of 7,000 immigrants of Muslim origin into more than 38 million Polish population does not threaten the country with the loss of national identity. What, then, is responsible for such a spontaneous reaction of the public to the issue of the influx of Muslims to Poland? The interpretation of the study results indicates two main reasons for forming this type of attitude: direct contact, or lack thereof, and the message of the media and opinion leaders involved in media and political discourse. The analysis of the qualitative research shows that direct contact with minority groups and immigrants is the surest way to reduce prejudices of the host country community. People who have direct contact with representatives of minority and immigrant groups not only gain knowledge about these groups, but also experience less fear of them and show higher empathy and compassion for their fate. Increased empathy and smaller fear translate into an overall improvement of attitudes towards these groups¹⁵.

In Poland, according to estimates, Muslims constitute less than 0.1% of the population. Research on assimilation of the Muslim community in Poland confirm that lack of contact is the main factor responsible for fears of an influx of refugees and attitudes towards Muslims in Poland. From year to year more and more Poles declare lack of acceptance for a Muslim as a neighbour¹⁶. The reluctance of Poles towards the Muslim community is also intensified by

¹⁴ See <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1543373,Marsz-Niepodleglosci-krolowaly-antyimigranckie-hasla-ale-obylo-sie-bez-powaznych-incydentow> [Accessed: 12 March 2016].

¹⁵ More on this topic in the study conducted by Pettigrew, T.F., Tropp, L.R. 2008. How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic test of three mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, no. 38. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 922–934.

¹⁶ In the study of the Centre for Research on Prejudice conducted in 2014 on the nationwide sample of adult Poles, 20% of respondents declared their lack of acceptance for a Muslim as a neighbour. In the nationwide survey conducted in summer 2015 as many as 32% of the respondents expressed lack of acceptance for a neighbour professing Islam. Bilewicz, M. et al. 2014. *Mowa nienawiści. Raport z badań sondażowych.* [Hate speech. The report of the survey.] Warszawa: Fundacja Stefana Batorego i Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami, *passim*.

the media debate lasting at least since 2015, involving many times so-called pseudo experts in the culture and religion of Islam. Suffice it to say that the knowledge of Poles about the Muslim community is selective and attention is focused mainly on terrorist attacks and violence caused deliberately by Islamic fundamentalists. Due to the events with the participation of Muslim immigrants in Paris on 13 November 2015, in Cologne on 31 December 2015 and on 22 March 2016 in Brussels, Islam is again associated with terrorism, and the cognitive representation of Muslims is dominated by negative elements of reference. In Poland, Islamophobic content and anti-Muslim hate speech are relatively common in the media, mainly in the form of comments on Internet forums. Due to the increasing availability of the Internet and a false sense of impunity of its users, statements about the Muslim community are full of anger, aggression and hatred¹⁷.

WHAT ABOUT THIS ASSIMILATION?

The increase in hostility towards Muslim refugees compels us to reflect on the following issues: is the assimilation of the ‘new wave’ of refugees with heterodox inhabitants of Warsaw possible at all, and with the use of what methods should it be implemented to be effective? The contemporary immigration crisis in Poland shows the crisis of Polish society which to a much greater extent results from fear and stereotyped perception of Muslims than from a rational analysis of facts pertaining to benefits and costs associated with the influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa. The situation of the Muslim community and their attitudes and behaviour depend largely on the attitude of the host society¹⁸. Poles are accustomed to living in a homogeneous country, to existence in a nationally, culturally and religiously uniform state¹⁹. That is why, integration and education action which can really change attitudes in local communities should be undertaken in advance. In the era

¹⁷ More in: Firlit-Fesnak, G., Łotocki Ł. eds. 2014. *Imigranci w polskim dyskursie publicznym*. [Immigrants in Polish public discourse.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, *passim*.

¹⁸ *Academia. Migracje*. [Migrations.] 2015. Special edition, pp. 8–11.

¹⁹ Balcer, A. Polska, Islam, Europa. Pomost czy przedmurze. [Poland, Islam, Europe. A bridge or a bulwark.] Available at: http://www.demoseuropa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1862%3Apolska-islam-europa-pomost-czy-przedmurze&catid=75%3Aanadchodzce&Itemid=98&lang=pl [Accessed: 16 February 2016].

of the increased influx of refugees to the European Union activities raising awareness of the host society about the culture and religion of Islam and the process of adaptation of newcomers should be carried out systematically and with greater budget support, also in Poland. This can be a counterweight to the media messages and statements of politicians, which rather antagonise than solve problems related to the adaptation of refugees. These activities will also facilitate the adaptation of refugees and protect against political radicalisation.

Each research subject's adaptation process in Poland proceeds in an individual way and depends on factors such as cultural patterns of contacts with foreigners acquired in the country of birth, personal experiences, the reasons for the decision to leave the homeland. In addition these factors include: the length of stay, the status in Poland and economic success. The above factors determine whether the foreigner has already started the process of 'entering' the new culture of the dominant society or is still going through a period of so-called culture shock. The study showed that both settled immigrants and temporary ones, for whom Poland is only a transit country, have experienced this state. According to the study, the process of adaptation is a complex, difficult, and complicated mechanism determined by the willpower and determination of the newcomer.

It consists of four stages which every immigrant goes through upon arrival at the new place of residence. The first step in the process of adaptation is 'reprogramming' of the immigrant's state of mind and consciousness. Due to this 'reprogramming' it will be easier for the newcomer to enter everyday life in the host country. Immediately after arriving in a new country of settlement foreigners feel joy and experience a sense of security. Poland (Warsaw) made a positive impression on the majority of respondents, including all persons who arrived in the country after 2000.

When the state of excitement is gone, newcomers experience the already mentioned culture shock²⁰. It usually causes a feeling of regret, helplessness, and also indifference, and hostility towards the new environment. The degree of hostility equals the degree of the difficulty with disposing of the culture which the newcomer acquired in childhood in the form of the instilled value system, rituals and symbols, which Geert Hofstede calls 'software of the

²⁰ Ząbek, M. ed. 2002. *Między piekłem a rajem. Problemy adaptacji kulturowej uchodźców i imigrantów w Polsce.* [Between hell and heaven. Problems of cultural adaptation of refugees and immigrants in Poland.] Warszawa: Trio i Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej Wydawnictwa Historycznego UW, p. 10.

mind²¹. The study confirms that culture shock is a universal phenomenon, and its scale depends on both subjective and objective factors. Culture shock is experienced by Africans and Chechens, political as well as economic immigrants.

Answers to questions about the place of residence in Warsaw, workplace, frequency and ways of communicating with people outside the Muslim community show that many migrants seek asylum in their own culture group if they can avoid unpleasant confrontation with the new reality. Existing only among their compatriots, both at home and work, they relieve the intensity of the experienced culture shock, which is in a way fully understandable. The problem appears when a group of support, in the form of people from the same cultural background which is to be a kind of a safety valve, fails for whatever reasons. This leads to the so-called double – existential and psychological – alienation in the host country.

The third phase of the immigrant's adaptation in the host country consists in the newcomer's adaptation to the environment²². Immigrants begin to familiarise themselves with the place of residence, to learn, and, what is more, to absorb rules of conduct and local customs predominant in the surrounding reality, and begin to understand basic phrases of the Polish language. They become more self-assured, which in turn helps them to come in contact with new people. The study shows that Muslims of Turkish origin are a group which relatively quickly enters this phase; they decidedly take action leading to the normalisation of life in Poland. They set up businesses – usually small diners and try to achieve as soon as possible what they have come here for – economic success. There are, however, groups such as Africans, for whom it is very difficult to adapt to the reality of life in Poland. The study shows that the reason for this state of affairs are mental determinants and a demanding attitude characterised by a high degree of expectations in relation to the host country. African Muslims' motivation for socio-professional adaptation in Poland is very well illustrated by the carrot and stick method. In this case, the motivation to get out of culture shock and the desire to achieve balance is the proverbial carrot – the Polish system of social assistance which is disproportionate in comparison with France or Nordic countries. Although this method is sometimes necessary, in the long term it is a factor which demotivates from becoming independent in the host country. Of course, we should not gener-

²¹ Hofstede, G. 2007. *Kultury i organizacje. Zaprogramowanie umysłu*. [Cultures and organizations: software of the mind.] Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, p. 247.

²² Ząbek, M. ed. *Między piekłem...* [Between hell...], p. 12.

alise and evaluate all African immigrants living in Poland as people who are passive and helpless in life. The analysis of questionnaires lets us conclude that thanks to achieving economic success in Poland, the Africans have finally decided to stay in Poland. The symbol of this success for the Muslim community is now the marketplace in Bakalarska street in Warsaw (and not only for them). In the years 1989-2008, the so-called Europe Fair in the Decade Stadium was such a place, though its area was much larger. The marketplace in Bakalarska street plays an important role not only for Africans. Among other nations, also Chechens, Russians and Ukrainians run their businesses here. Thanks to such places as the Europe Fair and the marketplace in Bakalarska street the majority of immigrants living in Warsaw have managed to achieve the desired success, often even before they have been able to legalise their stay. In addition, for immigrants and refugees these places are a synonym of integration institutions in Poland enabling effective adaptation.

Meta-analyses of studies on adaptation processes of immigrants in the host country show that economic success is a key factor in overcoming culture shock and successful adaptation²³. *Summa summarum*, the achievement of economic success in the host country is eventually the main goal of all immigrants, it enables the realisation of the objectives at the level of everyday existence. In conclusion, immigrants who achieve this economic success, adapt more quickly, integrate, and over time they can even assimilate.

The fourth and final phase of the adaptation process is the achievement of balance²⁴. The number of degrees of interaction varies. It is generally believed that it may in principle take three forms: assimilation, separation and integration. Robert Park, a representative of the Chicago School, enumerates four: accommodation, competition, conflict and assimilation²⁵. Lack of any of them forces migrants to change their place of residence or often condemns them to marginalisation²⁶.

²³ Ząbek, M. ed. 2002. *Między piekłem a rajem. Problemy adaptacji kulturowej uchodźców i imigrantów w Polsce*. [Between hell and heaven. Problems of cultural adaptation of refugees and immigrants in Poland.] Warszawa: Trio i Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej Wydawnictwa Historycznego UW, *passim*.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

²⁵ Park, R. 1921. *Introduction to the science of sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 735.

²⁶ Ząbek, M. *Między piekłem...* [Between hell...], *ibidem*, p. 15. See also Kubiak, H. 1980. Teoria, ideologia, polityka asymilacji. Szkic problemu. [The theory, ideology, policy of assimilation. A sketch of the problem.] In: Kubiak, H., Paluch A.K. eds. *Założenia teorii asymilacji*. [Assumptions of the theory of assimilation.] Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, pp. 15–25.

Relationships between concepts describing cultural transformations are often quite complicated, which is particularly evident in the case of the terms ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’. According to John W. Berry, integration is the most desired process. In turn, Paul Mecheril claims that assimilation is a state that ensures the most favourable conditions for the development of the immigrant in the host country. Integration as opposed to assimilation produces a ‘stranger’, emphasises the ‘otherness’ of immigrants in the host society. Each form of not equal treatment resulting from the ethnic origin stigmatises people and often makes them dependent on aid. Paradoxically, integration policy instead of facilitating interaction of the newcomers with the dominant society may hinder it unintentionally.

Assimilation is the oldest concept that describes the process of the inclusion of immigrants into the host society. Defined as total assimilation into the culture of the environment in every way, including the physical appearance, was regarded not so long ago in the countries of the West as the most beneficial effect of adaptation of immigrants into the host society. It is true that completely assimilated immigrants usually do not come into any conflict with the host community any more. They become ‘indigenous natives’ or at worst ‘immigrant-neighbours’, but not ‘neighbours-strangers’ as in the case of integration²⁷. Assimilation is both a process and a state consisting in taking over culture of the host society by immigrants, and most importantly the resignation of their own. In theory, people from the majority group can assimilate to the minority group, although currently it is a very rare phenomenon, generally people from minority groups become similar to the majority, immigrants to the majority society²⁸. The above definition of assimilation induces me to pose a hypothesis. Namely, given religious ambivalence, secularism and even atheism of the majority of the population in Western Europe, the contemporary migration crisis, consisting in the arrival of a large number of followers of expansive Islam in Europe, may in the future enforce the adaption of the principles of the religion and culture of the minority group by the majority group.

²⁷ More on the problem of strangeness in: Simmel, G. 2006. *Obcy* [The stranger.] In: Id. *Most i drzwi*. [Bridge and door.] Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, *passim.*; Bucholc, M. 2010. Dehumanizujący wymiar obcości i jej etyczna niezbędność. Na marginesie Obcego Georga Simmela. [Dehumanising dimension of strangeness and its ethical necessity. On the margins of Georg Simmel’s Stranger.] *Etyka*, no. 43. Warszawa: Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, *passim.*

²⁸ Budyta-Budzyńska, M. 2011. *Integracja czy asymilacja? Polscy imigranci na Islandii*. [Integration or assimilation? Polish immigrants in Iceland.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, pp. 47–48.

In practice this will mean the acceptance and complete assimilation of the culture and values of the minority group, in this case Muslims, by the host society.

In the twenty-first century, assimilation is still an equivocal term. The reason for this state of affairs are numerous modifications of the term made by Chicago researchers throughout the last century²⁹. Let me remind you that Sarah E. Simson gave the first scientific definition of assimilation in 1901. According to Simson, it is 'that process of adjustment and accommodation that occurs between the members of different races if their contact is prolonged and if the necessary psychic conditions are present. (...) Figuratively speaking, it is the process by which the aggregation of peoples is changed from a mere mechanical mixture into a chemical compound'³⁰. Robert Park was right, saying already in the twenties of the twentieth century that assimilation is the most complex and sophisticated process of the inclusion of newcomers in the majority society³¹.

Translating the above considerations into the canvas of the analysed case, it should be emphasised that assimilation is a process that requires time. For people who have come to Poland as already mature, fully formed persons, complete assimilation into the host society is very difficult. If we add to this significant cultural differences in terms of basic values set by the religion and differences in physical appearance, assimilation is basically impossible. It is difficult for me to indicate a typical example of successful assimilation in the group of 62 respondents or just people who were inclined to undergo a process of assimilation. For the respondents assimilation still carries negative connotations and has a pejorative label. Conceived, on the one hand, as lack of tolerance for their religious and cultural distinctness, on the other hand, simply as a way of their enslavement, it arouses respondents' opposition to succumbing to this process. The lack of will and determination of the Muslim community to become fully similar to the host society dooms assimilation to failure. It is worth noting that for the majority of the respondents assimilation means the denial of everything that defines their identity, giving them

²⁹ See Grzybek, D. 2013. Współczesne rozumienie asymilacji imigrantów w społeczeństwie amerykańskim. [Modern understanding of assimilation of immigrants in American society.] *Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Nauki Społeczne*, no. 6 (1/2013), pp. 57–58.

³⁰ Hirsch, W. 1943. Assimilation as a concept and as a process. *Social Forces*, vol. 21, no. 1, October 1943, pp. 35–39 cited in: Włoch, R. 2011. *Polityka integracji muzułmanów we Francji i Wielkiej Brytanii. [Policy of integration of Muslims in France and the UK.]* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, p. 18.

³¹ Park, R. *Introduction...*, op. cit., p. 736.

a ‘new-strange’ life, with which they do not identify themselves and to which they do not give consent. Muslims living in Poland (Warsaw) are connected to the homeland by means of an invisible and unbreakable ‘umbilical cord’ that prevents them from taking emotional, permanent roots in Poland. The more difficult the internal situation of the given country, the stronger commitment to values acquired in childhood.

Is Nathan Glazer’ statement that assimilation is ‘a worn theory that imposes ethnocentric and patronising requests on ethnic minorities, struggling to maintain cultural and ethnic consistency’ correct? ³². The results of the study lead to the conclusion that Glazer’ definition of assimilation is correct and it correctly depicts, on the one hand, the attitude of the respondents, and on the other hand, of the host country. The lack of respondents’ consent to becoming similar to the dominant society, the attitude of Polish society and Poland tell us to seek new adaptive solutions – alternative to the assimilation of the Muslim community in Poland.

SUMMARY

As a result of the immigration crisis, Poland, following Western countries, goes towards fairly restrictive immigration policy, basically opposing the influx of Muslim immigrants. In Poland politicians decide about the fate, existence and security of immigrants, including Muslim ones, and not rational immigration policy which is anyway hard to find. Balanced conversation about whom to accept and whom not, and whether at all has become impossible since the right-wing government in Poland gained strength. The political debate reminds a boxing ring or a street battle fought during the March of Independence on 11 November. The culture of the message on this matter seems to be absolutely meaningless, what matters is the strength of the voice and populism growing in strength.

Arguing that racism and xenophobia are the traits of Polish society would be harmful to all Poles. There is no scientific basis to claim that Polish society as a community is more xenophobic than other populations of the Union. The problem is not the question of whether to accept new refugees, but how to do it with dignity. How to take care of them. Poland will not accept a cohort of immigrants as Italy, Germany or France have done. Several thousand is

³² Glazer, N. *Is assimilation...*, op. cit., p. 128 cited in: Włoch, R. 2011. *Polityka integracji muzułmanów we Francji i Wielkiej Brytanii. [Policy of integration of Muslims in France and the UK.]* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, p. 21.

a drop in the ocean. Another issue is whether these several thousand people will be able to assimilate with Poles? To answer this question, we should first think about how many of them will remain in Poland (Warsaw) at least for a few years, and how many will disappear before they find out where Poland is on the map. Poland is not an attractive country for Muslim immigrants. In comparison with the post-colonial countries of Western Europe it is still seen as *terra nova* – the land undiscovered and unconquered by Muslims. On the basis of the present situation it is difficult to prove the thesis that Poland is being threatened with the exodus of Muslim refugees. It even seems that these 7 thousand refugees, to which the government agreed, will be ‘strangers-guests’ and therefore migrants for whom Poland will be a transit country only. This does not change the fact that the majority of Poles see ‘strangers-guests’ first of all as enemies, not people on the move seeking to find a new, safe place to life³³.

Following Rogers Brubaker, we can say that assimilation is more than just a process immigrants are subjected to, assimilation is also a state³⁴ and, therefore, fate, location, rationale and existence, living conditions which the immigrants ensure for themselves by the renunciation of their culture, the absorption of values of the host country and becoming similar to the host society. Assimilation is the most capacious term describing the process of ‘entering’ of immigrants into the host society. It is also a one-way mechanism, which in practice means ceding all responsibility for its implementation to immigrants. The participation of the state in the process of assimilation is reduced only to an auxiliary function, the state is not a participant as it is in the case of the integration process – a modern alternative to assimilation.

On the day when I was finishing the work on this article, there were two terrorist attacks in Brussels. The detonation of explosives at the Brussels airport and an underground station next to the buildings of EU institutions carried out by Islamic fundamentalists claimed the lives of dozens of innocent people. In the face of such events the question of what to do next comes to mind. Is it rational to admit more immigrants who as a result of improved weather are heading to the European Union Member States? Who is to blame for the current situation in the EU, and who should bear the responsibility for the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees accepted on the territory of EU Member States?

³³ See also Balcer, A. Polska... [Poland...], op. cit., *passim*.

³⁴ Walter, H. 1943. Assimilation as a concept and as a process. *Social Forces*, vol. 21, no. 1, *passim*.

The terrorist attacks carried out more and more frequently by Islamic extremists on the streets of Western cities also show a profound crisis of integration. Europe (that is also Poland) is facing a big social problem, which it has previously tried not to notice. It has also forgotten that in undertaking the refugee issue the most important point of reference cannot be only the interest of the state implemented within the framework of *Realpolitik*, but a man.

REFERENCES

- Academia. Migracje. [Migrations.]* 2015. Special edition, pp. 8–11.
- Balcer, A. Polska, Islam, Europa. Pomost czy przedmurze. [Poland, Islam, Europe. A bridge or a bulwark.] Available at: http://www.demoseuropa.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1862%3Apolaska-islam-europa-pomost-czy-przedmurze&catid=75%3Aanadchodzce&Itemid=98&lang=pl [Accessed: 16 February 2016].
- Bauer, W. 2016. *W. Przez morze. Z Syryjczykami do Europy. [Crossing the sea: with Syrians on the exodus to Europe.]* Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne.
- Bilewicz, M. 2012. *Stosunek do uchodźców. Możliwości zmiany. [Attitude to refugees. The possibility of changes.]* Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.
- Bilewicz, M., et al. 2014. *Mowa nienawiści. Raport z badań sondażowych. [Hate speech. The report of the survey.]* Warszawa: Fundacja Stefana Batorego i Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.
- Brubaker, R. 2001. The return of assimilation? The changing perspectives on assimilation and its sequels in France, Germany and the United States. *Ethnic and Radical Studies*, vol. 24, no. 4.
- Bucholc, M. 2010. Dehumanizujący wymiar obcości i jej etyczna niezbędność. Na marginesie Obcego Georga Simmla. [Dehumanising dimension of strangeness and its ethical necessity. On the margins of Georg Simmel's Stranger.] *Etyka*, no. 43. Warszawa: Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Budyta-Budzyńska, M. 2011. *Integracja czy asymilacja? Polscy imigranci na Islandii. [Integration or assimilation? Polish immigrants in Iceland.]* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- CSO. 2013. *Ludność. Stan i struktura demograficzno-społeczna. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011. [Population. The demographic and social status and structure. The National Census of Population and Housing 2011.]* Warszawa.

- Dassetto, F., Ferrari, S., Maréchat, B. 2007. *Islam in the European Union: What's at stake in the future*. Brussels: European Parliament.
- Firlit-Fesnak, G., Łotocki Ł. eds. 2014. *Imigranci w polskim dyskursie publicznym*. [Immigrants in Polish public discourse.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR.
- Glazer, N. 1993. Is assimilation dead? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 530.
- Grabarek, D. 2013. Współczesne rozumienie asymilacji imigrantów w społeczeństwie amerykańskim. [Contemporary understanding of assimilation of immigrants into American society.] *Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Nauki Społeczne*, no. 6 (1/2013).
- Hirsch, W. 1943. Assimilation as a concept and as a process. *Social Forces*, vol. 21, no. 1.
- Hofstede, G. 2007. *Kultury i organizacje. Zaprogramowanie umysłu*. [Cultures and organizations: software of the mind.] Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.
- Kaszubska, A., Nasordinova, Z. 2016. *186 szwów. Z Czechnii do Polski. Droga matki*. [186 stitches. From Chechnya to Poland. The road of a mother.] Warszawa: Edipresse Książki.
- Kim są muzułmanie w Polsce? [Who are Muslims in Poland?] Wojciech Tymowski's interview with Agata Skowron-Nalborczyk. Available at: http://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/1,34889,7653076,Kim_sa_muzulmanie_w_Polsce_.html [Accessed: 22 February 2016].
- Kubiak, H., Paluch A. K. eds. 1980. *Założenia teorii asymilacji*. [Assumptions of the theory of assimilation.] Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
- Nalborczyk, A.S. 2005. Status prawny muzułmanów w Polsce i jego wpływ na organizację ich życia religijnego. [The legal status of Muslims in Poland and its impact on the organization of religious life.] In: Parzymies. A. *Muzułmanie w Europie*. [Muslims in Europe.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog.
- Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Access to European Union Citizenship. Own Initiative opinion*, European and Social Council, 2003, Brussels.
- Park, R. 1921. *Introduction to the science of sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pettigrew, T.F., Tropp, L.R. 2008. How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic test of three mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, no. 38. John Wiley & Sons.

- Podemski, K. 2009. *Metody badań jakościowych*. [Qualitative research methods.] vol. 1, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Rynkowski, M. 2006. *Churches and religious communities in Poland with particular focus on the situation of Muslim communities*. State and Religion in Europe. Legal System, Religious Education, Religious Affairs. Istanbul: Center for Islamic Studies.
- Simmel, G. 2006. *Obcy* [The stranger.] In: Id. *Most i drzwi*. [Bridge and door.] Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa.
- Skowron-Nalborczyk, A. 2015. Syria gaśnie. Jak do tego doszło? [Syria is dying. How did this happen?] *Więź*, 4 (662).
- Soral, W. 2013. *Stosunek do imigrantów oraz jego korelaty*. [Attitude to immigrants and its correlates.] Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.
- Stefaniak, A. 2015. *Postrzeganie muzułmanów w Polsce. Raport z badania sondażowego*. [The perception of Muslims in Poland. The report of the survey.] Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami.
- Stefaniak, A., Bilewicz, M., Winiewski, M. 2015. *Uprzedzenia w Polsce*. [Prejudices in Poland.] Warszawa: Liberi Libri.
- Włoch, R. 2011. *Polityka integracji muzułmanów we Francji i Wielkiej Brytanii*. [Policy of integration of Muslims in France and the UK.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.
- Yazigi, J. 2014. *Syria's war economy*. European Council on Foreign Relation – Policy Brief 97, April 2014, Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR97_SYRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf [Accessed: 3 March 2016].
- Ząbek, M. ed. 2002. *Między piekłem a rajem. Problemy adaptacji kulturowej uchodźców i imigrantów w Polsce*. [Between hell and heaven. Problems of cultural adaptation of refugees and immigrants in Poland.] Warszawa: Trio i Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej Wydawnictwa Historycznego UW.

ASSIMILATION – A WORN THEORY? MUSLIMS IN WARSAW

Summary

The subject of the article is an analysis of the process of assimilation of the Muslim community in Poland on the example of the capital city of Warsaw. The research problem was to determine the degree of assimilation of the Muslim community with the residents of Warsaw and an attempt to find out if assimilation is the right term to describe the current interaction that takes

place between the Muslim community and heterodox inhabitants of Warsaw. Such an approach required, firstly, the definition of 'assimilation' which in the twenty-first century is still an equivocal term causing much controversy, secondly, the specification of barriers and difficulties and showing the cause and effect relationships hindering the process of assimilation

АСИМИЛАЦИЯ – ЗУЖЫТА ТЕОРИЯ? ВЪЗНАВЦЫ ИСЛАМУ В ВАРШАВЕ

Streszczenie

Предметом artykułu jest analiza procesu асимилации społeczności мuzułmańskiej w Polsce на przykładzie miasta stołecznego Warszawa. Problemem badawczym było określenie stopnia асимилации społeczności мuzułmańskiej z mieszkańcami Warszawy oraz próba udzielenia odpowiedzi, czy асимилация jest tym właściwym terminem określającym obecną interakcję, jaka zachodzi między społecznością мuzułmańską a innowierczymi mieszkańcami Warszawy. Takie ujęcie wymagało po pierwsze zdefiniowania „асимилации”, która w XXI wieku nadal pozostaje terminem wieloznacznym oraz wzbudzającym liczne kontrowersje, po drugie, określenia barier i trudności oraz ukazania związków przyczynowo-skutkowych utrudniających przebieg асимилации.

АССИМИЛЯЦИЯ – УТИЛИЗИРОВАННАЯ ТЕОРИЯ? МУСУЛЬМАНЕ В ВАРШАВЕ

Резюме

Предметом статьи является анализ процесса асимилации мусульманской общности в Польше на примере её столицы Варшавы. Исследовательской проблемой было определение степени асимилации мусульманской общности с жителями Варшавы, а также попытка ответа на вопрос о том, является ли *асимилация* подходящим термином, определяющим современные взаимоотношения между мусульманской общностью и представителями других вероисповеданий, живущими в Варшаве. Данный подход нуждался, во-первых, в истолковании термина *асимилация*, который в XXI веке по-прежнему остаётся многозначным термином, вызывающим многочисленные споры; во-вторых, в определении барьеров и сложностей, а также выявлении причинно-следственных связей, утрудняющих процесс асимилации.

Marta Stempień

JIHADISM EXPANSION IN EGYPT AFTER 2011 ON THE EXAMPLE OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS, SINAI PROVINCE AND OTHER STRUCTURES

INTRODUCTION

The escalation of terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula has gained widespread interest of the international community in recent years. However, this is not a new phenomenon, but only a manifestation of long-term growth of the role of extremism, perceived by marginalised communities as part of the fight against state power.

We can differentiate four major periods in the history of the proliferation of jihadism on the territory of the Sinai Peninsula. The first of them covers the years 2004–2011 in which sporadic terrorist attacks occurred, although resulting in numerous victims. This phase ended with the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’¹, as a result of which – after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak – the power was taken over by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Spectacular attacks gave way to smaller attacks on infrastructure targets. There was also an influx of terrorists through the Israeli-Egyptian border. The third period began in June 2012 after Muhammad Morsi, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected to the post of president. In August 2012 a military operation (Operation Sinai) was launched, resumed in

¹ Despite the disputes about the name itself, ‘Arab Spring’ commonly refers to mass demonstrations which started in December 2010 in Tunisia. In the majority of countries the situation remained at the level of protests and self-immolations, while in others the protests were accompanied by a change in the system of government. In some countries revolutions and civil wars broke out.

mid-2013². At the same time concerns about the safety of the state authorities increased, which was reflected in the assassination of General Mohamed el-Saeed, advisor of Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim, in January 2014³. We have observed the last stage since the overthrow of President Mohammed Mursi, that is since July 2013. In connection with the progressive persecution of Islamist groups, jihadism has begun to gain in importance, and groups identifying with this ideology and social movement have increased their operational capabilities, which is reflected in their increased activity outside the Sinai Peninsula.

Such an unstable situation requires constant enrichment of literature classifying the processes of destabilisation of the Middle East and describing regional armed conflicts, including interstate wars, internationalised internal conflicts and internal armed conflicts. The aim of the article is to present complex issues of expansion of jihadism in Egypt and its impact on the security in the national and international dimension. Egyptian jihadists direct their attacks on public infrastructure and security forces, cooperating with local communities, mostly Bedouins, who have developed aversion to the authorities because of many years of marginalisation⁴. However, the destabilisation of the state – located in a region where there is permanent destabilisation – also affects the security in the regional and global dimensions.

THE GENESIS OF EGYPTIAN JIHADISM

Several factors affect the growth of the attractiveness of Egypt as a suitable environment for the development of international jihadism. These include: poor control of security in border regions and insufficient security of movement of people across Egyptian borders, difficulties in the control of the Sinai Peninsula as well as long-standing policy of marginalisation of tribal communities by the state authorities.

² Taha, H. 2016. Militarisation and security challenges in Egypt. In: Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds. *Egypt after the Spring. Revolt and reaction*. New York: Routledge, pp. 178–179.

³ Cunningham, E. 2014. Aide to Egypt's interior minister killed; ousted president Morsi appears in court. *The Washington Post* 28 January 2014. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/aide-to-interior-minister-killed-ousted-egyptian-president-morsi-appears-in-court/2014/01/28/2773fbfe-8816-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html [Accessed: 25 June 2015].

⁴ Taha, H., op. cit. In: Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds., op. cit., p. 180.

The roots of Egyptian jihadism precede the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, and later Mohammed Mursi. In fact jihadist activism in the Sinai Peninsula dates back to the early twenty-first century and is associated with the brutal suppression of all forms of terrorism by the Egyptian security forces. For decades, despite the activities of the Egyptian security forces, including the military intelligence forces (*Mukhabarat el-Harbeya*) tourists or international peacekeeping forces in the Sinai Peninsula have been periodically attacked by terrorists. Jihadism in Egypt has gained importance as a result of the marginalisation of tribal communities and their exclusion from development projects. Intensification of the attacks took place in 2004–2006, when a group of Bedouin and Palestinian militants carried out a series of high-profile attacks in the Red Sea resorts of Sharm el-Sheikh, Taba and Dahab, in which more than 120 people were killed and at least 350 were injured. After seven years, terrorism spectacularly returned to Egypt as a result of the massacre in Luxor which took place in November 1997⁵. As a result of these attacks thousands of people were arrested, most of them were Bedouins. Services inflicted torture, even against women and children, which deepened the aversion of tribal communities to the central authorities. In July 2005, there was another terrorist attack. In Sharm el-Sheikh 70 people were killed and 150 wounded. Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (TSJ)⁶ admitted to the attack, a group founded in 1997 by Khaled Mosa, Nasir Khamis el-Malahy and Salem Khedra el-Shanou, recruiting members in local mosques. The success of the group, however, was short-lived. Ruthless repression by the Egyptian regime crushed the jihadists of the TSJ, killing the leaders in 2005 and 2006, and the group has *de facto* disintegrated⁷.

Over the next years relative peace prevailed in the Sinai Peninsula. This stabilisation turned out to be only temporary. At that time the Gaza Strip was the area of the development of Salafi jihadism which spread to neighbouring territories, primarily to the Sinai Peninsula. With the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’⁸ and the destabilisation of the region, new jihadi groups were created,

⁵ On 17 November 1997 Muslim militants made an attack, killing 62 people, mostly foreign tourists at the entrance to the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor. The attack was probably carried out by Jemaah Islamiah, linked to al-Qaeda.

⁶ Alexandrani, I. 2015. Sinai: from revolution to terrorism. In: Rougier, B., Lacroix, S. eds. *Egypt's revolutions: politics, religion, and social movements*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 181–182.

⁷ Awad, M., Tadros, S. 2015. Bay’a remorse? Wilayat Sinai and the Nile Valley. *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, vol. 8, issue no. 8. Available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CTC_Sentinel-Vol8Issue815.pdf, pp. 2–3.

⁸ More on 25 January 2011 revolution in Egypt in: Lipa, M. 2014. Arabska wiosna w Egipcie. Uwarunkowania, przebieg i skutki. [The Arab Spring in Egypt. Conditions,

among others,; Mujahideen Shura Council of Jerusalem, supporters of Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula, Soldiers of Allah or Ansar al-Sharia⁹.

Table 1

The leaders of Egypt in the years 1981–2015

Leader	Term of office	Post
Hosni Mubarak	X 1981 – II 2011	President
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi	II 2011 – VI 2012	The head of state as Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
Muhammad Mursi	VI 2012 – VII 2013	President
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi	3–4 VII 2013	Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Adli Mansur	VII 2013 – VI 2014	Temporary president
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi	VI 2014 –	President

Source: own study.

Despite this, a factor conditioning the spread of jihadism in Egypt was the fall of Mubarak's regime in 2011. This event created chaos conducive to the increase of the role of jihadism. Fugitives who managed to escape from prisons, as a result of the chaos after the overthrow of the president, joined the groups professing this ideology. They were joined in turn by foreign militants, penetrating the poorly protected Egyptian borders from unstable countries, such as Libya or Mali. In particular the Libyan crisis contributed to their inflow, it facilitated the smuggling of weapons and the influx of militants, allowing for collaboration between jihadist groups, including in the form of training of new radicals.

Thus, among the factors that contributed to the deterioration of security in the Sinai Peninsula we should enumerate the following:

- the overthrow of Muammar al-Gaddafi which affected the intensification of the flow of forces and means from Libya to the Sinai Peninsula;
- the release of jihadists from Egyptian prisons by the transitional military government;
- relations between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula;

course and consequences.] In: Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, E. *Arabska wiosna w Afryce Północnej: przyczyny, przebieg, skutki*. [The Arab Spring in North Africa: causes, course, consequences.] Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.

⁹ Awad, M., Tadros, S., op. cit., p. 3.

- cutting off smuggling routes from the Gaza Strip by the administration of Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, which reduces the traditional Bedouin sources of income;
- the proliferation of jihadism ideology on the regional and global scale, including the activities of the Islamic State.

THE REBELLION OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS

According to local sources, in 2011 a group of Palestinian jihadists joined TSJ establishing Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem, *Anṣār Bayt al-Maqdis* – ABM). An emir of TSJ was Palestinian Hasham al-Saedi, who had fought in the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and then in the Islamic State of Iraq – (ISI). The creation of the group was directly inspired by the organisational activity of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq¹⁰, showing a number of similarities, also in the ideological dimension¹¹. Drawing inspiration from Al-Zarqawi's activity, the leader transformed the ideological movement into an organised structure consisting of many cells. At that time the organisation maintained a close relationship with the Mujahedeen Shura Council of Jerusalem (*Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis*), operation in the Gaza Strip. Just like other groups coming from the Sinai Peninsula, the Mujahedeen Shura Council wanted to weaken Hamas, accusing militants of this group of conspiring against Salafism¹².

Thus, the group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis was created in 2011 after the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. The dictator ruled Egypt from 1981, creating an authoritarian political system that functioned with minor changes until early 2011¹³. As a result of protests, the leader decided not to apply for another term in the presidential election and power was taken by Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed

¹⁰ The founder and leader of an organisation called Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ) which later turned into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

¹¹ Azoulay, R. 2015. *Islamic State franchising. Tribes, transnational jihadi networks and generational shifts*. CRU report. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Rivka-Azoulay_Islamic_State_expansion_CRU_April2015.pdf, pp. 24–25.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 25.

¹³ See Lipa, M. 2013. *Autorytaryzm na arabskim Bliskim Wschodzie: Egipt w latach 1981–2010*. [Authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East: Egypt in the years 1981–2010.] Warszawa: Askon, Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych.

Forces. In 2012 Muhammad Mursi became the first democratically elected president in the history of the state. The new leader increased his prerogatives by means of decrees, which triggered another wave of protests, as the result of which the newly elected president was overthrown in July 2013. As a result of the coup, the military took power under the leadership of General Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who appointed Adli Mahmud Mansur for a temporary president of the country. In the face of these events, the former president, Muhammad Mursi, connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which in June 2013 with other parties formed the coalition National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy (NASL), called for a boycott of the government¹⁴. On the other hand, a large part of Egyptian society supported president As-Sisi, due to the economic recovery and the growing concerns about the increasing influence of extremist circles. Fearing worsening of the situation, a part of society accepts the limitation of rights and freedoms, and the militarisation of state structures.

The re-growth of violence in the Sinai Peninsula occurred after the overthrow of Muhammad Mursi in July 2013. Removal from office of the president connected with the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to the intensification of terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula. Since then, ABM and later Sinai Province have regularly admitted to the majority of the attacks targeting the military, police and other state structures in Egypt. Jihadists claim that this is the answer to the repression against Islamists and supporters of the president deposed by the army. In spite of the fact that Egyptian jihadists have not been enthusiastic about the political activity of the Muslim Brotherhood, equating it with democracy and nationalism, the removal from power of President Mursi gave them the opportunity to rebuild a networks of influence. Since then, ABM has expanded its attacks outside the Sinai Peninsula, including the capital of Egypt. Since 2013, in addition to direct attacks on Israel object in Egypt, including energy infrastructure, the group has expanded its attacks on the 'close enemy' – the apostate Egyptian regime. In order to project power outside the Sinai Peninsula, the subsidiary of IS must use operating forces of groups from the Nile Valley, but many of them remain connected with al-Qaeda.

The fight of the government with Islamists often causes death and destruction of civilian property. An example of this is the creation of a buffer zone near the border with the Gaza Strip, as a result of which houses of residents

¹⁴ In the second half of 2014 both the FJP and NASL were made illegal.

of Rafah were demolished, which was motivated by the fight against terrorism. The tribal society perceived it as a form of collective punishment, which deepened the aversion to the central government. Finally, in April 2014 the Egyptian government officially recognised Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis as a terrorist organisation¹⁵.

A PROVINCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN THE SINAI PENINSULA

The Sinai Peninsula, which is part of Egypt, is administratively divided into two provinces (Matrouh Governorates): North Sinai and South Sinai. Due to its geopolitical importance, this territory was a battleground for each war between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to 1979. The territory was demilitarised after these states signed the peace treaty in 1979. For this reason, the Egyptian armed forces did not fully control this area.

The strategic importance of the Sinai Peninsula, mainly due to the border with Israel, had already been noticed by al-Qaeda, whose subsidiaries conducted their operations in the area. The peninsula also became a foothold for the activities of jihadists from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Despite the lack of official oath of allegiance, the group seemed to have strong links with the network of al-Qaeda, whose leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in official statements presented sympathy for the leadership of ABM. Despite this, in 2014 the organisation formalised relations with the Islamic State¹⁶ (IS), thus ending its informal cooperation with al-Qaeda. In November 2013, this group, with the help of Twitter, swore *bay'ah* (oath of allegiance) to the leader of the Islamic State – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi¹⁷. Since that moment the organisation has used the name Wilayat Sinai, that is Sinai Province. It is also active in the territories bordering Israel and the Gaza Strip¹⁸.

¹⁵ Fahim, K., Thomas, M. 2014. Egypt flattens neighborhoods to create buffer zone along Gaza border. *The New York Times* 30 October 2014, p. A8; Taha, H., op. cit. In: Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds., op. cit., pp. 183–186.

¹⁶ The Islamic State (IS) is a jihadist structure established on 29 June 2014 after the announcement of the creation of a self-styled caliphate. Its predecessor is the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), although the abbreviation ISIS is used in parallel, which is the acronym for the above-quoted name.

¹⁷ Kirkpatrick, D. D. 2016. Militant group in Egypt vows loyalty to ISIS. *The New York Times* 11 November 2014, p. A1.

¹⁸ Israel and Islamic State. The caliphate eyes the Holy Land. *The Economist* 23 January 2016.

The choice of IS could be associated with the genesis of the creation of ABM, inspired by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's activity. After the death of the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in June 2006, which occurred as a result of US bombing, Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir took over the leadership. The Jihadist known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a close associate of al-Zarqawi, is considered one of the founders of the structure now referred to as the Islamic State¹⁹. Other leaders at the highest level and founders of ABM were also veterans of combats in Iraq, for example, Tawfiq Mohammed Faraj²⁰.

Also other factors contributed to the official association with the Islamic State. Firstly, as a result of the developing Syrian crisis and the fight against Islamism in Egypt, hundreds of people emigrated to Syria, where they came in contact with the ideology and practices of the Islamic State. According to some estimates, several thousand Egyptian militants fight in the ranks of IS. Secondly, due to the crisis in Libya the smuggling of weapons and fighters influx into Egypt became possible, which allowed for co-operation between jihadist groups, including in training of new fighters. Thirdly, the losses among executives also led to the oath to IS. Tawfiq Mohammad Faraj was killed as a result of fights with the Egyptian security forces between March and October 2014²¹. Therefore, it is possible that ABM swore allegiance to the Islamic State because of significant losses suffered as a result of the campaign conducted by the Egyptian armed forces, as well as because the operation of the group required both financial and operational support. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis might have declared loyalty to the Islamic State also due to a desire to intensify the recruitment and strengthen the zeal to fight with the Egyptian army by referring to the success of IS in Iraq and Syria.

Whatever the motivation, the oath of allegiance to Islamic State divided ABM into two camps: the one which approved it and the other which negated the loyalty to the self-proclaimed caliphate. A considerable part of groups belonging to the latter camp, operating in the Nile Valley, support al-Qaeda, despite the lack of official affiliation to this global network. Therefore, the declaration of allegiance to IS contributed to an internal split, which initially – at the turn of 2014 and 2015 – weakened the operational ability of the Egyptian jihadist environment.

¹⁹ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2014. *ISIS: Portrait of a jihadi terrorist organisation*. Available at: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20733/101_14_Ef_1329270214.pdf, p. 25.

²⁰ Azoulay, R. op. cit., p. 26.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

Despite the initial crisis, since swearing the oath to the Islamic State Egyptian jihadists have successfully continued attacks against the state administration. On 29 January 2015 they carried out a series of deadly bombings, mortar attacks and ambushes on objects and military and police officers in North Sinai. At least 40 people, including civilians were killed, and more than 100 injured in them²².

Sinai Province claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on objects of the security forces. Among them there were: a successful missile attack on an Egyptian patrol boat in July 2015 or the execution of a Croatian engineer working in Egypt, Tomislav Salopek, kidnapped in July 2015²³. IS militants from the Sinai Peninsula also claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on a Russian aircraft Boeing A321 in Egypt which took place on 31 October 2015. This attack by IS supporters resulted in the highest number of casualties, next to suicide attacks on mosques al-Badr and al-Hashoosh in Yemen on 20 March 2015 and a series of suicide bombings and shootings in Paris on 13 November 2015²⁴.

Table 2

The list of terrorist attacks carried out by ABM/IS in 2015 on the territory of Egypt

Date	Place	Number of victims
24 November 2015	Al-Arish, North Sinai; attack on the hotel <i>Swiss Inn Resort</i>	at least 7 people killed and 10 injured
4 November 2015	Al-Arish, the Sinai Peninsula; suicide bombing	at least 4 people killed and 10 injured
31 October 2015	The Sinai Peninsula; bomb explosion in the Russian plane Boeing A321	224 people killed
11 September 2015	Rafah, the Sinai Peninsula; bomb attack	2 people killed

²² Eleiba, A. 2015. Security imperatives in Sinai. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, no. 1232 5 February 2015. Available at: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10333/17/Security-imperatives-in-Sinai.aspx> [Accessed: 20 September 2015].

²³ The kidnapping was probably not carried out by Sinai Province. The employee was abducted by a criminal group which demanded a ransom, then transferred the prisoner to the IS subsidiary. Therefore, from the operational point of view, this event should not be seen as evidence of the increased presence of Sinai Province in Greater Cairo.

²⁴ Kalfod, M.A., Fahim, K., Schmitt, E. 2014. Militants linked to ISIS say they killed Yemenis. *The New York Times* 21 March 2014, p. A1.

Date	Place	Number of victims
26 August 2015	The Sinai Peninsula; attack on police officers near Al-Arish	2 people killed about 16 injured
12 August 2015	Decapitation of the Croatian employee – Tomislav Salopek because of Croatia's participation in the war with the Islamic State	1 person killed
11 July 2015	Cairo; explosion of a bomb in a car near the Italian consulate	1 person killed 4 injured
1–2 July 2015	North Sinai; attacks on checkpoints and police stations around the city of Sheikh Zuweid in North Sinai	21 people killed 9 injured
29 June 2015	Cairo; assassination of Hisham Barakat, Egyptian Attorney General, by the detonation of a remote controlled car bomb	1 person killed 4 injured
12 April 2015	North Sinai; attack on an armoured vehicle near the Sheikh Zuweid	6 soldiers killed 2 injured
12 April 2015	Al-Arish, North Sinai; bomb attack at a police station in Al-Arish	8 people killed 45 injured

Source: own study on the basis of media reports.

The attack on the Russian plane, carrying mostly tourists, shows that Egyptian jihadists pose a threat not only to the authorities they try to overthrow, but also to the international community. Despite such a spectacular attack, the tactical nature of the operation remains constant, as well as the targets, which for the most part are stationary checkpoints, patrols and convoys. Also, the preferred methods of attack are invariable. Jihadists use improvised explosive devices, mortars and guns. However, two particular trends become visible. The first is the intensification of attacks targeted at a group of private residences, using explosives and arson, though they are mainly directed at the security officials. The other is the increased use of anti-armour guided missiles.

Despite the fact that Sinai Province, created after swearing the oath of allegiance by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis to the Islamic State, is the most active armed group in Egypt, the Egyptian government's counterterrorism campaign focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood which appears as the 'organisation-brain' of all terrorist activities. The government recognises the combat with the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters as a way to eliminate terrorism and

ensure security and stability in Egypt²⁵. However, the growth of influence of IS has contributed to the justification by the Egyptian authorities of both militarisation of state structures and fight with other structures which link their activities with Sinai Province. Through such activities As-Sisi creates the image of Egypt as an important ally in the fight against global jihadist movement. The leader says that the international coalition should direct its operations also against other Islamic extremists, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, thus seeking to legitimise operations against the opposition. The lack of a differentiated approach to the Islamist opposition increases the likelihood of radicalisation of subsequent structures excluded from the entirety of political life²⁶.

THE SOLDIERS OF EGYPT (AJNAD MISR) AND THE POPULAR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (AL-'IQAB AL-THAWRI)

Despite the largest operational capabilities, Sinai Province is not the only jihadi structure functioning in Egypt. New armed groups opposing state structures are also formed.

At the end of 2013 a former member of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis – Humam Muhammed, known as Maged al-Din al-Masry, founded the group Soldiers of Egypt (Ajnad Misr). The group officially announced its formation in January 2014, and in May the Egyptian government officially recognised it as a terrorist organisation. The structure of the group is still not well known. However, the assassination of its leader, Hammam Attiyah, in April 2015 pushed Ajnad Misr in the direction of al-Qaeda. Some representatives of the security services define the group as an armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, although evidence for such an association is insufficient²⁷. The organisation carries out attacks mainly in and around the agglomeration of Cairo, where terrorist attacks have become part of everyday life of the residents. ABM/Sinai Province refers to the Soldiers of Egypt as 'brothers', but relations between the two structures are not well known either. Both groups attack state infrastructure, however, Sinai Province attacks primarily the armed forces, and

²⁵ See Burgrova, H. 2016. Insecurity in Sinai and beyond. Why the Egyptian counterterrorism strategy is failing. *DGAP Kompakt*, no. 1. Available at: <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27538> [Accessed: 02 February 2016].

²⁶ Taha, H., op. cit. In: Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds., op. cit., pp. 193–194.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 187–188.

Ajnad Misr focuses on the police structures, most likely due to the lack of operational capabilities²⁸.

Another structure was established in January 2015 as a result of the merger of five entities which formed the Allied Popular Resistance Movement (APRM), composed of the Popular Resistance Movement (PRM), the Determination Movement, the Revolutionary Punishment Movement (RPM), Beni Suef Revolutionaries and the Execution Battalion. Despite the unification in the APRM, the level of autonomy of the individual structures is not clear. The RPM is the most organised of the above mentioned entities. Although the date of the creation of the group has not been specified, it conducted its first officially confirmed attack in February 2015. Since then, the group has carried out a series of attacks in many provinces. The militants direct most of their claims to the security personnel, government and private entrepreneurs affiliated with the authorities²⁹.

Ideologically the APRM focuses on revenge for the suppression of the revolution. The coalition directed its early action against the security forces. Only in mid-2015 a shift towards more diversified activities became visible. The group takes over the methods of operation of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, although it is uncertain whether this represents a real ideological change or a measure aimed at attracting new members and funds.

SUMMARY

In the nineties of the twentieth century Egypt fought with a wave of terrorism and bombings carried out by jihadi organisations. With the beginning of the new millennium, this wave weakened, although in 2004–2006 spectacular terrorist attacks occurred. However, the ‘Arab Spring’ led to the destabilisation of Egypt and brought a new wave of terrorism, much more extreme than the previous one. In the past four years endemic problems have grown, and sporadic terrorist incidents have evolved into a rebellion.

The scale of the links built by the Islamic State in Egypt results from the relative proximity in relation to its territorial units in Iraq and Syria. In addition to the Libyan cells, Sinai Province seems to be the most developing

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 186–187; Barnett, D. 2014. Ajnad Misr, Egypt’s latest jihadist group. *Long War Journal* 2 February 2014. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ajnad_misr_egypts_latest_jihad.php [Accessed: 20 October 2015].

²⁹ The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. 2015. *Egypt’s rising security threat*. Available at: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tahrir_Report_FINAL_WEB.pdf, p. 26.

branch. However, it should not be overestimated, because its structures are not as advanced as those created in Mesopotamia, although certainly jihadists of IS are able to carry out effective terrorist attacks, which is confirmed by numerous aforementioned cases. With weak state control, marginalisation of tribal communities and rooted jihadist activism, Sinai Province seems to have a relatively large impact on the change of the local dynamics. Since its inception it has intensified its activities and generated new challenges to the security of Egypt, though we must not forget that next to this structure other extremist groups operate.

The main challenge for President Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi and the Egyptian security forces is the restoration of the stability of the state. The expansion of jihadism and an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, mainly in North Sinai, but also in other parts of the state prove that Egypt will have to fight a long war of attrition against Islamist and jihadist groups in order to achieve this goal.

REFERENCES

- Alexandrani, I. 2015. Sinai: from revolution to terrorism. In: Rougier, B., Lacroix, S. eds. *Egypt's revolutions: politics, religion, and social movements*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Awad, M., Tadros, S. 2015. Bay'a remorse? Wilayat Sinai and the Nile Valley. *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, vol. 8, issue no. 8. Available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CTC_Sentinel-Vol8Issue815.pdf
- Azoulay, R. 2015. *Islamic State franchising. Tribes, transnational jihadi networks and generational shifts*. CRU report. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Rivka-Azoulay_Islamic_State_expansion_CRU_April2015.pdf
- Barnett, D. 2014. Ajnad Misr, Egypt's latest jihadist group. *Long War Journal* 2 February 2014. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/ajnad_misr_egypts_latest_jihad.php [Accessed: 20 October 2015].
- Burgova, H. 2016. Insecurity in Sinai and beyond. Why the Egyptian counterterrorism strategy is failing. *DGAP Kompakt*, no. 1. Available at: <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27538> [Accessed: 2 February 2016].
- Cunningham, E. 2014. Aide to Egypt's interior minister killed; ousted president Morsi appears in court. *The Washington Post* 28 January 2014.

- Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/aide-to-interior-minister-killed-ousted-egyptian-president-morsi-appears-in-court/2014/01/28/2773fbfe-8816-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html [Accessed: 25 June 2015].
- Eleiba, A. 2015. Security imperatives in Sinai. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, no. 1232 5 February 2015. Available at: <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10333/17/Security-imperatives-in-Sinai.aspx> [Accessed: 20 September 2015].
- Fahim, K., Thomas, M. 2014. Egypt flattens neighborhoods to create buffer zone along Gaza border. *The New York Times* 30 October 2014.
- Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds. *Egypt after the Spring. Revolt and reaction*. New York: Routledge.
- Israel and Islamic State. The caliphate eyes the Holy Land. *The Economist* 23 January 2016.
- Kalfood, M. A., Fahim, K., Schmitt, E. 2014. Militants linked to ISIS say they killed Yemenis. *The New York Times* 21 March 2014.
- Kirkpatrick, D. D. 2016. Militant group in Egypt vows loyalty to ISIS. *The New York Times* 11 November 2014.
- Lipa, M. 2013. *Autorytaryzm na arabskim Bliskim Wschodzie: Egipt w latach 1981–2010*. [Authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East: Egypt in the years 1981–2010.] Warszawa: Askon, Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych.
- Lipa, M. 2014. Arabska wiosna w Egipcie. Uwarunkowania, przebieg i skutki. [The Arab Spring in Egypt. Conditions, course and consequences.] In: Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, E. *Arabska wiosna w Afryce Północnej: przyczyny, przebieg, skutki*. [The Arab Spring in North Africa: causes, course, consequences.] Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
- The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2014. *ISIS: Portrait of a jihadi terrorist organisation*. Available at: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20733/101_14_Ef_1329270214.pdf
- The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. 2015. *Egypt's rising security threat*. Available at: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tahrir_Report_FINAL_WEB.pdf

JIHADISM EXPANSION IN EGYPT AFTER 2011 ON THE EXAMPLE OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS, SINAI PROVINCE AND OTHER STRUCTURES

Summary

Since the ‘January 25 Revolution’ the Egyptian territory has become a subject of increased interest of various jihadist structures. The Sinai Peninsula plays a special role in their development as it is an area of strategic importance because of its proximity to Israel and Cairo, one of the centers of the Arab world. Among such structures there is Sinai Province, which is a relatively new player on the scene of the Egyptian political violence, although now this entity has the greatest influence on this territory. The group derives from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a group that appeared in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula in 2011. In 2013 it transformed into a branch of the Islamic State. Despite significant operational capabilities, Sinai Province is not the only jihadi structure functioning in Egypt. New armed groups opposed to state structures are formed, which include Ajnad Misr or the Allied Popular Resistance Movement. The article aims to present the process of jihadism expansion in Egypt after 2011, tying it with destabilisation of the state’s internal structures, reflected by frequent changes of authorities.

EKSPANSJA DŻIHADYZMU W EGIPCIE PO 2011 ROKU, NA PRZYKŁADZIE DZIAŁALNOŚCI ANSAR BAJT AL-MAKDIS, PROWINCJI SYNAJ ORAZ INNYCH STRUKTUR

Streszczenie

Od „rewolucji 25 stycznia 2011 r.” egipskie terytorium w zwiększonym stopniu stało się przedmiotem zainteresowania dżihadystów z różnych struktur. Szczególną rolę w ich rozwoju pełni Półwysep Synaj, będący obszarem o znaczeniu strategicznym, ze względu na bliskość Izraela oraz Kairu, jednego z centrów świata arabskiego. Pośród tego rodzaju struktur znajduje się Prowincja Synaj, która jest stosunkowo nowym graczem na egipskiej scenie przemocy na tle politycznym, choć obecnie to właśnie ten podmiot posiada największe wpływy na tym terytorium. Grupa wywodzi się z Ansar Bajt al-Makdis, ugrupowania, które pojawiło się w północnej części Półwyspu

Synaj w 2011 r., w 2013 r. przekształcając się w filię Państwa Islamskiego. Pomimo znacznych możliwości operacyjnych, Prowincja Synaj nie jest jedyną strukturą dżihadystyczną funkcjonującą w Egipcie. Powstają również nowe zbrojne ugrupowania, przeciwstawiające się strukturom państwowym, do których należą Żołnierze Egiptu czy Zjednoczony Ludowy Ruch Oporu. Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie przebiegu ekspansji dżihadyzmu w Egipcie po 2011 r., wiążąc ten proces z destabilizacją struktur wewnętrznych państwa, przejawiającą się m.in. w częstych zmianach władz.

ЭКСПАНСИЯ ДЖИХАДИЗМА В ЕГИПТЕ ПОСЛЕ 2011 ГОДА – НА ПРИМЕРЕ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ «АНСАР БЕЙТ АЛЬ-МАКДИС», «ПРОВИНЦИЯ СИНАЙ» И ДРУГИХ ГРУППИРОВОК

Резюме

Со времени «революции 25 января 2011 года» территория Египта стала в повышенной степени предметом заинтересованности со стороны джихадистов, образующих различные группировки. Особую роль в их развитии выполняет Синайский полуостров, являющийся районом стратегического значения из-за близости Израиля и Каира, одного из центров арабского мира. К подобным группировкам относится «Провинция Синай», которая является относительно новым игроком на египетской сцене насилия на политической почве, хотя в настоящее время именно этот субъект обладает наибольшим влиянием на данной территории. Группа берёт своё начало от «Ансар Бейт Аль-Макдис» – группировки, которая появилась в Северной части Синайского полуострова в 2011 году, а в 2013 году была преобразована в филиал Исламского государства. Несмотря на значительные оперативные возможности, «Провинция Синай» не является единственной группировкой джихадистов, функционирующей в Египте. Формируются также новые вооружённые группировки, противопоставляющие себя государственным структурам, к которым можно отнести Солдат Египта или Объединённое Народное Движение Сопrotивления. Цель данной статьи – представить процесс экспансии джихадизма в Египте после 2011 года, показывая его связь с дестабилизацией внутренних государственных структур, которая проявляется, в частности, в частой смене власти.

Józef M. Fiszer

SHAPING AND DEVELOPMENT
OF POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS
IN THE YEARS 1989–2005.
AN ASSESSMENT ATTEMPT

INTRODUCTION

Speaking of Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2005 we have in mind one of the most important stages in Polish and German history. It was in those years when a radical change in the history of the two countries and in the relations between them took place. At that time, new, strong legal bases were created for Polish-German relations, thanks to which they entered into an unprecedented stage, which in the literature is called the stage of normalisation and reconciliation and shaping of peaceful and democratic rules for Polish-German relations.

The aim of this article is an attempt to present Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2005, that is, from the fall of communism in Poland and in East Germany and after the reunification of Germany in 1990 to the parliamentary election in Germany in 2005, as a result of which Angela Merkel became a new chancellor. There is no doubt that for Poland and Germany it was one of the most difficult stages in their history. It was also an exceptional time in Polish-German relations, as well as a time of great international events in Europe and the world which had a significant impact on foreign policies of both these countries and on Polish-German relations.

This article was written in a chronological-problematic arrangement and consists of two parts. The first part covers the years 1989–1998 and shows the development of the treaty bases of Polish-German relations and their normalisation and development at this time. The second part contains an analysis of Polish-German relations in 1998–2005, with particular emphasis

on their continuity and changes and their reasons. The period 1998–2005 was the time of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens government coalition in Germany, and the SLD – PSL coalition in Poland.

The main thesis of the article is the observation that in the years 1989–2005 in Polish-German relations we dealt with their difficult normalisation, continuation and at the same time significant changes, not always favourable for Poland, especially in 1998–2005.

Another thesis of this article I try to advance here is that foreign policy of each country is significantly influenced by the international environment and the phenomena and processes occurring in it. The years 1989–2005, and especially the period 1998–2005, was a time of great international events in Europe and in the world that had a significant impact on the foreign policy of both countries and on Polish-German relations.

It should be emphasised that the reunification of Germany, which was significantly influenced by the overthrow of communism in Poland and the process known as the ‘Autumn of Nations 1989’ which started in Europe at that time, was, on the one hand, the consequence of overcoming the East-West conflict and the division of Europe, and, on the other hand, was associated with a change of their international environment. In contrast to the period before 1989 in terms of geopolitical situation Germany was no longer in the situation of a country divided by the line of the Cold War confrontation between the two opposing politico-military blocs, taking after the reunification a favourable central position in integrating Europe. Due to this it was able not only to overcome the existing military threat but also to move to a peaceful and beneficial cooperation with all its neighbours, to the east, including Poland, to the west, north and south.

There is also no doubt for me that the year 1998 was a turning point for unified Germany and its international policy, and especially for Eastern policy and Polish-German relations. In the subsequent parliamentary election on 27 September 1998 the CDU/CSU were defeated, which ended the sixteen-year long era of the government of ‘the chancellor of the reunification’, that is Helmut Kohl, which led to a break of the continuity in foreign policy of united Germany, based on Adenauer’s tradition of maintaining close links with Western democracies¹. A year later, the reign of Boris Yeltsin

¹ See more on this topic in: Cziomer, E. 2006. *Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec. Kontynuacja i zmiana po zjednoczeniu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki europejskiej i transatlantyckiej.* [German’s foreign Policy. The continuation and change after the reunification with special emphasis on European and transatlantic policy.] Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, pp. 13–55; Kiwerska, J., Tomczak, M. 2011. Problem kontynuacji i zmian

ended, who largely contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus opened a way for the reunification of Germany, and was a co-founder of the independent Russian Federation. In turn, these two events connected with personnel changes, were of great importance for Polish-German relations and the Euro-Atlantic system, in particular NATO and the European Union, for the membership in which at that time Poland applied².

The German newspaper 'Die Welt' wrote that Gerhard Schröder described Yeltsin's resignation from the function of the president of Russia as a 'chance for a new beginning', primarily for a peaceful solution to the problem of Chechnya³. Duties of the president of Russia were then taken over by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In German-Russian relations the mutual probing of politicians of both countries began. And although the German side was still critical of the Russian democratic deficit and the proceedings in relation to Chechnya, cautious optimism about the future prospects of cooperation could be noticed in bilateral statements, but the breaking of ice proceeded slowly⁴.

The new German Chancellor, Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder and the new leader of Russia, post-communist Vladimir Putin, were politicians who were guided by pragmatism and talked about the supremacy of national interests over global or European ones. As a result, exceptionally partnership relations between Chancellor Schröder and President Putin were formed. They quickly found a common language, which initiated accelerated cooperation between these countries and in general between the West and Russia behind the back of Poland's leaders, which was not without significance for Polish-German relations at the time. Initial distrust and reserve of the West due to the financial crisis and the deficit of democracy in Russia, the Kosovo

w polityce zagranicznej zjednoczonych Niemiec. [The problem of the continuation and changes in foreign policy of reunited Germany.] In: Kiwerska, J., Koszel, B., Tomczak, M., Żerko, S. *Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec. [Foreign policy of reunited Germany.]* Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, pp. 20–21.

² See, among others, Holzer, J. 2012. *Europa zimnej wojny. [Europe of the Cold War.]* Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak; Genscher, H.D. 1995. *Erinnerungen.* Berlin; Gorbatschow, M. 1999. *Wie es war. Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung.* Berlin; Judt, T. 2008. *Powojnie. Historia Europy od roku 1945. [The post-war period. History of Europe after 1945.]* Poznań; Fiszer, J.M. ed. 2009. *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Aspekty polityczne, międzynarodowe, społeczno-gospodarcze i wojskowe. [Poland in the European Union. Political, international, socio-economic and military aspects.]* Warszawa: ISP PAN.

³ See Jelzins 'historische Rolle' weltweit gewürdigt. *Die Welt* 3 January 2000.

⁴ See Kosman, M.M. 2013. *Polityka RFN wobec ZSRR/Rosji w latach 1989–2009. [The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the USSR/Russia in the years 1989–2009.]* Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, pp. 334–335.

conflict and the Chechen war turned into the process of institutionalisation of political, military and economic cooperation. Of great importance for both countries, but also for Poland was military cooperation and close relations of Russia and NATO, including the openness of Russia and Germany to the extension of the structures of NATO and the European Union, thanks to which on 12 March 1999 Poland became a member of NATO, and on 1 May 2004 it was admitted to the European Union⁵.

Germany's role in influencing Russia's restraint in the above matters was irrefutable. An important element of cooperation in the field of security and the armed forces were plans for technical-military cooperation in the sphere of armaments, as well as joint manoeuvres or training of staff. Their symbol was the first since the interwar period joint German-Russian manoeuvres in August 2002. Moreover, the following agreements were signed: an agreement on combating crime, agreements on legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition of criminals of 2001, a protocol on cooperation of border services of February 2003 and visa facilitation for selected categories of people. And the main element of the social dialogue became the office of a coordinator for German-Russian social cooperation established at the beginning of 2003⁶.

In the years 2003–2005 German-Russian cooperation deepened, especially in the energy sector, the main result of which was the agreement to build the North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream), which aroused opposition across Europe, and not only from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries. This agreement was presented as evidence for the fact

⁵ See Kosman, M.M. *Polityka RFN wobec ZSRR/Rosji w latach 1989–2009...* [*The Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the USSR/Russia in the years 1989–2009...*], pp. 319–15; Fiszer, J.M. 2011. Władimir Putin jako „fenomenalny” przywódca Rosji. [Vladimir Putin as a ‘phenomenal’ leader of Russia.] In: *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – Zeszyty Naukowe*, Uczelnia Vistula w Warszawie, no. 26, pp. 7–25; Kiwerska, J., Koszel, B., Tomczak, M., Żerko, S. 2011. *Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec*. [*Foreign policy of reunited Germany*.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.

⁶ See more on this topic of cooperation of Germany with Russia in: Kosman, M.M. *Polityka RFN wobec ZSRR/Rosji...* [*The Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the USSR/Russia...*], pp. 365–385; Mischczak, K. 2012. *Polityka zagraniczna, bezpieczeństwa i obrony koalicji rządowej SPD-Sojusz 90/Zieloni w okresie 1998–2005*. [*Foreign, security and defence policy of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens government coalition in 1998–2005*.] Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA; Stent, A. 2007. Russland. In: Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., Wolf, R. eds. *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden, pp. 443–444; Centre for Eastern Studies and Centre for International Relations. 2006. *Stosunki Rosja – Niemcy w latach 1998–2005*. [*Russian-German relations in the years 1998–2005*.] Report 2006. Warszawa.

that in its foreign policy Germany was directed by the narrowly conceived national interest, not the European one. Indeed, the new pipeline assured, bypassing transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus), greater security of supply for German consumers, and responded to the future growth in demand for gas in the total energy consumption in Germany in connection with the resignation from nuclear energy planned by Schröder's government⁷.

In the last several months of Schröder's reigns, Russian-German relations showed a far-reaching convergence of interests and assessments of leading international problems, although there were also many differences of opinion. However, if these occurred, the good relationship between the two leaders facilitated the easing of tensions, for example, in relation to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or the enlargement of NATO by the Baltic countries. The intensity of contacts between the two is evidenced by the fact that at the end of Schröder's government, in 2005, they met eight times. Because of Schröder and the German Social Democrats the axiological factor in Germany's policy towards Russia weakened at that time, which was manifested in practice by the lack of German Chancellor's criticism of the democratic deficit in Putin's internal policy. Moreover, an important element strengthening German-Russian cooperation was the opposition to the growing unilateral US foreign policy.

This article is an attempt to characterise Polish-German relations in the years 1998–2005 and shows their specificity at that time, and especially depicts the areas in which after the change of government in Germany cooperation with Poland continued and those where it deteriorated. I advance a thesis here that contrary to official assurances and statements of the German side, as well as of the Polish government about the excellent state of Polish-German relations in the analyzed period they underwent systematic deterioration, especially when it comes to political relations. The ways of Germany and Poland were slowly going apart and the 'Polish-German community of interests', painstakingly built in 1989–1998, was falling apart. Formally speaking, at first glance, especially at the beginning of this period everything in Polish-German relations was as in previous years, in the era of the reign of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who repeatedly stressed that Germany reunited thanks to Poland, was our advocate in NATO and the European Union. Theoretically we deal here with the continuation of Polish-German relations on many

⁷ See Cianciara, A. 2014. Gospodarcze uwarunkowania polityki wschodniej Niemiec i Francji. [Economic conditions of Eastern policy of Germany and France.] In: *Mysl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, no 2(45), pp. 202–203.

levels; there were numerous visits, a lot of pompous words were said, but in practice, our paths were diverging slowly. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in contrast to his predecessor Helmut Kohl did not treat Poland as a country of key importance for Germany. Russia became such a country for him. Animosities in Polish-German relations appeared already during our accession negotiations with NATO and the European Union, and aggravated after the aggression of the United States against Iraq in 2003, when Poland and Germany took different positions in relation to that fact. Their climax falls on the end of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government, who behind the back of the Polish government reached an agreement with Russia on the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream), which not only omitted Poland, but also became a source of tension in Polish-Russian relations.

The analysis of the reasons for Polish and German foreign policies, and the study of their mutual relations, especially political ones, required the use of several research methods. In the explanation of the discussed issues I used primarily the theory of structural realism, the historical analysis method and the institutional and legal analysis. The whole discussion was based on rich, both Polish and foreign literature on the subject. These problems have become a topic of numerous publications, including excellent scientific, source and documentary works.

1. THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS IN 1989–1998 AND THEIR PREMISES

Among historians and political scientists there is no doubt that 1989 was a turning point in European history, modifying its post-war shape by breaking the 'iron curtain'. Commonly in the world it is believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall in autumn that year symbolises the end of communism, and also the beginning of changes in the geopolitical situation of Europe. However, in the consciousness of Poles that breakthrough took place earlier and was manifested in 'Solidarity's' victory in the election to the parliament (Sejm and Senate) in June 1989. This election ended with the triumph of the Solidarity camp (35% of parliamentary seats in the Sejm and 99 out of 100 available seats in the Senate), and launched a process of political transformation in Poland⁸.

⁸ See Bankowicz, M. ed. 2004. *Historia polityczna świata XX wieku. [Political history of the world in the twentieth century.]* Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego,

The 'Autumn of Nations 89', launched by the historical socio-political changes in Poland, quickly spread to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Just like in Poland, also in other countries of the Soviet bloc, the great transformation of the system began, leading from the communist system to the social market economy and democracy. These processes led to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, and then in 1991 to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Yalta-Potsdam order, which had been the basis of the bipolar division of Europe and Germany⁹.

These changes also could not omit East Germany, where opposition groups became active. On 9 November 1989 the before mentioned Berlin Wall tumbled down – a symbol of the Cold War and the division of Germany. Thus, SED's policy of 'fencing off' of the GDR from the Federal Republic of Germany and the construction of a separate 'socialist German nation' ended in a fiasco. 3 October 1990 witnesses the reunification of Germany, and the end of the existence of the GDR. The reunification of Germany, and in fact the inclusion of the former East Germany to West Germany under Article 23 of the Bonn Basic Law surprised Europe and the world, including Germans themselves and Poles. At the same time it confirmed the thesis that there is a close relationship between the history of Polish-German relations and the history of Europe¹⁰.

Reunited Germany was faced with the need to redefine its role in the international arena. Similar challenges also emerged in front of other European countries, also in front of sovereign, democratic Poland. The case of

pp. 629–631; Painter, D.S. 2007. *The cold war. An international history*. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 106–110.

⁹ See Fiszer, J.M. 1992. *Proces jednoczenia Niemiec po „jesieni ludów 1989” i jego specyficzne cechy*. [The process of reunification of Germany after the 'Autumn of Nations 1989' and its specificity.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN; Fiszer, J.M. 2016. Nowy, pojałtański ład globalny: bipolarny czy multipolarny? Próba prognozy. [The new, post-Yalta global order: bipolar or multipolar? A forecast attempt.] In: *Biuletyn Analiz i Opinii*. ISP PAN, no. 01(22), pp. 1–6.

¹⁰ See Cziomer, E. 1998. Rozwój stosunków politycznych między Polską a RFN w latach 1989–1995. [The development of political relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1989–1995.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer, J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995. Próba bilansu i perspektywy rozwoju*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995. An assessment attempt and development prospects.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, pp. 27–45; Fiszer, J.M. 1996. Stosunki polsko-niemieckie po roku 1989 oraz ich znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa Europy. [Polish-German relations after 1989 and their meaning for the security of Europe.] In: *Studia Polityczne*, no. 5, pp. 141–151.

reunited Germany, however, was special, because now the future shape of relations in Europe, especially the prospect of European integration depend on it to a large extent, as well as – to a lesser extent – the picture of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, that is the basis of the functioning of the relations between Europe and America. It concerned also the nature of bilateral relations between united Germany and its proximal and distal neighbours. Europe and the United States feared that reunited and again powerful Germany may want to reach for Europe again and may depart from the principles of its hitherto prevailing foreign policy. As Jadwiga Kiwerska and Maria Tomczak aptly write: ‘For most countries, and not only Western ones, there was no doubt that keeping Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty was in the interest of united Germany and in the interest of European security. It still concerned a proven function of controlling Germany within the framework of NATO and the prevention of potential re-nationalisation of its security policy. Besides, maintaining united Germany in NATO meant not only the strengthening of NATO (due to the increase in the potential of new Germany), but also ensured a close relationship of the Federal Republic with the West, preventing gravity to the East dangerous for the transatlantic relations because the Alliance was also bonded by a certain community of values and principles and the tradition of political cooperation’¹¹.

Fortunately quite quickly after the German reunification it turned out that this view was also shared in Germany. The majority of society, German politicians and major parties in Germany: the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the FDP guaranteed, therefore, the continuation of the current policy, aimed at cooperation and maintaining of allied relations with the existing partners. Of course, there were forces opposed to the continuation of the current policy and in favour of conducting it in a more independent way than Germany did before the reunification. They demanded the departure from the principle of self-restraint in foreign policy of Germany.

In conclusion, it can be said that Germany’s foreign policy after its reunification was the resultant of continuation and change. The continuation manifested itself in making references to the tradition of Western Germany’s diplomacy and strengthening cooperation with the existing partners within the framework of Euro-Atlantic structures in aid of peace and security of Europe. The change, on the other hand, was determined by transformations

¹¹ See Kiwerska, J., Tomczak, M. *Problem kontynuacji i zmian w polityce zagranicznej zjednoczonych Niemiec...* [The problem of the continuation and changes in foreign policy of reunited Germany...], pp. 14–15.

taking place in the geopolitical and geo-economic environment of reunited Germany, and especially – after the fall of communism – in Central and Eastern Europe. A political vacuum was formed there, and socio-economic problems opened for foreign policy of united Germany a wide field for action and posed new challenges and temptations. This enforced the increased activity and responsibility of Germany in the international arena, and on the other hand, favoured more daring articulation of national interests in Germany's foreign policy. A clear shift in foreign policy of reunited Germany took place, however, only under the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens coalition in the years 1998–2005. In Krzysztof Miszczak's words, an expert on German politics, as well as Polish-German relations, the government of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens coalition was 'an exceptional period from the point of view of changes of foreign and security policy of reunited Germany', and it was 'the last and necessary period of political emancipation of the country in the international arena, which irrevocably ended the period of post-war Germany and began the process of real normalisation of foreign, security and defence policy'¹².

With the reunification of Germany and the fall of authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe a new chapter in the history of Polish-German relations and in the history of the whole of Europe opened up. Leading to a historic breakthrough in relations with Germany become a major foreign policy goal of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who on 24 August 1989 became the head of a new government in Poland, and was the first non-communist prime minister in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War. This task was entrusted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski, a superb lawyer and expert on Polish-German relations. The assumptions of Polish foreign policy pertaining to Polish-German relations were clear: to settle and close the past, to create strong foundations for the development of future relations and to build united Europe jointly with Germany. Jerzy Holzer writes: 'The creation of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government, in which Krzysztof Skubiszewski became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also a turning point for Polish-German relations. This resulted primarily from the fact that although the government felt initially obliged by the participation of Poland in the Warsaw Pact and alliance commitments to the Soviet Union, it rejected the dependence of Polish foreign policy on directives from Moscow or the usage of the psychosis of German threat for

¹² See K. Miszczak, *Polityka zagraniczna, bezpieczeństwa i obrony...* [Foreign, security and defence policy...], p. 400.

the purpose of domestic policy, which had continued with bigger or smaller intensity during the whole period of communist reigns in Poland¹³.

Assessing critically German policy of the Polish People's Republic, I would like to emphasise, however, that the policy of West Germany until 1970 and also later until 1990 did not facilitate abandoning of distrust and did not encourage Poland to show increased willingness to agreement and common dialogue and full normalisation of relations. Architects of Bonn's eastern policy gave priority to political relations with the Soviet Union because of the role the Kremlin played in intricate tangle of German affairs. Germany's political strategy towards other countries of the Eastern bloc was a function of the West Germany's policy towards Moscow. The above rule for years prejudged the location of Polish affairs in the eastern policy of Bonn¹⁴.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government was the first among the governments of the Warsaw Pact which in 1989 advocated for the right of the German people to reunite and decide on their own fate on condition that reunited Germany will not threaten any other country. Taking the view that the reunification could be beneficial for Polish national interests and the state, the government also announced its readiness for Polish-German reconciliation on the moral level. In his first speech on 12 September 1989 Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki emphasised, among others, that 'We need a breakthrough in relations with Germany. Societies of the two countries have already gone much further than their governments. We are looking forward to clear development of economic relations and we want true reconciliation just like the one that took place between Germans and the French'¹⁵.

At the same time, the then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl recognised reconciliation with Poland as one of the main aims of German foreign policy. However, in Polish foreign policy in 1989 there also appeared proponents of

¹³ See Holzer, J. *Próba bilansu i oceny stosunków polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–1995*. [An assessment attempt of Polish-German relations in the years 1989–1995.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995...*, [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995...], p. 47.

¹⁴ See Fiszer, J.M. 1998. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1989 – uwarunkowania i bilans*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1989 – conditions and an assessment.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995. Próba bilansu i perspektywy rozwoju*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995. An assessment attempt and development prospects.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, pp. 16–17. Cf. also: Gura, K. 1996. *Preliminaria do układu Polska – RFN z 7 grudnia 1970 roku*. [Preliminaries to the Polish – German treaty of 7 December 1970.] In: *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki*, vol. V., pp. 136–137.

¹⁵ *Gazeta Wyborcza* 13 September 1989.

the need to build a Polish-German community of interests, the implementation of which was conditioned by the definitive recognition of the Polish western border by reunited Germany¹⁶. For the Polish side an agreements of this type became all the more urgent because of the expected substantial economic aid from Germany in the processes of economic transformation which were to start soon¹⁷.

The Polish-German process of reconciliation and construction of the Polish-German community of interests began with the visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Poland on 9–14 November 1989. This visit had an even symbolic importance as it coincided at the same time with a great event for Germany and Europe, which was the fall of the Berlin Wall. The meeting in Krzyżowa and the adopted joint statement was the prototype of a bilateral treaty. This was undoubtedly a success for both sides that favoured the further development of comprehensive relations between Poland and Germany¹⁸.

In the joint statement adopted on 14 November 1989, numbering as many as 78 points, both parties expressed the desire to create a new basis for mutual relations. It was stressed, among others, that ‘the Polish People’s Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany are aware of their special responsibility for the policy of peace, understanding and cooperation in the interest of the people and nations of Europe. (...) Bearing in mind the tragic and painful pages of history, they are determined to shape their relations with the future in mind, and thus set an example of good neighbourliness’¹⁹.

¹⁶ See Fiszer, J.M. 1998. Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1989 – uwarunkowania i bilans. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1989 – conditions and an assessment.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995. Próba bilansu i perspektywy rozwoju*, [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995. An assessment attempt and development prospects.] Warszawa: ISP PAN, p. 25.

¹⁷ See Jacobson, H.A., Tomala, M. eds. 1992. *Warszawa – Bonn 1945–1991. Stosunki polsko-niemieckie. Analiza i dokumenty*. [Warsaw – Bonn 1945–1991. Polish-German relations. The analysis and documents.] Warszawa: PISM; Teltschik, H. 1991. *329 dni. Zjednoczenie Niemiec w zapiskach doradcy kanclerza*. [329 days. The unification of Germany in the notes of a Chancellor’s advisor.] Warszawa: PISM.

¹⁸ See Kuźniar, R. 2008. *Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej*. [The road to freedom. Foreign policy of the Third Polish Republic.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo SCHOLAR, pp. 54–57; Moynahan, B. 2006. Jak upadał stary świat. [How the old world was falling.] *Forum*, no. 22/23 1 June–14 June 2006, pp. 5–11.

¹⁹ See Tomala, M. ed. 1996. *Na drodze do współpracy i przyjaźni. Warszawa – Bonn 1945–1995*. [On the road to cooperation and friendship. Warsaw – Bonn 1945–1995.] Warszawa: PISM, p. 167; Koćwin, L. 1992. *Dekada przełomu. Stosunki polsko-niemieckie od czerwca 1989 do czerwca 1991. Dokumenty – Materiały – Komentarze*. [The

In addition, the document contained an announcement of Prime Minister Mazowiecki's visit to Germany, as well as Federal President's to Poland, the establishment of contacts between the heads of selected ministries and the intensification of relations at the parliamentary level, and the introduction of regular consultations of foreign ministers. The German side pledged to support Polish economic reforms and supported Polish efforts to obtain loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, Poland for the first time admitted here that on its territory there were people and groups of 'German origin' or admitting to the German 'language, culture or tradition'²⁰.

Due to the rapid process of the reunification of Germany, which started after 9 November 1989, and which was also supported by Poland, the issue of the final recognition of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse by Germany gained in importance for our country. 'The Treaty between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the basis for the normalisation of their mutual relations', signed in 1970, recognised this border only until the conclusion of a peace treaty with the reunited German state (the GDR recognised this border in 'The Agreement between the Polish Republic and the German Democratic Republic concerning the demarcation of the established and the existing Polish-German state frontier' (called the Treaty of Görlitz) which the GDR and Poland signed already in 1950 and in the agreements concluded for its implementation and amending²¹. This issue was very controversial because the German side was not initially inclined to final recognition of this border. Poland wanted to sign relevant treaties separately with the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic before their unification, but it turned out to be impossible because Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not accept such a solution. In exchange for the recognition of the Polish western border he demanded that the Polish government abandon efforts for reparations, grant the rights

breakthrough decade. Polish-German relations from June 1989 to June 1991. Documents – Materials – Comments.] Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, pp. 122–125.

²⁰ See Cziomer, E. Rozwój stosunków politycznych między Polską a RFN w latach 1989–1995. [The development of political relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1989–1995.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer, J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995...* [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995...], p. 31.

²¹ See Sułek, J. 2011. Historia powstania traktatu dobrosąsiedzkiego RP-RFN z 17 czerwca 1991 roku. [The history of the RP-FRG neighborly treaty of 17 June 1991.] In: *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 2, p. 14.

of the German minority living in Poland. In addition, the German side did not agree to Polish participation in the talks in the framework of the conference '2+4' on the 'external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the security problems of the neighbouring countries'²².

The behaviour of Chancellor Kohl provoked a wave of criticism in Poland. As is clear from the documents recently declassified by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to the reunification of Germany, Poland was disappointed with the attitude of the German Chancellor who supported Mazowiecki's government but for a long time refused to recognise the Polish western border. The distrust was fuelled by the fact that Helmut Kohl steered a middle course in this issue. On the one hand, he assured the Polish government that Germany had no claims to the Polish territory, and on the other hand, for example at the congress of the Federation of Expellees said that 'German legal positions' were in force, i.e. that after the reunification of Germany the issue of the border would return. The reunification plan presented by Kohl in late November 1989 also did not mention the borders²³.

Finally the Germany reunification plan was adopted at the International Conference '2+4', the sessions of which were attended by foreign ministers of four powers, members of the former anti-Hitler coalition, i.e. the United States, the UK, France and the Soviet Union as well as the FRG and the GDR. In some of its meetings concerning Poland, also a Polish delegation participated. During this conference, the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to the treaty, final recognition of its eastern border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse. Also 'the Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany' signed on 12 September 1990 in Moscow within the framework of the conference, also called the 'two plus four treaty', or the 'reunification treaty', contained a statement that reunited Germany would confirm this border. This treaty was also of great importance for the further process of the reunification of the two German states and for foreign policy of reunited Germany. The 'two plus four treaty' is considered today a masterpiece of

²² See Cziomer, E. Rozwój stosunków politycznych między Polską a RFN... [The development of political relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany...] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer, J.M. eds., p. 31; Romaniec, R. Trudna droga do traktatu. [A difficult road to the treaty.] Available at: www.dw.de

²³ See Wieliński, B.T. 2015. Baliśmy się zjednoczenia Niemiec. [We were scared of the reunification of Germany.] *Gazeta Wyborcza* 2 October 2015, p. 8. See also: Fiszer, J.M. 1992. *Proces jednoczenia Niemiec po „jesieni ludów 1989” i jego specyficzne cechy.* [The process of reunification of Germany after the 'Autumn of Nations 1989' and its specificity.] Warszawa: ISP PAN.

diplomacy. It was the result of several months of an extremely complex negotiation marathon, during which there were many meetings of heads of state and governments and foreign ministers of the countries participating in the ‘two plus four’ negotiations in Bonn, East Berlin, Paris and Moscow²⁴.

I would like to recall here that under that ‘reunification treaty’ Germany became a sovereign state, equated in its status with other European countries. The resignation of the four great powers under Article 7 ‘from their rights and duties towards Berlin and Germany as a whole’ was not just a rhetorical expression²⁵. In this way, the German state was given, without limitation, the right to independently determine its foreign policy – in accordance with the obtained sovereignty. This was of great importance for Germany. The sense of power and position of Germany in international relations grew, and the external perception of the German state also changed. Undoubtedly, in this way, Europe agreed to the emergence of a new centre of influence, radically changing the existing balance of power in the European arena. Moreover, the consent of the four great powers to independent shaping of foreign policy of reunited Germany gave it the right to choose alliances and international organisations. Article 6 of the reunification treaty of 12 September stated unequivocally that ‘this treaty does not violate the right of reunited Germany to belong to alliances with all the ensuing rights and obligations’²⁶.

Parallel to the conference, ‘2+4’ Polish-German talks were held on the issue of the final recognition of our western border. Initially, both countries sought to conclude a comprehensive treaty that would regulate besides the border issue also other issues concerning bilateral relations between the two countries after the reunification of Germany. Eventually it was decided that two treaties would be prepared, which, however, would be ratified together. In November 1990, when Helmut Kohl and Tadeusz Mazowiecki met again, the treaty concerning the borders had already been agreed²⁷.

²⁴ See Teltschik, H. 1991. 329. *Tage. Inneransichten der Einigung*. Berlin; Barcz, J., Tomala, M. 1992. *Polska – Niemcy: dobre sąsiedztwo i przyjazna współpraca*. [Poland – Germany: good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation.] Warszawa: PISM; Barcz, J. 1994. *Udział Polski w konferencji „2+4”. Aspekty prawne i proceduralne*. [The participation of Poland in the ‘2+4’ conference. Legal and procedural aspects.] Warszawa: PISM; Strobel, G. 1996. Der Normalisierungsprozess zwischen Polen und Deutschland. In: *Zeitschrift für politische Bildung*, no. 2, pp. 4–21.

²⁵ See Barcz, J. 1991. *Polska – Niemcy. Dobre sąsiedztwo i przyjazna współpraca*. [Poland – Germany: good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation.] Warszawa: PISM, pp. 5–12.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

²⁷ See Sułek, J. Historia powstania traktatu dobrosąsiedzkiego RP-RFN... [The history of the RP-FRG neighborly treaty...], p. 33; Cziomer, E. Rozwój stosunków politycz-

Finally, the ‘Treaty between the Polish Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the confirmation of the frontier existing between us’ was signed by the foreign ministers Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 14 November 1990 in Warsaw. This document, consisting of a preamble and four articles finally confirmed the course of the Polish-German border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse and closed the way for further speculation on this subject²⁸. In the preamble of the treaty both parties stressed that they would strive for reconciliation between the two nations and expressed their willingness to work towards a ‘European peace order’ in which borders are not the reason for discord between states, and become a guarantor of lasting peace and freedom on the European continent.

The signing and implementation of the treaty confirming the border between Poland and Germany marked a breakthrough in the process of normalisation of mutual relations and building of foundations for cooperation in all areas of life between Germany and Poland. According to earlier agreements, after the conclusion of the border treaty, work on a second treaty that would regulate the issues of peaceful coexistence between the two countries after Poland’s regained sovereignty and the reunification of Germany accelerated. Negotiations over it took place in 1990–1991. There were six rounds of negotiations, which took place in Bonn and Warsaw. The German side first of all sought to regulate matters concerning the German minority in Poland and the priority of the Polish side was to gain international support for our aspirations of integration with Euro-Atlantic structures and debt reduction. Finally, the treaty was signed on 17 June 1991 in Bonn²⁹.

nich między Polską a RFN... [The development of political relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany...], pp. 34–35.

²⁸ See *Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec o potwierdzeniu istniejącej między nimi granicy*. [The treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on the confirmation of the frontier between them.] In: Dz. U. 1992, no. 14, item 54.

²⁹ See *Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Federalną Niemiec o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy*. [The treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on the confirmation of the frontier between them.] In: Dz. U. 1992, no. 14, item 56. See also: Cziomer, E. *Rozwój stosunków politycznych między Polską a RFN...* [The development of political relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany...], p. 34; Barcz, J. 2007. *Podstawy prawne stosunków Polski z zjednoczonymi Niemcami*. [Legal bases of the relations of Poland with united Germany.] In: Góralski W.M. ed. *Polska – Niemcy 1945–2007. Od konfrontacji do współpracy i partnerstwa w Europie. Studia i dokumenty*. [Poland – Germany 1945–2007.

The treaty between Poland and Germany on good neighbourhood and friendly cooperation, the 25th anniversary of which will be celebrated in June 2016, is preceded by the preamble, which refers not only to history, but also to the common interests and the need to overcome divisions in Europe and to ensure its security. It is followed by as many as 38 articles. The first of them talks about the need for peaceful cooperation and consultations at various levels. In article eight there is a very important statement for Poland that Germany will support Polish efforts for the membership in the European Communities. Subsequent articles emphasise the need to develop economic cooperation between the two countries, the issues of regional cooperation, environmental protection and others. For Germany article twenty was of particular importance, giving Poles of German origin a minority status. From the beginning of the negotiations this issue was a priority for the German side. Further, among other things, the issues of cultural cooperation and care for places of worship are mentioned. Moreover, in the treaty both parties agreed to strengthen cooperation in the framework of international organisations³⁰.

Both treaties discussed above were ratified together by the Polish Sejm and the German Bundestag in October 1991 and in January 1992 after being signed by the presidents of both countries they entered into force. The border treaty of 1990 closed a painful chapter in the history of Polish-German relations, and the treaty on good neighbourliness of 1991 opened a new chapter in relations between the two countries. Both countries then entered on the path of reconciliation and building of the Polish-German community of interests³¹.

Democratic Poland and reunited Germany became sovereign states again, and at the same time direct neighbours. Systemic contradictions and ideologi-

From confrontation to cooperation and partnership in Europe. Studies and documents. [Warszawa: PISM, pp. 151–152.]

³⁰ *Ibidem.*

³¹ See more on this topic in: Stolarczyk, M. 1997. Niektóre problemy w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w pierwszej połowie lat dziewięćdziesiątych. [Selected problems in Polish-German relations in the first half of the nineties.] In: Dobrowolski, P. ed. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w okresie przemian ustrojowych w Polsce. Wybrane problemy.* [Polish-German relations in the period of systemic transformation in Poland. Selected problems.] Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, pp. 14–16; Fiszer, J.M. 1996. Rozwój stosunków polsko-niemieckich po roku 1989 i ich znaczenie dla integracji Europy. [The development of Polish-German relations after 1989 and their meaning for the integration of Europe.] In: *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki*, vol. V, p. 15–172; Malinowski, K. 1997. *Polityka Republiki Federalnej Niemiec wobec Polski 1982–1991.* [The Federal Republic of Germany's policy towards Poland.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.

cal barriers disappeared from Polish-German relations. Also, the problems of borders and minorities lost their previous importance, especially after Polish accession to the European Union, which Germany supported. Of course it must be mentioned here that Poland failed to negotiate the status of a national minority for over a million Polish people living in Germany, while the German government negotiated such status for a group of half a million Germans living in Poland. The signing of both treaties, however, required from both countries to accept a difficult compromise in the name of higher reasons. In summary, despite some shortcomings in the second of these treaties, their signing was a milestone in Polish-German relations and enabled their further development in the new, post-communist and post-Cold War international reality. As a result, these relations entered into a new phase, covering in the following years other planes as well, which led to the especially rapid development of economic, cross-border, scientific and cultural cooperation as well as on international forums.

Generally speaking, it can be argued that in Polish-German relations the years 1989–1998 were a time of a great breakthrough, a process of building new treaty foundations, and also a time of rapprochement and reconciliation between the two nations. In this regard symbolic gestures and events were very important here too. The historic visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Poland in November 1989 should be recalled, when the now famous conciliatory ‘gesture from Krzyżowa’ took place and also the announcement with Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of the above mentioned ‘joint statement’. This process could be implemented and accelerate after the countries of Central and Eastern Europe enslaved by the USSR regained sovereignty, and thanks to the reunification of Germany. These countries obtained the possibility of creating independent domestic and foreign policies.

In order to ‘return’ to Europe and to enter the Euro-Atlantic structures, Poland after 1989 had to not only transform the political system, based on the free market and the rule of law, but also properly arrange relations with its neighbours in the new international realities. Especially with Germany, where two ideologically opposed countries transformed into a single state according to the standards of the Federal Republic of Germany, which for years questioned the legality of the Polish western border. Despite some controversy over its recognition by some political circles in Germany, this issue was definitively closed by the conclusion of the above mentioned border treaty in 1990. The affirmation of the legality of the Oder-Neisse border by the German side was of great importance for Poland, as it signified the integrity and inviolability of its territory. In addition, by implementing the assumptions of

the border treaty, both Poland and Germany expressed their willingness for mutual understanding and reconciliation and readiness to contribute to the 'European peace order'.

As already mentioned, the treaty on friendly cooperation and good neighbourliness of 1991 was formulated in a similar vein. Three agreements were enclosed to it: on regional and border cooperation, supported by the facilitation of the border traffic (under agreements of 1991 and 1992.). The leitmotif for the signatory countries became the closure of difficult cards of the past and return to the good tradition of bilateral relations, while building united Europe based on human rights and democracy and the social market economy. In addition, Poland and Germany committed themselves to renouncing force in their mutual relations and expressed their adherence to the development of good neighbourly relations in the spirit of friendship, respect and mutual understanding.

The implementation of the assumptions contained in these treaties and agreements created a new political-legal framework for the development of Polish-German relations of a new type, and served their improvement, as evidenced by their growing intensification at the political and social level in the years 1989–1998, although Chancellor Kohl visited democratic Republic of Poland only in 1995, i.e. five years after the meeting with Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki. Undoubtedly this fact went beyond the realm of the protocol and resulted from the lack of political stability in Poland and certain differences in the functioning of the political system of both countries. At that time regular consultations of foreign ministers and meeting of heads of all the major departments were very important as they served the concretisation of cooperation in all fields on the basis of specific contracts and agreements. Parliamentary cooperation, supporting government contacts, also developed successfully. On the other hand, party contacts played a relatively smaller role due to differences in the functioning of party systems in both countries. German parties did not in fact have suitable and direct Polish partners. The above gap was filled to a certain extent by German political foundations close to the leading parties, which opened their representative offices in Poland – of Konrad Adenauer (CDU), Friedrich Ebert (SPD), Friedrich Naumann (FDP) and the Hans Seidel (CSU), which maintained lively contacts with individual groups and parties and opinion forming circles in Poland³².

³² See Cziomer, E. *Rozwój stosunków politycznych między Polską a RFN...* [The development of political relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany...], pp. 4–45; Dobraczyński, M. ed. 1996. *Niemcy-Polska-Rosja. Bezpieczeństwo europejskie i współpraca społeczeństw.* [Germany-Poland-Russia. European security and cooperation

In the years 1989–1998 regional and cross-border cooperation between Poland and Germany also rapidly developed, while political contacts between federal states and Polish provinces for various reasons were not particularly intense. It stemmed from the different nature of politico-administrative structures between the two countries, as well as the competences of the executive and parliaments.

Analyzing the political effects of Polish-German relations in the nineties of the twentieth century we should also mention the extension of bilateral cooperation in the direction of multilateral cooperation within the Polish-German-Danish military contingent, or with the participation of France in the framework of the Weimar Triangle, which preceded the Polish membership in NATO and the European Union. Especially in the context of Polish aspirations and efforts for the accession we should draw attention here to the Euro-Atlantic direction of Polish-German cooperation. Without the support of Germany, which was de facto an ‘advocate’ of Poland in the accession negotiations with both NATO and the European Union, Warsaw’s efforts might have been significantly delayed in time, and its possible adoption might have taken place on less favourable terms³³.

Summarising the effects of Polish-German relations in the years 1989–1998, we should emphasise their intensification visible at that time in all spheres of life. As a result, in 1995 these relations were defined both in Poland and in Germany as excellent and the Polish and German press wrote that they aroused hope and well served both countries and entire post-communist Europe. There was no indication that they will change with Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s departure from the political scene and after the transfer of power in 1998 to the Social-Democratic – the Greens coalition, headed by Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder.

of societies.] Warszawa; Tomala, M. 1996. Realizacja traktatu między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a RFN o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 17 czerwca 1991 r. [The implementation of the Polish-German treaty of good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation of 17 June 1991.] In: *Zeszyty Niemcoznawcze*, no. 1. Warszawa: PISM, pp. 77–104; Pflüger, F., Lipscher, W. ed. 1994. *Od nienawiści do przyjaźni. O problemach polsko-niemieckiego sąsiedztwa.* [From hatred to friendship. About the problems of Polish-German neighbourliness.] Warszawa: ISP PAN.

³³ See Michałowski, S. 2002. Nowa jakość w stosunkach z Niemcami. [New quality in the relations with Germany.] In: Kuźniar, R., Szczepanik, K. ed. *Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989–2002.* [Foreign policy of the Republic of Poland 1989–2002.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ASKON, pp. 145–147; Sulowski, S. ed. 2002. *Polska-Niemcy – nadzieja i zaufanie.* [Poland-Germany – hope and trust.] Warszawa: Fundacja Politeja.

Gerhard Schröder is undoubtedly an attention worth man mainly because of the great success he achieved without any financial support or patterns learned at home which would help him in his political career. His determination, fight against poverty he experienced in his youth and diligence shaped his character, making him a responsible man and an efficient politician³⁴. It seemed that Social Democrat Schröder would easily find a common language with the post-communists (SLD) led by Leszek Miller and President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the Peasant Party (PSL) which ruled in Poland at that time and would continue comprehensive cooperation between Germany and Poland. That did not happen, and I write about the reasons for changes in Polish-German relations in 1998–2005 in the second part of this study.

2. POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS IN 1998–2005

– CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

In late summer and autumn of 1998 the German political scene became an arena of a fierce election campaign which ended on 27 September in the parliamentary election, which brought victory for the Social Democrats and defeat for the Christian Democrats and the Liberals. Searching for the causes of the electoral defeat of the Christian Democrats, it was pointed primarily to inefficient social policy, manifested by rising unemployment and the ‘fatigue’ of voters with sixteen-year government of Helmut Kohl, who after losing the election resigned from being the chairman of the CDU. Chancellor Kohl was not a supporter of radical changes which had been awaited by German society for a long time. In the late nineties Helmut Kohl’s government ceased to be the guarantor of social security in reunited Germany, which resulted in the growing number of people dissatisfied with the direction of change after 1990 both in the east and the west of Germany³⁵.

On the other hand, Gerhard Schröder spoke mainly about the need to introduce changes and drew attention to social, economic issues, fighting unemployment, the need for technological progress and development of edu-

³⁴ See Anda, B., Kleine, R. 2002. *Gerhard Schröder. Eine Biographie*. München; Łoś, R. 2008. *Gerhard Schröder. Blaski i cienie władzy*. [*Gerhard Schröder. The ups and down of power*.] Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

³⁵ See Krasuski, J. 2002. *Historia polityczna Europy Zachodniej 1945–2002*. [*Political history of Western Europe 1945–2002*.] Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, pp. 369–370; Pięciak, W. 1999. *Kanclerz obojga Niemiec. Helmut Kohl – szkic do portretu*. [*The chancellor of both German states – a sketch for a portrait*.] Warszawa, p. 62.

cation, thanks to which he achieved a great electoral success. He spoke about what German society in fact wanted to hear. After sixteen years in power, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was substituted by Gerhard Schröder, who led to the creation of a coalition of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens, ruling in Germany until 2005. The position of Vice-Chancellor and the post of foreign minister in the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was taken by Joschka Fischer, a co-leader of the Greens, a quite colourful political figure, a pacifist in his youth and known for his anti-Western attitude³⁶.

In Poland, just like everywhere in Europe and in the United States these changes were received with mixed feelings; with certain concerns and reservations about the new chancellor and the Social Democrats in general, who were thought to be supporters of rapprochement of the Federal Republic of Germany with Russia. It was sad to say goodbye to Helmut Kohl who enjoyed great popularity and benevolence in Poland. Kohl was considered a proven partner and the formula of Germany as a ‘Polish advocate in Europe’ promoted by him gave Poland a certain, special place among the candidates to the European Union, with which accession negotiations began in 1998. On the other hand, there was also an attempt to look at the change of power in Germany with some optimism. It was emphasised that Schröder belongs to a younger generation of politicians who treat unification of Europe as a completely natural and understandable process. He was seen as a supporter of Germany playing a central role in Europe, but not a dominant one. It was also pointed to the opportunity to refresh and improve bilateral relations, ‘to come out of the rigid liturgy’, on the basis of a solid foundation in the mutual relations built in the early nineties. Schröder himself strengthened this optimism when in his first speech after the elections he emphasised the importance of the historical responsibility of Germany in relation to Poland³⁷.

³⁶ See Cziomer, E. 2006. *Historia Niemiec współczesnych 1945–2005*. [History of contemporary Germany 1945–2005.] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Neriton, p. 407 and 482; Kosman, M.M. *Polityka RFN...* [The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany...], pp. 319–320; Łoś, R. 2004. *Rząd Gerharda Schrödera wobec postkomunistycznych państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*. [Gerhard Schröder’s government towards the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe.] Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

³⁷ See Krzemiński, A. 1998. Bajka o złych socjaldemokratach. [A fairy tale about bad social democrats.] *Polityka*, no. 41, p. 21; Mildemberger, M. 2001. Od pojednania do trudnego partnerstwa. Dziesięć lat stosunków polsko-niemieckich w kontekście europejskim. [From reconciliation to difficult partnership. Ten years of Polish-German relations in the European context.] In: Malinowski, K., Mildemberger, M. eds. *Trudny dialog. Polsko-niemiecka wspólnota interesów w zjednoczonej Europie*. [A difficult dia-

Notabene, Gerhard Schröder visited Poland before assuming the office of chancellor. On 17 June 1998, on the 7th anniversary of the signing of the friendship and good neighbourly relations treaty he met with President Aleksander Kwaśniewski to discuss Polish-German relations and further cooperation. He assessed them as good and stressed that relations with Poland were as important as relations with France. In addition, he assured that Germany would support Polish aspirations for membership in NATO and the European Union. He also said that ‘our neighbours in Europe know that the more we, Germans, trust ourselves, the more they can trust us’³⁸.

The first programming documents and announcements of Schröder’s government did not indicate any shift in German foreign policy towards Poland, the United States and Russia, which Polish politicians feared. It looked like it would be a continuation of the policy pursued by the government of Chancellor Kohl. The large coalition agreement of 20 October 1998 talked mainly about German socio-economic problems and little space was devoted to foreign policy. The section entitled ‘Good neighbourliness and historical responsibility’ refers firstly to the relations with France, then with Poland, the Czech Republic and Israel, and Russia is mentioned together with Ukraine: ‘The new federal government will continue to develop (...) good relations with Russia and Ukraine. Its aim is to ensure the stability in the area by supporting democratic, social and market reforms’³⁹. In turn, in the government declaration announced on 10 November 1998 in the Bundestag, Schröder devoted a lot of attention to the relations of Germany with the United States, less to those with France, Great Britain, and Poland, and he did not mention Russia at all⁴⁰.

The government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder initially quite pointedly stressed that it intended to continue foreign policy of Helmut Kohl, both in bilateral and multilateral dimensions, and at the same time concentrated on

logue. A Polish-German community of interests in united Europe.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, pp. 31–32.

³⁸ See Wolff-Powęska, A. Polska racja stanu w procesie normalizacji stosunków z Niemcami w warunkach wolności i demokracji. [Polish raison d’état in the process of normalisation of relations with Germany in the conditions of freedom and democracy.] In: Góralski, W.M. ed. *Polska – Niemcy 1945–2007...* [Poland – Germany 1945–2007...], p. 181.

³⁹ See *Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*. Bonn 20 October 1998, p. 44. Available at: www.spd.de.

⁴⁰ See Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag. In: *Bulletin, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung*, no. 74, 1998.

greater pragmatism in German foreign policy, whose aim was to strengthen the position and role of sovereign Federal Republic of Germany in the arena of world politics. For this purpose the Federal Republic of Germany in 1999 got engaged in resolving the Kosovo conflict, and after 11 September 2001 was ready to participate in war with terrorism announced by President George W. Bush. This declaration and the subsequent concrete actions confirmed the intention of the red-green coalition to continue current German foreign policy. The authorities of Germany, despite the objections of the opposition and a large part of society, decided to take part alongside the United States in the attack on Afghanistan in October 2001⁴¹.

This situation changed, however, in 2002 with the preparations of the United States to attack Iraq. In Germany it sparked the debate on the principles and directions of German foreign policy. This debate became one of the main elements in the campaign taking place in Germany before the election to the Bundestag scheduled for 22 September 2002. The opposition of the SPD/the Greens coalition and the anti-American rhetoric of Chancellor Schröder revived the debate about the continuation and change in German foreign policy. It was discussed whether in the face of clearly colder relations with the United States it was already possible to speak about a break with the Atlantic political line, marked out in the fifties by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. What was alarming was the fact that Schröder decided to put emphasis on the development of relations with France and Russia, which disrupted so far well developing relations of Germany with a number of European Union countries, especially those that decided to support the US intervention in Iraq, including also Poland⁴².

The American attack on Iraq took place on 20 March 2003, and as early as 11 April 2003 Schröder met with Putin in St. Petersburg. The topic of their talks was the US-Iraqi war. On the next day, French President Chirac joined

⁴¹ See Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., Wolf, R. eds. 2007. *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden; Bos, E. 2003. Deutsche Außenpolitik nach dem 11 September 2001. Von der 'uneingeschränkten Solidarität' zum 'deutsche Weg'. In: Bos, E. u. a. (Hrsg). *Neue Bedrohung Terrorismus*. Münster; Rühle, M. 2009. Afghanistan. Deutschland und die NATO. *S + F*, no. 1/2009.

⁴² See Malinowski, K. 2004. Konsekwencje kryzysu irackiego. Niemcy wobec nowego kształtu stosunków transatlantyckich. [The consequences of the Iraq crisis. Germany towards the new shape of the transatlantic relations.] In: *Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego*, no. 34, pp. 10–14; Miszczak, K. 2005. Niemcy i Polska wobec europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. [Germany and Poland towards European security Policy.] In: *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 1, pp. 79–109; Kosman, M.M. *Polityka RFN...* [*The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany...*], pp. 398–402.

them, which was the beginning of the traditional Russian-German-French consultations in subsequent years. The three leaders expressed criticism of the US-British actions, emphasizing their non-compliance with international law. At the same time Schröder and Putin manifested the desire to avoid creating the impression of a formation of a Paris – Berlin – Moscow axis, stressing that excellent German-Russian relations were not in conflict with the transatlantic relations. The three leaders called for a rapid reconstruction of Iraq from the devastation of war under the aegis of the United Nations and for a multipolar international order. In addition, German Chancellor warned against questioning of international law by the unilateral actions of the United States⁴³.

In the years 2002–2003 a clear turn appeared in Germany's foreign policy, which largely interrupted its continuity in relation to the years 1990–1998. As Krzysztof Miszczak writes, during the reigns of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens coalition 'in foreign, security and defence policy (...) there were significant revaluations, changes and modifications of these policies and the increase of Germany's importance in the European and worldwide arena. (...) During the reigns of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens coalition foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany reached a new quality, unknown in the post-war history of this country, which in a limited way corresponds to the previously declared concept of civil power of the state (*Zivillmacht*) in foreign policy of Germany before 1989. The thesis that there was "only" a continuation of the essential principles of foreign, security and defence policy of this state is empirically untenable⁴⁴.

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder justified this turn saying that Germany was then a normal country, i.e. a country which ended the stage of settling accounts with the past, and therefore should conduct independent policy, according to the German *raison d'état*. Formally speaking, he took advantage of reunified Germany's right to conduct sovereign foreign policy, about which I wrote earlier, discussing the results of the '2+4' conference. Despite this, the turn in Schröder's international politics caused great concern in Germany and around the world, including in Poland. It was feared that united Germany

⁴³ See Reissner, J. 2004. Europas Beziehungen zu Iran. In: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 9, pp. 47–54; Kosman, M.M. *Polityka RFN... [The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany...]*, p. 401.

⁴⁴ Patrz K. Miszczak, *Polityka zagraniczna, bezpieczeństwa i obrony... [Foreign, security and defence policy...]*, p. 15.

was ready to negate the policy worked out after World War II and again become a threat to peace and security in Europe⁴⁵.

The change of directions in Germany's foreign policy under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had an impact on Polish-German relations, especially in 2003-2005, when their continuity was also interrupted compared to the relationship between Poland and Germany at the times of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government. In addition to the international situation, the then situation in both countries undoubtedly influenced Polish-German relations. Polish attempts to adapt to the conditions set by the European Union and the transformation and adjustment of the eastern part of Germany (the former GDR) to the western part certainly did not facilitate mutual contacts. The prospects of Polish accession, and later membership in NATO and the European Union were undoubtedly beneficial for the mutual relations, but also here some disagreements appeared, for which the Federal Republic of Germany was responsible.

One of the most important events in Polish-German relations at the beginning of the functioning of Schröder's government was the joint celebration of the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. On this occasion, in 1999 the German president and Chancellor came to Poland. This was the first event of this kind that was jointly celebrated. A year later, the millennium of Polish-German neighbourliness was celebrated. During the intergovernmental consultations in April 2000 both governments repeated that Polish-German relations were better than ever. 2000 was also the 10th anniversary of the signing of the border treaty of 14 November 1990 and the 30th anniversary of the conclusion of the border treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland on 7 December 1970. On this occasion, during a visit to Poland, Gerhard Schröder assured that at the upcoming EU summit in Nice Germany would approve solutions that would make it easier for Poland to join the European Union⁴⁶. This was an important promise for

⁴⁵ See Kiwerska, J., Tomczak, M. Problem kontynuacji i zmian w polityce zagranicznej zjednoczonych Niemiec. [The problem of the continuation and changes in foreign policy of united Germany.] In: Kiwerska, J., Koszel, B., Tomczak, M., Żerko, S. *Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec. [Foreign policy of reunited Germany...]*, pp. 24–25; K. Miszczak, *Polityka zagraniczna, bezpieczeństwa i obrony... [Foreign, security and defence policy...]*, pp. 117–291; Erler, G. 2009. *Mission Weltfrieden. Deutschlands neue Rolle in der Weltpolitik*. Freiburg im Breisgau.

⁴⁶ See Brössler, D. Podsumowanie stanu obecnego. Badania oceniające stan stosunków niemiecko-polskich. [The summary of the current state. Research assessing the state of German-Polish relations.] In: Kerski, B. ed. *Sąsiedztwo w centrum... [Neighbourliness in the centre...]*, p. 47; Stolarczyk, M. 2010. *Zbieżność i różnice interesów w stosunkach*

Poland, because in the course of accession negotiations, which took place from 1998 to 13 December 2002, Poland encountered many difficulties, the source of which was the often intransigent positions of Germany. For example, as far as the free movement of people was concerned, Schröder's government wanting to protect its own labour market, advocated the introduction of the longest transition period for Polish workers, which ultimately amounted to 7 years. Another controversial area of Polish accession negotiations, which was also greatly influenced by Germany, was agriculture. At the beginning of the negotiations on this subject, the German government was opposed to granting any direct payments to farmers in the new Member States. Finally, during the final phase of the accession negotiations, which took place in Copenhagen in December 2002, the increasing funds for subsidies for Polish farmers from the common EU budget were agreed. At first it was 25% to 35% of the funds which farmers in countries which became members of the EU before 2004 were entitled to. Later it was possible to increase the amount of these payments to 65%⁴⁷.

An important issue that was solved then, was the agreement between the Polish government and Germany on compensations for Polish forced labourers working during World War II for the Third Reich. In contrast to the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder's government distanced itself from restitution claims of the German expellees environment towards Poland and finally agreed to resolve this painful problem. In mid-2000 the German Bundestag established the Foundation 'Remembrance, Responsibility and Future' for this purpose, the aim of which was to distribute the funds allocated by the German government for this purpose among partner organisations. At the same time both governments reached an agreement on this issue and jointly established the amount which was to be allocated as a compensation for all victims and people forced to work not only from

polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–2009. [The convergence and differences of interests in Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2009.] Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, pp. 13–15.

⁴⁷ See Lorkowski, A., Ostrzyniewska, K. 2004. Proces negocjacji akcesyjnych Polski z Unią Europejską – kwestie wrażliwe z punktu widzenia Niemiec. [The process of accession negotiations of Poland with the EU – issues sensitive from the German point of view.] In: Małachowski, W. ed. *Polska – Niemcy a rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej. [Poland – Germany and the enlargement of the European Union.]* vol. I, Warszawa: SGH, pp. 282–285; Stolarczyk, M. *Zbieżność i różnice interesów w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–2009...* [The convergence and differences of interests in Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2009...], p. 522.

Poland, but also from other countries. This amount reached the value of 10 milliard marks, out of which 1,812 milliard DM was assigned for Poland⁴⁸.

However, a dispute over the war in Iraq, which arose at the turn of 2002 and 2003, played the greatest role was in the context of the continuity and change in Polish-German relations. From the very beginning of the Iraq crisis the German government took a stand which was radically different from the Polish position. As early as the end of 2002 during the election campaign to the Bundestag, Chancellor Schröder assured that Germany would not participate in the military intervention against Iraq. Moreover, in January 2003, he announced a possible veto of Germany as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council if the United States put to the vote a resolution that would legitimise their attack on Iraq. The German chancellor did not dispute the fact that Saddam Hussein was a bloody tyrant, but sceptically evaluated arguments in favour of the military intervention given by the US government. Throughout the period preceding the American military intervention in Iraq, representatives of the German government pointed to the need for prior exhaustion of the whole arsenal of economic and legal measures. The position of Germany was supported by France, Russia and China⁴⁹.

Meanwhile, on 31 January 2003, Prime Minister Leszek Miller signed the famous ‘letter of eight’, which in a sense was a declaration of Polish solidarity with the United States in the Iraqi conflict. Poland, a member of NATO since 1999, wanted to show the world, especially the US ally that it was a responsible and loyal partner. Together with Poland the letter was signed by representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Hungary, Spain and the Czech Republic. The letter caused consternation in the countries opposing the US war with Iraq. The German press wrote at the time that it divided the European Union and led to the isolation of Germany in the international arena⁵⁰. Miller’s government committed a faux pas not informing the German side about its decision, thought it was required to do

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 13–14.

⁴⁹ See Varwick, J. 2003. Kultura strategiczna i zmiany w polityce bezpieczeństwa Niemiec (wojna o Kosowo, zwalczanie terroryzmu, kryzys iracki). [Strategic culture and changes in Germany’s security policy (the war about Kosovo, fight with terrorism, the Iraq crisis).] In: Malinowski, K. ed. *Kultura bezpieczeństwa narodowego w Polsce i Niemczech*. [The culture of national security in Poland and Germany.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, pp. 257; Szabo, S.F. 2006. *Na rozstaju dróg. Kryzys w stosunkach niemiecko-amerykańskich*. [At the cross-roads. The crisis of German-American relations.] Warszawa.

⁵⁰ See Szubert, O. 2003. Podzielona zjednoczona Europa. [Divided united Europe.] In: *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, no. 2, pp. 156–158.

so pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty of 17 June 1991, providing ‘consultations to coordinate their positions on international issues’⁵¹.

The fact that Poland and Germany were on the opposite sides of the conflict between Iraq and the United States had a negative impact on Polish-German relations. Germany believed that Poland showed ingratitude to its western neighbour and wanted to play a role of a power, and in Poland the German position on the intervention in Iraq was assessed as a betrayal of the transatlantic interests. Germany was accused of having super power ambitions and returning to the so-called ‘German special way’ in the international arena. Neither party was able to fully understand its neighbour’s proceedings. This led to the deterioration of the political dialogue, and affected Polish-German relations in the European Union. Poland could no longer count on Germany’s support in many issues. This was particularly evident during the meeting held at that time on the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union. Mainly due to Germany the treaty included many provisions which were unfavourable for Poland, especially in relation to provisions contained in the Treaty of Nice signed on 26 February 2001⁵².

In order to improve the atmosphere in bilateral relations on 2 November 2003, Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz in a special supplement on the pages of ‘Tygodnik Powszechny’ formulated ten points pertaining to Polish-German relations stressing that Germany was the most important partner for Poland, both in economic and political cooperation and that both countries should continue to play an essential role in shaping European and global security structures⁵³.

Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz presented this position again a year later in a message on Polish foreign policy in 2004, but the German side did not change its policy towards Poland till the end the reign of Chancellor

⁵¹ See Tomala, M. 2004. Wspólnota interesów polsko-niemieckich czy tylko własne interesy Polski i Niemiec? [A community of Polish-German interests or only own interests of Poland and Germany?] In: *Rocznik Polsko Niemiecki*. Warszawa: ISP PAN, pp. 123–124; Michałowski, S. 2004. Stosunki Polski z Niemcami. [Relations of Poland with Germany.] In: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej*. Warszawa: PISM, pp. 132–135.

⁵² See Chyliński, M. 2012. Między polityką europejską i atlantycką. Niemiecka SPD wobec dylematów bezpieczeństwa 1989–2011. [Between European and transatlantic policies. The German SPD towards security dilemmas 1989–2011.] In: *Athenaeum*, vol. 35, pp. 204–205; Stolarczyk, M. *Zbieżność i różnice interesów w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–2009...* [The convergence and differences of interests in Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2009...], pp. 500–501.

⁵³ See Zając, M. 2003 Niemcy. [Germany.] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, no. 44.

Gerhard Schröder, which meant that we dealt with far reaching stagnation in Polish-German political relations. The Polish side was irritated by the disrespectful attitude of the government of Chancellor Schröder to the Polish fear of close cooperation between Germany and Russia. It seemed that the German side completely did not understand the Polish fears and often put forward quite malicious counterarguments. In retrospect it seems to me that, indeed, the Polish side too emotionally approached the German-Russian rapprochement. On the other hand, it was a sign of a trauma and a syndrome of fear of German-Russian cooperation behind Polish back, which in the past ended tragically for our country, that is in successive partitions⁵⁴.

On the other hand, in the years 1998–2005 economic and trade cooperation between the two countries developed quite well. We can distinguish here its two stages, namely in the years 1998–2003 and 2004–2005, i.e. before and after Polish accession to the European Union, which – as I said – was also supported by Chancellor Schröder's government. We dealt here rather with the continuity in Polish-German relations. At that time, the trade turnover between the two countries grew steadily, exceeding the sum of 40 milliard USD in the year of Polish entry into the European Union. German direct investment grew from year to year, proving that Poland was an attractive country for German investors. An important role in Polish-German trade was played by the border regions and Euroregions created there, among others, Euroregion Spree-Neisse-Bober and Pro Europa Viadrina. The development of cross-border cooperation greatly accelerated the integration of the Polish economy with the EU economy⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ See Cziomer, E. 2005. *Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec. Kontynuacja i zmiana po zjednoczeniu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki europejskiej i transatlantyckiej*. [Germany's foreign Policy. The continuation and change after the reunification with special emphasis on European and transatlantic policy.] Warszawa: Fundacja Promocji Wiedzy o Polityce Politeja, pp. 256–257; Guział, A. 2006. Miejsce Rosji w polityce zagranicznej RFN a szanse na wspólną politykę wschodnią UE. [The place of Russia in Germany's foreign policy and chances for EU's common Eastern policy.] In: *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 2.

⁵⁵ See Brocka-Palacz, B. 2006. Zmiany w polityce gospodarczej Niemiec w okresie rządów koalicji SPD/Zieloni. [Changes in Germany's economic policy during the reign of the SPD/the Greens coalition.] In: Bil, I. ed. *Gospodarka Niemiec a kraje Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*. [Germany's economy and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, pp. 16–19; Kasperska-Sporek, T. 2004. Euroregiony – formą współpracy Polski i Niemiec. [Euroregions as a form of cooperation of Poland and Germany.] In: Weresa, M.A. ed. *Niemcy w Unii Europejskiej. Implikacje dla Polski*. [Germany in the European Union. Implications for Poland.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, pp. 253–255.

At the end of this analysis, I would like to point out that in the era of the rule of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder Polish and German cultural relations and military cooperation also developed quite well. Here, too, we dealt more with their continuity than change. At the University of Wrocław Chancellor Schröder founded Willy Brandt's Scientific Centre which has effectively operated to this day. One of the most important cultural events during Schröder's government was undoubtedly the Polish-German Year in 2005. This event became a nice touch, as well as the completion of mutual relations in the era of the rule of Chancellor Schröder.

Many scholars and experts believe that the years 1998–2005 were a very difficult period for Polish-German relations, that in the era of the rule of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder the process of building the 'Polish-German community of interests' was interrupted. I think these are too far-reaching assessments. In my opinion, in this period, only significant differences in the objectives and tasks of foreign policies of the two countries and ways of achieving them were revealed. In this period, in spite of everything, the political dialogue between the two countries continued all the time, including in the framework of the Weimar Triangle. The economic cooperation and in the field of culture and science developed well. In the years 1998–2005 certain new habits in our relations were established, which pointed to the importance and role of Poland for Germany. Namely, in those years annual intergovernmental meetings and talks were held regularly at which the most contentious issues could be discussed and ways to solve them could be found. It was not always possible to find a compromise or persuade the other party as to the relevance of own arguments, but the fact that such meetings took place regularly was proof of the importance of Poland for Germany, because Germany practices this form of cooperation only with its most important allies.

The government of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder still supported Polish efforts to join NATO and the European Union, and without this support it would be difficult for Poland to achieve these strategic goals for our foreign policy. The differences – in my opinion – mainly related to the interests and objectives of Poland and Germany realised in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic system and the rules of its operation⁵⁶. Despite these differences, it

⁵⁶ See Cziomer, E. *Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec. Kontynuacja i zmiana po zjednoczeniu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki europejskiej i transatlantyckiej...* [Germany's foreign Policy. The continuation and change after the reunification with special emphasis on European and transatlantic policy...], pp. 252–260; Lipowicz, I. 2005. *Stosunki z Niemcami.* [Relations with Germany.] In: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej – 2005 rok.* Warszawa: PISM.

was after all during the reign of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder that Poland was admitted to NATO and the European Union, which strengthened our position in Europe and in the world. Simultaneously, for the first time in the history of Poland and Germany we became allies, and we found ourselves on the same side of the barricade, that is in the same bloc of democratic and sovereign states.

SUMMARY

Summarizing the above considerations, I would like to emphasise that my research and many publications on this subject show that in the years 1989–2005 in Polish-German relations we dealt with both the continuity and changes, especially after 1998, but these were not radical changes, either for Poland or the Federal Republic of Germany. These changes were unavoidable, because bilateral cooperation of states – as I mentioned earlier – is always greatly influenced by numerous external factors, and in particular determined by transformations taking place in the close international proximity. And those were dynamic and far-reaching, both in the international environment of Poland and West Germany in the years 1989–2005. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that they caused the changes in Polish-German relations.

After the next early parliamentary election in 2005, in which Gerhard Schröder was defeated, Angela Merkel became a new Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. She comes from the former GDR and knows the taste of life in the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe⁵⁷. Jadwiga Kiwerska emphasises that ‘Angela Merkel was a new type of a political leader of Germany. She represented the third post-war generation – not emotionally connected with pro-Americanism of the fifties and sixties, as Kohl’s generation, and also not shaped by the passions of ‘68, including strong anti-Americanism, as was in the case of Schröder and Fischer. (...) Convinced that the improvement of relations with the United States was in the interest of Germany, she was ready to work in aid of this improvement. She understood that it would be beneficial for the strengthening of the transatlantic treaty, which is an important element of the international order. But above all, she wanted to help change the anti-American senti-

⁵⁷ See Stepin, A. 2014. *Angela Merkel. Cesarzowa Europy*. [*Angela Merkel. The Empress of Europe.*] Warszawa: Wydawca Agora SA.

ment in Germany⁵⁸. And one her biographers writes about her that she has something in common with the sphinx. She is impenetrable, and says little and reluctantly about her past. Polish roots of her grandfather, who in the thirties of the twentieth century changed the surname from Kaźmierczak to Kasner remained one of her secrets for a long time. Angela Merkel arouses extreme emotions among German and European politicians. Also in Poland, where in the public opinion research center poll in 2012 she was chosen the most popular foreign politician for the fifth time, winning previously in 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011⁵⁹.

The government formed in 2005 by Angela Merkel, called the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU-SPD made a successful attempt to restore Adenauer's principles in German foreign policy: the Atlantic orientation and the rejection of the choice between Washington and Paris. It is true that the fact that Frank-Walter Steinmeier, formerly a close associate of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, became the Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor constituted a threat that the course of foreign policy characteristic of the SPD-Greens coalition would be maintained, and so it happened, but only to a small extent⁶⁰.

As a result of Angela Merkel's coming into power, the relations Moscow-Berlin, so friendly during the reign of Gerhard Schröder whose relations with Vladimir Putin went far beyond official contacts, became less personal. In addition, Merkel sought to repair the transatlantic relationships impaired during the reign of Schröder and to pay more heed to the interests of the Central European countries with the relations with Moscow. On the other hand, the coalition partner, Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in Schröder's government the chief of the Federal Chancellery, was a supporter of the continuation of the pro-Russian course. This pragmatic approach, marginalising the issues of Russia's democratic shortcomings boiled down mainly to exposing such areas of cooperation as energy relations and international security. It was supported mainly by France, Italy

⁵⁸ See Kiwerska, J. Niemcy we wspólnocie transatlantyckiej. [Germany in the transatlantic community.] In: Kiwerska, J., Koszel, B., Tomczak, M., Żerko, S. *Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec...* [Foreign policy of united Germany...], p. 242.

⁵⁹ Ibidem, p. 9. See also: Wieliński, B.T. 2013. Mutti jest tylko jedna. [There is only one Mutti.] *Wysokie Obcasy* 21 September 2013, pp. 11–17.

⁶⁰ See Kosman, M.M. *Polityka RFN...* [The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany...], pp. 417–492; Franzke, J. 2009. Wertepolitik versus Realpolitik. Die Russlandpolitik der Regierung Merkel/Steinmeier. In: *Welt Trends*, no. 67, pp. 93–98.

and Spain, while the Central European EU members, including Poland, as well as the UK and Denmark had a critical attitude.

Generally speaking, Angela Merkel managed to overcome the most painful consequences of actions of Schröder's government, including rebuilding of confidence in Germany among allies and to bring the crisis in European politics under control. Germany once again became a reliable, loyal partner of the United States and an active member of the European Union. It became a strong link in the Euro-Atlantic system, which is the guarantor of security in Europe, and thus in Poland⁶¹.

Angela Merkel also found a common language with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who in autumn 2007 became the head of the coalition government of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). One of the main objectives of the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk was the normalisation of the strongly impaired relations with Berlin. Prime Minister Tusk referring to Polish relations with Germany in his first speech also confirmed the desire and determination to strengthen the strategic partnership with Berlin, saying, among others: 'I guarantee that these relations will bring satisfaction to the whole EU and both partners'⁶².

The parliamentary speech of Prime Minister Tusk was a clear signal for Chancellor Angela Merkel that a change in the balance of power on the Polish political scene was also accompanied by a positive reorientation of Polish foreign policy towards Germany. As a result, since the formation of the PO – PSL coalition government, which ruled in the years 2007–2015, the relations between Warsaw and Berlin have come back on the proper track for the benefit of both countries and their peoples and for the security of the whole of Europe. Let us hope it will be continued.

⁶¹ Patrz Kiwerska, J. Niemcy we wspólnocie transatlantyckiej. [Germany in the transatlantic community.] In: Kiwerska, J., Koszel, B., Tomczak, M., Żerko, S. *Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec...* [Foreign policy of united Germany...], pp. 230–255; Bowers, L.N. ed. 2009. *German foreign and security Policy*. New York.

⁶² See *Expose Premiera Rady Ministrów RP Donalda Tuska*. [Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's First Speech.] Warszawa 23 October 2007. Cf. also: Koszel, B. 2009. „Nowe otwarcie”? Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w okresie rządów koalicji PO-PSL [‘A new opening’? Polish-German relations during the reign of the PO-PSL coalition.] In: *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 4, pp. 193–206; Cichocki, A.M. 2006. Niemiecka polityka wobec Polski na nowych drogach? [German policy towards Poland on new roads?] In: *Dialog*, no. 76, pp. 23–25.

REFERENCES

- Anda, B., Kleine, R. 2002. *Gerhard Schröder. Eine Biographie*. München.
- Bankowicz, M. ed. 2004. *Historia polityczna świata XX wieku*. [Political history of the world in the twentieth century.] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
- Barcz, J. 1991. *Polska – Niemcy. Dobre sąsiedztwo i przyjazna współpraca*. [Poland – Germany: good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation.] Warszawa: PISM.
- Barcz, J. 1994. *Udział Polski w konferencji „2+4”*. *Aspekty prawne i proceduralne*. [The participation of Poland in the ‘2+4’ conference. Legal and procedural aspects.] Warszawa: PISM.
- Barcz, J., Tomala, M. 1992. *Polska – Niemcy. Dobre sąsiedztwo i przyjazna współpraca*. [Poland – Germany: good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation.] Warszawa: PISM.
- Bos, E. 2003. Deutsche Außenpolitik nach dem 11 September 2001. Von der ‘uneingeschränkten Solidarität’ zum ‘deutsche Weg’. In: Bos, E. u. a. (Hrsg). *Neue Bedrohung Terrorismus*. Münster.
- Bowers, L.N. ed. 2009. *German foreign and security Policy*. New York.
- Brocka-Palacz, B. 2006. Zmiany w polityce gospodarczej Niemiec w okresie rządów koalicji SPD/Zieloni. [Changes in Germany’s economic policy during the reign of the SPD/the Greens coalition.] In: Bil, I. ed. *Gospodarka Niemiec a kraje Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej*. [Germany’s economy and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH.
- Centre for Eastern Studies and Centre for International Relations. 2006. *Stosunki Rosja – Niemcy w latach 1998–2005*. [Russian-German relations in the years 1998–2005.] Report 2006. Warszawa.
- Chyliński, M. 2012. Między polityką europejską i atlantycką. Niemiecka SPD wobec dylematów bezpieczeństwa 1989–2011. [Between European and transatlantic policies. The German SPD towards security dilemmas 1989–2011.] In: *Athenaeum*, vol. 35.
- Cianciara, A. 2014. Gospodarcze uwarunkowania polityki wschodniej Niemiec i Francji. [Economic conditions of Eastern policy of Germany and France.] In: *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, no. 2(45).
- Cichocki, A.M. 2006. Niemiecka polityka wobec Polski na nowych drogach? [German policy towards Poland on new roads?] In: *Dialog*, no. 7.
- Cziomer, E. 1998. Rozwój stosunków politycznych między Polską a RFN w latach 1989–1995. [The development of political relations between

- Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1989–1995.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer, J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995. Próba bilansu i perspektywy rozwoju*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995. An assessment attempt and development prospects.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.
- Cziomer, E. 2006. *Historia Niemiec współczesnych 1945–2005*. [History of contemporary Germany 1945–2005.] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Neriton.
- Cziomer, E. 2006. *Polityka zagraniczna Niemiec. Kontynuacja i zmiana po zjednoczeniu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki europejskiej i transatlantyckiej*. [German's foreign Policy. The continuation and change after the reunification with special emphasis on European and transatlantic policy.] Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA.
- Dobraczyński, M. ed. 1996. *Niemcy-Polska-Rosja. Bezpieczeństwo europejskie i współpraca społeczeństw*. [Germany-Poland-Russia. European security and cooperation of societies.] Warszawa.
- Erler, G. 2009. *Mission Weltfrieden. Deutschlands neue Rolle in der Weltpolitik*. Freiburg im Breisgau.
- Expose Premiera Rady Ministrów RP Donalda Tuska*. [Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's First Speech.] Warszawa 23 October 2007.
- Fiszer, J.M. 1992. *Proces jednoczenia Niemiec po „jesieni ludów 1989” i jego specyficzne cechy*. [The process of reunification of Germany after the 'Autumn of Nations 1989' and its specificity.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.
- Fiszer, J.M. 1996. *Rozwój stosunków polsko-niemieckich po roku 1989 i ich znaczenie dla integracji Europy*. [The development of Polish-German relations after 1989 and their meaning for the integration of Europe.] In: *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki*, vol. V.
- Fiszer, J.M. 1996. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie po roku 1989 oraz ich znaczenie dla bezpieczeństwa Europy*. [Polish-German relations after 1989 and their meaning for the security of Europe.] In: *Studia Polityczne*, no. 5.
- Fiszer, J.M. 1998. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1989 – uwarunkowania i bilans*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1989 – conditions and an assessment.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995. Próba bilansu i perspektywy rozwoju*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995. An assessment attempt and development prospects.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.
- Fiszer, J.M. 2011. *Władimir Putin jako „fenomenalny” przywódca Rosji*. [Vladimir Putin as a 'phenomenal' leader of Russia.] In: *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – Zeszyty Naukowe*, Uczelnia Vistula w Warszawie, no. 26.

- Fiszer, J.M. 2016. Nowy, pojałtański ład globalny: bipolarny czy multipolarny? Próba prognozy. [The new, post-Yalta global order: bipolar or multipolar? A forecast attempt.] In: *Biuletyn Analiz i Opinii*. ISP PAN, no. 01(22).
- Fiszer, J.M. ed. 2009. *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Aspekty polityczne, międzynarodowe, społeczno-gospodarcze i wojskowe*. [Poland in the European Union. Political, international, socio-economic and military aspects.] Warszawa: ISP PAN.
- Franzke, J. 2009. Wertepolitik versus Realpolitik. Die Russlandpolitik der Regierung Merkel/Steinmeier. In: *Welt Trends*.
- Genscher, H.D. 1995. *Erinerungen*. Berlin.
- Gorbatschow, M. 1999. *Wie es war. Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung*. Berlin.
- Gura, K. 1996. Preliminaria do układu Polska – RFN z 7 grudnia 1970 roku. [Preliminaries to the Polish – German treaty of 7 December 1970.] In: *Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki*, vol. V.
- Guział, A. 2006. Miejsce Rosji w polityce zagranicznej RFN a szanse na wspólną politykę wschodnią UE. [The place of Russia in Germany's foreign policy and chances for EU's common Eastern policy.] In: *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 2.
- Holzer, J. 1998. Próba bilansu i oceny stosunków polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–1995. [An assessment attempt of Polish-German relations in the years 1989–1995.] In: Holzer, J., Fiszer J.M. eds. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1970–1995. Próba bilansu i perspektywy rozwoju*. [Polish-German relations in the years 1970–1995. An assessment attempt and development prospects.] Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.
- Holzer, J. 2012. *Europa zimnej wojny*. [Europe of the Cold War.] Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Jacobson, H.A., Tomala, M. eds. 1992. *Warszawa – Bonn 1945–1991. Stosunki polsko-niemieckie. Analiza i dokumenty*. [Warsaw – Bonn 1945–1991. Polish-German relations. The analysis and documents.] Warszawa: PISM.
- Jelzins 'historische Rolle' weltweit gewürdigt. *Die Welt* 3 January 2000.
- Judt, T. 2008. *Powojnie. Historia Europy od roku 1945*. [The post-war period. History of Europe after 1945.] Poznań.
- Kasperska-Sporek, T. 2004. Euroregiony – formą współpracy Polski i Niemiec. [Euroregions as a form of cooperation of Poland and Germany.] In: Weresa, M.A. ed. *Niemcy w Unii Europejskiej. Implikacje dla Polski*. [Germany in the European Union. Implications for Poland.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH.
- Kiwerska, J., Tomczak, M. 2011. Problem kontynuacji i zmian w polityce zagranicznej zjednoczonych Niemiec. [The problem of the continuation

- and changes in foreign policy of reunited Germany.] In: Kiwerska, J., Koszel, B., Tomczak, M., Żerko, S. *Polityka zagraniczna zjednoczonych Niemiec*. [Foreign policy of reunited Germany.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
- Koćwin, L. 1992. *Dekada przełomu. Stosunki polsko-niemieckie od czerwca 1989 do czerwca 1991. Dokumenty – Materiały – Komentarze*. [The breakthrough decade. Polish-German relations from June 1989 to June 1991. Documents – Materials – Comments.] Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
- Kosman, M.M. 2013. *Polityka RFN wobec ZSRR/Rosji w latach 1989–2009*. [The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the USSR/Russia in the years 1989–2009.] Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego.
- Koszel, B. 2009. „Nowe otwarcie”? Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w okresie rządów koalicji PO-PSL [‘A new opening’? Polish-German relations during the reign of the PO-PSL coalition.] In: *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 4.
- Krasuski, J. 2002. *Historia polityczna Europy Zachodniej 1945–2002*. [Political history of Western Europe 1945–2002.] Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
- Kuźniar, R. 2008. *Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej*. [The road to freedom. Foreign policy of the Third Polish Republic.] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo SCHOLAR.
- Lipowicz, I. 2005. Stosunki z Niemcami. [Relations with Germany.] In: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej – 2005 rok*. Warszawa: PISM.
- Lorkowski, A., Ostrzyniewska, K. 2004. Proces negocjacji akcesyjnych Polski z Unią Europejską – kwestie wrażliwe z punktu widzenia Niemiec. [The process of accession negotiations of Poland with the EU – issues sensitive from the German point of view.] In: Małachowski, W. ed. *Polska – Niemcy a rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej*. [Poland – Germany and the enlargement of the European Union.] vol. I, Warszawa: SGH.
- Łoś, R. 2004. *Rząd Gerharda Schrödera wobec postkomunistycznych państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*. [Gerhard Schröder’s government towards the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe.] Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.
- Łoś, R. 2008. *Gerhard Schröder. Blaski i cienie władzy*. [Gerhard Schröder. The ups and down of power.] Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.
- Malinowski, K. 1997. *Polityka Republiki Federalnej Niemiec wobec Polski 1982–1991*. [The Federal Republic of Germany’s policy towards Poland.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
- Malinowski, K. 2004. Konsekwencje kryzysu irackiego. Niemcy wobec nowego kształtu stosunków transatlantyckich. [The consequences of the Iraq crisis.]

- Germany towards the new shape of the transatlantic relations.] In: *Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego*, no. 34.
- Michałowski, S. 2002. Nowa jakość w stosunkach z Niemcami. [New quality in the relations with Germany.] In: Kuźniar, R., Szczepanik, K. ed. *Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989–2002. [Foreign policy of the Republic of Poland 1989–2002.]* Warszawa: Wydawnictwo ASKON.
- Michałowski, S. 2004. Stosunki Polski z Niemcami. [Relations of Poland with Germany.] In: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej*. Warszawa: PISM.
- Miszczak, K. 2005. Niemcy i Polska wobec europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. [Germany and Poland towards European security Policy.] In: *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 1.
- Miszczak, K. 2012. *Polityka zagraniczna, bezpieczeństwa i obrony koalicji rządowej SPD-Sojusz 90/Zieloni w okresie 1998–2005. [Foreign, security and defence policy of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens government coalition in 1998–2005.]* Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA.
- Moynahan, B. 2006. Jak upadał stary świat. [How the old world was falling.] *Forum*, no. 22/23 1 June–14 June 2006.
- Painter, D.S. 2007. *The cold war. An international history*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Pięciak, W. 1999. *Kanclerz obojga Niemiec. Helmut Kohl – szkic do portretu. [The chancellor of both German states – a sketch for a portrait.]* Warszawa.
- Pflüger, F., Lipscher, W. ed. 1994. *Od nienawiści do przyjaźni. O problemach polsko-niemieckiego sąsiedztwa. [From hatred to friendship. About the problems of Polish-German neighbourliness.]* Warszawa: ISP PAN.
- Reissner, J. 2004. Europas Beziehungen zu Iran. In: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 9.
- Rühle, M. 2009. Afganistan. Deutschland und die NATO. *S + F*, no. 1/2009.
- Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., Wolf, R. eds. 2007. *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden.
- Stent, A. 2007. Russland. In: Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., Wolf, R. eds. *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden.
- Stępin, A. 2014. *Angela Merkel. Cesarzowa Europy. [Angela Merkel. The Empress of Europe.]* Warszawa: Wydawca Agora SA.
- Stolarczyk, M. 1997. Niektóre problemy w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w pierwszej połowie lat dziewięćdziesiątych. [Selected problems in Polish-German relations in the first half of the nineties.] In: Dobrowolski, P. ed. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w okresie przemian ustrojowych w Polsce. Wybrane problemy. [Polish-German relations in the period of systemic transformation in Poland. Selected problems.]* Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski.

- Stolarczyk, M. 2010. *Zbieżność i różnice interesów w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–2009*. [The convergence and differences of interests in Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2009.] Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
- Strobel, G. 1996. Der Normalisierungsprozess zwischen Polen und Deutschland. In: *Zeitschrift für politische Bildung*, no. 2.
- Sulowski, S. ed. 2002. *Polska-Niemcy – nadzieja i zaufanie*. [Poland-Germany – hope and trust.] Warszawa: Fundacja Politeja.
- Szabo, S.F. 2006. *Na rozstaju dróg. Kryzys w stosunkach niemiecko-amerykańskich*. [At the cross-roads. The crisis of German-American relations.] Warszawa.
- Szuber, O. 2003. Podzielona zjednoczona Europa. [Divided united Europe.] In: *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, no. 2.
- Teltschik, H. 1991. *329 dni. Zjednoczenie Niemiec w zapiskach doradcy kanclerza*. [329 days. The unification of Germany in the notes of a Chancellor's advisor.] Warszawa: PISM.
- Teltschik, H. 1991. *329. Tage. Inneransichten der Einigung*. Berlin.
- Tomala, M. 1996. Realizacja traktatu między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a RFN o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 17 czerwca 1991 r. [The implementation of the Polish-German treaty of good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation of 17 June 1991.] In: *Zeszyty Niemcoznawcze*, no. 1. Warszawa: PISM.
- Tomala, M. 2004. Wspólnota interesów polsko-niemieckich czy tylko własne interesy Polski i Niemiec? [A community of Polish-German interests or only own interests of Poland and Germany?] In: *Rocznik Polsko Niemiecki*. Warszawa: ISP PAN.
- Tomala, M. ed. 1996. *Na drodze do współpracy i przyjaźni. Warszawa – Bonn 1945–1995*. [On the road to cooperation and friendship. Warsaw – Bonn 1945–1995.] Warszawa: PISM.
- Varwick, J. 2003. Kultura strategiczna i zmiany w polityce bezpieczeństwa Niemiec (wojna o Kosowo, zwalczanie terroryzmu, kryzys iracki). [Strategic culture and changes in Germany's security policy (the war about Kosovo, fight with terrorism, the Iraq crisis).] In: Malinowski, K. ed. *Kultura bezpieczeństwa narodowego w Polsce i Niemczech*. [The culture of national security in Poland and Germany.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
- Wielński, B.T. 2013. Mutti jest tylko jedna. [There is only one Mutti.] *Wysokie Obcasy* 21 September 2013.
- Zajac, M. 2003 Niemcy. [Germany.] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, no. 44.

SHAPING AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE YEARS 1989–2005. AN ASSESSMENT ATTEMPT

Summary

The aim of this article is an attempt to present Polish-German relations in the years 1989–2005, that is, from the fall of communism in Poland and East Germany and after the reunification in 1990 to the parliamentary election in Germany in 2005, as a result of which Angela Merkel became a new chancellor. There is no doubt that for Poland and Germany it was one of the most difficult stages in their history. It was also an exceptional time in Polish-German relations, as well as a time of great international events in Europe and the world which had a significant impact on foreign policies of both these countries and on Polish-German relations. This article was written in a chronological-problematic arrangement and consists of two parts. The first part covers the years 1989–1998 and shows the development of the treaty bases of Polish-German relations and their normalisation and development at this time. The second part contains the analysis of Polish-German relations in 1998–2005, with particular emphasis on their continuity and changes and their reasons. The period 1998–2005 was the time of the SPD – the Alliance 90/the Greens government coalition in Germany, and the SLD – PSL coalition in Poland. The main thesis of the article is the conclusion that in the years 1989–2005 in Polish-German relations we dealt with their difficult normalisation, continuation and at the same time significant changes, not always favourable for Poland, especially in 1998–2005.

KSZTAŁTOWANIE SIĘ I ROZWÓJ STOSUNKÓW POLSKO-NIEMIECKICH W LATACH 1989–2005. PRÓBA BILANSU

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest próba przedstawienia stosunków polsko-niemieckich w latach 1989–2005, czyli od momentu upadku komunizmu w Polsce i NRD oraz po zjednoczeniu Niemiec w 1990 roku do wyborów parlamentarnych w RFN w 2005 roku, w wyniku których nowym kanclerzem została Angela Merkel. Nie ulega wątpliwości, że dla Polski i Niemiec był to jeden z najtrudniejszych etapów w ich historii. Był to również wyjątkowy czas w stosun-

kach polsko-niemieckich, a także czas wielkich wydarzeń międzynarodowych w Europie i na świecie, które miały istotny wpływ na politykę zagraniczną obu państw i na relacje polsko-niemieckie. Niniejszy artykuł został napisany w układzie chronologiczno-problemowym i składa się z dwóch części. Część pierwsza obejmuje lata 1989–1998 i ukazuje kształtowanie się podstaw traktatowych stosunków polsko-niemieckich oraz ich normalizację i rozwój w tym czasie. Natomiast w części drugiej dokonana została analiza stosunków polsko-niemieckich w latach 1998–2005, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem ich ciągłości i zmian oraz ich przesłanek. Lata 1998–2005 to czasy rządów w RFN koalicji SPD – Sojusz 90/Zieloni, a w Polsce koalicji SLD – PSL. Tezą główną artykułu jest konstatacja, że w latach 1989–2005 w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich mieliśmy do czynienia z ich trudną normalizacją, kontynuacją i zarazem istotnymi zmianami, nie zawsze korzystnymi dla Polski, zwłaszcza w latach 1998–2005.

ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ И РАЗВИТИЕ ПОЛЬСКО-НЕМЕЦКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ В 1989–2005 ГОДАХ. ПОПЫТКА ПОДВЕДЕНИЯ ИТОГОВ

Резюме

Целью статьи является попытка представления польско-немецких отношений в 1989–2005 годах, или от момента упадка коммунизма в Польше и ГДР, а также после объединения Германии в 1990 году до парламентских выборов в ФРГ в 2005 году, в результате которых новым канцлером стала Анджела Меркель. Не подлежит сомнению, что для Польши и Германии это был один из труднейших периодов их истории. Было это также особенным временем для польско-немецких отношений, кроме того, временем значительных международных событий в Европе и в мире, оказавших существенное влияние на внешнюю политику обоих государств и на польско-немецкие отношения. Настоящая статья имеет проблемно-хронологическую композицию и состоит из двух частей. Первая часть охватывает временной период с 1989 по 1998 год и рассматривает формирование основ договорных польско-немецких отношений, а также их нормализацию и развитие в этот период. В свою очередь, во второй части произведён анализ польско-немецких отношений в 1998–2005 годах, с особенным учётом их продолжительности, изменений и предпосылок. 1998–2005-е годы – это период правления в ФРГ коалиции СДПГ – «Союз 90/Зелёные», а в Польше – коалиции SLD – PSL (Союз демократических левых сил – Польский Крестьянский Союз). Главным тезисом статьи является кон-

статирование, что в 1989–2005 годах в польско-немецких отношениях мы имели дело с трудностью их нормализации, продолжением и одновременно существенными изменениями, не всегда благоприятными для Польши, прежде всего в 1998–2005 годах.

Tomasz Paszewski

THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of NATO for Poland. Since the end of the last century the membership in the Alliance has been by far the most important instrument to ensure the security of the country. However, the central role of NATO in Poland's security policy, and the large dependence of the state security and defence on NATO and US policy, much stronger than in the case of most other member states, has not been accompanied unfortunately by a wider reflection either about the nature of alliances and rules governing their functioning, or issues related to the credibility and effectiveness of collective defence in the rapidly changing international situation. Despite numerous statements of Polish decision makers that the presence of NATO does not fully guarantee the security of the country and does not relieve from national defence preparations, in practice, Poland has often acted as if this was the case.

Such an attitude, however, is completely contrary to the very nature of alliances, including defence alliances¹. As K.J. Holsti wrote, 'in every international system composed of independent and sovereign states (...) there is no automatic guarantee that even the most solemn obligations will be fulfilled, if they are in conflict with the overriding interests of various governments. Many situations can cause tension in alliances, undermining their effectiveness as instruments of deterrence as well as military organisations'². One of

¹ Friedman, J.R. 1970. Alliances in international politics. In: Friedman, J.R., Bladen, Ch., Rosen, St. eds. *Alliances in international politics*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., pp. 13–14.

² Holsti, K.J. 1970. Diplomatic coalitions and military alliances. In: Friedman, J.R., Bladen, Ch., Rosen, St. eds., p. 99.

the characteristics of alliances is the fact that they are inherently unstable. Hans J. Morgenthau pointed out that a typical alliance is based on a small portion of interests of all constituting countries. Other interests of its members are either neutral from the point of view of the objectives of the alliance, or competitive or even contradictory. The duration of the effectiveness of the alliance depends on the relationship between the objectives and interests that the Alliance supports and all the others, and the relationship changes over time³. Moreover, as Morgenthau said, if the alliance is to be operative, the Member States must agree not only about the general political orientation, but also on specific policies and measures. However, as can be clearly seen on the example of Russia, for many years NATO has been able to meet only the first condition, while at the level of specific actions there have been already significant differences. The main creator of the classical realism also thought that the ideological similarity or proximity can strengthen the alliance if it is a factor put on a real community of interests, but it can also weaken it by obscuring the nature of common interests and their limited scope, as well as by the creation of expectations impossible to satisfy⁴. It is worthwhile to remember this thesis, for example, in the context of the Polish approach to the alliance with the US during the past quarter of the century.

These issues are always relevant although they might have seemed insignificant at the moment of Polish accession to NATO in 1999. At that time Russia, the only potential aggressor, was very weak while NATO had a devastating conventional military advantage over any potential adversary. This arrangement of forces in Europe gave little reason to worry about the effectiveness of NATO support. However, already the first decade of the membership revealed some disturbing symptoms. NATO, convinced of the lack of threat from Russia, did not realise its promise from the accession period pertaining to the capability of military aid for Poland and other new members in the event of aggression from outside⁵. Moreover, for many years the Alliance was also unable to adopt contingency plans for the new states, due to the opposition of some Western allies, who, firstly, did not see such a need, and secondly saw such a move as an unnecessary manifestation of distrust towards Russia. In practice, as noted by one analyst, each attempt to strengthen the capacity for collective defence was instantly critically evalu-

³ Morgenthau, H.J. 1970. Alliances. In: Friedman, J.R., Bladen, Ch., Rosen, St. eds..., p. 85.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 83.

⁵ Asmus, R.D. 2009. Shattered confidence in Europe. *Washington Post* 19 September 2009.

ated in terms of possible negative consequences for the expeditionary capability of the alliance, as well as from the point of view of what implications it may have for NATO's relations with Russia⁶. The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 contributed, although not immediately, to breaking the resistance on the contingency plans, but did not change significantly the Alliance's approach to the issue of deterrence, which is still often seen as marginal⁷

In parallel, starting from the second half of the past decade, NATO's military capabilities in Europe – as a result of involvement in costly stabilisation operations, significant reductions in defence budgets and the gradual withdrawal of US troops – underwent a deep erosion. According to SIPRI, in the years 2006–2015 defence spending of the US decreased in real terms by 3.9%, of the UK by 7.2%, France by 5.9%, and Italy by as much as 30%⁸. Only Germany recorded a minimal growth by symbolic 2.8%. For comparison, Russia's outlays on the armed forces increased in this period by 91%. The financial data themselves, however, do not reflect the full scale of the changes in the balance of power in Europe, and more precisely in the relation of military forces between Russia and NATO. While western countries focused their spending on expeditionary capacities, including counter-guerrilla and stabilisation, at the same time reducing or neglecting traditional conventional capabilities in terms of modernisation, repairs and training, Russia in its great programme of modernisation of the armed forces gave priority to the capacity for high intensity activities, including against technically advanced Western armies⁹. Due to all this, the current NATO's capability to deter aggression is at least very doubtful¹⁰.

⁶ Jonson, P. 2010. The debate about article 5 and its credibility. What is all about? *Research Paper*, no. 58. Rome: NATO Defence College, p. 3.

⁷ The treatment of deterrence, especially of Russia, as a third rate issue was visible both at the level of NATO policy as well as in various scientific and expert publications. See, among others: Kamp, K-H., Yost, D.S. eds. 2009. *NATO and the 21st deterrence*. Rome: NATO Defence College.

⁸ SIPRI. 2016. *Trends in world military expenditures, 2015*. Stockholm: SIPRI Fact Sheet, p. 2.

⁹ General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognised the Russian armed forces as the most serious threat for the interest of the USA. Burgess, R.R. 2016. Dunford: 'Russia presents greatest array of threats'. *Seapower Magazine* 29 March 2016. Available at: <http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20160329-dunford.html> [Accessed: 4 May 2016].

¹⁰ Rogers, J., Romanovs, U. 2015. NATO's Eastern Flank: Rebuilding Deterrence?, *RUSI Newsbrief* 1 May 2015. London: Royal United Service Institute.

NATO began to seriously approach threats to its eastern members after the Russian attack on Ukraine, however, the process proceeded slowly and gradually, strengthened with new examples of Russian militarism, and the undertaken defensive measures can hardly be considered adequate to the needs¹¹. The past divisions associated with the policy of the pact towards Russia did not disappear either. They were visible both in terms of NATO's reaction to Russian aggression in Ukraine and strengthening of the capacity of deterrence and defence of the alliance itself¹². The demands for the creation of permanent NATO bases in Central and Eastern Europe (that is bases of western members subordinated to NATO) turned out to be politically unacceptable¹³. In the coming years, a lot will depend on the attitude of Moscow, as well as the evolution of the political and economic situation in the West, but even now we can say that the attempts to return to the state of relations with Russia from the times before the Ukrainian crisis are getting stronger. What is more, the more the reaction of NATO to Russia's aggressive policy will be spread over time, the greater the risk that the next years, when the conflict in Ukraine is relegated to the background by other events, it will be so diluted that its significant portion will finally not come into force.

The aim of this text is to assess the credibility of NATO security guarantees in the short and medium term perspective through the prism of the risks that are already clearly outlined, and which pertain to two basic variables that determine the effectiveness of these guarantees: military capabilities and political will to use them. The term 'guarantee' cannot be taken literally, as an unconditional commitment to military aid, as in NATO this type of

¹¹ Larsen, J.A. 2014. *The Wales Summit and NATO's deterrence capabilities: an assessment*. Rome: NATO Defence College; Cooper, H., Erlanger, S. 2014. Military cuts render NATO less formidable as deterrent to Russia. *New York Times* 26 March 2014; Manea, O. 2015. After Crimea: NATO response still anchored in the logic of 1990s. *Romania Energy Center* 3 July 2015. Bucharest. Available at: <http://www.roec.biz/bsad/portfolio-item/raspunsul-nato-ramane-anchilozat-in-logica-anilor-90/> [Accessed: 20 July 2016].

¹² Patrick, S.M. 2014. NATO: suddenly relevant, deeply divided. *Council on Foreign Relations* 28 August 2014; Pifer, S. 2014. NATO looks divided and its eastern members look exposed. *Financial Times* 19 May 2014.

¹³ They were criticised not only in Western countries but also in Visegrad countries. See, among others: Binnendijk, H. 2015. Deterring Putin's Russia. In: Kupiecki, R., Michta, A. eds. *Transatlantic relations in a changing European security environment*. Warsaw, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 22–23; Šimečka, M. 2015. NATO's Eastern promises? *European Security Spotlight*, no. 14. Prague: Institute on International Relations.

'hard' guarantees does not exist, but rather as a very serious treaty-political commitment of states to mutual assistance in the case of aggression from outside. What is also important is the distinction made by Michael Fitzsimmons between uncertainty and a risk¹⁴. While in the case of uncertainty there is no basis for predicting the future, a risk refers to a situation in which the ultimate development of events is unknown, but it is possible to assess the probability of different scenarios on the basis of known facts, experience and testing of adopted assumptions. In the case of NATO security guarantees we can already, on the basis of the assessment of the current situation in the transatlantic community and the experience of several past years, distinguish a number of risks of this type, the likelihood of materialisation of which seems now not only real, but often even quite high. As J. Friedman rightly pointed out, 'probability' is 'the key to the calculation inside the alliance' pertaining to its behaviour in case of war¹⁵.

The analysis of individual risks will be preceded by a brief look at the theory of deterrence, because the main objective of NATO's policy, just like of most national defence policies, is not so much winning a defensive war, but rather preventing it. Moreover, the effectiveness of deterrence policy and of defence policy are extremely closely related.

DETERRENCE AND SECURITY GUARANTEES OF NATO

Deterrence is indeed an integral part of states' defence or military policy existing for thousands of years. The theory of deterrence, which essentially developed only during the Cold War, is a different matter. This theory originally referred almost exclusively to nuclear deterrence, as one of key strategic relations between the two superpowers, later it has encompassed the conventional forces¹⁶. From its very beginnings until today, it has been based, in spite

¹⁴ Fitzsimmons, M. 2006/2007. The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 4, Winter 2006/2007.

¹⁵ Friedman, J.R. 1970. Alliances in international politics. In: Friedman, J.R., Bladen, Ch., Rosen, St. eds. ..., p. 13.

¹⁶ Authors of one of the most important works of the seventies differentiated three levels of deterrence: the strategic one pertaining to a nuclear war between superpowers, a limited war (e.g. in Korea) and a situation below the threshold of war (crises, secret operations, provocations, etc). While on the strategic level there is no doubt about the kind of response to an attack, on the other levels also political factors count due to which the response to an act of aggression is less certain. George, A.L., Smoke, R. 1974. *Deterrence in American foreign policy: theory and practice*. New York, London:

of many voices questioning this approach, on the rational choice theory, and related ones, including e.g. a model of expected benefits.

In the case of NATO security guarantees for Poland it can be assumed, following numerous authors, that we deal with a form of so-called extended deterrence. This term refers to a situation where one country (defender) deters another from the attack on its ally, that is a country it protects for one reason or another. Of course, the United States is a country most widely applying extended deterrence, protecting in this way more than 50 countries around the world. However, it can also refer to NATO, where aid commitments from all the members are a deterrent against a military attack on one of the allies. Unlike basic deterrence, which consists of deterring a potential aggressor (or attackers) from your own country, extended deterrence is much less credible, due to a significantly smaller motivation of the state which deters¹⁷. In the case of this country there is a risk that fulfilling the commitment related to deterrence it may incur costs exceeding the value of what it protects¹⁸. This problem always occurred during the Cold War – there were always doubts as to whether the US would decide to use nuclear weapons in defence of its European allies, risking a retaliatory nuclear attack¹⁹. In order to increase the credibility of extended deterrence, and thus its effectiveness, deterring states often undertake a number of actions increasing in a demonstrative way their commitment to the defence of allies. These are usually such measures as deploying their own troops in the territory or public declarations or other forms of political commitment, from which it would not be easy to withdraw during the crisis, because of external and internal expectations and pressures²⁰. Engaging in protecting the ally of both its soldiers, who are exposed to danger in the event of aggression, as well as its own reputation, the state authenticates its policy of deterrence, for the price, however, of limiting itself room for manoeuvre in the event of an actual attack on the ally.

Columbia University Press, p. 39 and 53; see also: Mearsheimer, J.J. 1983. *Conventional deterrence*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

¹⁷ Schelling, T.C. 1966. *Arms and influence*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, pp. 35–36; Freedman, L. 2008. *Deterrence*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 35.

¹⁸ Crowford, T.W. 2004. The endurance of extended deterrence: continuity, change, and the complexity in theory and policy. In: Paul, T.V., Morgan, P.M., Wirtz, J.J. eds. *Complex deterrence: strategy in the global age*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, p. 280.

¹⁹ Fedder, E.H. 1973. *NATO: the dynamics of alliance in the postwar world*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, p. 56–57.

²⁰ Crowford, T.W. ..., p. 283.

It is easiest to measure the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence by the analysis of its constituent elements. The literature often distinguishes three of them: 1) appropriate military capabilities, 2) the will to use these capabilities if necessary, 3) effective communication of the readiness to defend to the potential opponent. The last element, however, is largely a function of the previous two, it also has a very situational nature, due to which is not subject to any long-term predictions. Therefore, it is adopted in this text that deterrence is primarily a function of the assessment by the potential aggressor of NATO military capabilities and political will to use them²¹. Exactly the same criteria as already mentioned will be used to assess the credibility of NATO security guarantees.

In reality, however, the effectiveness of the policy of deterrence, understood as the absence of war, is equally, if not more determined by the type of countries that are deterred rather than by the actions taken by the deterring side. While the states which in general are satisfied with the status quo are relatively easy to deter with the use of even small forces, in the case of those seeking consistently to change it, and Russia, China and Iran can be now regarded as such, the policy of deterrence requires much more substantial measures because these actors are clearly ready to take greater risks. In such cases, the effectiveness of deterrence is primarily determined by the local balance of power, because the armed forces which are on site can repel a fast attack or succumb to it²². In the case of extended deterrence the aggressor that has a clear local advantage may assume that it will be able to achieve all its military objectives before the defender is able to help its ally²³. If the goal was to capture some territory it can be assumed that the defender would choose not to win it over because of too high costs.

In the theory of deterrence there are two main ways of its implementation: deterrence through direct preventing of effective aggression (deterrence by denial), and by retaliation (deterrence by punishment)²⁴. The first type is

²¹ Gerson, M.S. 2009. Conventional deterrence in the second nuclear age. *Parameters* Autumn 2009, p. 42. Watman, K., Wilkening, D. 1995. *U.S. regional deterrence strategies*. Santa Monica: RAND, p. 57.

²² Gerson, M.S. ..., p. 38.

²³ Watman, K., Wilkening, D. ..., p. 68.

²⁴ Another typology of deterrence divides it into general deterrence – working all the time, not necessarily against a specific state and immediate deterrence – appearing in crisis situations threatening with an outbreak of war. The latter kind of deterrence appears when the former one has turned out to be ineffective. Very High Readiness Joint Task Force created by NATO could be used exactly in the case of incidents of this type.

also referred to sometimes as counter-military, and the other as counter-value, because its essence are attacks on the aggressor's high value targets, and these may be either purely military or civilian targets. It is generally believed, at least in the case of conventional deterrence, that deterrence by denial is more effective because it is based on the threat and possibilities of direct repulsion of enemy forces engaged in aggression, and this is equivalent to its failure. In the case of deterrence by punishment the aggressor decides what level of loss it is ready to bear²⁵, and whether to respond to retaliatory attacks with the escalation of the conflict. The latter situation could arise particularly in the case of Russia acting in the role of an aggressor. For various reasons this state is, on the one hand, less sensitive to suffered losses than Western democracies, on the other hand, it has a wide range of military means of conflict escalation, and its leader and the power elite cannot so easily afford a military defeat, for intra-political reasons.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO SECURITY GUARANTEES – THE MILITARY POTENTIAL

The aggressive Russian policy in the years 2015-2016 found NATO unprepared to counter conventional threats connected with the use of force or threats to use it. Despite some adjustments in defence policies of member states and priorities of NATO, there is a real risk that this condition will not improve significantly. A lot of old and new challenges may hinder the strengthening of the military capabilities of NATO in Europe. Those which are the most important and most probable in the foreseeable future can be classified into two groups: a) related to the economic and financial situation of the member states and b) resulting from the military involvement of the key members in other regions of the world or focusing on other threats.

- a) Geographical and financial threats for NATO capabilities for collective defence

One of the main causes of significant weakening of the defence capabilities of NATO, in particular those related to high intensity activities were cuts in defence budgets associated with the effects of the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009, which are felt even today. The most important of these

²⁵ Freedman, L. ..., p. 39.

effects is a very high level of debt, which, moreover, as shown in Table 1, in some countries will continue to grow for a few years. The burden of the debt will significantly affect the financial capabilities of key NATO countries for many years, including the possibility of increasing defence expenditures.

Table 1

Public debt of Poland's Western allies

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
USA	104,78	104,78	105,85	105,79	105,28	105,52	106,17
France	95,56	97,08	98,40	98,01	97,21	95,48	93,08
Germany	74,62	70,74	68,22	65,85	63,36	60,44	57,88
Italy	132,09	133,10	132,28	130,47	128,33	125,76	122,95
The UK	89,39	88,89	88,02	86,69	84,55	81,28	77,79

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016.

In the US, high levels of federal debt and the associated need to reduce the budget deficit were the main reasons for the real fall of the Pentagon budget in the period 2011–2015 by 21%²⁶, probably it will be a very important brake limiting its growth in the coming years. According to one analysis, taking into account not only the level of debt and its servicing costs but also, among others, rising costs of federal programmes for pensions and health care, the long-term possible level of defence spending ranges between 1.6–2.6% of GDP, well below the US post-war average and less than today²⁷. In the absence of a clear political consensus on raising taxes, or a significant reduction in spending, and such a scenario is very likely, the gap between the existing global tasks of the US armed forces and the level of their funding is likely to maintain or even increase. This can give rise to a strong pressure to cede a part of the defence burden to regional allies.

These cuts of the Pentagon budget have already strongly affected the state of the US armed forces, which in some respects is one of the worst in the post-war period²⁸. According to the report of the Heritage Foundation,

²⁶ SIPRI. 2016. *Trends in world military expenditures, 2015*. Stockholm: SIPRI Fact Sheet, p. 2.

²⁷ Williams, C. 2011. *The future affordability of U.S. national security*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 28 October 2011; See also Congressional Budget Office. 2016. *The budget and economic outlook, 2016–2026*. Washington D.C.

²⁸ Statement by general Daniel Allyn, vice chief of the United States Army Staff before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness. 26 March 2015.

measuring the state of the US armed forces every year, the capabilities of ground troops in 2015 were assessed as weak, one degree lower than in the previous year, while those of the Navy, Marine Corps and nuclear forces were considered barely sufficient²⁹. Given the budgetary constraints with which the American ground troops will struggle through almost the entire current decade, and possibly longer, their technological advantage over militarily strong opponents, such as Russia, may be further eroded³⁰.

The high level of debt will also affect the defence capabilities of European countries, although their situation in this respect varies. In the case of France and Britain, their defence budgets will remain very tight at least until the end of the current decade³¹. Germany will have potentially the greatest financial possibilities to strengthen its forces, especially ground forces, due to definitely the most favourable budget situation. In its case, however, the announced gradually increasing military spending, if it really comes to that, will have to be spent to a large extent on the regeneration of the current military capabilities, including the recovery of the equipment already used in the service, much of which due to years of underfunding is not suitable in the current state to be used on the battlefield³².

Another threat is a spectre of another deep economic crisis in Europe, which could turn out to be much more difficult to bring under control than that of the end of the past decade. Its potential source could become a financial or economic slump in one of the European economies. Especially Italy is facing extremely serious challenges encompassing a deep demographic

²⁹ Wood, D.L. ed. 2016. *2016 Index of U.S. military strength: assessing America's ability to provide for the common defense*. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, p. 7.

³⁰ Weisgerber, M. 2015. Russia could block access to Baltic Sea, US General Says. *Defense One* 9 December 2015. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/12/russia-could-block-access-baltic-sea-us-general-says/124361> [Accessed: 3 January 2016]; Sen, A.K. 2015. *A three-pronged strategy to deal with Putin*. Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 8 October 2015. On the topic of modernization of US ground troops (US Army) see US Army, US. Department of Defense. 2016. *Army equipment program in support of President's budget 2016*. Washington D.C.; US Army. 2015. *The US Army combat vehicle modernization strategy*, 15 September 2015.

³¹ Chalmers, M. 2015. Mind the gap: the MoD's emerging budgetary challenge. *RUSI Briefing Paper* 13 March 2015. Royal United Service Institute.

³² Mizokami, K. 2015. Is Germany's military dying? *National Interest* 1 September 2015. Available at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/germanys-military-dying-13748?page=show>; Vestring, B. 2014. Unfit for fight – or flight: Germany's army admits to massive equipment failure. *IP-Journal* 30 September 2014. DGAP. Available at: <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/berlin-observer/unfit-fight-or-flight> [Accessed: 12 October 2014].

crisis, huge public debt and weak, uncompetitive economy³³. In addition, the uncertain economic and financial situation still persisting in some Western European countries may lead them to a more cautious course in foreign and security policy because they have to try to avoid a new recession and a further significant debt increase at any price, and both these phenomena could occur, for example, in the case of a serious political and military conflict in Europe.

b) Other threats and challenges

NATO is facing a whole range of challenges, and the threat from Russia is just one of them. Problems in North Africa and the Middle East are much more important, more urgent and real for a large part of the members, including of course all from southern Europe³⁴. Undoubtedly, in the coming years the threat from this direction will concentrate a large part of the attention and resources of the Alliance. From the point of view, however, of the credibility of NATO's deterrence potential, especially against threats such as those posed by Russia, the US military geographical and functional priorities will be of key importance. But for the United States for years China, not Russia, has been the main geopolitical rival, which is firmly committed to a gradual revision of the existing status quo in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia. Beijing supports its regional aspirations with quickly modernised armed forces, constituting an increasingly serious threat to US allies as well as America's own troops in the region³⁵. If the US does not start to a greater extent than ever before to balance through its own armaments the growing Chinese military power, it may lose the military dominance over the region of

³³ Ezrati, M. 2014. Will Italy wreak economic havoc on Europe? *The National Interest* 25 August 2014.

³⁴ Parker, G., Pickard, J. 2015. David Cameron announces £2bn extra military spending to fight Isis. *Financial Times* 16 November 2015.

³⁵ On the topic of the change of the military balance of power in Asia between the US and China see Heginbotham, E. et al. 2015. *The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power, 1996–2017*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation; Blackwill, R.D., Tellis, A.J. eds. 2015. *Revising U.S. grand strategy toward China*. Council Special Report, no. 72. Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015; Center for Security and International Studies. 2016. *Asia-Pacific 2025: capabilities, presence, and partnerships*. Washington D.C.; Kamphausen, R., Lai, D. 2015. *The Chinese People's Liberation Army in 2025*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; Montgomery, E.B. 2014. Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China's rise and the future of U.S. power projection. *International Security*, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 115–149.

the western Pacific to China, and this would mean a fundamental degradation of its leadership role, not only in this region constituting today the economic and geopolitical centre of the world, but also on a global scale. Taking into account such potentially momentous consequences, a growing and long-term development of the American military potential in this part of the world, perhaps at the expense of lesser involvement in other regions, seems to be a likely scenario.


THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO GUARANTEES – POLITICAL FACTORS

Another group of factors affecting the credibility of NATO guarantees, far less tangible than military capabilities, covers issues related to the political will of countries forming the alliance. This problem cannot be limited to a possible future decision on the defence of a threatened or attacked ally. What is equally important are issues related to the strategic culture of individual countries in general, as well as their attitudes toward issues such as collective defence and deterrence policy of NATO, the degree and nature of transatlantic solidarity and cooperation, as well as the policy towards Russia and the changes which may occur in this respect in the foreseeable future. These issues create the context, inter alia, through their impact on the physical, organisational and geographic capabilities of NATO in the sphere of collective defence, in which the member states would take a decision on possible allied aid under Article 5. They also have influence on public opinion in the individual alliance members, which, especially in the light of the public opinion survey presented in Figure 1, may also have important implications in the event of a *casus foederis*.

Below there are briefly outlined two factors that create, within the next 5–10 years, a political risk for NATO's ability to fulfil its original mission, though of course there are more of them, for instance a potential political and institutional crisis in the EU or the severity of disintegration tendencies. The first is the future US policy towards NATO, which could weigh on the fate of the pact, the other are possible changes of power in the member states, threatening with the departure of those countries from the principles that have guided the Euro-Atlantic community so far and on which in fact the post-Cold War European order has been based.

Figure 1

If Russia was in a serious military conflict with one of its neighbours belonging to NATO, should your country, or should not, use its armed forces in the defence of this country?



Source: PEW Research Centre, September 2015.

a) US policy towards NATO – no more tolerance for ‘fare dodging’?

According to Edward Lucas, well-known for the extremely Atlanticist views, NATO in such a state as it is now is not sustainable. Europe, with 500 million inhabitants and having combined GDP of 20 billion USD, cannot indefinitely rely on military aid from the US, with 320 million inhabitants and GDP of 17 billion USD³⁶. As Robert D. Kaplan, a well-known commentator, asked in the context of Ukraine and policy towards Putin’s Russia: ‘Why should America defend the continent which does not want to defend itself?’³⁷ A similar view is shared by more and more politicians and experts³⁸. The United States is fed up with tolerating European ‘fare dodging’.

³⁶ Lucas, E. 2016. Make NATO great again. *Center for European Policy Analyses* 11 April 2016. Available at: <http://cepa.org/Europes-Edge/make-nato-great-again> [Accessed: 16 April 2016].

³⁷ Kaplan, R.D. 2015. America will lose patience with European appeasement. *Financial Times* 7 April 2015.

³⁸ See, among others, Joyner, J. 2014. Europe’s free ride on the American-defense gravy train. *National Interest* 13 July 2014; Dempsey, J. 2014. *Europe is losing America*. Brus-

In Kaplan's opinion the sluggish response of Obama's administration to Putin's aggressive policy is not necessarily an expression of its weakness or immanent indecision and more a reflection of the gradual but visible change that takes place in the USA in relation to the problems of security in Europe. In fact, this change has become apparent already within a few previous years, including in the form of a significant reduction of the American military presence in Europe, the conduction from the 'back seat' in the course of the intervention in Libya in 2011, or just in a limited and very stretched in time strengthening of defence of the eastern flank of NATO³⁹. In 2012 the House of Representatives adopted a resolution, which ultimately never entered into force, calling on the administration to withdraw all remaining combat units from Europe. Washington gradually goes from purely verbal calls for more equal sharing of costs in the alliance to the gradual reduction of its involvement in Europe. If European countries are not more involved in the defence of peace and stability on the continent, the United States will probably be more cautious in taking on its shoulders both existing and new tasks, even if the risks are serious. There is a risk that in Europe, due to the reduced presence of the US and the inability of European countries to take over part of its duties, a security vacuum will appear at some point⁴⁰.

Meanwhile, the prospects for a change in the European approach to security seem faint. Shortly after the adoption of commitments at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 it turned out that some members had already broken them, and the prospect of implementing the target objectives set for 2020 is at least questionable. Not only because of the financial situation of many

sels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Daalder, I. 2013. Europe must be prepared to spend on defence. *Financial Times* 23 December 2013; Cordesman, A.H. 2014. *NATO and Ukraine: the need for real world strategies and for European partners rather than parasites*. Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: <http://csis.org/publication/nato-and-ukraine-need-real-world-strategies-and-european-partners-rather-parasites> [Accessed: 14 July 2014]; Schwarz, J. 2014. Europe's paralysis problem. *National Interest* 22 September 2014; Cohen, E. 2014. The 'kind of things' crisis. *The American Conservative* 10 December 2014; Michta, A. 2015. A stasis in Europe. *The American Interest* 18 August 2015.

³⁹ Sullivan, G. 2015. Europe requires more than symbolic defense. *Defence One* 7 May 2015. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/05/europe-requires-more-symbolic-defense/112210/> [Accessed: 11 May 2015]. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/05/europe-requires-more-symbolic-defense/112210/>; Gould, J. 2015. US removing 24 Apaches from Europe. *Defense News* 19 April 2015.

⁴⁰ Techau, J. 2015. *The politics of 2 percent: NATO and the security vacuum in Europe*. Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 7.

Member States, but also due to the clear lack of political will⁴¹. We can even have some doubts whether this problem can be solved at all. Already in 1966 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser published a famous article in which on the basis of empirical data and a model created by them they argued that in NATO and other similar organisations large countries bear a disproportionate burden, while small countries contribute very little or almost nothing at all and due to the layout of national interests in both of these groups, this situation cannot be changed⁴². So far, their argument is largely supported by expenditures of NATO members, however, we need to add yet another variable, namely the level of a military threat.

The border states of the alliance, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, would experience the negative effects of such a situation to a largest extent. This applies also to countries such as Estonia or Poland, which spend 2% of GDP on defence as required by NATO. Contrary to the opinion fairly common in our country, the credibility of US military aid in the event of crisis or war depends not mainly on the Polish-American relations, but on the fulfilment by Poland of its commitments. The USA looks at the issue of European security more comprehensively, demanding far more equal distribution of tasks and costs. In this respect Poland is necessarily dependent on the rest of the European members of NATO, especially the largest ones. Their decisions can influence the scale of further American presence in Europe.

b) The change of power in the member states

The last of the analysed threats to the credibility of NATO as a military alliance is a matter of further promotion of transatlantic and European solidarity in security issues by successive governments in America and Europe. This issue concerns many member states of NATO and the EU, however from the point of view of the alliance response to the threat generated by Russia, of key importance are the United States and several European powers, including Germany, an informal leader of Europe.

⁴¹ Raynova, D., Kearns, I. 2015. The Wales pledge revisited: a preliminary analysis of 2015 budget decisions in NATO Member States. *Policy-Brief*. Brussels: European Leadership Network; Jones, S. 2015. NATO spending promises largely ignored. *Financial Times* 26 February 2015; Techau, J. 2015. *The politics of 2 percent: NATO and the security Vacuum in Europe*. Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 12.

⁴² Olson, M. Jr., Zeckhauser, R. 1996. An economic theory of alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 266–279.

In Poland, just like in many other European countries, the involvement of the United States in the security of the old continent, dating back to the Second World War, has been considered for decades to be constant, and in the light of the consensus on this matter prevailing until recently among American elites, this belief has had strong bases. Today, however, it is much more questionable. In the spring of 2016 out of three major presidential candidates, only Hillary Clinton represented the traditional American approach to European security. Her Democratic rival Bernie Sanders, an opponent of NATO expansion to the east, would offer rather 'soft' policy towards Russia rather than strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO, or help for still militarily threatened Ukraine⁴³. From the point of view of NATO and transatlantic relations Donald Trump is by far the worst candidate. Trump's statements in the campaign have been so vague that it is difficult to predict his future policy on their basis, but he is certainly not a supporter of the transatlantic relations in their present form⁴⁴. In his first speech devoted to foreign policy, he reproached the NATO allies that only four of them spend the recommended 2 percent on defence and then said: 'the countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defence – and, if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves'. Whatever this rather strange statement means, this is not good news for European allies⁴⁵. In the case of his victory in the election the most probable position towards NATO will be a firm demand for a fundamental change in the distribution of costs of the defence of Europe, other steps cannot be excluded either. His possible policy towards Putin's Russia is also unknown.

Germany is the second key country whose inside-political decisions can significantly affect the credibility of NATO's deterrence of threats from the east. It results from both its political, economic and military potential, as well as geographic location. Its role in NATO is, however, limited by two factors – the reluctance of a significant part of society and political elites to their country's participation in strictly military activities and the specific attitude to Russia.

German-Russian relations gradually, but noticeably cooled in the last decade. This process can be quite conventionally divided into three stages.

⁴³ Parakilas, J. 2016. *US election note: Russia policy after 2016*. London: Chatham House, pp. 5–6.

⁴⁴ Brooks, R. 2016. Donald Trump has a coherent, realist foreign policy. *Foreign Policy* 12 April 2016. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/donald-trump-has-a-coherent-realist-foreign-policy/?wp_login_redirect=0 [Accessed: 20 April 2016].

⁴⁵ Trump, D.J. 2016. Trump on foreign policy. *National Interest* 27 April 2016.

The first came with the seizure of power in Berlin by Angela Merkel, the second after the return of Vladimir Putin to the post of the president of Russia in 2012, the third after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Still, in Germany there are numerous supporters of cooperation with Russia (*Russlandversteher*), in practice regardless of the behaviour of Russia itself⁴⁶. They are visible in all segments of the political spectrum and among business elites. It is impossible not to note that among the more or less strong opponents of tough policy of Chancellor Merkel towards Russia in connection with the conflict in Ukraine there are such figures as Horst Teltschik, a former closest advisor to Helmut Kohl, former President Roman Herzog, former Social Democratic chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Gerhard Schröder and former, long-time foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as well as a number of active politicians of the CSU, the SPD and smaller parties⁴⁷. Even if supporters of the Russian option are not able to pursue their own political intentions toward Russia, they can still have the possibility, e.g. as part of the government coalition, to effectively block efforts to help allies threatened by Russia. Even more so as the majority of German society would probably support it⁴⁸.

SUMMARY

When Poland joined NATO in the nineties of the last century, the West was at the peak of its global power. It might have seemed, therefore, that membership in NATO would almost guarantee the security of Poland for decades, and any possible internal problems of the pact would be compensated by the overwhelming military power of the United States and strong political leadership. This kind of thinking, however, was a mistake.

Military alliances are inherently unstable. Mainly because national goals and interests of all member states are only partially identical or convergent, in the case of other interests there are often substantial discrepancies. While for Poland and a few other members of the alliance deterrence of Russia is the most important priority in the field of security, for the vast majority of

⁴⁶ Scally, D. 2014. Coddling the Russian bear. *IP-Global* 21 March 2014. DGAP.

⁴⁷ See Forsberg, T. 2016. From Ostpolitik to 'frostpolitik'? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia. *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1.

⁴⁸ *Sondaż: większość Niemców przeciwko pomocy dla Polski w razie agresji Rosji.* [Survey: the majority of Germans against aid for Poland in the case of Russian aggression.] TVN24, 27 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.tvn24.pl/sondaz-wiekszosc-niemcow-przeciw-pomocy-polsce-w-razie-agresji-rosji,638981,s.html>

other members it is a secondary or tertiary goal. It is not surprising, then, that for 15 years of Polish membership the task has been neglected, and even today, in the face of the aggressive attitude of better-armed Russia, most of the allies do not see the need to take more serious actions by NATO. In this context, taking into account the balance of power between Russia and the alliance, which is considerably less favourable in comparison with the end of the twentieth century, and many risks presented in the text, the credibility of NATO security guarantees is strongly weakened.

The above statements should not, however, lead to the conclusion that NATO and alliances as such are useless. Alliances, as wise scholars pointed, are eternal. In every contending environment, and the international environment is one of them, the actor has only a few options, which usually include: joining a rival, strengthening own potential and entering into an alliance. If nation-states disappear, other entities will come into alliance relationships. The problem lies not in the alliance institution and its inherent weaknesses and limitations, but in the ability of states to properly use alliances. Unfortunately, despite the existence of certain consciousness that NATO is not a complete protection against threats, Poland over the years has failed to develop adequate security policy that would try to compensate those negative characteristics of the alliance.

REFERENCES

- Asmus, R.D. 2009. Shattered confidence in Europe. *Washington Post* 19 September 2009.
- Binnendijk, H. 2015. Deterring Putin's Russia. In: Kupiecki, R., Michta, A. eds. *Transatlantic relations in a changing European security environment*. Warsaw, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Blackwill, R.D., Tellis, A.J. eds. 2015. *Revising U.S. grand strategy toward China*. Council Special Report, no. 72. Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015.
- Brooks, R. 2016. Donald Trump has a coherent, realist foreign policy. *Foreign Policy* 12 April 2016. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/donald-trump-has-a-coherent-realist-foreign-policy/?wp_login_redirect=0 [Accessed: 20 April 2016].
- Burgess, R.R. 2016. Dunford: 'Russia presents greatest array of threats'. *Seapower Magazine* 29 March 2016. Available at: <http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20160329-dunford.html> [Accessed: 4 May 2016].

- Center for Security and International Studies. 2016. *Asia-Pacific rebalance 2025: capabilities, presence, and partnerships*. Washington D.C.
- Chalmers, M. 2015. Mind the gap: the MoD's emerging budgetary challenge. *RUSI Briefing Paper* 13 March 2015. Royal United Service Institute.
- Cohen, E. 2014. The 'kind of things' crisis. *The American Conservative* 10 December 2014.
- Congressional Budget Office. 2016. *The budget and economic outlook, 2016–2026*. Washington D.C.
- Cooper, H., Erlanger, S. 2014. Military cuts render NATO less formidable as deterrent to Russia. *New York Times* 26 March 2014.
- Cordesman, A.H. 2014. *NATO and Ukraine: the need for real world strategies and for European partners rather than parasites*. Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: <http://csis.org/publication/nato-and-ukraine-need-real-world-strategies-and-european-partners-rather-parasites> [Accessed: 14 July 2014].
- Crowford, T.W. 2004. The endurance of extended deterrence: continuity, change, and the complexity in theory and policy. In: Paul, T.V., Morgan, P.M., Wirtz, J.J. eds. *Complex deterrence: strategy in the global age*. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.
- Daalder, I. 2013. Europe must be prepared to spend on defence. *Financial Times* 23 December 2013.
- Dempsey, J. 2014. *Europe is losing America*. Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Ezrati, M. 2014. Will Italy wreak economic havoc on Europe? *The National Interest* 25 August 2014.
- Fedder, E.H. 1973. *NATO: the dynamics of alliance in the postwar world*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.
- Fitzsimmons, M. 2006/2007. The problem of uncertainty in strategic planning. *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 4, Winter 2006/2007.
- Forsberg, T. 2016. From Ostpolitik to 'frostpolitik'? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia. *International Affairs*, vol. 92, no. 1.
- Freedman, L. 2008. *Deterrence*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Friedman, J.R., Bladen, Ch., Rosen, St. eds. *Alliances in international politics*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc.
- George, A.L., Smoke, R. 1974. *Deterrence in American foreign policy: theory and practice*. New York, London: Columbia University Press.
- Gerson, M.S. 2009. Conventional deterrence in the second nuclear age. *Parameters* Autumn 2009.

- Gould, J. 2015. US removing 24 Apaches from Europe. *Defense News* 19 April 2015.
- Heginbotham, E. et al. 2015. *The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power, 1996–2017*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
- Jones, S. 2015. NATO spending promises largely ignored. *Financial Times* 26 February 2015.
- Jonson, P. 2010. The debate about article 5 and its credibility. What is all about? *Research Paper*, no. 58. Rome: NATO Defence College.
- Joyner, J. 2014. Europe's free ride on the American-defense gravy train. *National Interest* 13 July 2014.
- Kamp, K-H., Yost, D.S. eds. 2009. *NATO and the 21st deterrence*. Rome: NATO Defence College.
- Kamphausen, R., Lai, D. 2015. *The Chinese People's Liberation Army in 2025*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
- Kaplan, R. D. 2015. America will lose patience with European appeasement. *Financial Times* 7 April 2015.
- Larsen, J.A. 2014. *The Wales Summit and NATO's deterrence capabilities: an assessment*. Rome: NATO Defence College.
- Lucas, E. 2016. Make NATO great again. *Center for European Policy Analyses* 11 April 2016. Available at: <http://cepa.org/Europes-Edge/make-nato-great-again> [Accessed: 16 April 2016].
- Manea, O. 2015. After Crimea: NATO response still anchored in the logic of 1990s. *Romania Energy Center* 3 July 2015. Bucharest Available at: <http://www.roec.biz/bsad/portfolio-item/raspunsul-nato-ramane-anchilozat-in-logica-anilor-90/> [Accessed: 20 July 2016].
- Mearsheimer, J.J. 1983. *Conventional deterrence*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Michta, A. 2015. A stasis in Europe. *The American Interest* 18 August 2015.
- Mizokami, K. 2015. Is Germany's military dying? *National Interest* 1 September 2015.
- Montgomery, E. B. 2014. Contested primacy in the Western Pacific: China's rise and the future of U.S. power projection. *International Security*, vol. 38, no. 4.
- Olson, M. Jr., Zeckhauser, R. 1996. An economic theory of alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 48, no. 3.
- Parker, G., Pickard, J. 2015. David Cameron announces £2bn extra military spending to fight Isis. *Financial Times* 16 November 2015.

- Patrick, S. M. 2014. NATO: suddenly relevant, deeply divided. *Council on Foreign Relations* 28 August 2014.
- Parakilas, J. 2016. *US election note: Russia policy after 2016*. London: Chatham House.
- Pifer, S. 2014. NATO looks divided and its eastern members look exposed. *Financial Times* 19 May 2014.
- Raynova, D., Kearns, I. 2015. The Wales pledge revisited: a preliminary analysis of 2015 budget decisions in NATO Member States. *Policy-Brief*. Brussels: European Leadership Network.
- Rogers, J., Romanovs, U. 2015. NATO's Eastern Flank: Rebuilding Deterrence?, *RUSI Newsbrief* 1 May 2015. London: Royal United Service Institute.
- Scally, D. 2014. Coddling the Russian bear. *IP-Global* 21 March 2014. DGAP.
- Schelling, T.C. 1966. *Arms and influence*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
- Schwarz, J. 2014. Europe's paralysis problem. *National Interest* 22 September 2014.
- Sen, A.K. 2015. *A three-pronged strategy to deal with Putin*. Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council.
- Šimečka, M. 2015. NATO's Eastern promises? *European Security Spotlight*, no. 14. Prague: Institute on International Relations.
- SIPRI. 2016. *Trends in world military expenditures, 2015*. Stockholm: SIPRI Fact Sheet.
- Statement by general Daniel Allyn, vice chief of the United States Army Staff before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness. 26 March 2015.
- Sullivan, G. 2015. Europe requires more than symbolic defense. *Defence One* 7 May 2015. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/05/europe-requires-more-symbolic-defense/112210/> [Accessed: 11 May 2015].
- Techau, J. 2015. *The politics of 2 percent: NATO and the security vacuum in Europe*. Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Trump D.J. 2016. Trump on Foreign Policy. *National Interest* 27 April 2016.
- US Army. 2015. *The US Army combat vehicle modernization strategy*. 15 September 2015.
- US Army, US. Department of Defense. 2016. *Army equipment program in support of President's budget 2016*. Washington D.C.
- Watman, K., Wilkening, D. 1995. *U.S. regional deterrence strategies*. Santa Monica: RAND.

- Weisgerber, M. 2015. Russia could block access to Baltic Sea, US General Say. *Defense One* 9 December 2015. Available at: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/12/russia-could-block-access-baltic-sea-us-general-says/124361> [Accessed: 3 January 2016].
- Williams, C. 2011. *The future affordability of U.S. national security*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 28 October 2011.
- Wood, D.L. ed. 2016. *2016 Index of U.S. military strength: assessing America's ability to provide for the common defense*. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation.
- Vestring, B. 2014. Unfit for fight – or flight: Germany's army admits to massive equipment failure. *IP-Journal* 30 September 2014. DGAP. Available at: <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/berlin-observer/unfit-fight-or-flight> [Accessed: 12 October 2014].

THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE

Summary

The article distinguishes such risks for the credibility and effectiveness of NATO as a collective defence organisation in the short and medium term perspective, as tight defence budgets in key NATO countries, concentration of a large part of the members of NATO on other risks than those associated with Art. 5, the reduction of US involvement in European security connected with permanently unequal distribution of costs in NATO and changes in power in alliance countries that may undermine the transatlantic solidarity in the field of security. Referring to the theory of alliances and theories of deterrence the text argues that the credibility of alliance guarantee is always limited and is subject to significant fluctuations over time.

WIARYGODNOŚĆ NATOWSKICH GWARANCJI BEZPIECZEŃSTWA Z PERSPEKTYWY POLSKI

Streszczenie

Artykuł wyróżnia ryzyka dla wiarygodności i skuteczności NATO jako organizacji kolektywnej obrony w perspektywie krótko- i średnio-terminowej,

zaliczając do nich napięte budżety obronne w kluczowych państwach NATO, koncentracji dużej części członków NATO na innych zagrożeniach niż tych związanych z art. 5, ograniczenie amerykańskiego zaangażowania w europejskie bezpieczeństwo związane z permanentnie nierównym podziałem kosztów w NATO oraz zmiany na szczytach władzy w państwach sojuszu, które mogą podważyć transatlantycką solidarność w sferze bezpieczeństwa. Odwołując się do teorii sojuszków i teorii odstraszenia tekst stawia tezę, że wiarygodność sojuszniczych gwarancji jest zawsze ograniczona, a także podlega istotnym fluktuacjom w czasie.

НАДЕЖНОСТЬ ГАРАНТИЙ СО СТОРОНЫ НАТО С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ ИНТЕРЕСОВ ПОЛЬШИ

Резюме

В статье дан сравнительный анализ риска для надёжности и эффективности НАТО как организации коллективной обороны в краткосрочной и долгосрочной перспективе, включая в них ограниченные оборонные бюджеты в ключевых государствах НАТО, сосредоточение большинства членов НАТО на угрозах, которых не касается пятая статья, ограничение американского участия в обеспечении европейской безопасности, связанное с непрекращающимся неравномерным распределением расходов в НАТО, а также изменения в верхах власти в государствах-членах блока, которые могли бы подорвать трансатлантическую солидарность в сфере безопасности. Обращаясь к теории альянса и теории отпугивания, автор текста выдвигает тезис, что надёжность гарантий со стороны альянса всегда ограничена; кроме того, она подвержена значительным флуктуациям на протяжении времени.

Stanisław Koziej

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC TASKS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AT THE TURN OF THE SECOND AND THIRD DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

National security is a process of continuous ensuring of opportunities to pursue national interests in conditions of uncertainty, challenges and threats posed by external and internal factors¹. This can be done by means of the current responding to emerging needs in this area (the operating behaviour) or pre-emptive preparation in advance (the strategic behaviour). The first method is expensive and often unreliable due to the possibility of being surprised by the nature and scale of the needs. Therefore, any prudent state tries to act strategically. This means long-term planning and the organisation of appropriate preparations for the future. The proper identification of priority strategic tasks in the short, medium and long term perspective is of particular importance in the context of such preparations². This publication presents such a catalogue of priorities in relation to the security of the Republic of Poland for the next 5–10 years.

In recent years the security conditions in the immediate vicinity of Poland and in the surrounding of our security supra-systems, that is NATO and the EU, have deteriorated. Behind the eastern border of Poland, NATO and the

¹ See, e.g., Koziej, S. 2016. System bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski. [Systems of Poland's national security.] In: Pietraś, M., Wojtaszczyk, K.A. eds. *Polska w systemie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego*. [Poland in the international security system.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, pp. 269–294.

² Koziej, S. 2015. Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa). [The strategy of national (state) security.] In: Pawłowski, J. ed. *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa współczesnego państwa (podmiotu). Implikacje*. [Bases of security of the contemporary state (entity). Implications.] Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, pp. 493–532.

EU there is an armed conflict. Russia, illegally annexing Crimea, and then supporting directly and indirectly a separatist rebellion in the east of Ukraine, has undermined the international order in Europe. Ukraine itself is struggling with internal problems. Russia is increasing the political and strategic pressure on Eastern European NATO states, including through intensive information war and provoking military incidents in the air and sea space at the junction with NATO. At the same time in the Middle East and North Africa a threat from the so-called Islamic State is expanding and intra-European terrorism is weakening the stability of Europe. The EU is experiencing the largest internal crisis since its inception against the background of the migratory pressure, weakening integration processes, problems with leadership. All this causes specific threats and challenges for security that require both current and long-term efforts to strengthen national security of the Polish Republic.

The most urgent and current task is to complete the process of changes in the Polish security system related to the strategic turn shifting the main effort from foreign missions (expeditionary policy) to tasks related to direct Polish security, including the defence of its own territory. This means that state institutions should carry out a series of mutually coordinated activities aimed at strengthening the national potential and external pillars of Polish security. In this analysis I present ten strategic tasks, the implementation of which should lead to the achievement of this goal.

1. THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING CYCLE

Task: the completion of the strategic planning cycle taking into account the negative changes in the security environment caused by Russia's aggressive policy; verification of its results in the exercise of the COUNTRY type and launching of the next planning and organisation cycle, starting from conducting the second Strategic Review of National Security.

In recent years the state action in the area of national strategic planning has been put in order. Currently its full cycle is finishing, started with the first Strategic Review of National Security (2010–2012)³, then the approval of the new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (November

³ Overt results of the review: NSB. 2013. *Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

2014)⁴ and the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland issued by the President (July 2015)⁵. Now the main task is to update the operational plans for the operation of all the structures of the state in times of threat and war. This applies to both the central government and local governments, as well as the Armed Forces and other services and guards performing safety tasks. It is connected also with the need to update the Defence Response Plan of the Republic of Poland.

Another task is to complete the preparation and carrying out of the system verification exercise codenamed COUNTRY. The concept of the exercise was approved after the release the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland⁶. During the exercise the person designated to be appointed as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in the event of war should appear in this function for the first time.

In parallel with the operational preparations, the next cycle of development programming of the Armed Forces should be carried out, pursuant to the resolution of the Polish President on ‘Major Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and their Preparation for the Defence of the state for the years 2017–2026’⁷.

In 2016, it is advisable to start a next cycle of national strategic planning, starting from carrying out the second Strategic Review of National Security⁸. The review should have a verification and conceptual nature, giving the basis

⁴ NSB. 2014. *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

⁵ The Political and Strategic Defence Directive specifies the tasks for all state structures at the time of threat and war. See NSB. The NSB chief for PAP: *Dyrektywa obronna najważniejszym dokumentem wykonawczym do Strategii Bezpieczeństwa*. [The Defence Directive – the most important executive document of the Security Strategy.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6905,Szef-NSB-dla-PAP-Dyrektywa-obronna-najwazniejszym-dokumentem-wykonawczym-do-Stra.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

⁶ The President approved the concept of the exercises at the beginning of August 2015. See: NSB. The NSB chief for PAP *Ws. ćwiczeń systemu obronnego pk. „Kraj”*. [On the defence system exercise codenamed COUNTRY.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6942,Szef-NSB-dla-PAP-ws-cwiczen-systemu-obronnego-pk-quotKraj-quot.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

⁷ See NSB. *Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych*. [The President specified the main directions of development of the Armed Forces.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6941,Prezydent-okreslil-glowne-kierunki-rozwoju-Sil-Zbrojnych.html> [Accessed 5 May 2016].

⁸ On the role of the review see: Kamiński, S. 2015. *Przegląd bezpieczeństwa narodowego w planowaniu strategicznym Polski*. [The review of national security in the strategic planning of Poland.] Warszawa: Difin.

for the design of recommendations responding to the changing conditions of international and national security⁹.

The review should formulate a recommendation on the maintenance, revision or preparation of a new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. The result of the Review, in addition to the preparation of the report for the state authorities, should be also the second edition of the White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland.

The review can also be an opportunity to undertake work on Poland's first Encyclopaedia of National Security supporting the development of Polish security sciences¹⁰.

2. THE CONSOLIDATION (INTEGRATION) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The task: to strengthen the organisational system of national security management – the establishment of the Committee of the Council of Ministers for National Security and strengthening of the Government Security Centre as the staff body of this committee. Conducting a strategic training with the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, verification of the state defence managing positions, ensuring secure communications and the purchase of an aircraft for the transport of the most important people in the country (including mobile control stations).

Polish security is still managed 'by departments'. There are separate systems of planning and management of defence and crisis response extending from the headquarters, through ministries, provinces, up to local govern-

⁹ Possible options of conducting the second Strategic Review of National Security – see Koziej, S. *Ogólna koncepcja II Strategicznego Przeglądu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*. [The general concept of the second Strategic Review of National Security.] Available at: <http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Opcje-II-SPBN.pdf> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

¹⁰ The plan originated in the National Security Bureau during the preparation of the next strategic review. A reflection of this needs may also be: NSB, *MINISŁOWNIK NSB. Propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa*. [Minidictionary of NSB. Proposals for new terms in the field of security.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/minislownik-NSB-propozy/6035,MINISLOWNIK-NSB-Propozycje-nowych-terminow-z-dziedziny-bezpieczenstwa.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

ments (separate defence, crisis, Civil Defence plans and programmes). There is no integrated and comprehensive approach¹¹.

This happens in conditions when more and more areas of security are trans-sectoral (e.g. cyber security, energy security, defence industry issues, coordination of special services, etc.), which requires unified management. At the same time, among others, question of the organisation and functioning of the National Civil Defence should be comprehensively regulated, as it is a structure responsible for the protection of the population in the conditions of external threat to the security of the state and during a war.

Therefore there is a need to consolidate the system of national security at all levels of the state – from the Council of Ministers to the level of local government – according to a model: a decision-maker, a collegiate advisory body, a staff body.

At the central level, it is advisable to establish a Governmental Committee for National Security serviced by the Government National Security Centre, created by the expansion of the current Government Security Centre.

Moreover, key strategic state documents pertaining to security should also be substantively integrated. For example, instead of the current Political and Strategic Defence Directive, which regulates only defence matters, a Political and Strategic National Security Directive should be prepared which would regulate the activities of the state in all areas of security.

The integration of the national security management system also requires the regulation of laws, which can be achieved through the preparation of the law on national security management.

The implementation of such a comprehensive approach in practice requires proper preparation of specialised clerical personnel. For the needs of the national security management system it is advisable to create a university engaged in research and education in the field of integrated, trans-sectoral, cross-sectoral, state-wide national security (educating both students, and – at special courses – executives and civil servants). Such a university might be established during a reform of higher military education.

¹¹ All major theoretical studies confirm the conclusions of the Strategic Review of National Security about the need to integrate safety actions. See, e.g. Pawłowski, J. ed., *op. cit.*

3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC RESILIENCE OF THE COUNTRY TO AGGRESSION

The task: the completion of the preparation and implementation of a programme for strengthening the strategic resilience of the country to aggression (the duties of Special Forces in the defence of the country, the reform of the National Reserve Forces, the reserve mobilisation system, Civil Defence, the prevalence of defensive preparations, education for security, support for initiatives and activities of pro-defence associations and other social organisations, including for fostering patriotism).

The basis for ensuring the external security of the state is a suitable deterrence potential, which can have both an offensive (retaliatory) dimension and a defensive (deterrent) one.

In terms of offensive deterrence we should maximally use the alliance potential (nuclear and conventional ones) and selectively build our own capacities. At the same time Poland should organise its own national system of defensive deterrence (deterrence, repression).

The purpose of this system should be to immunise the state and its territory to various forms of aggression, especially to hybrid aggression, including primarily subthreshold aggression (below the threshold of an open, regular war), so that in strategic calculations of a potential aggressor offensive actions would be too expensive in comparison with the expected political and strategic benefits.

Therefore, the construction of a system of strategic resilience to all kinds of threats must be continued¹². The idea behind this system is the coordination of the legislative, operational, training, organisational, technical, etc actions in areas such as:

- irregular activities on the territory occupied by the enemy;
- military and non-military support of operating troops in regular activities;
- preparation of mobilisation reserves;
- operational preparation of the territory and protection of critical infrastructure;

¹² See more on this topic, among others, in: Koziej, S. 2016. Strategiczna odporność kraju i rola w niej podmiotów niepaństwowych. [Strategic resilience of the country and the role of the non-state actors.] *Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem*. Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego, vol. 8, no. 1/2016, pp. 82–92.

- ensuring the safety of citizens and state structures, including widespread civil protection;
- conducting public education for security, including defence preparation of society, among others, by exploiting the potential of non-governmental pro-defence organisations.

These operational tasks require the clarification of tasks of the Special Forces, the reformed National Reserve Forces (NSR) and territorial defence forces built on their basis, non-military security and civil protection formations, or non-governmental pro-defence organisations. These are also tasks connected with the improvement of the system of reserves mobilisation.

Irregular activities on the territory occupied by the enemy should be organised and coordinated by the Special Forces¹³. Therefore, they should be entrusted with a wider scope of country defence tasks; what is necessary is the increase of their number and their training on the territory of the country with other state structures.

A task of territorial defence forces (created especially as a result of the reform and expansion of the National Reserve Forces) should be local support for activities of operational troops and other security forces, as well as participation in irregular activities on the territory overrun by the enemy. Preparation for this task should be based on the reform and expansion of the NRF, leading to the creation of separate formations at military units, operating under the subordination to Provincial Military Chiefs of Staff ('provincial governors' army'). It is important that their members should be primarily reservists, not candidates for professional service.

It is necessary to improve the system of reserve mobilisation, enabling the strategic expansion of the armed forces to the size and structure of the war time and their replenishment in the course of any hostilities. The tasks in this area are the adequate planning of needs, the organisation of the mobilisation of resources and their systematic training.

The safety of state structures, citizens and critical infrastructure in the face of armed threats should be provided by non-military security formations. This is connected with the need to clarify properly tasks of the police, special forces, local government guards, security agencies and object protection formations and to prepare them for these tasks.

¹³ A study about special troops – see Królikowski, H. 2005. *Działania specjalne w strategii wojskowej III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [Special operations in the military strategy of the Third Republic of Poland.] Siedlce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej.

Adequately prepared formations of civil protection should be responsible for the protection of civilians from the effects of military and non-military threats in a time of war¹⁴. Preparation tasks in this area should involve, among others, the creation of a rescue system involving services such as the National Fire Service, emergency medical services and volunteer fire brigade and the creation of structures of Civil Defence of the Country for a time of war (appropriate transformation of some rescue formations into National Civil Defence formations for this time).

An important role in the system should be played by social pro-defence organisations (associations, uniformed classes, reconstruction groups), realising the task of preparing citizens and local communities for national security and preparing them to act in conditions of threat and war, including the implementation of defence tasks¹⁵.

4. THE ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE ACCELERATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CYBER SECURITY SYSTEM

The task: to develop a doctrine of information security and organise operation units in cyberspace in the Ministry of National Defence and other ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation) and public safety protection services, and to create a system of supra-ministry coordination of information activities and in cyberspace.

Among hybrid threats for the security of Poland the first place is occupied by the politico-military pressure, carried out mainly in the information sphere, also in cyberspace. Therefore, it should be a priority to build an

¹⁴ On challenges in this sphere see, among others: Kossowski, B., Włodarski, A. ed. 2007. *Wyzwania bezpieczeństwa cywilnego XXI wieku – inżynieria działań w obszarze nauki, dydaktyki i praktyki*. [Civil security challenges in the twenty-first century – engineering activities in the field of science, education and practice.] Warszawa: Fundacja Edukacja i Technika Ratownictwa.

¹⁵ Koziej, S. 2016. Marnowanie potencjału organizacji proobronnych nie wchodzi w grę. [Wasting of the potential of pro-defence organization is out of the question.] In: Chęłchowski, W., Czuba, A. *Militarni. Już wojskowi czy jeszcze cywile*. [The military. Already the military or still civilians.] Warszawa: MUZA SA.

effective system of information security with a well-organised cyber security sector¹⁶.

The beginning of action should be the development and adoption of the information security doctrine as one of the documents implementing the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland¹⁷. The doctrine should specify strategic objectives and determine the desirable courses of action (operational tasks), and the necessary preparations (preparation tasks) in the field of information security.

According to the outlined guidelines, the individual information security units (including cyber security units) should be created and expanded in the defence and protection (military and non-military) links of the national security system. These should be structures capable of performing both defensive and offensive tasks.

It is particularly important to ensure the sovereign operating and technical control over highly digitalised systems of combat and support, including management systems (disposal of source codes of their software). An important task is supra-ministry coordination of this issue in the context of building an integrated system of national security.

In the context of threats in cyberspace, it is important to:

- develop mechanisms of interaction and cooperation between the public and private sectors;
- ensure a balance between security measures and civil liberties;
- continuously improve civic awareness in the field of cyber security;
- use the potential of citizens within the country's cyber defence and cyber protection in the form of voluntary work for cyber security of the state;
- construct a support system for research and development projects in the field of cyber security, conducted in cooperation with the world of science and commercial enterprises;
- invest in national solutions in the field of cyber security, in particular in the field of cryptology;

¹⁶ Recently adopted doctrinal findings should be used and implemented. See: NSB. 2015. *Doktryna Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [The cybersecurity doctrine of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

¹⁷ A draft of such a document has been prepared by the NSB: *Doktryna Bezpieczeństwa Informacyjnego. Projekt*. [The Doctrine of Information Security. A draft.] Available at: http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Projekt_Doktryny_Bezpieczenstwa_Informacyjnego_RP.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2016].

- create a national mechanism for coordination of activities, serving not only the improvement of cooperation within the public administration, but also coordination of cooperation with the private sector.

In addition to the activities within information security, also other areas of non-military security, including energy security and economic security, should be strengthened.

5. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF PREPARATION OF RESERVE MOBILISATION AND A REFORM OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE FORCES

The task: to develop a system of armed forces mobilisation, with a simultaneous reform of the National Reserve Forces and involvement of social pro-defence organisations.

In the conditions of having a professional army, it is necessary for the state to have appropriately numerous and well-prepared reserves that can be mobilised.

It is assumed that the task of a professional army in a time of peace is primarily to prevent the outbreak of a conflict. In the event of war on a large scale the activities must be carried out by the armed forces expanded by the mobilisation to the size needed for this time. The expansion and prevalence of defence is ensured by the systematically trained reserves, along with weapons and equipment maintained them for the time of the expansion. In the face of the contemporary needs this solution is adequate and reasonable.

The increased activity of all pro-defence non-governmental social organisations should be maximally utilised for the training of military reserves. A good step in this direction is to associate some of these organisation into a national federation of such entities, with the support of the Ministry of National Defence.

An important element of the military reserve system should also be the reformed National Reserve Forces, along with the territorial defence forces created as a result of the reform. Reforming them we should move from single NRF jobs located today in operating troops to establishing separate, territorially subordinated formations (branches) of the NRF, constituting the first, 'elitist' and operational echelon (as opposed to the mobilisation of reserves) of strategic reserves of the Polish Armed Forces.

The main operational tasks of the so reformed the NRF should include local support for operations of operational troops and other services of the

state in ensuring territorial security or participation in irregular activities on the territory overrun by the enemy.

6. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 'THIRD WAVE' OF TECHNICAL MODERNISATION OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES – CYBER DEFENCE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS, PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS

The task: to consistently pursue a long-term programme of technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces in accordance with the adopted priorities and to prepare a programme of the modernisation 'third wave' oriented at extensive computerisation of the army (cyber defence, unmanned systems, precision-guided weapons, including ones based on the use of satellite technology).

The Armed Forces are a synthesis of three factors: man, weapons and organisation¹⁸. The personal capital is the most important. The organisational solutions are also important. However, weapon is the essence of the army. Without it, even the largest and best-organised group of people would not be a full-fledged army. Therefore, the development of weapons and military technology and their continuous technical modernisation are factors that largely prejudice the strength and the face of the armed forces, and determine the direction of the transformation of the army¹⁹.

The rational, planned and long-term development of the Armed Forces in Poland has a nearly fifteen-year history. Its beginning was the establishment in 2001 of the statutory fixed rate of budgetary outlays on the military at the level not lower than 1.95 percent of GDP (and, additionally, in a separate act 0.05 percent of GDP on the multiannual programme to finance the purchase of a multi-purpose aircraft).

As part of the planned modernisation a number of important programmes, which can be described as the 'first wave' of the modernisation of the Polish Army in the twenty-first century, have been implemented in the Armed Forces. It concerns primarily the acquisition of a multi-role aircraft F-16, a wheeled armoured personnel carrier ROSOMAK, or an anti-missile system SPIKE.

¹⁸ See more in: Koziej, S. 2011. *Teoria sztuki wojennej*. [The theory of military art.] Warszawa: Bellona.

¹⁹ See more on this topic, among others, in: Ciastoń, R. et al. 2014. *Sily Zbrojne RP – stan, perspektywy i wyzwania modernizacyjne*. [The Polish Armed Forces – the state, prospects and modernization challenges.] Warszawa: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego.

Currently the 'second wave' of the modernisation is being implemented. It consists of the programmes that are launched in accordance with the priorities laid down in the governmental and presidential Major Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and their Preparations for the Defence of the State for the years 2013–2022:

- air defence, including anti-missile defence²⁰;
- information systems (communications, reconnaissance, command);
- the mobility of land forces, especially the helicopter mobility.

As a result of the implementation of these programmes the Polish Armed Forces will belong to the main core of NATO forces. An important support here is raising the fixed rate of budgetary expenditure on defence to 2 percent of GDP.

However, in the near future the Polish Armed Forces await the implementation of priorities within the framework of the 'third wave' of the modernisation, the assumptions of which were outlined in the decision of the President on the Main Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and their Preparations for the Defence of the State for the years 2017–2026²¹.

Similarly to Toffler's theory of development of civilisation, the 'third wave' of the modernisation of the Polish Army in the twenty-first century should be a technological leap in the sphere of information. This means massive equipping of the Polish Armed Forces with the computerised combat and support systems. This process should be completed in the third or fourth decade of the twenty-first century.

As part of the 'third wave' the following three modernisation development programmes of the Polish Armed Forces must be treated as a priority²²:

- Cyber defence means (broadly – cyber combat, cyber weapons) – combat for supremacy in cyberspace will be even more important for the success

²⁰ See, e.g. Ciastoń, R. et al. 2014. „Polska Tarcza” – potrzeby, wyzwania i implikacje dla bezpieczeństwa kraju. [Polish ballistic missile defence – needs, challenges and implications for the security of the country.] Warszawa: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego.

²¹ See: NSB. Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych. [The President specified the main directions of development of the Armed Forces.], op. cit.

²² These priorities are in line with the latest trends in the development of the armed forces in the most technologically advanced armies of the world. See, e.g. the strategy of the so-called 'third offset' in the US Army: *The third U.S. offset strategy and its implications for partners and allies. As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2015.* Available at: <http://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=2575&Article=606641>

than, for instance, the struggle for supremacy in the air known in the previous century.

- Unmanned combat and support systems – the information revolution enables and enforces even wider replacing of men by highly computerised, unmanned systems (drones). Just like in the twentieth century cavalry was supplanted by tanks, so in the twenty-first century manned machines will be supplanted by unmanned ones.
- Precision-guided weapons, including the ones using satellite security technologies, i.e. systems making use of space for the need of national security, including the armed forces (just like all other computerised systems of combat and support, systems based on operation in cyberspace cannot operate effectively without the simultaneous use of space). Satellite communication, the use of satellites to identify, monitor, control, command, etc., are a prerequisite for the effective operation of computerised armed forces saturated with ITCs.

7. LAUNCHING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS (A FLYWHEEL OF INNOVATIVENESS FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

The task: to launch and implement the National Programme of Unmanned Systems as an engine of innovativeness for safety and economic development, especially the innovativeness of Polish defence industry.

There is a good chance for Poland to become one of the leading international manufacturers of unmanned systems. This innovative direction also presents a unique opportunity for a generation leap for Polish research and production potential in the sphere of defence.

Unmanned systems are among the most prospective security systems, including defence and protection systems. They are also used in other sectors of the economy, and in many spheres of public and private life. Other arguments in favour of the use of unmanned systems are their effectiveness, efficiency, and economic considerations, and – most importantly – the reduced risk of loss of human life or health²³.

²³ See more on this topic, e.g., in: NSB. *Potrzebny narodowy program bezzałogowców*. [We need the national programme of unmanned systems.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov>.

Therefore, their use and development must be one of modernisation priorities, which is already happening among others in the Polish army. In the future, their use, also by public and non-public services and protective guards will take place on an even larger scale. We can also expect an increase in commercial demand for drones, because a group of users of such systems, as well as the number of their applications is constantly growing.

When using unmanned aerial systems in the area of security a key issue is the information control and management systems, or 'cryptographic control' (own software source codes), without which it is impossible to fully rely on the used equipment. This is one of the most important arguments for the establishment of own, national programme of their development and production.

To fully control unmanned aerial systems at the operational level, they must be of Polish production. Purchases from abroad are in such a situation burdened with too great a risk to base the equipment of Polish forces and structures of national security on them.

Polish science and industry have a promising human and technical potential, creating opportunities for innovativeness to design and produce a full range of unmanned systems of various classes and types in the perspective of a decade.

Using this chance Poland could be in the forefront of European countries-producers of unmanned systems, and also cooperate with international producers, for example, in the framework of the European programme of unmanned systems²⁴.

What is necessary to launch the initiative of the National Programme for Unmanned Systems is the interest and cooperation of three groups: users defining the needs (the Polish Armed Forces, the police, services, guards); a scientific potential focused on the development of national solutions (including the National Centre for Research and Development); a production potential implementing specific projects (Polish defence industry entities). The cooperation of the above communities and the achieved synergy are a primary way to implement this complex challenge. It will also create a unique chance for a generation leap of Polish R&D and production poten-

pl/pl/wydarzenia/5375,Potrzebny-Narodowy-Program-Bezzalogowcow.html and http://youtu.be/Dxk5Z_Fd0NI [Accessed 6 May 2016].

²⁴ Even today these possibilities are significant. See, e.g. Lentowicz, Z. 2016. Bezzalogowce z Polski poleca walczyc za granica. [Unmanned aerial systems from Poland will fly to fight abroad.] *Rzeczpospolita* 4 May 2016.

tial in the sphere of defence²⁵, making unmanned systems a showcase of the national defence potential

8. THE ACTIVITIES STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The task: to develop on the international forum activities strengthening the mechanisms of NATO collective defence, including the defence potential on the eastern flank of the Alliance, especially by transforming the training, rotational presence of the armed forces of allied countries in the region into the strategic, continuous, permanent presence.

NATO responded adequately to the outbreak of the conflict in the east increasing the military allied activity and presence in the flank countries, as well as in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea²⁶.

However, given the durability of changes in the security environment caused by Russia, the permanent strategic adaptation of the Alliance's policy has become an important issue, especially by strengthening the mechanisms of collective defence.

Important directions of this adaptation – leading to strategic strengthening of the capacity on the eastern flank of NATO – were adopted at the NATO summit in Newport in 2014. The most important of them is the continuous, rotational military presence on the eastern flank in the framework of the increased exercise activity; the creation of the so-called 'Very High Readiness Joint Task Force' for immediate response (VJTF); the creation of advanced command elements with the necessary logistic infrastructure and support; the concretisation of contingency plans with the possible transformation of some of them into permanent defence plans in the future.

At the NATO summit in Warsaw (scheduled for 8–9 July 2016) these tasks should be summarised. At the same time it will be important to design the directions of the further strategic adaptation of the Alliance.

In this regard, it should be the most important to build the capacity to scare away, halt, deter a potential opponent from aggression below the threshold of an open, regular war. The Alliance undoubtedly has the cred-

²⁵ To see how important it is, see Kleiber, M. 2014. Nauka i technologia na rzecz bezpieczeństwa państwa w polskich realiach. [Science and technology is aid of the security of the state in the Polish reality.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 32, pp. 61–74.

²⁶ Koziej, S., Pietrzak, P. 2014. Szczyt NATO w Newport. [NATO summit in Newport.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 31, pp. 11–30.

ible deterrence potential, including nuclear deterrence, against large-scale aggression on its territory. On the other hand, the difficulty with responding and obtaining a consensus within NATO may occur in the event of irregular, asymmetric aggression, hybrid low-intensity aggression, and especially aggression below the threshold of an open war²⁷.

One of the important ways to deter a potential aggressor from such actions is to ensure a strategic presence of troops from other allied countries on the territory of NATO border states. A potential attacker would then have to take into his strategic account entering into a conflict not only with the country which is the target of aggression, but also the countries whose troops would be deployed on the territory of the attacked state.

It is therefore necessary to strengthen the military presence in the border countries, in particular, to give it a more permanent nature. The concept of 'Very High Readiness Joint Task Force' adopted in Newport and the system of the rotary, exercise presence should be supplemented at the summit in Warsaw with the continuous presence of not even numerous, but clearly visible allied forces and adequate infrastructure in the border zone of NATO.

It is also important that the use the doctrine of the 'Very High Readiness Joint Task Force' for immediate response also assumed their anticipatory expansion in the direction of threats already in the phase of the emerging crisis, and not only in the form of a response to the existing aggression. Moreover, previous deployment of military equipment and weaponry in the border countries ('prepositioning') will also contribute to enhancing of the speed of VJTF operations.

One important challenge is NATO's conceptual response to Russia's nuclear doctrine with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, including the concept of the so-called 'de-escalation nuclear strikes' during a conventional conflict. This requires modification and adaptation of NATO nuclear doctrine concerning especially tactical nuclear weapons to virtually neo-Cold War conditions²⁸.

²⁷ On certain aspects of this problem – see Fryc, M. 2015. Polska strategia obronności wobec potencjalnego wystąpienia zagrożenia militarnego z elementami „wojny hybrydowej”. [Polish defence strategy against the potential military threat with 'hybrid war' elements.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 33, pp. 61–80.

²⁸ Koziej, S. 2016. Nuclear deterrence in the new Cold War. *Geopolitical Information Service* 6 May 2016. Available at: <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1462512789466042800> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

It also seems that, given the scale, nature and duration of changes in the security environment²⁹, a fundamental reflection within NATO on the amendment to the Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010 will be necessary. It is advisable to start working on it already at the next NATO summit in Warsaw, with the prospect of the adoption of a new concept at the summit in 2018.

9. ACTIVITIES LEADING TO STRATEGIC EMPOWERMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE EU (POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO HYBRID THREATS)

The task: to continue efforts to agree on a new common and viable EU security strategy, taking into account its complementarity with NATO and the development of systemic mechanisms of cooperation between NATO and the EU (the construction of a Euro-Atlantic 'security tandem').

The European Union is one of the pillars of Poland's security³⁰. Despite the fact that NATO remains the main international guarantor of military security, including of Poland and other Central European countries, the reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict showed that the EU has a great deterrent potential implemented by means of economic instruments, such as economic sanctions. The EU can also complement the competences of the Alliance in the field of non-military security, including energy, information, cybernetic, financial and social security.

If, however, the potential of the EU as a security pillar of the Republic of Poland is to be fully utilised, it has to become an essential strategic actor in the field of security and defence. That is why, Poland should seek to strengthen the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), engaging in the development of this initiative and defining its future shape³¹.

²⁹ A prognostic study on this topic: Fiszer, J.M., Wódka, J., Olszewski, P., Paszewski, T., Cianciara, A., Orzelska-Stączek, A. 2014. *System euroatlantycki w wielobiegunowym świecie. Próba prognozy. [The Euro-Atlantic system in the multipolar world. A forecast attempt.]* Warszawa: ISP PAN.

³⁰ Fiszer, J.M. ed. 2015. *Dziesięć lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Próba bilansu i nowe otwarcie. [Ten years of Polish membership in the European Union. An assessment attempt and a new opening.]* Warszawa: ISP PAN.

³¹ Koziej, S. 2016. *Przed czerwcowym szczytem UE w sprawie WPBiO – Europa potrzebuje jakościowo nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa. [Before the June EU summit on CSDP –*

The main challenge of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy – which became evident as a result of the Ukrainian crisis³² – is the lack of a uniform strategy with which all Member States would identify themselves. The European Union needs a strategy to become a more efficient and effective institution. This strategy should relate to military affairs, but also (and perhaps primarily) to non-military aspects of security³³.

What is needed are actions building the sense of the empowerment of the European Union as a strategic actor of security, especially in the face of the rapidly changing security environment on its eastern flank. A key to strengthening the subjectivity of the EU will be the implementation of the tasks posed by the European Council on 25–26 June 2015 ordering the preparation of the EU global strategy for foreign and security policy by June 2016³⁴.

The cooperation on the forum of NATO-EU is of particular importance. It seems that now is the right time to break the long-term deadlock and take action to build a Euro-Atlantic security tandem.

It is important in the face of the contemporary complexity of security threats in Europe³⁵, hybridity meaning the simultaneous use of different methods and means of pressure and aggression from political, diplomatic, informational ones, through economic, financial, energy, cyber, to military ones in all possible degrees of severity (including aggression below the threshold of an open, regular war, particularly dangerous for allied/community organisations).

The EU-NATO tandem is an optimal solution in countering hybrid threats. The EU would be particularly effective in the field of non-military security and NATO in political and military security.

Europe needs a qualitatively new security strategy.] Fundacja Pułaskiego. Available at: <http://pulaski.pl/przed-czerwcowym-szczytem-ue-w-sprawie-wpbio-europa-potrzebuj-jakosciowo-nowej-strategii-bezpieczenstwa/> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

³² Sobczyk, K. 2015. Konflikt na Ukrainie – porażka czy szansa dla Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE? [The conflict in Ukraine – a defeat or a chance for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy?] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 33, pp. 37–60.

³³ Koziej, S., Formusiewicz, R. 2014. O potrzebie nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The need for a new security strategy of the European Union.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 32, pp. 17–30.

³⁴ Koziej, S. 2016. The EU needs a security strategy based on common interests. *Geopolitical Information Service* 2 September 2016. Available at: <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/defense-and-security/the-eu-needs-a-security-strategy-based-on-common-interests> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

³⁵ On the diversity of threats and challenges – see Wojciechowski, S., Potyrała, A. ed. 2014. *Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne wyzwania.* [Poland's security. Contemporary challenges.] Warszawa: Difin.

10. STRENGTHENING OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, ESPECIALLY THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US

The task: to strive for the permanent stationing of US troops in Poland and in the region (including missile defence systems, air forces, special forces) and to expand Polish-American political-military cooperation adding non-military dimensions. At the same time to strengthen relations with key European allies and the countries of the region lying on the eastern flank of NATO.

The strategic partnership with the United States is the third – alongside the membership in NATO and the European Union – external pillar of Poland's security. It is in the interest of Poland to strive for the durability and quality of the transatlantic links, based on the foundation of the US military presence in Europe, particularly on the eastern flank of NATO.

Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict the United States has undertaken a number of actions to enhance the security of Central and Eastern Europe, including in the framework of the European Reassurance Initiative announced by US President Barack Obama in Warsaw on the Freedom Day 4 June 2014.

Recently these decisions have been strengthened by an increased budget for the needs of the presence of the US forces in the region; strategic, continuous, rotary in the case of the personnel and constant in the case of heavy equipment and weapons. These activities should acquire a more permanent character, and be complemented by the presence of troops also of other European allies, the presence of NATO's on the eastern flank should have the highest possible multinational character.

Currently a priority for the Polish-American strategic partnership is the planned development of the allied missile defence system, whose key element is the American component within the EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach). A missile defence base located in Redzikowo, the construction of which should begin this year, is to become its part in 2018³⁶. The continuation of technical and military cooperation should be also an important element of strengthening this co-operation.

³⁶ Fryc, M. 2014. Rozwój amerykańskiego systemu przeciwrakietowego w Europie – czy możliwe jest przyspieszenie budowy „tarczy”? [The development of the American anti-missile system in Europe – is it possible to speed up the construction of Polish ballistic missile defence?] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 31, pp. 31–50.

Apart from the cooperation in the field of 'hard' security, Poland should seek to expand a bilateral strategic security dialogue with the United States adding issues related to supporting democracy in the world, cyber threats, energy security and scientific-technical cooperation. The prospect of cooperation in the field of energy gains special importance.

The strengthening of cooperation with the United States should be accompanied by the development and strengthening of regional and bilateral partnerships of Poland with major European allies (the Weimar Triangle, the United Kingdom), as well as with the countries of the eastern flank (the Visegrad Group, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria), as well as the Scandinavian countries. Investments in the format of the eastern flank countries appear to be particularly promising. They can bring tangible benefits both in terms of bilateral activities, as well as in the framework of NATO and the European Union.

* * *

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the continuity, the continuation of the efforts of the state is particularly important in ensuring national security. Work in fits and starts, from change to change, is not the best procedure. Security requires a strategic approach, and that means being directed by long-term priorities. They cannot be changed ad hoc. Let us hope that a change of political power in Poland – beyond the natural propaganda rhetoric – will not lead to a real break in the priorities of Polish security presented in this publication, and realised, in fact, for years.

REFERENCES

- Ciastoń, R. et al. 2014. „Polska Tarcza” – potrzeby, wyzwania i implikacje dla bezpieczeństwa kraju. [*Polish ballistic missile defence – needs, challenges and implications for the security of the country.*] Warszawa: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego.
- Ciastoń, R. et al. 2014. *Sily Zbrojne RP – stan, perspektywy i wyzwania modernizacyjne.* [*The Polish Armed Forces – the state, prospects and modernization challenges.*] Warszawa: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego.
- Fiszer, J.M. ed. 2015. *Dziesięć lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Próba bilansu i nowe otwarcie.* [*Ten years of Polish membership in the European Union. An assessment attempt and a new opening.*] Warszawa: ISP PAN.

- Fischer, J.M., Wódka, J., Olszewski, P., Paszewski, T., Cianciara, A., Orzel-ska-Stączek, A. 2014. *System euroatlantycki w wielobiegunowym świecie. Próba prognozy.* [The Euro-Atlantic system in the multipolar world. A forecast attempt.] Warszawa: ISP PAN.
- Fryc, M. 2014. Rozwój amerykańskiego systemu przeciwrakietowego w Europie – czy możliwe jest przyspieszenie budowy „tarczy”? [The development of the American anti-missile system in Europe – is it possible to speed up the construction of Polish ballistic missile defence?] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 31.
- Fryc, M. 2015. Polska strategia obronności wobec potencjalnego wystąpienia zagrożenia militarnego z elementami „wojny hybrydowej”. [Polish defence strategy against the potential military threat with ‘hybrid war’ elements.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 33.
- Kamiński, S. 2015. *Przegląd bezpieczeństwa narodowego w planowaniu strategicznym Polski.* [The review of national security in the strategic planning of Poland.] Warszawa: Difin.
- Kleiber, M. 2014. Nauka i technologia na rzecz bezpieczeństwa państwa w polskich realiach. [Science and technology is aid of the security of the state in the Polish reality.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 32.
- Kossowski, B., Włodarski, A. ed. 2007. *Wyzwania bezpieczeństwa cywilnego XXI wieku – inżynieria działań w obszarze nauki, dydaktyki i praktyki.* [Civil security challenges in the twenty-first century – engineering activities in the field of science, education and practice.] Warszawa: Fundacja Edukacja i Technika Ratownictwa.
- Koziej, S. 2011. *Teoria sztuki wojennej.* [The theory of military art.] Warszawa: Bellona.
- Koziej, S. 2015. Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa). [The strategy of national (state) security.] In: Pawłowski, J. ed. *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa współczesnego państwa (podmiotu). Implikacje.* [Bases of security of the contemporary state (entity). Implications.] Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej,
- Koziej, S. 2016. Marnowanie potencjału organizacji proobronnych nie wchodzi w grę. [Wasting of the potential of pro-defence organization is out of the question.] In: Chełchowski, W., Czuba, A. *Militarni. Już wojskowi czy jeszcze cywile.* [The military. Already the military or still civilians.] Warszawa: MUZA SA.
- Koziej, S. 2016. Nuclear deterrence in the new Cold War. *Geopolitical Information Service* 6 May 2016. Available at: <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1462512789466042800> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

- Koziej, S. 2016. *Przed czerwcowym szczytem UE w sprawie WPBiO – Europa potrzebuje jakościowo nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa.* [Before the June EU summit on CSDP – Europe needs a qualitatively new security strategy.] Fundacja Pułaskiego. Available at: <http://pulaski.pl/przed-czerwcowym-szczytem-ue-w-sprawie-wpbio-europa-potrzebuje-jakosciowo-nowej-strategii-bezpieczenstwa/> [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- Koziej, S. 2016. Strategiczna odporność kraju i rola w niej podmiotów niepaństwowych. [Strategic resilience of the country and the role of the non-state actors.] *Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem.* Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego, vol. 8, no. 1/2016.
- Koziej, S. 2016. System bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski. [Systems of Poland's national security.] In: Pietraś, M., Wojtaszczyk, K.A. eds. *Polska w systemie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.* [Poland in the international security system.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR.
- Koziej, S. 2016. The EU needs a security strategy based on common interests. *Geopolitical Information Service* 2 September 2016. Available at: <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/defense-and-security/the-eu-needs-a-security-strategy-based-on-common-interests> [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- Koziej, S., Formusiewicz, R. 2014. O potrzebie nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The need for a new security strategy of the European Union.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 32.
- Koziej, S. *Ogólna koncepcja II Strategicznego Przeglądu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego.* [The general concept of the second Strategic Review of National Security.] Available at: <http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Opcje-II-SPBN.pdf> [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- Koziej, S., Pietrzak, P. 2014. Szczyt NATO w Newport. [NATO summit in Newport.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 31.
- Królikowski, H. 2005. *Działania specjalne w strategii wojskowej III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.* [Special operations in the military strategy of the Third Republic of Poland.] Siedlce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej.
- Lentowicz, Z. 2016. Bezzałogowce z Polski polecą walczyć za granicą. [Unmanned aerial systems from Poland will fly to fight abroad.] *Rzeczpospolita* 4 May 2016.
- NSB. 2013. *Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.* [White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.
- NSB. 2014. *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.* [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.
- NSB. 2015. *Doktryna Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.* [The cyber-security doctrine of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

- NSB. *Doktryna Bezpieczeństwa Informacyjnego. Projekt.* [The Doctrine of Information Security. A draft.] Available at: http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Projekt_Doktryny_Bezpieczenstwa_Informacyjnego_RP.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- NSB, *MINISŁOWNIK NSB. Propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa.* [Minidictionary of NSB. Proposals for new terms in the field of security.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/minislownik-NSB-propozy/6035,MINISLOWNIK-NSB-Propozycje-nowych-terminow-z-dziedziny-bezpieczenstwa.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- NSB. *Potrzebny narodowy program bezałogowców.* [We need the national programme of unmanned systems.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/5375,Potrzebny-Narodowy-Program-Bezalogowcow.html> and http://youtu.be/Dxk5Z_Fd0NI [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- NSB. *Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych.* [The President specified the main directions of development of the Armed Forces.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6941,Prezydent-okreslil-glowne-kierunki-rozwoju-Sil-Zbrojnych.html> [Accessed 5 May 2016].
- NSB. The NSB chief for PAP *Dyrektywa obronna najważniejszym dokumentem wykonawczym do Strategii Bezpieczeństwa.* [The Defence Directive – the most important executive document of the Security Strategy.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6905,Szef-NSB-dla-PAP-Dyrektywa-obronna-najwazniejszym-dokumentem-wykonawczym-do-Stra.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- NSB. The NSB chief for PAP *Ws. ćwiczeń systemu obronnego pk. „Kraj”.* [On the defence system exercise codenamed COUNTRY.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6942,Szef-NSB-dla-PAP-ws-cwiczen-systemu-obronnego-pk-quotKrajquot.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].
- Sobczyk, K. 2015. Konflikt na Ukrainie – porażka czy szansa dla Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE? [The conflict in Ukraine – a defeat or a chance for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy?] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 33.
- The third U.S. offset strategy and its implications for partners and allies. As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2015.* Available at: <http://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=2575&Article=606641>
- Wojciechowski, S., Potyrała, A. ed. 2014. *Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne wyzwania.* [Poland's security. Contemporary challenges.] Warszawa: Difin.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC TASKS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AT THE TURN OF THE SECOND AND THIRD DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Summary

This article presents the main strategic tasks that Poland should take to strengthen their own security in the next 5 to 10 years. The first and particularly important task is to continue the cycle of national strategic planning. It is necessary to complete the development of basic directive and planning documents to ensure the implementation of the adopted in 2014, the new National Security Strategy, and at the same time to start another Strategic Review of National Security, starting a new cycle of planning. Six tasks concern the practical, organisational and technical strengthening Poland's own security capabilities. These include: the consolidation of the system of national security management, building a system of strategic resilience to aggression, organizing national information security system, including the acceleration of the construction of the cyber security system, improving preparation of reserve mobilisation and reform of the National Reserve Forces, implementation of the 'third wave' of technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces – cyber-defence, unmanned systems, precision-guided weapons, launch and implementation of the National Programme for unmanned systems (flywheel of innovation for security and development). The third part of the tasks refers to activities aimed at strengthening the Poland's external security pillars. These are measures to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the strategic actions leading to the empowerment of the European Union and the development of cooperation between NATO and the EU (political and strategic response to hybrid threats) and strengthening strategic partnerships, especially the alliance with the US.

STRATEGICZNE ZADANIA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA NARODOWEGO RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ NA PRZEŁOMIE II I III DEKADY XXI WIEKU

Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia główne zadania strategiczne, jakie Polska powinna podjąć dla wzmocnienia swojego bezpieczeństwa w najbliższych 5–10 latach. Pierwszym i szczególnie ważnym zadaniem jest kontynuacja cyklu narodowego planowania strategicznego. Należy dokończyć opracowanie podstawowych dokumentów dyrektywnych i planistycznych zapewniających realizację przyjętej w 2014 roku nowej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego i jednocześnie uruchomić kolejny Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, rozpoczynający nowy cykl planistyczny. Sześć zadań dotyczy praktycznego, organizacyjno-technicznego wzmocnienia własnego potencjału bezpieczeństwa. Należą do nich: konsolidacja systemu kierowania bezpieczeństwem narodowym, budowa systemu strategicznej odporności kraju na agresję, organizowanie narodowego systemu bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego – w tym przyspieszenie budowy systemu cyberbezpieczeństwa, doskonalenie systemu przygotowywania rezerw mobilizacyjnych oraz reforma Narodowych Sił Rezerwowych, wdrożenie „trzeciej fali” modernizacji technicznej Sił Zbrojnych RP – cyberobrona, systemy bezzałogowe, broń precyzyjnego rażenia, uruchomienie i realizacja Narodowego Programu Systemów Bezzałogowych (koło zamachowe innowacyjności dla bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju). Trzecia część zadań dotyczy działań na rzecz wzmocnienia zewnętrznych filarów bezpieczeństwa Polski. Są to działania wzmocniające Sojusz Północnoatlantycki, działania prowadzące do strategicznego upodmiotowienia Unii Europejskiej i rozwoju współpracy NATO-UE (polityczno-strategiczna odpowiedź na zagrożenia hybrydowe) oraz umacnianie strategicznych partnerstw, szczególnie sojuszu z USA.

СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ЗАДАЧИ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ПОЛЬША НА РУБЕЖЕ II И III ДЕКАД XXI ВЕКА

Резюме

В статье представлены главные стратегические задачи, которые Польше необходимо решить для укрепления своей безопасности в ближайшие 5–10 лет. Первостепенной и важнейшей задачей является продолжение цикла национального стратегического планирования. Необходимо завершить разработку базовых директивных и планистических документов, обеспечивающих реализацию принятой в 2014 году новой Стратегии Национальной Безопасности и одновременно привести в действие очередной Обзор стратегий национальной безопасности, начинающий новый планистический цикл. Шесть задач касаются практического, организационно-технического укрепления собственного потенциала безопасности. К ним относятся: консолидация системы управления национальной безопасностью, формирование системы стратегической устойчивости государства к агрессии, организация национальной системы информационной безопасности, – в частности, ускоренное формирование системы кибербезопасности, совершенствование системы подготовки мобилизационных резервов, а также реформа Национальных резервных сил, реализация «третьей волны» технической модернизации вооруженных сил Польши – киберзащита, беспилотные системы, высокоточное оружие, приведение в действие и реализация Национальной программы систем беспилотных летательных аппаратов, (маховик инноваций для безопасности и развития). Третий цикл задач связан с деятельностью, направленной на укрепление внешних устоев безопасности Польши. Среди них можно назвать действия по укреплению Североатлантического блока, действия, направленные на стратегическое расширение прав и возможностей Европейского Союза и развитие сотрудничества НАТО-ЕС (политическо-стратегическая реакция на угрозы смешанного типа), а также укрепление стратегических партнерств, в первую очередь альянса с США.

R E V I E W S

TOMASZ KAMIŃSKI
SYPIAJĄC ZE SMOKIEM. POLITYKA UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ WOBEC CHINY
[‘*SLEEPING WITH THE DRAGON.*
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA’]

WYDAWNICTWO UNIwersYTETU ŁÓDZKIEGO
ŁÓDŹ 2015, PP. 194

The importance of China in the international arena has been growing steadily for years. In the modern world due to the economic links connecting states and the nature of global challenges, it is simply impossible to ignore China, that is the title ‘dragon’. Also the European Union itself trying to maintain its current position in the international arena is simply doomed to a partnership with China. However, as the author indicates ‘sharing the bedroom with the “dragon” is neither comfortable nor easy’ (p. 8). It seems that these words perfectly describe the situation the European Union is now in. In his book Tomasz Kamiński tries to present the complexity of relations between the two entities, showing what changes they underwent in the period between the publication of the first EU strategy towards China in 1995 and 2014 when China became the world’s largest economy. The main aim of the author is to prove the thesis ‘that in the balance of power between the EU and China there was a fundamental change to the disadvantage of Europe, as a result of which it lost the possibility to effectively use a part of the tools of its external policy’ (p. 13). In addition to the main aim, the author also lists three specific objectives which include: the identification of historical and institutional conditions, the analysis of the key areas of the EU’s policy towards China, and the determination of the scope of necessary changes in the assumptions of the EU’s policy.

The main part of the work was divided into eight chapters, each of which is dedicated to a different issue associated with the EU’s policy towards

China. This division results in part from the above-mentioned aims adopted by the author. The first chapter of the book entitled „Bilans pierwszego dwudziestolecia relacji – polityka wobec ChRL w latach 1975–1994” [‘The balance of the first two decades of the relations – the policy towards China in the years 1975–1994’] presents the genesis of the EU’s relations with China. In order to systematise the chapter, this period is further divided into three characteristic stages. The first covers the years 1975–1989, that is the stage of development of economic relations. Particular attention was devoted to the Agreement on Trade and Cooperation adopted in 1985 which still constitutes the current legal basis for mutual relations. The next stage covers the years 1989–1991, i.e. the period of the crisis in relations caused by the massacre in Tiananmen Square. The last stage are the years 1992–1995, that is the period of normalisation of relations. The author shows how the first Asian strategy was adopted by the European Commission in 1994, which became the reason for the adoption of a strategy dedicated exclusively to China a year later.

The second chapter entitled „Ewolucja strategicznych założeń polityki unijnej wobec Chin” [‘The evolution of strategic objectives of the EU’s policy towards China’] is a direct continuation of the narrative begun in the previous chapter. The starting point for the author is the programme document entitled ‘A long term policy for China-Europe relations’ adopted by the European Commission in 1995. In this chapter Tomasz Kamiński makes an in-depth analysis of six programming documents adopted in the period from 1995 to 2006, when the last strategy was issued, entitled ‘Closer partners, growing responsibilities’. Each of these documents is thoroughly described in separate subsections.

The third chapter is entitled „Struktura instytucjonalna polityki Unii Europejskiej wobec Chin” [‘The institutional structure of the EU’s policy towards China’]. In this chapter the author presents the institutional state both before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. A lot of attention was devoted here also to the issue of high mismatch between the current legal basis of the EU-China relations and the current reality. Both parties are unable to agree on the scope of a new framework agreement which would replace the current agreement dating back to 1985. While Europe wants to conclude a comprehensive agreement which would cover both political and economic issues, China wants to reduce its scope solely to economic issues.

The fourth chapter is entitled „Gospodarczy wymiar współpracy Unii Europejskiej z Chinami” [‘The economic dimension of EU cooperation with China’]. In terms of size it is the most extensive chapter in the whole work,

which is justified by the fact that economic issues are still the most important aspect of the relations between the two entities. A lot of attention was devoted to changes in trade relations which occurred when China joined the World Trade Organisation. Moreover, Tomasz Kamiński raises an extremely valid issue related to granting of the status of the 'market economy' to China.

The next chapter „Unia Europejska wobec problemu łamania praw człowieka w Chinach” [‘The European Union and the problem of human rights violation in China’] was dedicated to one of the most problematic issues in the relations between the EU and China. The author describes how the attitude of EU decision-makers to the issue of human rights violations changed from the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 to the reactions to the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008.

The sixth chapter is entitled „Problem ochrony środowiska w polityce wobec Chin” [‘The problem of environment protection in policy towards China’]. This topic is very important because this is now one of the most serious challenges of a global nature. What is worth attention is the fact that it is one of few areas of cooperation, in which both parties at least seem to agree with each other on the merits. Chinese policymakers have been trying to acquire Western know-how in the field of renewable energy technologies for years, so Europe is the ideal partner for talks.

The next chapter, „Embargo na sprzedaż broni” [‘The embargo on arms sales’] raises the issues of the embargo imposed on China after the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Despite long-term attempts of Chinese authorities to abolish the embargo there has been no breakthrough yet, partly, as indicated by the author, as a result of strong pressure from the United States.

The last, eighth chapter entitled „Pomoc unijna dla Chin” [‘The EU’s aid for China’] describes the issue of development aid granted to China in the past. The author attempts to answer the question about the effectiveness of the executed aid projects and programmes. However, an answer which is unfavourable for the European Union emerges from his considerations. In the current EU budget for 2013-2020 European states did not foresee further development aid for China.

There is no doubt that Tomasz Kamiński’s book clearly indicates that indeed in accordance with the adopted thesis there was a change in the distribution of power. When in 1995, the EU adopted its first programme document entitled ‘A long term policy for China-Europe relations’ it was clearly a dominant party in the relations. Since then, China has undergone a remarkable economic transformation and has become a power as influential as the EU itself. The original plan of constructive engagement of China in

more active participation in the international arena lost its meaning a long time ago because the People's Republic of China has occupied an important position in world politics for a long time. We may wonder, however, if the thesis advanced here is ambitious enough, whether this fact is not already well-known in the second decade of the twenty-first century to the majority of researchers interested in international relations. Nevertheless, the book according to its subtitle „Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Chin” [‘The European Union’s policy towards China’] provides an extremely valuable knowledge about a wide spectrum of issues related to the EU-China relations. Thanks to the efficient and coherent narrative the reader is led through all key aspects of these relations.

The title chosen by the author „Sypiając ze smokiem” [‘Sleeping with the dragon’] very well illustrates Europe’s relations with China outlined in the book. After reading, it seems that the title can be understood in two ways. The first way involves the spontaneous association with the saying ‘sleeping with the enemy’. Indeed, the EU has to deal with a partner but also – what you have to remember – a more and more influential competitor in the international arena which presents completely different values. It is difficult for both parties to reach an agreement in the majority of issues. It can be assumed that some of the issues which have been in deadlock for years, for example the European arms embargo, will still be valid for many years. But despite all issues that divide the two sides, they are aware that they are doomed to cooperate with each other and whether they want it or not they have to find a way to common coexistence. The other way of understanding the title is connected with the assessment of the hitherto prevailing activity of the EU in relations with China. After considering this it can be concluded that while the ‘dragon’ is becoming more and more influential, the Union is simply asleep. It is aware of the need for closer relations with China and yet is still doing far too little to turn the relations with that country into a real, not just on paper, strategic partnership.

„Sypiając ze smokiem” [‘Sleeping with the dragon’] is a very important item on the Polish market since, as the author notes in the introduction, the relations of these two world powers have not yet been summarised in a comprehensive monograph in our native language. Given the scale of political and economic ties between the European Union and China this state of affairs is incomprehensible. That is why, we should appreciate Tomasz Kamiński’s book which can contribute to the popularisation of the issues in Poland. The advantage of the book is that the author draws his knowledge from the analysis of sources, both primary and secondary, the majority of

them are foreign publications in the English language, not readily available in our market.

The only drawback of the book is the fact that the burden of the narrative seems to sometimes stop in the years 2005–2008. For example, the author discussing the issue of the impact of exchange rates on trade relations focuses on the rates of the yuan against the euro from 1999, 2004 and finally 2008, when one euro cost even 10.7 yuan (p. 89). He does not mention, however, that at the end of 2014 one euro cost only 7.6 yuan. In another place he writes, ‘it is estimated that the average savings of a statistical European household arising from the availability of cheaper goods from China amount to about 300 euro per year’ (p. 74). While this information is valuable for the reader, it seems that the author should have explained that the source on which he relies says about the state of as late as 2006. These minor shortcomings on the part of the author may partly result from the fact that, as he himself admits, the book is to some degree based on the doctoral thesis, in which the narrative ended in 2008 (p. 9). It cannot be denied, however, that the author has put a lot of effort to expand and update the narrative by adding events until 2014. In the book we find a lot of information and statistical data on the present state and current activities of the European Union.

In conclusion, the book is a very good position for all persons for whom the subject of relations between the European Union and the title ‘dragon’ remains unknown. It is also worth recommending to all persons who wish to systematise and supplement their existing knowledge. Due to the fact that the author used a thought out and transparent structure of the work, and a very intelligible language readers can easily and fast familiarise themselves with basic information about the complex relations between the European Union and China.

Łukasz Świetnicki

KAROL ŻAKOWSKI

*'DECISION-MAKING REFORM IN JAPAN. THE DPJ'S FAILED ATTEMPT
AT THE POLITICIAN-LED GOVERNMENT'*

ROUTLEDGE, LONDON AND NEW YORK 2015, PP. 223

Karol Żakowski is a doctor of political science, a lecturer in the Department of East Asian Studies at the Faculty of Political and International Studies of the University of Łódź. In his academic work he focuses on Japan, both on its external affairs (mainly relations with China), as well as internal ones. The subject of the reviewed book is the best example of his interests. Żakowski describes in it an unsuccessful attempt of a reform of the decision-making system and the introduction of an effective mechanism of policy making in the country which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), ruling in Japan in 2009–2012, tried to put into practice.

In the introduction the author writes about the DPJ's victory in the parliamentary election in 2009, and its announcements and plans to exchange state administration managed by bureaucracy. It concerned the whole Japanese system supporting the 'iron triangle' of connections between politicians, bureaucrats and big business (p. 1).

These announcements were not realized, and the DPJ returned to the political practices of its predecessor, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The consequence of this was its electoral defeat in 2012 and the return of the LDP to power.

In the introduction the author identifies and defines the theoretical foundation on which the analysis of the issues described in his work is based. It is a 'historical institutionalism'. Żakowski quotes the opinion of a scholar Douglas North, according to which 'institutions are the rules of the game in society' and 'man-made structures, shaping human interactions' (p. 2).

Later in the introduction the author recalls the inspiration of the DPJ leadership with the British political system (the so-called Westminster model),

as well as the idea of the government composed of and administered by politicians (not bureaucrats).

In the first chapter Żakowski presents the decision-making process during the reign of the LDP. He points to its weakness, whose main element was the ‘two-track’ decision-making process – where bodies of the ruling party were more important than the government. The consequence of this were ‘weak prime ministers’ – not able to push their vision over the opinion of party leaders.

That is why, the slogan about the government controlled by politicians became an important element of the identity of the DPJ and was one of the reasons of the political change in 2009.

Reforms conducted in the nineties strengthened slightly the position of the prime minister against the ruling party and bureaucrats. However, according to the author, what was needed to properly apply them was a prime minister with the personality of a strong leader. One such person was the LDP Prime Minister – Junichiro Koizumi, in contrast to his successors.

The next three chapters of the book (the second, third and fourth) are devoted to the evolution of the mechanism of policy making during the exercise of power by the offices of successive prime ministers of Japan – Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda.

The aim of the first of them was the creation of a new system of governing. However, his strong anti-bureaucratic stance led to problems of coordination and communication between various ministries, which greatly undermined the effectiveness of decisions made by Hatoyama. In spite of the electoral slogan of concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister and his government, DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa had a large impact on their decisions. He exerted pressure on individual ministers and their ministries.

The pronounced differences in opinions between Cabinet members combined with the lack of support from the ministerial bureaucracy (including the dissolved council of deputy ministers) led to the resignation of Hatoyama from the function of the prime minister of the government on 2 June 2010 (pp. 102–103).

The third chapter describes the next Prime Minister Kan’s attempts to cope with these problems. Unlike his predecessor, he presented a more realistic approach to the mentioned issue. He tried to use old bureaucratic structures and new institutions supporting his government (such as, e.g. the Policy Research Committee). However, external factors (the failure of a nuclear reactor in Fukushima during the earthquake), along with errors in internal and external policies (such as, for example, plans to increase VAT or a bad

strategy during the incident on the East China Sea)¹ led to the loss of social trust. The bad government policy in this latter issue was affected, among others, by the fact that he ignored suggestions given to him by the ministerial clerical staff (pp. 134–136).

The next chapter is devoted to the further process of reforms of the decision-making system conducted by the next prime minister – Noda. Influenced by the experience of the predecessors from his party, he reverted to the old political practices of the LDP. The majority of ministers of his government ‘seemed pleased to accept the presidency of bureaucracy’ (p. 192). Nevertheless, his cabinet fell, among others, as a result of factional arguments in the DPJ, caused by, *inter alia*, the adoption of VAT increase.

An equally important reason was the deterioration of relations with China related to the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. This step was taken by the government to prevent islands from being bought by the nationalist governor of Tokyo because otherwise they could become a place of demonstrations of the Japanese extreme right. However, this move of Noda’s government only inflamed relations with the People’s Republic of China. The reason for this state of affairs was the lack of informal relations of the government with the leadership of the Communist Party of China and relying only on official diplomatic communication channels (p. 191–193).

The book ends with a summary and conclusions. In them the author explains the DPJ’s failure in the introduction of the ‘Westminster model’ in Japan by means of the differences between this party and the British Labour Party. One of them was the lack of ideological cohesion of the Japanese party, which was created by politicians from different parties. Another was a different ethos of the civil service in both countries. While the British bureaucracy was apolitical, the Japanese one had strong relationships with both politics and business. Therefore, the full implementation of the ‘Westminster model’ in Japan failed.

A consequence of the DPJ’s failed attempts to introduce the reform of governing was the return of the LDP to power in 2012 and the rule of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In the last sentence of his book the author states that ‘an appropriate external model, a coherent political vision and appropriate institutional tools’ are needed to strengthen a new system of government (p. 206).

¹ This incident took place on 7 October 2010 when a Chinese fishing vessel collided with two Japanese patrol vessels near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Japanese arrested the Chinese captain of the ship. He was released after several days, but Japanese-Chinese relations had already deteriorated. (The author’s note).

The reviewed book provides an accurate description of the operation and transformation of the Japanese government in 2009–2012 and is a solid institutional analysis of the causes of the failure of the DPJ in the creation of the government administered by politicians.²

However, after reading it, other questions may come to mind of anyone interested or involved in Japanese domestic politics.

Was the party system in Japan, with the LDP dominating since 1955, permanently changed in the years 2009–2012³?

Has the return of the LDP to power in 2012 restored the system anew?

At the end of the book there is an impressively long list of books and materials used by the author, pointing to his strong academic and intellectual background.

Mikołaj Kukowski

² Though the author of this review is not enthusiastic about explaining political and social phenomena by means of an institutional analysis, because he believes that external factors and human interactions have a greater impact on them. (The author's note).

³ This system is called a 'system of 1955' or 'imperial democracy'. (the author's note).

NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Bartłomiej Biga – PhD, Assistant Professor of Cracow University of Economics

Elżbieta Roszko-Wójtowicz – PhD, Professor of the University of Lodz in Lodz

Maciej D. Kryszczuk – PhD, independent researcher, Warsaw

Michał Wenzel – PhD, Assistant Professor of SWPS University, Warsaw

Adam Rogala-Lewicki – PhD, Assistant Professor of the University of National Economy in Łódź

Anna M. Solarz – PhD, Assistant Professor of the University of Warsaw in Warsaw

Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek – PhD, Professor of Lazarski University in Warsaw

Șerban Olah – PhD, Assistant Professor of University of Oradea

Gabriel Roșeanu – PhD, Assistant Professor of University of Oradea

Daria Orzechowska-Słowikowska – PhD, Assistant Professor in the Institute of Political Studies of the PAS in Warsaw

Marta Stempień – MA, doctoral student of Faculty of Humanities of Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

Józef M. Fiszer – Full Professor, PhD, Professor of Lazarski University in Warsaw

Stanisław Koziej – retired general, Professor, PhD, Lazarski University in Warsaw

Łukasz Świetnicki – MA, doctoral student of Institute of European Studies of the University of Warsaw in Warsaw

Mikołaj Kukowski – PhD, Assistant Professor of Polonia University in Częstochowa

NOTY O AUTORACH

Bartłomiej Biga – dr, adiunkt Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie

Elżbieta Roszko-Wójtowicz – dr hab., profesor Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego w Łodzi

Maciej D. Kryszczuk – dr, niezależny badacz, Warszawa

Michał Wenzel – dr, adiunkt Uniwersytetu SWPS, Warszawa

Adam Rogala-Lewicki – dr, adiunkt Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Krajowej w Łodzi

Anna M. Solarz – dr, adiunkt Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego w Warszawie

Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek – dr hab., profesor Uczelni Łazarskiego w Warszawie

Șerban Olah – dr, adiunkt University of Oradea

Gabriel Roșeanu – dr, adiunkt University of Oradea

Daria Orzechowska-Słowikowska – dr, adiunkt Instytutu Studiów Politycznych PAN w Warszawie

Marta Stempień – mgr, doktorantka Wydziału Humanistycznego Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach

Józef M. Fiszer – prof. dr hab., Uczelnia Łazarskiego w Warszawie

Tomasz Paszewski – dr, adiunkt Instytutu Studiów Politycznych PAN w Warszawie

Stanisław Koziej – generał w stanie spoczynku, prof. dr hab., Uczelnia Łazarskiego w Warszawie

Łukasz Świetnicki – mgr, doktorant Instytutu Europeistyki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego w Warszawie

Mikołaj Kukowski – dr, adiunkt Wyższej Szkoły Polonijnej w Częstochowie

ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ ОБ АВТОРАХ

Бартломей Бига – кандидат наук, преподаватель Экономического университета в Кракове

Эльжбета Рошко-Войтович – доктор наук, профессор Лодзинского университета в Лодзи

Мачей Д. Крыщук – кандидат наук, независимый исследователь, Варшава

Михал Вэнзэль – кандидат наук, преподаватель Университета SWPS, Варшава

Адам Рогалья-Левицки – кандидат наук, преподаватель Академии народного хозяйства в Лодзи

Анна М. Соляж – кандидат наук, преподаватель Варшавского университета в Варшаве

Агнешка Ожельска-Стончек – доктор наук, профессор Университета Лазарского в Варшаве

Сербан Олях – кандидат наук, преподаватель Орадейского университета

Габриэль Росеану – кандидат наук, преподаватель Орадейского университета

Дария Ожеховска-Словиговска – кандидат наук, преподаватель Института Политологии ПАН в Варшаве

Марта Стэмпень – магистр, аспирант Гуманитарного факультета Университета естественных и гуманитарных наук в Седлицах

Юзеф М. Фишер – профессор, доктор наук, Университет Лазарского в Варшаве

Томаш Пашевски – кандидат наук, преподаватель Института Политологии ПАН в Варшаве

Станислав Козей – генерал в отставке, профессор, доктор наук, Университет Лазарского в Варшаве

Лукаш Съветницки – магистр, аспирант Института Европейских исследований Варшавского университета в Варшаве

Миколай Куковски – кандидат наук, преподаватель Академии Полонии в Ченстохове

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS SUBMITTING ARTICLES
TO *ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THOUGHT*

1. The quarterly accepts original unpublished scientific articles devoted to issues within a broad field of economics and political studies as well as management. Submitted manuscripts should provide substantial theoretical generalisations. The journal also publishes reviews and reports on academic life. The submission of an article means the author approves of and follows commonly accepted rules of publication ethics and publication malpractice. Articles are subject to evaluation by two reviewers and their positive opinion is a condition for their publication.
2. Manuscripts should be submitted in one copy of a standard typescript (30 lines of 60 characters each, i.e. ca. 1,800 characters per page) together with a digital version saved on a data storage device and emailed to wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl.
3. Footnotes should be placed at the bottom of a page providing the initials of the author's given name and surname, the year of publication, the title, the name of a journal or a publisher, the place of publication (in case of books) and a page number.
In case of books with multiple authors, give the first name and surname of their editors. Online material is to be described in the same way as articles in print journals or books followed by a URL and the date of access. It is also necessary to add a bibliography after the article text. Detailed information for authors is published on the Lazarski University Publishing House website: <http://www.lazarski.pl/pl/badania-i-rozwoj/oficyna-wydawnicza/dla-autorow/> (We encourage you to read the English version.).
4. Photographs and drawings can be submitted in the original version (for scanning) or saved in TIFF, GIF and BMP formats.
5. An article should be accompanied by its abstract informing about its aim, methodology, work outcomes and conclusions. An abstract should not exceed 20 lines of typescript. If an abstract contains specialist, scientific or technical terms, their English equivalents should be provided.
6. An article should not exceed 22 pages of a standard typescript and a review, scientific news or information 12 pages.
7. The editor reserves the right to introduce changes in the manuscript submitted for publication, e.g. shorten it, change the title and subheadings as well as correct the style.
8. A manuscript shall contain the author's full given name and surname, their residence address with the telephone/fax number, their email address, the scientific degree or title and the name of the scientific institution the author works for.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THOUGHT
PUBLICATION REVIEW PROCEDURE

1. The Editorial Board appoints at least two independent reviewers, i.e. specialists who are not Lazarski University employees, to evaluate each publication.
2. One of the two reviewers shall be an employee of a foreign research centre.
3. The reviewing procedure is a so-called double-blind peer review process, i.e. follows a rule that an author and reviewers do not know their identity.
4. Reviewers submit written declarations of non-existence of a conflict of interests in their relations with the authors of articles being reviewed.
5. A review must be developed in writing and provide an unambiguous recommendation to accept a manuscript for publication or decline it.
6. The above procedure and rules of reviewing are published on the *Economic and Political Thought* website.
7. The names of reviewers of particular publications are not revealed. However, the name of the reviewer of each quarterly issue is publicised. The above procedures and reviewing principles conform to the directives of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Editor-in-chief
Prof. dr hab. Józef M. Fiszer

Lazarski University Press
offers following publications:

1. Krystyna Regina Bąk (red.), *Statystyka wspomagana Excelem 2007*, Warszawa 2010.
2. Wojciech Bieńkowski, Krzysztof Szczygielski, *Rozważania o rozwoju gospodarczym Polski*, Warszawa 2009.
3. Remigiusz Bierzanek, *Przez wiek XX. Wspomnienia i refleksje*, Warszawa 2006.
4. Piotr Brzeziński, Zbigniew Czarnik, Zuzanna Łaganowska, Arwid Mednis, Stanisław Piątek, Maciej Rogalski, Marlena Wach, *Nowela listopadowa prawa telekomunikacyjnego*, Warszawa 2014.
5. Hans Ephraïmson-Abt, Anna Konert, *New Progress and Challenges in The Air Law*, Warszawa 2014.
6. Janusz Filipczuk, *Adaptacyjność polskich przedsiębiorstw w warunkach transformacji systemowej*, wyd. II, Warszawa 2007.
7. Jerzy A. Gawinecki (red. nauk.), *Ekonometria w zadaniach*, praca zbiorowa, Warszawa 2008.
8. Jerzy A. Gawinecki, *Matematyka dla ekonomistów*, Warszawa 2010.
9. Grażyna Gierszewska, Jerzy Kisielnicki (red. nauk.), *Zarządzanie międzynarodowe. Konkurencyjność polskich przedsiębiorstw*, Warszawa 2010.
10. Tomasz G. Grosse (red. nauk.), *Między polityką a rynkiem. Kryzys Unii Europejskiej w analizie ekonomistów i politologów*, praca zbiorowa, Warszawa 2013.
11. Marian Guzek, *Makroekonomia i polityka po neoliberalizmie. Eseje i polemiki*, Warszawa 2011.
12. Marian Guzek (red. nauk.), *Ekonomia i polityka w kryzysie. Kierunki zmian w teoriach*, praca zbiorowa, Warszawa 2012.
13. Marian Guzek, *Teorie ekonomii a instrumenty antykryzysowe*, Warszawa 2013.
14. Marian Guzek, *Kapitałizm na krawędzi*, Warszawa 2014.
15. Marian Guzek, *Doktryny ustrojowe. Od liberalizmu do libertarianizmu*, Warszawa 2015.
16. Anna Harasiewicz-Mordasewicz, *Word 2007*, Warszawa 2009.
17. Anna Harasiewicz-Mordasewicz, *Excel 2007*, Warszawa 2010.
18. Dominika E. Harasimiuk, Marcin Olszówka, Andrzej Zinkiewicz (red. nauk.), *Prawo UE i porządek konstytucyjny państw członkowskich. Problem konkurencji i wzajemnych relacji*, Warszawa 2014.
19. Stanisław Hoc, *Prawo administracyjne gospodarcze. Wybrane zagadnienia*, Warszawa 2013.
20. „Ius Novum”, Ryszard A. Stefański (red. nac.), kwartalnik, Uczelnia Łazarskiego, numery: 1/2007, 2–3/2007, 4/2007, 1/2008, 2/2008, 3/2008, 4/2008, 1/2009, 2/2009, 3/2009, 4/2009, 1/2010, 2/2010, 3/2010, 4/2010, 1/2011, 2/2011, 3/2011, 4/2011, 1/2012, 2/2012, 3/2012, 4/2012, 1/2013, 2/2013, 3/2013, 4/2013, Numer specjalny 2014, 1/2014, 2/2014, 3/2014, 4/2014, 1/2015, 2/2015, 3/2015, 4/2015, 1/2016, 2/2016.
21. Andrzej Jagiełło, *Polityka akcyzowa w odniesieniu do wyrobów tytoniowych w Polsce w latach 2000–2010 i jej skutki ekonomiczne*, Warszawa 2012.
22. Anna Konert (red.), *Aspekty prawne badania zdarzeń lotniczych w świetle Rozporządzenia 996/2010*, Warszawa 2013.
23. Anna Konert, *A European Vision for Air Passengers*, Warszawa 2014.
24. Jerzy Kowalski, *Państwo prawa. Demokratyczne państwo prawne. Antologia*, Warszawa 2008.
25. Rafał Krawczyk, *Podstawy cywilizacji europejskiej*, Warszawa 2006.
26. Rafał Krawczyk, *Islam jako system społeczno-gospodarczy*, Warszawa 2013.

27. Maria Kruk-Jarosz (red. nauk.), *System organów ochrony prawnej w Polsce. Podstawowe instytucje*, wyd. II zm. i popr., Warszawa 2008.
28. Maciej Krzak, *Kontrowersje wokół antycyklicznej polityki fiskalnej a niedawny kryzys globalny*, Warszawa 2012.
29. Jerzy Menkes (red. nauk.), *Prawo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku. Księga pamiątkowa profesor Renaty Szafarz*, Warszawa 2007.
30. Jerzy Menkes (red. nauk.), *Prawo międzynarodowe – problemy i wyzwania. Księga pamiątkowa profesor Renaty Sonnenfeld-Tomporek*, Warszawa 2006.
31. Jerzy Menkes (red. nauk.), *Wybór kasusów z prawa międzynarodowego. Zagadnienia ogólne*, zeszyt 1, Warszawa 2008.
32. Aleksandra Mężykowska, *Interwencja humanitarna w świetle prawa międzynarodowego*, Warszawa 2008.
33. Mariusz Muszyński (red. nauk.), Dominika E. Harasimiuk, Małgorzata Kozak, *Unia Europejska. Instytucje, polityki, prawo*, Warszawa 2012.
34. „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”, Józef M. Fiszer (red. nac.), kwartalnik, Uczelnia Łazarskiego, numery: 1(28)2010, 2(29)2010, 3(30)2010, 4(31)2010, 1–2(32–33)2011, 3(34)2011, 4(35)2011, 1(36)2012, 2(37)2012, 3(38)2012, 4(39)2012, 1(40)2013, 2(41)2013, 3(42)2013, 4(43)2013, 1(44)2014, 2(45)2014, 3(46)2014, 4(47)2014, 1(48)2015, 2(49)2015, 3(50)2015, 4(51)2015, 1(52)2016, 2(53)2016.
35. Edward Nieznański, *Logika dla prawników*, Warszawa 2006.
36. Bartłomiej Opaliński, Przemysław Szustakiewicz, *Policja. Studium administracyjnoprawne*, Warszawa 2013.
37. Bartłomiej Opaliński, *Rola Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w procesie stanowienia ustaw na tle praktyki ustrojowej Konstytucji III RP*, Warszawa 2014.
38. Leokadia Oręziak, *Konkurencja podatkowa i harmonizacja podatków w ramach Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa 2007.
39. Leokadia Oręziak (red. nauk.), *Finansowanie rozwoju regionalnego w Polsce*, Warszawa 2008.
40. Leokadia Oręziak, Dariusz K. Rosati (red. nauk.), *Kryzys finansów publicznych*, Warszawa 2013.
41. Maciej Rogalski, *Świadczenie usług telekomunikacyjnych*, Warszawa 2014.
42. Dariusz Rosati (red. nauk.), *Gospodarka oparta na wiedzy. Aspekty międzynarodowe*, Warszawa 2007.
43. Dariusz Rosati (red. nauk.), *Euro – ekonomia i polityka*, Warszawa 2009.
44. Grzegorz Rydlewski, Przemysław Szustakiewicz, Katarzyna Golat, *Udzielanie informacji przez administrację publiczną – teoria i praktyka*, Warszawa 2012.
45. Jacek Szymanderski, *Schyłek komunizmu i polskie przemiany w odbiorze społecznym*, Warszawa 2011.
46. Jerzy Wojtczak-Szyszkowski, *O obowiązkach osób świeckich i ich sprawach. Część szesnasta Dekretu przypisywanego Iwonowi z Chartres* (tłum. z jęz. łac.), Warszawa 2009.
47. Janusz Żarnowski, *Współczesne systemy polityczne. Zarys problematyki*, Warszawa 2012.

Oficyna Wydawnicza
 Uczelni Łazarskiego
 02-662 Warszawa, ul. Świeradowska 43
 tel.: (22) 54 35 450
 fax: (22) 54 35 392
 e-mail: wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl
www.lazarski.pl

