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EDITORIAL

Today we are handing to our readers the third issue of our academic quarterly in 2018, which we are traditionally publishing in English. In terms of volume it is very extensive, and in terms of content it is interesting and certainly deserves attention. We are publishing eleven original articles in the field of social sciences, in particular in economics, political sciences and international relations. We are publishing articles that are the result of scientific research conducted by individual authors as part of various research projects or are excerpts from scientific dissertations – doctoral and postdoctoral, or professorial.

We are addressing this issue in particular to economists, political scientists and experts in contemporary international relations, as well as to teachers, doctoral students and students. We are also recommending it to politicians and publicists as it contains many original thoughts, interesting theses and hypotheses regarding important, current economic, financial, social, political and international problems. A lot of attention is devoted in the articles to problems concerning Poland, Europe and the world. That is why we hope that, like all volumes of “Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” [‘Economic and Political Thought’] published so far, this one will also be of interest to a wide range of readers in Poland and abroad and will be received with great attention and applied in practice.

The presented issue of the quarterly, according to our practice and rules adopted by the editorial office, consists of two parts: the first one which is devoted to broadly understood economic issues, and the second pertaining to social and political issues and international relations.

In the first part we are publishing five articles. It opens with the article by American researcher Clifford A. Bates entitled ‘Carl Schmitt and the Limits of the Modern Liberal State’, in which the author presents the views of eminent German philosopher Carl Schmitt on liberalism and its role in the development of a modern, democratic state. In the next article entitled ‘The

Analysis of the Influence of Religion on Economic Growth in the Context of Max Weber's Views' its author Janusz Myszczyszyn writes about the role of religion in economic processes of the state. He verifies the thesis of Max Weber, who connected the development of capitalism with, among others, the increase of rationality caused by a particular religion, i.e. Protestantism. Using his own econometric model, the author shows, on the example of Germany, that the Protestant religion, apart from the level of emigration and the percentage of people working in agriculture, was important for creating social welfare (GDP), but – in his opinion – this is a negative dependence, because an increase in the number of Protestants led to a drop in GDP growth.

The next, third article in this part of the quarterly is the article by Jakub Marszałek entitled 'Determinants of R&D Activity – Analysis of the Polish Logistics Sector'. The aim of the article is to identify factors significantly affecting the level of R&D investment and to determine the strength of this impact. The research involved 950 Polish logistics companies. Three groups of potential R&D determinants of the studied entities were distinguished as explanatory variables: intensity of competition, financial conditions of the enterprise and macroeconomic determinants. The survey showed that R&D activities of logistic companies are primarily carried out by larger enterprises, conducting conservative financing policy based on low indebtedness and high financial liquidity. The study did not confirm the impact of competition on R&D activity, which – according to the author – may result from the growth of the sector itself. However, the availability of road infrastructure and urbanised areas is a factor significantly affecting R&D.

The subsequent, fourth article is the article by Jacek Lewkowicz entitled 'Firm-specific Human Capital as a Contract Determining Factor – a Reason for Internal Bilateral Interdependence between the Employer and the Employee'. In this article the author discusses an interesting and complex problem for companies, namely the consequences of employing a worker with human capital specific for a given company. Such a situation implies some kind of interdependence between the employer and the employee, whose knowledge and skills can be perceived as specific assets. Both parties are strongly interdependent: the employer must rely on the employee, who in turn is not able to easily find an alternative job based on human capital. The article contains proposals for solving this type of problem by referring to transaction cost economics theory and agency theory.

Then there is the text written by three authors, i.e. Ewa Cichowicz, Ewa Rollnik-Sadowska and Justyna Kozłowska, entitled 'The Assessment of Technical Efficiency in Public Employment Services', which is devoted to the ana-

lysis and assessment of various techniques and systems used for professional activation and measurement of work effectiveness in various public sector services, e.g. in broadly understood education or banking.

The second part of the presented journal, concerning political science, contains six interesting texts, mostly devoted to various problems and aspects of the activity of the European Union. It opens with Michał Kuź's article under the title 'France, Russia, USA: on Hegemony, Revolutions and Wars'. On the basis of specific examples, the author discusses various types of warfare to which countries are exposed after the start of a revolution. The cases described by the author show that all revolutionary states are in a similarly uncertain situation, despite various specific threats they may meet.

Further there is Jerzy Zarzycki-Siek's article entitled 'Integration through Control: the Model of Power Hijacking as an Alternative View on European Union Integration'. As its title suggests, the aim of the article is to analyse integration processes taking place within the European Union in the light of game theory and its alternative models.

The next article, prepared by Mateusz Czasak, entitled 'The Role of the Weimar Triangle in the Processes of European Integration in 1991–2004' is very interesting. The author shows the genesis of this informal grouping of three states, i.e. Germany, France and Poland in 1991, and its activities for the integration of post-communist Europe in 1991–2004. He emphasises that the activities of the Weimar Triangle significantly contributed to the processes of integration of Europe, especially of Central and Eastern Europe, on many levels.

The following text is the article authored by Józef M. Fiszer, entitled 'The Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation of 17 June 1991 between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany: Origin, Aims and Implementation. Successes, Failures and Prospects in the Context of the Migration Crisis in Europe'. The aim of this article is to show the genesis of the Polish-German treaty on good neighborliness and friendly cooperation of 17 June 1991 and its importance for the reconciliation and development of comprehensive cooperation between Poland and Germany in the context of the current migration crisis in Europe. The author formulates a few interesting theses and tries to answer many questions concerning Polish-German relations in the period 1989–2018 and their conditions and prospects. He emphasises that in the last two years Polish-German relations, especially political ones, have deteriorated considerably, and one of the reasons for this is the immigration crisis in Europe.

Another engaging text in this part of the quarterly is the article by Katarzyna Gmaj and Krystyna Iglicka under the title 'Immigrant Voters in Poland

– Being just “Right behind the Corner”, in which the authors analyse the situation of immigrants in Poland, their political commitment and the attitude of particular political parties to them.

The last treatise here is the extensive article ‘Development and Shift of US Occupation Policy in Japan (1945–1951) in the International Context’ by Mikołaj Kukowski, in which the author shows the influence of the American occupation of Japan on its political, social and economic system after the Second World War.

The presented issue of “Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” [‘Economic and Political Thought’] closes with two reviews of the latest, very interesting scholarly books devoted to President Barack Obama and his foreign policy and Polish-Ukrainian relations in 1991–2017.

We are happy to inform you that the quarterly “Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” [‘Economic and Political Thought’] has achieved another success, namely since 27 April 2018 it has been indexed in the international database of high-value scientific journals ERIH PLUS. At the same time I would like to remind you that our quarterly is also indexed in the database of journals INDEX COPERNICUS, in the Central and Eastern Online Library (CEEOL) database and in the BazHum database. In addition, we have already applied to Clarivate Analytics for including “Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” [‘Economic and Political Thought’] in the Web of Science database.

We wish all our readers interesting reading and we encourage everyone to cooperate with our editorial board and the Lazarski University, one of the best universities in Poland, which is celebrating the 25th anniversary of its activity this year.

prof. zw. dr hab. Józef M. Fiszer

A R T I C L E S A N D S T U D I E S

Clifford Angell Bates*

CARL SCHMITT AND THE LIMITS OF THE MODERN LIBERAL STATE

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INTRODUCTION

Carl Schmitt is a controversial figure in the history of twentieth century political thought not only because of the reactionary authoritarian and anti-liberal critique of the liberal trajectory of the modern state but also his opportunistic joining and serving the Nazi regime in 1933 after the passing of the Enabling Act by the Reichstag, as well his rejection of all attempts of denazification after his release from detention for possible crimes in 1946 which prevented Schmitt's return to academic life in post-War West Germany. Yet even in 'exile' Schmitt had very close contacts with some of the leading European intellectuals concerned with politics and international affairs such as Ernst Jünger, Alexander Kojève, Hans Morgenthau, and Raymond Aron, not to mention philosophic and religious thinkers like Jacob Taubes (who never ended pointing out the role that Schmitt played in the intellectual development of neo-Marxist Jewish thinker Walter Benjamin). Yet it remains a fact that he is perhaps one of the most important political theorists of the twentieth century.

The purpose of this paper is to show that Schmitt's critique of the modern liberal state is not so much a rejection of the modern liberal state, but a rejection of the radicalisation of the liberal state by later modern political theorists. Thus, to call Carl Schmitt the twentieth century Thomas Hobbes

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is not far off the mark, in that Schmitt's project attempts to force a defence of the modern state *via* a return to the political thought of Hobbes (Schwab 1989, Bendersky 1983).

The limited scope of this paper prevents a much needed correction of an inaccurate and historically uninformed interpretation of not only Schmitt's political thought but how his political thought informed the politics of the Weimar Republic (Holmes 1988: 31–34). Rather, in the confined scope of this presentation, I hope to show how those who hold such a view of Schmitt's thought fail to understand the main thrust of his argument – that if the liberal state is to defend itself it must not tie its own hands and thus prevent its own defence. Such a fate can be avoided only, Schmitt believes, by returning to the political thought that originates the theory of the Modern state – the political thought of Thomas Hobbes.

I believe Schmitt to be wrongly accused of causing policies which led to (or abetted) the downfall of the Weimar Republic – the downfall of the Republic was found in a combination of incoherence of the Constitutional structure, that is a product of later and more radical tradition of liberal legalism, and the unwillingness of the President to use his powers to eliminate political parties that were enemies of the Constitution. Also, I do not believe that his thought is fascistic, although it definitely shared authoritarian traits of Political Catholicism that opposed the forces of the French Revolutionary tradition in European politics, and thus has some sympathy for the Italian and Austrian schools of fascism. However, I nevertheless hope to point to a problem in Schmitt's understanding of the Hobbesian foundations of state. A problem which does not allow him to notice that his return to Hobbes does not offer an actual alternative to the liberal politics he is critiquing¹.

There is a tendency in certain critics of Schmitt to overstate the extent to which he is an anti-liberal. This view of Schmitt arises because these critics tend to see his criticism of neo-Kantian legal-political thought as a thorough-

¹ This paper with its focus on the way Carl Schmitt engages with the tradition of liberal political thought does not seek to address the question of Schmitt as a political theologian as does the work by Heinrich Meier. I agree with Meier that Schmitt embraces theological concepts as the means to comprehend the core principles that shape modern political thought and in doing so correctly sees the connection between certain Christian theological concepts and the concepts of the modern state. See Meier, H. (1988) *The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction Between Political Theology and Political Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and Meier, H. (1995) *Carl Schmitt & Leo Strauss-The Hidden Dialogue: Including Strauss's Notes on Schmitt's Concept of the Political & Three Letters from Strauss to Schmitt*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

going and complete criticism, and hence a rejection, of liberalism. However, this view is not necessarily the truth. Rather it is an appearance that one must go beyond if one is to truly learn from his political thought. Schmitt is taken to be an anti-liberal because of the tone he takes towards liberals and their policies. He seems to be very critical of liberalism and its effects upon politics, especially on Weimar politics. On a certain level this perception is true. He does reject the liberalism (of Kelsen et al) which underlies Weimar politics. He thinks that such liberalism is politically naive and therefore very dangerous. Yet, does this rejection of the liberalism inherent in the Weimar Republic imply a wholehearted rejection of liberalism? Most critics of Schmitt argue that it does. They usually point not only to his criticism of Weimar liberals, but also to his membership in the Nazi party in 1933. I will not address the Nazi issue; others have done well to rescue Schmitt from an opportunistic mistake (Schwab 1989, Bendersky 1983). Rather, I will suggest that his criticism and rejection of the liberalism inherent in Weimar is not a wholehearted rejection of liberalism².

The reason why the critics see Schmitt's criticism of Weimar liberalism as a complete rejection of liberalism is that they collapse liberalism into one approach. Thus, to reject the liberal advocates of the Weimar Republic (e.g. Kelsen et al) is to reject all liberalism. One of the reasons they read him in the above way is that they fail to deal with the rhetorical-historical character of his work. Because they fail to take into account: 1) the rhetorical character of his work – i.e. its polemical tone – and 2) the specific historical context in which Schmitt is writing (i.e. the political crises of the Weimar Republic of the mid 1920s to early 1930s), they only receive a distorted and polemical picture of Schmitt's arguments and hence of his political thought in general. Because his critics tend to see any criticism of any form of liberalism as an attack upon all of liberalism, they tend not to go beyond the polemical rhetoric of his work.

There are also several reasons as to why Schmitt's critics fail to address the historical context of his writings: 1) although the majority of his work has increasingly been available in English translation (with three available in the 80s, approximately 7 in the 90s, and now by 2015 most of his major works are available in English) they are still less read by students unless they run into an instructor who uses Schmitt; 2) many political theorist do not like history and

² For the typical view of Schmitt as a fundamental opponent of liberalism see McCormick, J.P. (1999) *Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

avoid addressing the historical context of any thinker (this is usually done to avoid the charge of historicism); and 3) most scholars in political thought do not have a good understanding of European legal traditions and this prevents them from fully understanding what Schmitt and those whom he is addressing are exactly arguing about.

The failure to address the substance of Schmitt's work and being caught up with the polemic character of his style is a constant problem with most critics. They constantly depict him, as Paul Gottfried notes, as 'perpetually predisposed toward the totalitarian Right', because he failed to give constant evidence of his own personal faith in Enlightenment liberalism (Gottfried 1990). Thus, because Schmitt is not a 'cheerleader for liberal democracy' and because he champions executive prerogative, these critics interpret all his work in light of his choice in 1933 – regardless of the fact that his work does not support such a conclusion (Schwab 1989, Bendersky 1983).

Also Schmitt has for the past 20 years been increasingly important and popular for those on the political left who still seek to critique liberalism yet lost faith in the Marxist doctrine. With the final collapse of the Soviet sphere in 1988–92, increasingly voices on the left have turned to Schmitt and his critique of liberalism as a weapon in their attacks on it. Those radical intellectuals have come to believe not only that Marxism failed to offer an effective answer why liberalism not only seemed to survive and by the mid 90s was triumphant, but also seemed to be fined to a repressive and unattractive alternative to liberalism. For these leftist critics of liberalism found in Schmitt's thought a radical critique of the anti-political character of the liberal state, one that allowed for a recovery of politics in its classical understanding. These leftist critics also turned to Schmitt because his historical approach echoed most of theirs (most of them being either followers of the post-structuralists like Michael Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and Slavoj Žižek; or Heideggerian influenced deconstructionists like Jacques Derrida and Paul deMannjust to name a few). And following the European left's intellectual response to the actions and policies of the Bush administration after the events of 11 September 2001, many of them saw in the writing of Schmitt's *Diktatur* and his treatment of the use of sovereign power in the state of emergency a useful tool to critique the actions of America (Agamben 2005)³.

³ Yet the use of Schmitt's concept of 'exception' to understand the necessity to use the executive, presidential power in times of crisis has also been utilised by adherents of the Neo-Liberal law and economics school such as Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner (2011) *The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic*. New York: Oxford University Press. See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr's criticism of Vermeule's and Posner's

SCHMITT AS NATIONALIST?

Some may interpret Schmitt's attack upon liberalism and his defence of the nation-state structure of Europe as the beginnings of a political thought of nationalism (Frisch 1993). Such an interpretation is critical misreading of Schmitt's thought. He does not develop a theory of nationalism. Rather, he presents a defence of the liberal nation-state as a state. Thus, Schmitt is working within a particular framework established by Hobbes and Bodin, which treats the state as a conceptual (or intellectual) construct and not an organic construct. For Schmitt to have developed a theory of nationalism, he would have to have addressed the issues of race and ethnicity (as does Herder and other theorist of nationalism). Yet he never does this. A theory of race and ethnicity is wholly absent from his scholarship. This fact is also what prevents him from ever being a true Nazi and what leads actual Nazi scholars to attack both him and his work (See Bendersky 1988: 219–242 and 256–262).

Schmitt speaks of the nation in its historical context as of the source from which the Modern state emerged within European politics. In Schmitt's thought, the nation is thus not a co-current social-political structure but rather the means from which the liberal state emerges. Thus, Schmitt's attempt to bolster the state is not an attempt to bolster nationalist sentiment. Rather, his project is an endeavour to save the liberal state from the attempt by the later stages of liberalism to make it irrelevant or eliminate it. Schmitt claims that extreme liberal normativism tends to forget that to achieve the goods it desires, the existence of the state is a necessary precondition (Schmitt 1976: 22–25 and 69–79). It is a failure to admit the very political character of the liberal project, which underlies Schmitt's main objection to the liberal normativism.

NORMATIVISM

Schmitt's critique of the liberal state is an attempt to rescue politics from what he considers non-political a-priori assumptions; these assumptions are called normativistic. These assumptions ultimately place a radical precondition on human political activity and when those a-priori assumptions

use of Schmitt to understand the role of Executive Power in the American model in 'Is the Imperial Presidency Inevitable?' *The New York Times: The Sunday Book Review*. 13 March 2011.

are respected politically, at all costs, one ends up ‘tying the hands of’ or restraining the state. Restraining the state is especially dangerous when the survival of the state is at stake. Thus, to save the state in a time of political crisis, Schmitt advocates a return to the origins of modern politics, and the origins of the Modern theory of the state starts with the political thought of Hobbes. In order to understand the need to return to Hobbes and the origins of the Modern theory of the state, we must address the particular crisis which the Modern state faces because of liberal normativism. The *foci* of Schmitt’s critique of the Modern liberal state, expressed in the particular terms of it being a liberal parliamentary state, is its excessively normativistic assumptions.

Where does the term ‘normative’ come from? Why does not Schmitt define this term? Ellen Kennedy points out that the term ‘normative’ was a central intellectual concept within the German legal positivist tradition. She says that German legal scholars, such as Georg Meyer and Gerhard Anschütz, coined the particular flavour, with which the term ‘normative’ was used within the legal scholarship (Kennedy 1985: xxv). Thus, Schmitt did not coin this term as a term. Rather, he found it within the vocabulary of neo-Kantian political-legal terminology, which dominated German jurisprudence early in this century. However, Schmitt made use of this term to critique how liberal normativism dangerously constrains state action and in doing this he made the term famous (or perhaps, infamous).

What Schmitt and the Neo-Kantian legal tradition (which Schmitt is working within) call normativism is the placing of normative preconditions upon political actors. The concept of the normative is a derivative of the fact/value distinction and its central role within German legal positivist thought (Schmitt 1985a: 18). Thus, the normative is the realm of values and values are the preconditions for any set of legal and political norms. Now these preconditions can vary in either their nature (or character) and how they are applied. Thus, the legal positive thought claims that these normative preconditions are logically prior to the political.

These normative preconditions become, in reality, restrictions on state action. Thus, norms are that which structures the political activity within a given political system. Thus, normativism is the binding set of rules or values that restrain political action. Schmitt argues that the normative function is primarily legislative and deliberative (Schmitt 1985a: 45). The example Schmitt gives of normativist frameworks are legal structures, constitutional institutions, and administrative principles. Yet, he argues, the tendency of stressing the importance of the legislative and hence the normativistic element

of the state usually results in down-playing or underrating the importance of the executive element. In doing so, the normativistic tendency usually places excessive restraints upon how the executive can act and therefore what it can do to address political problems. This becomes especially dangerous in times of political or constitutional crisis.

Schmitt contrasts normativism with decisionism. Normativism deals with restraints of and/or the structural set up of political behaviour. Thus, the emphasis of normative structures is the normal and typical behaviour of political action and not of times of political crisis. Thus, normativism at best deals with the ordinary and not extreme (or exceptional) occurrences. The part of the state best suited to act in these exceptional circumstances is not the legislature, but the executive. Therefore, during times of crisis, where decisive state action is called for, action outside the scope of the normal restraint placed upon the state by legal and constitutional norms, is sometimes called for. Yet, the tendency of a liberal normativist is to excessively restrain the executive, forcing it to be restrained by legal and constitutional norms (Schmitt 1985a: 13–14).

The preconditions of liberal normativism (one of neo-Kantian philosophical assumptions) are a-priori in character. Thus, its assumptions must be agreed to before the application within the system. These liberal a-priori norms are assumptions about the human goods or values (Schmitt 1976: 69–79). These goods or values are trumps which limit or restrain political actors. The modern liberal claim that rights trump state action is the most striking example of what Schmitt is talking about as the political tendency of normativist principles.

Now these norms which trump politics are usually viewed as pre-political or non-political. They become a legal and constitutional norm that limits and/or restrains the state from acting. Thus, Schmitt's critique of normativism arises out of the particular use of legal norms (or values) within German neo-Kantian legal-political thought, especially the thought of Hans Kelsen. A neo-Kantian understanding of the 'norms' which restrain political behaviour is the politicalisation of the 'Categorical Imperative', where all political actions must be guided by norms or laws, if those actions are to be considered legal. Such normativism is one which undermines the ability of the executive to act decisively during times of constitutional crisis, because the actions needed in times of crisis are rarely specifiable by law. Also, such normativism weakens the defence of the state, especially the liberal state, making it vulnerable to internal forces intent upon its destruction. The demise of the Weimar Republic seems to validate Schmitt's claim.

Schmitt's berating of liberal normativism is not so much a rejection of normativism but a critique of how a particular form of liberal normativism tends to place extreme a-priori constitutional or legal assumptions upon the executive and its actions. Schmitt argues that these particular a-priori assumptions arise from the liberal legal-political understanding (of Kelsen et al) and their radically normativistic conception of politics and law. These legal theorists attempt to categorically limit and restrain state (i.e. executive) action *via* law. Politics, in the liberals' view, is therefore relegated to a separate and/or inferior position in relation to other goods. Although it becomes merely the one who delivers social goodies, its political role, as defender and protector, tends to be forgotten or underrated. Here is the crisis of the liberal state. When confronted by internal (or even external) forces hostile to its liberal principles, it finds itself unable, and sometimes unwilling, to defend itself. This inability arises because the state is constrained to strictly follow legal and constitutional norms which tend to proscribe all executive action.

Schmitt's critique of normativism is not to be understood as a dogmatic rejection of normativism or the rule of law, as some critics charge (Scheuerman 1996: 299). Rather, as I have been attempting to suggest, Schmitt is criticising a particular conception of normativism, one that dogmatically excludes any room for executive leeway (or prerogative) by the sovereign during exceptional times of crisis. Schmitt has no objection to normativistic restrictions or the rule of law during normal or typical times. However, excessive and dogmatic normativism, Schmitt argues, denies the state the necessary means of surviving times of political or constitutional crisis. Thus, Schmitt's critics, who point to his criticism of normativism, fail to read his arguments within the rhetorical-historical context of the Weimar Republic. These critics would object to this claim by saying that they do indeed put Schmitt in his historical context (Scheuerman 1993: 265–280). Yet, if they do bring up the Weimar context, they only bring it up to ignore it.

HOBBS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE

Schmitt believes that to understand the proper role of state action and the assumptions which frame politics, we must return to the political thought of Hobbes (Schmitt 1976: 3, 6, 7–8n14, 52, 59, 61, 65, 67, 89–92, 92n2, 93, 97, 99–100, 103, 107, Schmitt 2013: 16–18, 98, 99, 100, Schmitt 1985: 33–37, 47–48– 52, Schmitt 1985a: 43, 100–101, 114, Schmitt 2008b). The return to Hobbes is a needed rejection of excessively normativistic liberal politics.

This critique is often taken to be a rejection of liberalism in favour of the state. If this is true, we must come to terms with the state and its origins. It is my belief that when we do this, we will have a different understanding of Schmitt's critique.

The state is a product of modern political philosophy (Strauss 1988, Viroli 1992, Skinner 1989: 90–131, Skinner 2002: 368–413, Skinner 2009: 325–370). The state, as a political unit, did not exist until the 15th century (Viroli 1992, Skinner 2009: 325–370). Even the term, the state, is a creation of Machiavelli (Strauss 1936: xv, de Alvarez 1989: xii–xvii and xxxii–xxxiii, Mansfield 1988: 849–57, Hexter 1956: 113–138, Strauss 1988: 40–55). The modern state – and its contemporary embodiment, the modern liberal state – although conceived by Machiavelli, is the child of Thomas Hobbes (Strauss 1988). It is true that Hobbes does not explicitly define the state, yet it is nevertheless a product of his understanding of a political community (Strauss 1936: xv).

The term Hobbes uses to specify the political community is The Commonwealth (Hobbes 1991: 117–121, Schmitt 2008b). It is the social construction that Humans will into existence. In Machiavelli, the state is the articulated will of the prince – an actual person. It is true that Hobbes's use of the term sovereign leads readers to think he is speaking as though the sovereign is a single human ruler, like a king or a monarch. However, Hobbes's argument does not require the sovereign to be an actual human person. Rather, Hobbes also uses the term as a metaphor to describe not a person but the embodied will of that which authorises the body politic. He calls the sovereign an artificial person (Hobbes 1991: 9, 121–129). Thus, the sovereign is no longer the body of the sovereign, i.e. the king or prince, but the abstracted will of the whole body politic (Hobbes 1991: 9, 121–129, and 155–165, Schmitt 1985a: 6–12)⁴.

To repeat: Hobbes's creation of the state is derived from Machiavelli. Hobbes turned the will of the prince into the will of the body politic. Thus, Hobbes goes one step further than Machiavelli. In doing so, Hobbes creates a body politics where the sovereign's will is the collected representation of a people's will. The sovereign is not necessarily, strictly speaking, a person. Rather, it is in Hobbes's thought the collected will of a people when they

⁴ In this sense Foucault is the radical outcome of Hobbes's line of argument concerning the abstraction of will and its relation to the body politic. Also Foucault's comment about the body of the sovereign indicates how liberal politics fail to understand how the underpinning of liberal politics depends upon a certain understanding of how to perceive the body politic. See Foucault, M. (1979) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Press, 3–31.

are contracted into a civil society with each other (Hobbes 1991: 94–95, 117–129, and 155–165). The contract, therefore, is the source from which the sovereign’s will emanates. Therefore, the state is the temporal embodiment of the sovereign’s will. It is not only an agent that embodies the sovereign’s will but it also enforces the contract (Hobbes 1991: 29–137). It keeps all within it in line with the guidelines established by the originating agreement.

Thus, the modern state is no longer the articulated will of any specific ruler, but an abstracted will of the whole body politic. The concept of the modern state reaches its intellectual peak with Hegel’s articulation of it. Yet Hegel’s conception of the state did not address the issue of legitimacy in terms favourable to liberalism, in that it restrained the scope of liberalism within the social framework⁵. Given this, supporters of Hegel generally tend to be either left-socialists or authoritarian conservatives, not liberals (Hegel 1991). Rather, liberals tend to prefer a modified Kantian or neo-Kantian framework (Kelsen 1971).

In modern political thought, the person of the executive is understood to be an embodiment of the sovereign (Schmitt 2013, Mansfield 1989). This is to say that the executive is the part of the state that can best seemingly embody the sovereign and its will. This is because the executive is the part of the state that tends to be a person – as the sovereign originally was. As such, he is the part of the state that can take action most effectively and in doing so act as though he is the state.

In classical and medieval political thought, a king or a monarch solely possessed the executive power. He also embodied all the other functions of the political as well – i.e. the judicial and the legislative. Although in feudal times, some of these functions were exercised by other institutions (i.e. courts, parliaments, etc.), their authority and thus their power emanated

⁵ Regarding Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* in Schmitt (2007a) *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*. New York: Telos Press Publishing, 21, note 32 writes ‘I would like to develop fully and hermeneutically sections 247–248 of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right” as a historico-intellectual nucleus for understanding the contemporary techno-industrial world, just as the Marxist interpretation developed the preceding sections 243–46 for an understanding of bourgeois society’. It is important to note that these sections mentioned by Schmitt are about Civil Society: Sections 241–245 are about ‘Poverty in Civil Society’, sections 246–248 are about ‘Civil Society’s Tendency to Colonial Expansion’ (see Hegel, G.W.F. (1991) *The Elements in the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Marx himself once did a reading of Hegel in the ‘Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”’; Marx concentrates on sections 261–313 regarding Constitutional Law.

from the king and their possession of those powers were a gift or dispensation from him.

As republican and democratic regimes began to dominate political reality, ministers and presidents replaced kings and monarchs as the chief executive. As this occurred, the other political functions were likewise distributed. Kings became little more than figureheads. Also, other institutions were invested with those other (i.e. legislative and judicial) powers. Also the institutions to whom those powers (legislative and judicial) were given, tended to be different from the ones which possessed the executive power of the state. Liberalism took pride in this separation of functions and called it 'separation of powers' (Schmitt 1985b, Schmitt 2008a). It was claimed that when the powers of the state were separated into different and perhaps opposing institutions, political freedom became possible.

However, liberalism, especially after Kant, had the tendency to grant too much power to the legislative (i.e. parliament) (Kant 1991). This occurred because the legislative powers were seen as the law making part of the state and as such it was understood to be the part best suited to provide the goods liberals claimed humans sought. Legislatures rule by instituting norms and laws, which thus frame how societies are to be governed (Schmitt 1985b, Schmitt 2008a). Thus, the crisis of liberal politics arises from the excessive taming of executive power by legal and constitutional norms (Mansfield 1989, Schmitt 2013). Although it is true that if the executive is too strong, the state will likely turn into a dictatorship or a tyranny, it is equally true that if the executive is too tame or too restricted by norms and legal restraints, the state will be open to predators – as was the way the Nazis used the law and parliamentary procedure to see control. In his writings of the 20s Schmitt pointed out that such problems could happen given the character of parliamentary systems (Schmitt 1985b, Schmitt 1976, Kennedy 2004). This is Schmitt's problem with the trend of liberal normativism in the Weimar Republic (Schmitt 2013, Schmitt 1985a, Schmitt 1976).

Although Hobbes is one of the intellectual fathers of the modern state, it could also be said that Hobbes is the father of liberalism; the very liberalism of the modern state which Schmitt sees as dangerously restraining the state. One could argue that the particular liberalism Schmitt is objecting to arises not so much from Hobbes but from Kant's, or even more correctly the neo-Kantian, radicalisation of Hobbesian politics. Yet, perhaps a better explanation is that the Hobbes of the state and the Hobbes of liberalism are one-and-the-same. This view argues that liberalism necessitates the creation of the state, because it is the state which will allow the securing of the goods liberalism seeks to bring forth.

Also, the state is that body which secures the goods which liberalism seeks and as such there is a necessary interconnection between the two. Because liberalism and the state are coequal, it should make sense that this tradition has dealt with the issues of the scope and limits of state power more than any other tradition of political power. The tradition of liberalism to this very day debates how much or little power the state should exercise in securing goods for individuals.

THE KANTIAN TURN AND THE MODERN STATE

Kant is the radicalisation of Hobbes (Kant 1991: 73–87, 137–140, and 141–154, Hobbes 1991). Kant takes Hobbes's social contract as a model for his ethical system. For Hobbes, the social contract is a product of the human will and is merely a political construct used to create a political community by establishing peace and security (Hobbes 1991: 111–128). Although politics and the political community became a product of the human will, Hobbes left morality alone – it was still left in the realm of nature (Hobbes 1991: 111–130). Now Kant treats morality as Hobbes treated the political community, by turning it into a construct of the human will. What is Categorical Imperative but an individualised social contract. It is a willed framework, which sets up a criterion for all moral and ethical action (or judgement). Thus, when Kantian and neo-Kantian political thought subjects the state to the categorical imperative, this system forces an abstraction upon an abstraction. This act by Kant is only taking Hobbes's position to its logical extreme. Contra Kant's protestation, he is nonetheless a child of Hobbes – if not one of his best interpreters.

However, one might object to this argument by claiming that Kant's position differs from Hobbes's in that Kant radically subjects the state to moral and value restraints, whereas Hobbesian political thought does not (Kant 1991: 73–87). Thus, when liberals seek to restrain the state from interfering with social and economic rights or goods, they impose preconditions upon the state. Granted that Hobbes does not subject the state to the various preconditions Kant and the other liberals do, he nonetheless establishes that there are indeed preconditions upon the state. Thus, Hobbes establishes a framework that will only be radicalised by Kant and those who follow his line of thought. This is to say that the state is the means by which one brings about specific human goods. Thus, the state is merely a means to an end. The end, for Hobbes, is peace and security within The Commonwealth (Hobbes 1991: 91–127). For Kant, many additional goods are included (Kant 1991: 73–87).

The ends of the state – i.e. peace and security – are more important than the means used to obtain those ends. Thus, the Hobbesian state is understood to be merely instrumental. Although Hobbes' understanding of the human goods – i.e. peace and security – which the state secures is more restrained and limited than what later liberal thinkers claim, his framework nevertheless admits the inclusion of those additional human goods (Hobbes 1991: 91–142). In this light, the followers of Kant, such as Kelsen et al, follow Hobbes in seeing politics as both instrumental and artificial. They differ from Hobbes by their demand that the state and its actors be obliged to be restrained by absolute moral principles. An important question is how these moral principles are arrived at, since God and Natural Law are precluded as sources of moral principles. They are to be rejected because the Moderns do not believe in such systems, because they are teleological in character and thus rely upon metaphysical assumptions which Modern philosophers categorically reject. Now a deontological approach, one that will not be open to metaphysical assault, is demanded as the basis of all moral principles. Kant's thought offers such an approach, one that will provide principles (or values) that will be categorical and a-priori in their make-up.

Politically, these principles (or values) are to be the law which governs the state. All state action is now to be governed by law or legal norms derived from categorical statements about justice. These legal norms are seen as restrictions and restraints placed upon state action. Now any action that does not obey or adhere to the law (or the absolute norms) is not a legal action of the state. Thus, legitimate state actions are lawful actions and illegitimate actions are unlawful ones. Neo-Kantian political thought, thus, ties legitimacy to legality.

Legality implies an emphasis upon the legislative aspect of the state, in that it is the legislative part of the state that makes the laws. This emphasis on the legislative is, as was said earlier, generally done at the expense of the executive. This is seen in the fact that most legal norms are aimed at restraining and limiting (or even defining and expanding) the scope of executive power (or prerogative). This tends to systematise and constrain the executive into formal and excessively legalistic roles. Such an understanding radically bans the state from acting, far more than Hobbes or his political thought ever desired. Because of 1) the general character of law and legal norms and 2) the specific character of constitutional crises, an excessive liberal normativistic view of the state, where all the power is in the hands of the legislature (i.e. parliament or congress) and very little independence is given or even granted to the executive, ensures that no decisive action will be taken in times of constitutional crisis.

As a product of neo-Kantian political thought, liberalism, which Schmitt is subjecting to intense criticism, attempts to normalise and restrain all politics and in the process of doing so places restraints upon state action. This is seen in the fact that the normativistic legalism of Kelsen and neo-Kantians demand that the state act only how the law permits. For Kelsen and neo-Kantians, it is law and legality that legitimises the state and any act done in its name. Because of this view, the state (and those who act in its name) must be bound by the law. Schmitt does not object to this claim, what he does object to is the view, which arises from Kant, that Emergency law is no law (Schmitt 1985a: 14).

Such an understanding of politics and law makes decisive state action by the executive in times of crisis impossible. As such, these conditions condemn the liberal state to destruction. Contrary to this trend, Schmitt desires to give the state more leeway (or prerogative) to act in times of crisis, hence his stress upon ‘decisionism’ (Schmitt 1985a: 5–6). Yet, contra his critics, Schmitt’s embrace of decisionism and ‘the challenge of the exception’ is not a rejection of the rule of law⁶. Rather it is a realistic understanding of the limits of law and the rule of law, one that is handed down from Aristotle’s *Politics* 3.15 (Mansfield 1989).

Any examination of Schmitt executive power in states must address his *Die Diktatur* (Schmitt 2014). When examining the interconnection between sovereign power and crisis and how that effects the behaviour of the state, readers and commentators tend to point to and deal with much earlier translated works like *Politische Theologie* or *Der Begriff des Politischen* (*Concept of the Political*). Yet, not to look at it in this issue would not do justice to Schmitt’s thinking in these areas. *Die Diktatur* presents a very extensive historical examination of how the modern state in its European context attempts to institutionalise, through executive power, the use of emergency power of what was found in the Roman political institution called the ‘dictator’, one that echoes what he wrote in his *Verfassungslehre*, which is translated as *Constitutional Theory* in the English translation of this classic of German constitutional law scholarship (Schmitt 2008a).

Schmitt clearly tries to show that the intellectual founders of the modern state (Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau, etc.) all tried to find means to bring into the concept of the state the power and effectiveness that the

⁶ Contrast Scheuerman, W.E. (1993) ‘The Rule of Law Under Siege’. *History of Political Thought* 14 (2), 265–280, also see Scheuerman, W.E. (1996) ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism’. *The Review of Politics* 58 (2), 299–322.

Roman dictator had in dealing with a crisis that normal powers of executive offices restrained by law seem unable to resolve, but without the dangers and threats to political liberty the abuse of it posed. The reasons why they sought to constrain such power can be found in the origins of the concept of the state which sought to overcome the conflict and strife that prevailed in the political world that often prevented a peaceful and prosperous development of European nations. Thus the rise of the modern state in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was a move to make routine the power of the Roman 'dictator' but constrained through the institutional framework of the modern state. Yet the reality of crisis and the need to often have more power than many legalistic formalists who often shaped Constitutional executives and thus Schmitt saw how examining the concept of the power within 'the commissarial dictator' within certain constitutional arrangements (in Schmitt's case when he is writing the Weimar Constitution) could address this problem.

Also Schmitt examines the evolution from the Roman model of 'commissarial dictator', which often acted extra-constitutionally or above the law for a specified period of time and in times where normal political means were either unavailable or not powerful enough (due to the laws restraint on those offices) to deal with the crisis, to the way the major thinkers of Western political tradition attempt to harness for the modern state a means to utilise the pure power of the sovereign in order to effectively resolve crises that are irresolvable by ordinary political and legislative means (Schmitt 2013). Hence Schmitt's examination of the role of the executive in crisis hits directly on his criticism which says that most liberal models rely too heavily on law and the legislative procedure to secure and protect the state – which does include for him the people and their rights (Schmitt 1985b, Schmitt 1976, Schmitt 2008a). He explicitly worries that all too often parliamentary bodies are composed of many members and parties, and as a collective it lacks the ability to act uniformly and decisively (Schmitt 1985b, Schmitt 1976, Schmitt 2008a, Schmitt 2013). Also legislative forms tend to the normativism – which is to say the application of legal norms and universal rules that often cannot speak to particular circumstances. Schmitt sees this tendency to normativism as undermining effective and often necessary state action in times of crisis (Schmitt 1985b, Schmitt 1976, Schmitt 2013). And it is exactly this concern in the world following America's response to the events of 11 September 2001 that drives so many contemporary political thinkers to Schmitt's work and especially this work (i.e., Agamben and Vermeule and Posner) (Agamben 2005, and Vermeule, and Posner 2011).

CONCLUSION

Given the understanding of Hobbes as a founder of liberal politics and the liberal polity, Schmitt's apparent hostility to liberalism would seem to require him to abandon Hobbes as the recourse against the normativist liberal state. However, he never does this. This failure to abandon Hobbes is either due to 1) a failure on Schmitt's part to understand Hobbes as also the father of liberalism or 2) Schmitt does not wish to merely reject liberalism wholesale, but only the radicalised form of liberalism that arises after Kant. Of these two options, the latter is the one that I believe to be the reason why Schmitt insists upon a return to Hobbes. The return to Hobbes is the means by which one can rescue the liberal state from excessive liberal normativism, like that which dominated the Weimar Republic (i.e. the legal and political positivism of both Max Weber and Hans Kelsen).

The view that Schmitt failed to see Hobbes as the father of liberalism would be an error of such a magnitude on his part as a reader of Hobbes as suggesting that Schmitt is a poor or sloppy reader of one of the key texts that shape modern intellectual history and political thought. Yet, if anything is shown in reading Schmitt's works it is that he is far from a sloppy reader of the thing. On the contrary, he is rather an extremely careful and thoughtful reader and scholar, even though he writes with a very polemical tone. Given this, he would not have missed that Hobbes's thought is the foundation of liberal thought. Given we are forced to accept 1) that Hobbes is a liberal and 2) that Schmitt is a perceived to be an anti-liberal, we must come to a understanding why he nevertheless endorses a return to Hobbes. Schmitt's desire to return to Hobbes, who is the father of liberalism, would make no sense if Schmitt was an anti-liberal as the critics assert. Rather the critics must be incorrect in their assertion of Schmitt's anti-liberalism. His argument for the return to Hobbes makes sense only if we take him as a liberal, who desires to save liberalism from its more radical and self-destructive stages.

In this attempt to understand Schmitt we could learn from one of his students, Leo Strauss. Strauss said, 'Schmitt is undertaking the critique of liberalism in a liberal world. We [mean] by this that his critique of liberalism takes place within the horizon of liberalism; his illiberal tendencies are arrested by the as yet undefeated "systematic of liberal thinking". The critique of liberalism that Schmitt has initiated can therefore be completed only when we succeed in gaining a horizon beyond liberalism. Within such a horizon Hobbes achieved the foundations of liberalism. A radical critique of liberalism is therefore possible only on the basis of an adequate understanding

of Hobbes' (Strauss 1976: 104–05). Thus, Schmitt's radical critique of liberalism is nevertheless a critique within the tradition of liberalism. His embracing of Hobbesian politics would force the careful student to see his work as consistent with the original tradition of liberalism and not the radical rejection of liberalism as the critics claim.

Even Schmitt's greatest failing, his membership in the Nazi party in May 1933, can be justified within the Hobbesian framework, in that after the Enabling Act of March 1933 the Nazis, under the absolute leadership of Hitler, were then the Sovereign of Germany. And as we know, any good student of Hobbes obeys the sovereign (Schwab 1989: 148). Thus, if there is a flaw in Schmitt, it is that he was not sufficiently anti-liberal to overcome his attachment to Hobbes and the Hobbesian framework of politics – in that within the logic of Hobbes there is no means to overturn the unjust or wicked ruler once the sovereign body consented to it.

After March 1933, although there was no longer a liberal state in Germany, there was still a state and Schmitt's behaviour can be interpreted as an attempt to preserve it within a Nazi framework, perhaps as a last vestige of liberalism. Thus, the best one can say about his Nazi period and how it relates to his earlier work is that he attempted to frame (or more correctly re-frame) the Nazi movement within the last vestige of the old liberal state. He attempts to place the Hitlerian regime in some (albeit very vague and loose) form of the state with very implicit norms which could guide Nazism into a more benign political system (i.e. make it more liberal, or at least more founded in the framework of law and the constitutional framework of the law-state (*Rechtsstaat*)). But such a programme was not to be allowed in the totalitarian regime envisioned by true Nazis. Like radical liberals and communists, the Nazis had no room for the state, which they perceived to be something which could or would limit the power of the party. Thus, true Nazis saw this aspect of Schmitt's thought and attacked him because they understood what his project entailed (Schwab 1989, Benderski 1983).

Although such an attempt cannot justify his obedience to the Nazi regime, it does allow one to understand his actions⁷. Perhaps in other circumstances, Schmitt's attempt to preserve the liberal state from the extreme consequences

⁷ Another and perhaps better explanation for Schmitt's behavior between 1933–1936 is that he became disillusioned with liberalism and its unwillingness to confront and prevent the Nazi takeover of the government. His disillusion with liberalism led to an acceptance of the current reality and thus self-preservation guided the rest of his actions, which can be understood as an attempt to save not only his person but his position within the new Germany.

of liberal policy is something noble and justifiable. This is why contemporary liberals must turn to Schmitt now to learn not only from his warning but also his failure, else they better be prepared to suffer the same fate.

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CARL SCHMITT AND THE LIMITS OF THE MODERN LIBERAL STATE

Summary

This paper looks at Schmitt and his critique of liberalism in terms of the question of how the constitutional structure of the modern state can lead to certain contradictions and problems that arise out of the radicalism of the liberal doctrine advanced by the neo-Kantian legal tradition that dominated in Germany in the early twentieth century. I argue that according to Schmitt a return to Hobbes, as well as other modern political thinkers such as Machiavelli and Bodin, was the only means to correct this radicalisation of liberalism to allow for the survival of politics.

Key words: Carl Schmitt, Liberalism, State, Executive Power, Decisionsism, Sovereignty

CARL SCHMITT I OGRANICZENIA WSPÓŁCZESNEGO PAŃSTWA LIBERALNEGO

Streszczenie

W tym artykule przyglądamy się Schmittowi i jego krytyce liberalizmu pod kątem pytania o to, w jaki sposób konstytucyjna struktura współczesnego państwa może prowadzić do pewnych sprzeczności i problemów wynikających z radykalizacji liberalnej doktryny promowanej przez neokantowską tradycję prawną, która dominowała w Niemczech na początku XX wieku. Autor twierdzi, że według Schmitta powrót do Hobbesa, a także innych współczesnych myślicieli politycznych, takich jak Machiavelli i Bodin, był jedynym sposobem na naprawienie tej radykalizacji liberalizmu, aby umożliwić przetrwanie polityki.

Słowa kluczowe: Carl Schmitt, liberalizm, państwo, władza wykonawcza, decyzyjonizm, suwerenność

КАРЛ ШМИТТ И ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ЛИБЕРАЛЬНОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА

Резюме

В центре внимания этой статьи находится Шмитт, а также его критика либерализма в аспекте того, как конституционная структура современного государства может привести к некоторым противоречиям и проблемам, возникающим в результате либеральной радикализации доктрины, пропагандируемой неокантианской правовой традицией, которая доминировала в Германии в начале 20-го века. Мы согласны с утверждением Шмитта, что возвращение к Гоббсу, а также к другим современным политическим мыслителям, таким, как Макиавелли и Бодин, представляло собой единственный способ исправления этой радикализации либерализма с целью обеспечения дальнейшего существования политики.

Ключевые слова: Карл Шмитт, либерализм, государство, исполнительная власть, решенничество, суверенитет

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THE ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE CONTEXT OF MAX WEBER'S VIEWS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Certainly, the success that Western Europe has achieved in building capitalism and in the growth of social welfare has led to the constant search for the model of factors of economic growth and development. The growth rate of national income is essentially influenced by two groups of factors: the accumulation of production factors resulting in the increase of human skills, and the ability to effectively use the possessed resources. Technology, institutional development, geographical location are also important determinants affecting economic development. A more controversial and questionable factor may be the affiliation to and profession of a particular religion.

On the one hand, there are attempts to examine the influence of religion on the increase in the level and dynamics of economic growth in macro terms, as well as the impact of religion on an individual worshipper in defining his character traits and attitudes that influence the formation of *Homo economicus* (Höhener, and Schaltegger 2012). On the other hand, the religious variable is treated as a variable depending on the level of economic development (the level of secularisation).

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In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries German scientists, among others Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Werner Sombart, played a special role in the assessment of the impact of religion and church on the construction of the capitalist order. Their views on the issue of religion were radically different, but undoubtedly they influenced subsequent generations of economists who, using various research methods, including econometric analysis, have tried to assess the significance of the 'religious variable' in generating economic growth.

Weber's thesis assumes that religion affects the personality traits and mentality of the individual, which in turn has had a significant impact on the entire economy. Weber described the development of capitalism as a gradual process of rationalisation. The process of rationalisation growth was a combination of professed religion and economic development. In this respect, Weber saw the special significance of reformed religions, including Calvinism. Although the thesis advanced by Weber is already over a hundred years old and has had many different interpretations, it still raises many controversies and doubts.

The author set himself the goal of determining whether, according to M. Weber's thesis, Protestantism had an impact on the economic growth of the German Reich?

To this end, using the previously developed GDP level model, the author included the religious variable (the number of Protestants) in the study of its relationship to the economic growth of the German Reich in 1879–1910 (Myszczyzyn 2013, Myszczyzyn 2016). Protestantism was the dominant religion in Germany, hence affecting the individual characteristics of worshippers (savings, mutual assistance) it hypothetically might have influenced the pace of economic growth.

The following research hypothesis was assumed: the Protestant religion was an important factor influencing the economic growth of the German Reich (1879–1910). Assuming that the religious variable is important, it can be treated only as one of many factors of Germany's economic growth.

In this work, the author only tries to determine the influence of religion (as an independent variable) on economic growth, while he does not consider equally important issues as demand, supply of religion, including market analysis. The article should be treated as a preliminary study in this respect, which will be developed in the future by adding further factors of economic growth.

2. THE DISPUTE ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM. KARL MARX, MAX WEBER, WERNER SOMBART

The three well-known German economists had a very different assessment of the importance and the influence of religion on economic life.

Karl Marx (1818–1883), assessing the influence of religion on the development of capitalism, referred to the criticism of the influence of Christianity in this area formulated by Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach (Feuerbach 1841, Bauer 1843, Stirner 1845)¹. These young Hegelians believed that religious content was only a reflection of human nature. Marx added: *‘Der Mensch macht Religion, die Religion macht nicht den Menschen’* (‘Man creates religion, religion does not create man’), *‘Religion ist der Seufzer der bedrängten Kreatur, das Gemüt einer herzlosen Welt, wie sie der der Geistloser Zustände ist. Sie ist das Opium des Volkes’* (‘Religion is the repulse of a persecuted being, the mind of a heartless world, like the spirit of a soulless state, It is »like« an opium for the nation’) (Kruhöfer 2002: 47–48). Although Marx despised religion, it cannot be said that it was irrelevant to him and his relatives. His family had been professing Judaism for hundreds of years, and only his father changed his religion to Protestantism.

Marx, presenting the thesis of economic determinism, treated religious and cultural issues as a superstructure through an economic base.

Max Weber (1864–1920) opposed Karl Marx’s theses. Certainly, Max Weber’s views were influenced by his upbringing and family relationships. His mother Helena, maiden name Fallenstein (1844–1919), who was a Protestant, at the same time explored her faith through personal loyalty to God that gave her the power to live. The son, after a serious illness in childhood, remained under a special care of his mother. As he said about himself, he was the son of his mother (*‘Muttersohn’*). His mother advised him until the end of his life, influenced his mood, warned him like a child against threats, accompanied him during his travels. In addition, the mother devoted herself fully to household work, bringing up children (eight), and she was reluctant to share her domestic duties with servants.

His father, Max senior (1836–1897) – a Prussian politician, was not a practicing Christian, he saw too much mystification in religious ceremonies and believed that they forced people to be obedient.

¹ Both are classified as so-called left Hegelians (young Hegelians).

Young Max felt a Prussian and lived in times when the importance of the Kingdom of Prussia grew in the struggle for the unification of Germany, and because of the Protestant religion the state was in a way connected with the throne and the altar of faith (state Protestant religion) (Kaesler 2014: 21 ff.). It shaped his later views.

In his book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (*Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*) (1905, 1930) Weber argued that the economic calculation used by merchants and traders had a fundamental impact on rationality in the sphere of management, policies (e.g. trade policy), spreading to other spheres of the economic life of society. Capitalism was the highest form of this rationality. Weber calls capitalism ‘the most fateful force in our modern life’ (Weber 2010: 8). He noted that even the most unlimited greed for gain is not in the least identical with capitalism, and is still less its spirit. He defines capitalism as ‘the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise’. ... ‘In a wholly capitalistic order of society, an individual capitalistic enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction’. Weber defined the word capitalistic as ‘an economic action resting on the expectation of profit by the utilisation of opportunities for exchange, thus on (formally) peaceful chances for profit’ (Weber 2010: 8–9).

Weber assumed that religiosity was an independent variable that could have an impact on economic results achieved on a macro scale, and thus on economic growth and development (social welfare).

He pointed out that religious beliefs are not unrelated to the economy, and the cultivation of personal traits such as work ethics, honesty (and at the same time trust), frugality, charity, pursuing the goals assumed by the individual with the assumption of a certain risk can positively affect the entire economy. In contrast to Marx, he assumed that religion can affect the economy through the strength of rationality. Hence the attempt to determine the relationship between professed religions and the economy.

In a special way, in his book, Weber gave examples of the behaviour of the followers of particular factions of the Christian religion². He indicated how important it is to define the profession and professional work for individual Christian religions, for instance for M. Luther (1483–1546) work meant service for the glory of God, and for Calvinism economic success was a sign

² These arguments were undoubtedly strongly influenced by M. Weber’s three month stay of in the USA (1904) at the world exhibition in St. Louis. Thanks to W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Weber got to know the situation of the Afro-American population, their education, etc.

of the vocation (predestination). At the same time, in many places in his book, Weber showed how the reformed churches affected human behaviour and temporal affairs in contrast to the Catholic religion: 'The Catholic is quieter, having less of the acquisitive impulse; he prefers a life of the greatest possible security, even with a smaller income, to a life of risk and excitement, even though it may bring the chance of gaining honour and riches. The proverb says jokingly, "either eat well or sleep well". In the present case the Protestant prefers to eat well, the Catholic to sleep undisturbed' (Weber 2010: 27).

Weber's insights lead to the observation that the followers of the Protestant religion, especially the followers of Calvinism, had fundamentally influenced the economic development of Western Europe countries and the USA. Weber gives an example of their positive impact on the economies of the United States, England and the Netherlands.

Weber's thesis regarding the influence of the Protestant religion on economic growth may raise doubts and is not without many flaws. As Karl-Heinz Brodbeck notes, however, Weber limits rationality to the Protestant style of life. His observations regarding Confucianism, Buddhism, and Hinduism can only be a confirmation of an erroneous thesis; Weber believed that, for example, India would not be able to generate real economic growth (Brodbeck 2006). In many places of Weber's work one can feel great reluctance towards Catholicism and individual sacraments. He writes about the sacrament of penance:

'The rationalisation of the world, the elimination of magic as a means to salvation, the Catholics had not carried nearly so far as the Puritans (and before them the Jews) had done. To the Catholic the absolution of his Church was a compensation for his own imperfection. The priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation, and who held the key to eternal life in his hand. One could turn to him in grief and penitence. He dispensed atonement, hope of grace, certainty of forgiveness, and thereby granted release from that tremendous tension to which the Calvinist was doomed by an inexorable fate, admitting of no mitigation (...) The God of Calvinism demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system' (Weber 2010: 83–84).

Referring to the sacrament of penance it would be appropriate to evoke the crucifixion of Christ and the very fact that the follower of the Catholic religion is uncertain about the forgiveness of sins and dispensed atonement.

In search of factors conducive to the creation of capitalism, it is impossible not to mention another German scientist, a representative of

the younger German historical school: Werner Sombart (1863–1941). Max Weber's colleague believed that the Protestant religion was not a driving force (spirit) of capitalism at all. He reminded that Protestant religions (including Calvinism) in the initial phase of their formation were hostile to capitalism itself, thus it is difficult to think that they had a positive impact on the development of the spirit of capitalism. At the same time, he indicated that the development of capitalism (including British capitalism) was probably influenced by completely different factors than Calvinism and the English-Scottish version of it, that is puritanism (Sombart 1920: 323 ff.).

Starting chapter 22 of his work *Der Bourgeois* W. Sombart wrote '*Der Protestantismus bedeutet zunächst auf der ganzen Linie eine ernste Gefahr für den Kapitalismus und insbesondere die kapitalistische Wirtschaftsgesinnung*' (Protestantism means first of all a serious threat to capitalism, and especially to the capitalist economic mentality) (Sombart 1920: 323).

At the same time, following the scientific achievements of Sombart, it should be added that he noticed the role of the Jewish religion and Jews themselves in the development of capitalism. He presented a controversial thesis that '*Amerika in allen seinen Teilen ist Judenland*' ('America in all its parts is a Jewish state'). He recalled the merits of Jews in the development of capitalism and their contribution to incorporating the American continent into the European economic system (Sombart 1911: 31–32).

After reading W. Sombart's work M. Weber asked 'What were the distinctive economic achievements of Judaism in the Middle Ages and in modern times? Moneylending, from pawnbroking to the financing of great states, certain types of commodity business, particularly retailing, peddling, and produce trade of a distinctively rural type; certain branches of wholesale business...'. He added that in the Jewish activity there was no significant feature of modern capitalism – the organisation of industrial production in domestic industry and in the factory system (Weber 2002: 466–487).

As it was shown above religion was assessed differently by K. Marx, M. Weber and W. Sombart; the first of them treated religion as a superstructure, Weber thought that reformed religions played an important role in the process of rationalisation and development of the spirit of capitalism, Sombart stressed the importance of the Jewish religion.

3. RELIGION AS A SPECIFIC GOOD – RESEARCH RESULT REVIEW

Since the times of Adam Smith worshippers have been perceived as members of an economic club. Belonging to a religious community both exerts influence on the individual behaviour of the members (by strictly defined rules, participation in rites, penalty for violation of the rules, perception of others) and also affects the whole social group, being an important element of social capital.

In economic modelling religion is treated as a specific good. A single person chooses a particular religion, which is also connected with the participation of that person in religious practices. From an economic point of view, both the costs and benefits of religious affiliation in the aspect of multiplying social welfare should be considered (Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997: 350–364).

In the sense of new institutional economics, religion is something that creates a structure and is characterised by informal rules. Thus, religion, apart from factors such as manners, customs, tradition, is an important social factor, in addition deeply rooted in the studied community and affecting its development (Hoffmann 2012: 23–58)³. Apart from this, religion is not subject to frequent changes, hence it is a factor taken for granted (Williamson 1998: 23–58).

Essentially, religion can affect the economy through two channels:

- (indirect) impact on the person’s individual traits and mentality. Aggregation of these features at the social level may affect economic values, including economic growth;
- direct influence of religion on conduct among people, and affiliation to religion strengthens economic cooperation between members of the community (Höhener, and Schaltegger 2012).

It should also be emphasised that various scientific studies on the influence of religion on individual behaviour as well as the verification of Max Weber’s thesis have led to various conclusions.

For example, the following relationships between the studied religion and individual characteristics of its followers have been found:

³ As Robert Hoffmann shows, despite the emergence of more and more secular attitudes, religion still plays a significant role in the twenty first century – for example, in 2010 half of Americans surveyed thought that religion was very important in their lives. This assessment has basically remained unchanged for 40 years. Moreover, other studies prepared by the Bertelsmann Foundation proved that 62% of Americans considered themselves very religious.

- negative correlation between personal income and religious affiliation (Lipford, and Tollison 2003: 249–260);
- higher correlation between religious affiliation (Catholics and Jews) and personal income than in the case of Protestants (Steen 2004: 572–581);
- positive correlation between the percentage of Protestants and the number of suicides (Becker, and Woessmann 2011);
- positive (strong) correlation between religious affiliation and tax morality (propensity to pay taxes). Differentiated correlation coefficient, but always high for particular denominations (Torgler 2006: 81–109);
- positive influence of religiosity on propensity to save, attitude to cooperation, women’s rights, etc., and thus a positive impact on economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003: 225–282);
- positive influence of the Catholic religion on subjective satisfaction with life, health, family relations, lower unemployment, creation of social ties in comparison with other citizens (Tao, 2008: 905–919);
- positive influence of religiosity (in general and considering particular denominations) on the level of satisfaction in comparison to non-believers (Steiner, Lienert, and Frey, 2010: 9–24).

Contemporary scientific research aimed at determining the interdependence between economic growth and the religious variable, (i.e. indirect influence of religion), was conducted, among others by: Luigi Guiso, Paula Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. They came to the following conclusions:

- religiously active citizens are usually little tolerant and have conservative views, e.g. regarding the role of women in society;
- religiously oriented citizens emphasise that people are naturally lazy and do not have enough willpower. In particular, vanity of man is stressed in Protestantism;
- Christian religions have a positive impact on economic growth, Islam – negative;
- Protestants have more confidence in other people and institutions compared to Catholics. They are more willing to pay taxes;
- Catholics more than Protestants support private property, property also plays a serious role in Hinduism, and the smallest in Islam;
- Jews are the most willing to pay taxes and are opposed to tax evasion, followed by Protestants, Hindus, and Catholics take the last place;
- the least willing to give bribes and other financial benefits are Buddhists, then Protestants and followers of Islam, Catholics close the list;
- Catholics have a positive attitude to the rules of competition in the economy, more than Protestants.

The authors conclude that religion exerts a positive influence on economic growth, but at the same time emphasise very large diversification of individual features affecting the level of economic growth, which also have a connection with religion. This does not allow them to easily indicate which religion has a decisive influence on the construction of economic prosperity. Certainly, Christian religions exert more positive influence on economic growth than Islam. The authors distance themselves from concluding which of the Christian religions exerts a greater influence on economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003: 225–282).

Horst Feldmann from the University of Bath in UK conducted another study, concluding that Protestant countries are characterised by a higher rate of economic activity (Dambeck 2007). He showed, using statistical data, including the correlation and regression calculus, that in the Protestant countries the professional activity rate is higher on average by 6%; what is more, among women the ratio is higher even by 11%. He adds that among women of other denominations (including Catholics and Muslims), finding a job is often not worth the effort. Moreover, in employees in the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and the USA, one can sense the ethics of work, discipline, willingness to work and supposedly these features are influenced by Protestantism. Bearing in mind the weaknesses of his research, Feldmann adds that despite these conclusions his thesis cannot be confirmed in former East Germany (where Luther lived), and Catholic Bavaria. Probably it would be difficult to confirm this thesis in the (other) former provinces of Prussia. A big drawback of Feldmann's research is the fact that he only tried to show the relationship between Protestantism and professional activity in particular Protestant countries, omitting the use of the identical modelling for Catholic and Muslim countries.

In 2001 Delacroix and Nielsen carried out research on Weber's thesis. The researchers considered statistical data from western European countries from the end of the eighteenth century. They investigated how the religious variable (the percentage »%« of people professing the Protestant religions) is correlated with Protestant attitudes (e.g., propensity to savings, setting up stock exchanges, extension of the railroad network, social distribution of labour »reducing employment in agriculture at the expense of industry and services«), and the development of capitalism. Contrary to theses advanced by Weber the researchers did not prove a significant correlation between Protestantism and: the level of social income per capita, founding of stock exchange, social distribution of labour. The negative correlation coefficient between Protestantism and the pace of railway network expansion was

a surprise. The only significant correlation existed between Protestantism and an increase in bank deposits, which could be interpreted as the fact that the followers of reformed religions were characterised by a greater propensity to save (Delacroix, and Nielsen 2001: 509–553).

Shawn F. Dorius and Wayne Baker conclude, however, that Weber's hypothesis should be reoriented in such a way that the values of the laity and not only of Protestantism and other religions are referred to in defining changes in the mentality of people (Dorius, and Baker 2012, McCleary, and Barro 2009).

4. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE GERMAN REICH AND THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA (1871–1910)

At the beginning of the twentieth century 90 million followers of Protestantism and 173 million Catholics lived in Europe (*Informationen zur politischen Bildung [Information on political education]* No. 315/2012).

In the German Reich created on the initiative of Prussia in 1871 out of 41,058,792 residents, nearly 25.6 million people declared their affiliation to the Protestant denominations, about 14.9 million were Catholics, there were 82 thousand followers of other Christian religions and over 512 thousand of the Jewish religion. The Kingdom of Prussia was the largest national state that was part of the German Empire. Prussia with a total area of 348,779.9 km² accounted for 64.49% of the total area of the Reich, and its population of 24,691,085 constituted 60.14% of the population of the Reich (*Statlisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich [Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich] 1914:1*).

Analysing the statistics of religious believers in Prussia in 1871:

- 64.97% of citizens were the followers of the Protestant religion;
- 33.49% of citizens declared the Catholic denomination;
- 0.22% of citizens were other Christians;
- 1.32% of citizens professed Judaism.


Out of 12 Prussian provinces, 6 provinces were located entirely (provinces: Posen, Westpommern) or partially (Pommern, Ostpommern, Schlesien, Branderburg) on the territory of current Poland. Analysing the religious diversification of this part of Prussia, it is easy to notice that Christianity was the dominant religion. On the other hand, two rites dominated in the Christian religion: Protestant and Catholic, while there were nearly twice as many followers of the first.

According to statistical data taken from the Statistical Yearbook of Prussia (*Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Preussischen Staat [Statistical Yearbook*

of the Prussian State] 1903 1904), the followers of Protestantism dominated in provinces: Pommern, Westpommern, Brandenburg, (e.g. in the district of Gąbin 96.89% of the total population, Szczecin 96.57% of the total population), in turn, Catholics prevailed in the province of Posen, in the province of Schlesien in general Catholics also were in the majority, but there was a large variation depending on the district, for example in Legnica Protestants constituted 81.85% of the total population, while in the district of Opole Catholics accounted for 90% of the total population. In the Westpommern province, the followers of the two rites were in similar number; except that in the region of Gdańsk Protestants constituted about 49.5% of the total population, Catholics 48.1%, while in the district of Kwidzyna Catholics constituted 53.48% of the total population, and Protestants 44.68%. In total, in the Westpommern province there were over 800,000 people who were Catholics and over 730,000 residents professing the Protestant religion (*Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Preussischen Staat [Statistical Yearbook of the Prussian State] 1903 1904: 15*). Analysing the percentage share of particular denominations in the period 1871–1910, both for the German Reich and the Kingdom of Prussia, these proportions changed slightly, but nevertheless in favour of Catholics. In 1910 Protestants constituted 61.5% of the total number of believers in the entire Reich (decrease by 1.1% in relation to 1871), Catholics 36.6% (increase by 0.72% in relation to 1871), Jews 0.95% (decrease by 0.29% in relation to 1871) and other Christians 0.44% (increase by 0.23% in relation to 1871) (Figure 1).

Figure 1

The followers of major religions in the German Reich in 1910 (%)



Source: Own study on the basis of: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich [Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich] 1917*, Herausgegeben vom Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amt, Berlin: Verlag von Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, p. 1, 13.

In 1910 in Prussia, the largest state of the Reich, Protestants accounted for 61.82% of all believers (decrease by 3.15% compared to 1871), Catholics 36.31% (increase by 2.82% compared to 1871), Jews 1.04% (decrease by 0.28% compared to 1871) and other Christians 0.47% (increase by 0.25% compared to 1871).

The analysis of statistics from 1871–1910 for the German Reich proves that despite the increase in the absolute number of the followers of Christian religions (Catholics and Protestants), the percentage of Protestants decreased by 0.79%, while the percentage of Catholics rose by 0.78% at the same time.

5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS – THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH. GDP LEVEL MODEL

In order to establish the relationship between economic growth measured by the level of GDP and independent variables describing the German economy, the author used the model he had developed earlier, which concerned the estimation of the impact of, among others, a railway variable on the economic growth of Germany. The author used the following collected statistical data describing the state of the German economy:

- percentage of the number of people employed in agriculture in relation to the employed in the entire national economy (%) (hereinafter referred to as AW),
- level of emigration (in thousands of people) (hereinafter referred to as EM_{t-1}),
- level of investment in the economy (in million RM) (hereinafter referred to as I),
- number of marriages entered into (in thousands) (hereinafter referred to as MA),
- number of pupils and students (in thousands) (hereinafter referred to as ST_{t-1})
- number of Protestants (in thousands of people) (hereinafter referred to as PR) (*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich [Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich] 1880–1913, Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Preussischen Staat [Statistical Yearbook of the Prussian State] 1903 1904*, Hoffman, 1965: 352–354, 368–370, Maddison www.sais-jhu.edu/library/subjectguides/stats.htm).

The aim of the inclusion of the religious variable was to verify the research hypothesis assumed by the author, as well as to expand the model and further search for factors of German economic growth in the nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries. Due to the availability of statistical data on individual religions published in *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* [*Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich*] (years 1880–1913) the author analysed the time series of 1879–1910 (Myszczyszyn 2016: 475–484, Mata, Love 2008: 461–492).

In the proposed model, the GDP level was an endogenous variable, while the other used variables were explanatory.

The function had a general form:

$$\ln Y_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i \ln x_{i,t} + \varepsilon_t$$

where:

Y_t – GDP of Germany (1879–1910),

x_{it} – selected explanatory variables characterising the economy of Germany, described under the equation,

β_i – structural parameters,

β_0 – the constant term,

\ln – natural logarithm,

ε_t – random component.

In this approach, the structural parameter β_0 determines the flexibility of a dependent variable with respect to explanatory variables. It describes a relative change of the GDP level (in USD 1990) caused by a relative change of only one of the distinguished factors by 1%, with a set level of other factors (*ceteris paribus*).

At the same time, it was assumed that the critical value of the correlation was:

$$r^* = \sqrt{\frac{t_{\alpha, N-2}^2}{N-2 + t_{\alpha, N-2}^2}} \approx 0,344$$

where:

$t_{\alpha, N-2}^2$ – the value of the statistics read from the Student's t -distribution tables for the significance level of 0.05 and $(N-2)$ degrees of freedom.

All exogenous variables (including the religious community) were significantly correlated with the explanatory variable.

At the same time, the stationarity of individual variables was examined using two tests: the extended Dickey Fuller test (ADF), and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS). The ADF test verifies the (null) hypothesis about the occurrence of a unit root. The lack of grounds for rejecting it


indicates the non-stationarity of the series. The KPSS test indicates the stationarity of the series when there is no basis for rejecting the null hypothesis. It was assumed that the unit root test and stationarity test are complementary to each other and should be used in parallel (Kębłowski 2003: 87–104).

The results of the integration analysis indicated the stationarity of the integrated variables at level 0 for: the level of investment and the level of emigration and the first differences for: the level of GDP, the level of employment in agriculture, the number of marriages, the number of pupils and students, the number of Protestants.

The below figure (Figure 2) presents the dependent variable – first differences of GDP of Germany.

Figure 2

First differences – the GDP of Germany variable (1879–1910)



Source: own calculation on the basis of: A. Maddison, *Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1-2003 AD*, www.sais-jhu.edu/library/subjectguides/stats.htm [02.12.2015].

6. THE OBTAINED RESULTS AND THEIR ANALYSIS

The least squares method (LSM) was used to estimate the structural parameters of the above model.

The GDP level model taking into account the religious variable – the number of Protestants (variable PR):

$$\ln Y_t = 0,171 - 6,146 \ln PR - 0,021 \ln EM_{t-1} - 0,89 \ln AW$$

$$\begin{array}{cccc} |t| & (4,08) & (3,06) & (3,70) & (2,94) \end{array}$$

$$R^2=0,3960 \quad \text{Adjusted } R^2=0,3313 \quad S_{EE}=1,60 \quad DW=1,97$$

where:

- Y_t – increases in Germany's GDP in 1879–1910,
 PR – increase in the number of followers of Protestantism,
 EM_{t-1} – emigration level (t-1) (in thousands of people)⁴,
 AW – increase in the number of people working in agriculture.

For the above modelling step, R^2 determination coefficient was 39.6%, and its adjusted value amounted to 33.013%.

The significance test was based on the distribution of Student's t-statistics. Inequality is the result for three parameters $|t| > t_\alpha$ ($|t| > 2,0484$). The variables of the investment level ($|t|=0,768$), increase in the number of marriages ($|t|=0,414$), increase in the number of pupils and students ($|t|=0,438$), turned out to be insignificant.

To test homoscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test was done. The value of LM statistics 2.98, on the basis of the empirical level of significance (value $p > 0.05$) equal to 0.39 there are no grounds for rejecting H_0 hypothesis about the occurrence of homoscedasticity of model residuals.

The assessments of structural parameters for the above equation (assuming *ceteris paribus*) lead to the following conclusions:

- increase in the number of Protestants by 1% affected the decline in the growth of German GDP by about 6.146%!
- decrease in the level of emigration by 1% meant an increase in GDP growth by 0.02%,
- decrease in the percentage of people employed in agriculture by 1% affected the increase in GDP by 0.89%.

However, it should be added that both the percentage of people employed in agriculture and the level of emigration in the analysed period (1879–1910) basically had a tendency to decline, i.e. they influenced the growth of German GDP. On the other hand, the number of followers of Protestant religions (mainly due to a rise in the number of population) increased.

The obtained results confirm that, according to the assumed research hypothesis, the religious variable turned out to be a significant variable affecting Germany's GDP.

⁴ Time delays (t-n) were used in the model for selected variables (level of emigration, number of marriages) in order to eliminate the endogeneity of these variables.

Analysing the above equation, it should be noted that the following factors were important in influencing the explanation of the endogenous GDP variable in the period 1879–1910:

- demographic factors, including the level of emigration analysed by the author;
- the importance of human capital development as a percentage of the number of pupils and students (ST_{t-1}) turned out to be insignificant, which may be a big surprise, because in the case of the research carried out for the period 1850–1913 the author obtained a positive influence of this factor (Myszczyzyn 2013). It is similar in the case of the variable of marriages entered into (in thousands) (hereinafter referred to MA);
- the decline in employment in agriculture proved to be significant as in the previous research of the author (for the years 1850–1913). In German agriculture there was still a significant percentage of people employed in the national economy in the total number of employees; for example, in 1913 it was close to 35% of the total number of employees. There were many reasons for this condition, including the character of provinces of the Eastern Reich, which were supposed to serve as a resource base. Another possible reason was a change in commercial policy, among others, an alliance of junkers and industrialists (the iron and rye union), as a result of which cereal farming was still profitable, and the outflow of labour from agriculture to the industry was relatively small.
- the number of followers of Protestantism (PR), although a significant variable, the increase in the number of followers affected the decline in GDP growth.

CONCLUSIONS

The GDP growth rate is essentially influenced by two groups of factors: accumulation of production factors (resources), in particular manifested in the level of investments in physical capital and investments in human capital (the level of education, number of students, access to education, etc.) resulting in the increase of human skills. Another group is the ability to effectively use the resources. Technology, institutional development, geographical location are also important determinants affecting economic development.

In this context, Max Weber's controversial thesis about the positive influence of Protestantism, including Calvinism on the development of capitalism, was subject to verification for Weber's homeland – Germany.

Using the available statistical data about the economy of the German Reich (1879–1910) and the econometric model developed by himself, the author included the religious variable (especially the increase in the number of Protestants) in his analysis.

The results of the research indicate that the religious variable turned out to be (along with other variables) an important variable in the model of Germany's GDP level in 1879–1910. It may be intriguing that it affected negatively the growth of Germany's GDP considering that the number of Protestants increased, but in view of the rapid demographic growth, the percentage of Protestants in relation to the number of followers nevertheless decreased. It can be added that the (adjusted) coefficient of determination R^2 amounted to 33.13%, which proves that the level of GDP was also influenced by other factors not taken into account by the author in the model. It seems that W. Sombart was right in pointing out that at the beginning of the twentieth century many factors influenced social welfare.

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THE ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE CONTEXT OF MAX WEBER'S VIEWS

Summary

The basis of Weber thesis is presented in the work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Analysing the development of capitalism Weber connected it, among others, with an increase of rationality caused by a particular religion. He stated that an increase in ascetic Protestantism (including Calvinism), and in particular a set of values and beliefs about work, savings, investment, and multiplying wealth were essential to the creation of modern capitalism.

The author conducted a verification of Weber's thesis and used his own econometric model for the economy of Germany. The Protestant religion, in addition to the level of emigration, the proportion of people working in agriculture, was important for the creation of social welfare (GDP). This is a negative relationship as an increase in the number of Protestants led to a decrease in GDP growth. At the same time, it should be noted that the percentage of the number of Protestants in the German Reich decreased during the analysed period. The relatively low coefficient of determination also indicates that the model explains 33.13% of the cases.

Key words: economic growth and Protestantism, the German Reich, Max Weber, cliometrics

ANALIZA WPŁYWU RELIGII NA WZROST GOSPODARCZY W KONTEKŚCIE POGLĄDÓW MAXA WEBERA

Streszczenie

W dziele *Etyka protestancka a duch kapitalizmu* jest przedstawiona podstawa tezy Webera. Analizując rozwój kapitalizmu Weber wiązał go m.in. ze wzrostem racjonalności wywołanej konkretną religią. Uznał, że wzrost ascetycznego protestantyzmu (w tym kalwinizmu), a szczególnie zbiór wartości i przekonań dotyczący pracy, oszczędności, inwestycji oraz pomnażanie bogactwa, był niezbędny do powstania nowoczesnego kapitalizmu.

Autor przeprowadził weryfikację tezy Webera i wykorzystał własny model ekonometryczny dla gospodarki Niemiec. Religia protestancka, obok poziomu emigracji, odsetka pracujących w rolnictwie, była istotna dla tworzenia społecznego dobrobytu (PKB). Jest to zależność ujemna, gdyż przyrost liczby protestantów prowadził do spadku przyrostu poziomu PKB. Należy jednocześnie zauważyć, że odsetek liczby protestantów w Rzeszy Niemieckiej w analizowanym okresie spadał. Relatywnie niski współczynnik determinacji wskazuje też, że model wyjaśnia 33,13% przypadków.

Słowa kluczowe: Max Weber, wzrost gospodarczy a protestantyzm, Rzesza Niemiecka, kliometria

АНАЛИЗ ВЛИЯНИЯ РЕЛИГИИ НА ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ РОСТ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ВЗГЛЯДОВ МАКСА ВЕБЕРА

Резюме

Суть тезиса Вебера представлена в труде *Протестантская этика и дух капитализма*. Вебер, анализируя развитие капитализма, устанавливает его связь, в частности, с ростом рационализма, вызванным определенной религией. Он считает, что рост аскетического протестантизма (в том числе кальвинизма), и в особенности набор ценностей и убеждений, касающихся труда, сбережений, инвестиций и умножения богатства, необходимы для формирования современного капитализма.

Автор провел верификацию тезиса Вебера и применил собственную эконометрическую модель для экономики Германии. Протестантская религия, кроме уровня эмиграции, влияющего на процентное количество людей, работающих в сельском хозяйстве, оказалась существенной в вопросе создания социального благосостояния (ВВП). Эта зависимость носит отрицательный характер, поскольку увеличение количества протестантов привело к снижению темпов роста ВВП. Следует в то же время заметить, что процентное количество протестантов в Германском рейхе в анализируемый период снизилось. Относительно низкий коэффициент детерминации также указывает на то, что модель позволяет выявить 33,13% случаев.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, экономический рост и протестантизм, Германский рейх, клиометрия.

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DETERMINANTS OF R&D ACTIVITY – ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH LOGISTICS SECTOR

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INTRODUCTION

The logistics sector plays an important role in the development of any economy due to the nature of the business – spatial movement of resources. It provides a mechanism for efficient allocation of resources, which is the foundation of the market economy. In many instances the development of infrastructure necessary for the provision of logistics services determines the economic growth of the region. This is due to the greater availability of material resources and human capital. The intensity of this development also stimulates economic activities of logistics companies. While infrastructure changes have their roots in transport policy pursued by the state or region, the development of the logistics sector is also dependent on factors stimulating the development of entrepreneurship as such. This means that economic activity of logistics enterprises is the result of feedback between possibilities offered by their business and the degree of regional economic growth, although it is the development of infrastructure that triggers this dependence (Truskolaski 2006).

This article discusses the problem of R&D investment of logistics enterprises in Poland. The development of transport infrastructure, mainly road infrastructure, creates opportunities for the development of this sector, especially in the context of sustainable economic growth in Poland. However,

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investment activity of enterprises does not depend on the conditions of the broad economic environment, but it results from the competition in the immediate environment and the adopted development strategy of the entity. For this reason, potential determinants of investment of logistics companies were taken into account broken down by their origin: infrastructural and macroeconomic conditions, the intensity of competition in the sector and financial performance of enterprises. The aim of the article is to identify factors significantly affecting the level of R&D investment in logistics companies and to determine the strength of this impact.

DETERMINANTS OF R&D OF LOGISTICS COMPANIES

Investment decisions of logistics companies are based on premises similar to those followed by other private entities. Investment activity of an enterprise depends on three groups of determinants: demand, supply and state policy (Róžański 2006). Demand-related conditions result from the market in which the entity operates and are connected with the level of competition within a given sector. Supply factors concern the costs of the business. State policy is an element affecting both supply and demand circumstances. This impact is all the greater, the stronger the sector is regulated by the state. This applies above all to creating conditions conducive to competition, as well as to implementing specific economic policy that stimulates the activity of entities, e.g. financing infrastructure from public funds.

The demand aspects of investment activities of Polish logistics companies are primarily related to the level of intra-sector competition (Rosa 2013). It is worth noting that the market of logistic services is highly fragmented (in 2009–2015 these companies employed on average 5 people) (Local Data Bank CSO 2017). This primarily affects the scope of their business operations and access to lending offers of banks to finance investment projects.

The size of enterprises also means that they focus mainly on the local market, which means that the local infrastructural conditions and local economic growth gain in importance. For this reason, the intensity of competition measured by the number of competitors was assumed as the first potential determinant of R&D expenditure and the first research hypothesis was formulated. As already noticed by Joseph Schumpeter, an acclaimed pioneer of research on the R&D activity of enterprises, while the fragmented market creates a market mechanism, enterprises have better conditions for conducting R&D activity on the more monopolised market (García-Quevedo,

Pellegrino, and Vivarellic 2014). The size of enterprises also means that they focus mainly on the local market, which means that the local infrastructural conditions and local economic growth gain in importance. For this reason, the intensity of competition measured by the number of competitors was assumed as the first potential determinant of R&D expenditure and the first research hypothesis was formulated.

Hypothesis 1. The number of current and new competitors intensifies competition among enterprises, which increases their R&D activities, therefore, it is positively correlated with expenditures on development of logistics companies.

The local scope of business activities of logistics companies also facilitates the reduction of operating costs (Szymonik 2013). Competition takes on the features of the free market opening the way to almost any competitive strategy, which, in turn, determines investment policy of the company (Popiołek 2014). Companies that are best suited for competing will be able to generate operating surplus, which can be later used in development activities. Other companies, due to the lack of such an opportunity and difficult access to financing, will conduct less active development activities. The above considerations lead to the following second research hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2. Being able to achieve the operating margin target determines development activities because the higher the efficiency of operating activities (the lower the share of operating costs in operating revenues), the higher R&D expenditure of logistics companies.

Development investments engage capital – own and from external sources. An enterprise can pursue a safe financing policy based on its own resources, which means that investments are financed mainly from generated financial surpluses (Coad, and Rao 2010). The second solution is to apply an aggressive strategy based on the external capital, i.e. to incur debt. Such a strategy can be applied if the enterprise in question is sufficiently profitable at the operational level to guarantee proper debt servicing. Therefore, if we assume that R&D investments depend on operational efficiency, the latter should be accompanied by a more aggressive financing policy reflecting investing operators' ability to accept higher risk (Lev, and Sougiannis 1996).

However, many studies indicate that companies which invest intensively in R&D have relatively low debt levels (Hall 2002; Wang, and Thornhill 2010).

This is caused by their inability to secure debt. R&D activities often have very limited collateral value and companies usually have to use other assets to obtain debt financing (Berger, and Udell 1990). The second reason is that debt financing may lead to financial problems, which can be particularly severe in the case of R&D activity of the company (Cornell, and Shapiro 1988). Equity capital has many advantages over debt in financing research and development. Although the biggest disadvantage of equity financing seems to be the difficulty in its quick acquisition, in this article it was assumed that the behaviour of the surveyed enterprises is consistent with the pattern observed so far. Therefore, a conservative policy of R&D financing by logistics enterprises was adopted as it is the only way for a company to accumulate surplus necessary to finance the investment.

R&D investments are related to specific liquidity policy of the company. A higher level of indebtedness may reduce financial liquidity as enterprises liquidate excess liquidity with financing costs. This is partly due to the fact that the development process is not fully predictable and it may involve some additional investments in research, hiring specialists or the need to implement the results. In a competitive environment companies must act quickly. This forces developing companies to maintain a financial buffer in case of emergency costs (Brown, and Petersen 2011). For this purpose, they often maintain a high level of cash and a lower level of receivables, which may lead to higher liquidity levels (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009). The availability of the capital market is a factor that may limit such behaviour (Opler et al. 1999). Studies of US companies involved in R&D projects have shown that they keep lower cash liquidity the greater their access to finance. So if a sudden investment expenditure must be incurred they can use several sources of capital at the same time, choose the most favourable or currently available one. External equity capital plays a particularly important role (Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen 2012). For companies examined in this article, access to capital is rather limited, therefore, a higher level of financial liquidity should be expected. Sometimes enterprises maintain a higher level of liquidity by changing the structure of assets. A positive relationship between disinvestments and the level of expenditure on R&D was observed (Borisova, and Brown 2013). These changes are accompanied by a significant increase in cash flow that increases the company's liquidity. In the group of the surveyed enterprises, such a source of financing of development activities may be used, however, due to the lack of data on changes in the fixed assets value, the research in this area was not carried out. It is worth noting that the results of a questionnaire survey of Polish transport companies, which make

up a major part of the logistics sector, carried out by EFL, confirmed the correlation between liquidity and investment outlays. However, the strength of this relationship was not specified (EFL 2014).

Hypothesis 3. Outlays of logistics companies on R&D are accompanied by higher profitability, lower debt levels and higher liquidity.

Barriers to access to capital concern mainly smaller and younger enterprises (Fishman, Rob 1999). This is due to limited resources, e.g. insufficient fixed assets, which can provide collateral for a debt (Dalziel, Gentry, and Bowerman 2011). In the case of logistics companies, whose fixed assets are often leased, this barrier is particularly important. A short business history and insufficient assets also impede equity raising. The company is unreliable to new potential owners. Larger enterprises are better prepared for R&D activities also due to their resources. Their experience allows better management of the development process (Tsai, and Wang 2004; Park, Jaeun, and Kim 2010).

Hypothesis 4. Limitations of smaller enterprises results in a positive relationship between R&D expenditure and the size of logistics companies.

Logistics companies have a lot in common with entities from other sectors, but they are much more dependent on state policy. Transportation, a vital element of the logistics industry, needs efficient infrastructure. The role of the state is fundamental here. The investment process that has been going on for many years has focused mainly on road infrastructure and seems to be an important factor affecting the development of logistics companies. The development of road infrastructure is also dependent on the degree of urbanisation of the area in question. This is most often connected with the rate of growth of a particular region, availability of skilful staff with university diplomas or the demand represented by other operators interested in the services of logistic companies. Under such conditions, logistics companies can develop. Previous studies indicate that under growing demand companies predominantly seek to grow and R&D activities are their second top priority. They are pursued primarily by adapting already existing solutions to better meet customers' requirements (Barge-Gil, and López 2014).

The development of logistics companies would be difficult without access to engineers and specialists, especially in the field of management (Galende, and Suarez 1999). Research results also suggest that the company's technical staff who

have knowledge of technological fields can integrate knowledge for research and development purposes (Fleming 2001). The presence of active academic centres may also contribute to the intensity of conducting and implementing R&D. This skill has been described in the absorptive capacity theory (Cohen, Levinthal 1990). Many studies confirm that it does exist (Barge-Gil, and López 2014).

For these reasons, the degree of urbanisation and access to infrastructure should support the logistics industry. The increase in the number of enterprises and competition between them can stimulate development activities. It is worth noting that strongly urbanised areas are mostly characterised by high GDP, which is a consequence of the number of business entities. The assessment of the relation between R&D expenditure and GDP allows the nature of competition between entities to be determined. Strong GDP growth may be ‘consumed’ by the growing number of enterprises and will not be conducive to competition if enterprises are satisfied with their current scope of activity. However, if R&D expenditure increases along with the increase in GDP, it will also mean increased competition within the sector.

Hypothesis 5. The degree of the urbanisation of the region measured with GDP per capita, the size of business population, and the availability of university graduates encourages R&D expenditure of logistics companies.

Since transportation nodes can develop outside of agglomerations, the inclusion of access to infrastructure regardless of the degree of urbanisation will allow for highlighting its impact on the development of logistics companies. On the one hand, the latter will depend on demand factors, but on the other hand, the essence of the industry is to transport resources. Therefore, the location of logistics operators, i.e. the location of their R&D investment, may be cost-driven, not necessarily related to the degree of urbanisation. Excessive concentration of state support in financing of road transport infrastructure seems to be an important factor limiting the development of other transport activities, especially rail transport (The Ministry of Infrastructure of the Republic of Poland 2011). There is no doubt that improved infrastructure, especially motorways, supports the development of the transport sector, although this is not necessarily connected with regional development. This is due to higher capital intensity of transport in conditions of less developed infrastructure (Krzemiński 2007:102).

Hypothesis 6. R&D expenditure of logistics companies depends on the availability of a system of roads measured by their length in the region where a particular company is based.

Verification of the above hypotheses will allow for identifying the determinants of R&D investment decisions of logistics companies in a multi-dimensional approach. The analysis will cover both the conditions of competition in the sector, the microeconomic financial situation of enterprises and their ability to invest. The whole study completes the assessment of general conditions determining the development of the sector of logistics companies.

DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD

To study R&D investment outlays of logistics companies we used data on Polish logistics companies available from the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland [Polish abbr. GUS] for a group of transport companies (section H) for the period 2007–2015.

Table 1

Capital expenditures, operating revenues and the number of logistics companies in Poland in 2009–2015

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
R&D expenditure (in PLN million)	1,720.4	1,762.2	6,322.0	5,298.1	7,309.0	4,002.2	7,356.7
Number of enterprises	131,959	138,642	145,942	141,748	135,225	140,682	145,955
R&D expenditure per enterprise	0.013	0.013	0.043	0.037	0.054	0.028	0.050
Operating revenues per enterprise	0.559	0.579	0.606	0.671	0.711	0.716	0.724

Source: the author's calculations based on the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

The analysis of values presented in Table 1 helps us notice that enterprises surveyed by the Central Statistical Office generally increased R&D expenditures. However, the exercise is not a continuous one. The nominal values of these investments sometimes decreased over the observed period. This occurred despite the increased number of enterprises and the growth of the entire sector, as evidenced by the growing value of average operating

revenues. The average value of R&D expenditures of logistics company did not increase. It can, therefore, be assumed that competition between enterprises did not force them to be active in R&D.

We distinguished the following three groups of potential development policy determinants for entities covered by the study: intensity of competition, financial performance of the company, and macroeconomic conditions. The first group, which specifies the number of enterprises in the sector: newly created (designated as X2.1.) and existing ones (designated as X2.2.), was taken as a measure of competition intensity. In the second group (designated as X3.1–X3.14), selected items from financial statements and relations between them were taken into account in order to demonstrate microeconomic determinants of investment outlays. The following variables were included in the study: the share of production costs of products in revenue from operating activities, as a measure of the ability to achieve margin on core operations (X3.1); the share of variable costs in revenue from operating activities, as a measure of the operating leverage of the enterprise (X3.2); the relation of the financial result from sales to the net result, as a measure of the financial leverage of the enterprise (X3.3); the net turnover profitability ratio, defined as a relation of the net financial result to revenues from total activity (X3.4); financial liquidity ratio I, defined as a relation of current assets to current liabilities (X3.5); financial liquidity ratio III, understood as a relation of cash and its equivalents to current liabilities (X3.6); the net result to total loans ratio (X3.7); the business result to long-term liabilities ratio (X3.8); the result of economic activity to total loans ratio (X3.9); revenues from total activity (natural logarithm), as a measure of the size of the enterprise (X3.10); the relation of financial costs to the financial result of business activities, as a measure of the possibility of using leverage (X3.11); the share of the number of enterprises showing positive net profit in the total number of enterprises (X3.12); the value of bank loans and total loans taken out (natural logarithm) (X3.13); gross financial result burden – income tax (X3.14).

The third group includes the following macroeconomic and infrastructural factors understood as external incentives for the development of logistics companies: the value of GDP per capita (in current prices, as a measure of economic growth (X4.1); the number of university graduates, as a measure of the development potential of the region (X4.2); the total population of enterprises, as a measure of the potential demand for logistics services (X4.3); the length of motorways and expressways (X4.4); the length of public roads, showing the degree of urbanisation of the region (X4.5). Statistical characteristics of the variables examined in the paper are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics of variables used in the study (national level) (n=9)

Variable	Arithmetic mean.	Median	Standard deviation	Kurtosis	Skewness
Y	4031.59	4002.20	2462.75	-2.02	0.17
X2.1	19017.13	19150.00	1238.79	-0.71	-0.26
X2.2	140021.86	140682.00	4834.24	-0.86	-0.35
X3.1	0.95	0.91	0.05	2.87	-1.32
X3.2	0.61	0.61	0.00	1.29	1.38
X3.4	1.22	1.20	0.10	4.53	1.82
X3.5	3.71	3.97	1.33	5.57	1.09
X3.6	0.33	0.37	0.49	-3.82	-0.10
X3.7	1.13	1.23	0.26	-1.55	-0.25
X3.8	2.14	2.11	0.50	-0.10	-0.15
X3.9	0.97	1.05	0.24	-1.79	-0.30
X3.10	21.38	21.44	0.16	-1.11	-0.51
X3.11	0.37	0.37	0.07	0.09	0.06
X3.12	80.25	79.65	2.37	-1.83	0.20
X3.13	18.23	16.25	4.27	-3.91	-1.11
X3.14	16.50	16.46	0.09	1.04	1.30
X4.1	39,505.44	40,669.00	1,079.08	0.04	0.60
X4.2	429,889.89	424,317.00	37,640.65	-0.35	0.04
X.4.3	3,936,974.00	3,909,802.00	185,419.56	-1.22	0.33
X.4.4	2,128.90	2,112.50	793.76	-1.91	-0.02
X4.5	405,292.16	412,149.40	14,781.66	-1.36	-0.79

Source: the author's calculations based on the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

The analysis of descriptive statistics of aggregated variables at the national level presents a fairly diversified picture of the examined data. The observed variables exhibit low, as well as high volatility. The described variable exhibits

moderate volatility. The median is not significantly different from the arithmetic mean. However, kurtosis has a significantly negative value, which indicates the flattening of the distribution and an increase in the probability of different values. The low and positive skewness of the distribution indicates that values above the determined average are more likely.

Variables related to the concentration of logistics enterprises (X2.1, X2.2) are characterised by low variability as well. The value of arithmetic mean does not differ significantly from the median value. The value of kurtosis is also low, but negative, which indicates the flattening of the variable distribution and, consequently, a value different from the average. The distribution exhibits a left-sided asymmetry, which increases the probability of observations smaller than the average. In the group of variables which describe financial relations high volatility is observed in liquidity ratios (X3.5, X3.6), as well as in net turnover profitability (X3.4). In the first case, the distributions of variables are diametrically different. Observations of the liquidity index I have asymmetrical right-sided distribution with high positive kurtosis, which means that there are several cases significantly exceeding the average level. In turn, the liquidity index III is observed as a left-sided asymmetrical distribution with high negative kurtosis, which means the occurrence of cases significantly below the average level. The value of bank loans and total loans taken out is also very different (X3.13). Standard deviation has a high value and the values of kurtosis and skewness indicate flattened distribution with a left-sided asymmetry.

The smallest diversity of observations occurs in the business result to long-term liabilities ratio (X3.8), the relation of financial costs to the financial result of business activities, as a measure of the possibility of using leverage (X3.11) and the value of GDP per capita (X4.1). Other variables describing financial performance of the surveyed companies are moderately volatile. The arithmetic mean values are not significantly different from the median level. We observe a delicate asymmetry of both left-sided and right-sided distribution. Kurtosis is mostly close to zero or slightly negative, while even a more flattened distribution type is observed in the group of variables defining external development stimulants for logistics enterprises (X4.2–X4.5). In all cases negative kurtosis was observed. The variability of variables is low or moderate. As before, a delicate asymmetry of both left-sided and right-sided distribution is observed.

A statistical test was carried out on aggregated national values and using regional-level data. A descriptive statistics analysis of the variables at the voivodship (regional) level allows for drawing conclusions similar to those for

nationwide data, although the degree of diversification within each voivodship is slightly higher. Data for voivodships helped us determine the importance of local economic development for the investment policy of logistics companies. As a result, the study was more accurate. The assessment of dependence in this case is so difficult because the time series are very short, they cover only the years 2007–2015 ($n = 9$). Unfortunately, since GUS has changed the pattern of aggregating economic operators into groups within the Polish Classification of Economic Activities, it is not possible to acquire comparable data for earlier periods. The evaluation of relations between variables made for voivodships can be treated only as indicative and requires further analysis in subsequent years.

In order to precisely determine factors determining investment expenditures of enterprises from the logistics sector, a correlation study was conducted. The study was based on the Pearson correlation coefficient, which requires several assumptions to be met: (1) variables must be quantitative, (2) the relationship between them should be linear, and (3) two-dimensional distribution of the dependent variable should be normal (the larger the sample, the greater the resistance of the measure to deviations from the last assumption). When any of the above assumptions is not met, instead of the Pearson linear correlation coefficient the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is usually used. Considering the nature of the sample, and a large spread of values of the analysed variables, as well as deviations from the linearity of the relationship between them, in some cases – even though we study quantitative variables – Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient should be given up in favour of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. In the analysis, a correlation study with the use of both coefficients was conducted.

Large dispersion of values of the analysed variables also hinders the construction of an econometric model that would in a multidimensional manner allow for describing investment expenditures on research and development in the section of transport and storage companies in relation to their financial characteristics. Panel models, estimated on the basis of the cross-sectional test, prove to be useful in this case. In these models the intercept or random component is decomposed by objects and time units. In this case, a model with decomposition of the intercept (FEM – Fixed Effects Model) was used. In FEM m_i is decomposed into the intercept (fixed) for individual groups separately. The model takes the following form (Witkowski 2012: 267):

$$y_{it} = a_1 d_{1it} + a_2 d_{2it} + \dots + a_k d_{kit} + bx_{it} + e_{it} = a_i + bx_{it} + e_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where: a_i – specific intercepts, and d_i – dummies, taking the value 1, when $j = i$, b – structural parameter expressing the influence of the explanatory variable, x_{it} – implementation of the explanatory variable for the i -th object in the t -th period, e_{it} – residuals that meet the classic assumptions: $E(e_{it}) = 0$ $I Var(e_{it}) = S^2_e$.

The model assessment is based on F statistics (calculated traditionally, based on the sums of squared deviations). At low p, lower than the accepted level of significance α (usually $\alpha = 0.05$), the decomposition of the intercept is considered justified. The evaluation of the prognostic properties of the model is done in a standard manner, using the determination coefficient (including the adjusted R^2). The estimation of panel models was made using the Gretl programme.

RESULTS

Table 3 presents correlation coefficients between R&D expenditure and selected financial measures (ratios and absolute values) and macroeconomic indicators based on the cross-sectional and time-related sample (Polish voivodships in 2007–2015). Measures of enterprises' financial policy, such as the net result to total loans ratio, financial result from sales to net result ratio, net turnover profitability ratio or financial liquidity III ratio are strongly and positively correlated with R&D expenditure. This shows a fairly consistent picture of the investing companies, which are profitable operators, skilfully using financial leverage and maintaining high financial liquidity. It can also be observed in less visible correlations, such as the result of economic activity to long-term liabilities ratio, the result of economic activity to total loans ratio or the financial liquidity ratio I. This also testifies to the moderate nature of the investment policy of an enterprise.

The correlation analysis of the operating costs causes some concerns. A strong and positive relationship was found between R&D investment expenditure and the share of production costs of products in revenues from operating activities, as well as the share of variable costs in revenues from operating activities. It means that the propensity to invest increases as the operating margin decreases. This seemingly contradictory relationship, especially in the context of the positive correlation between investment outlays and profitability, may be explained by competitive conditions, in which logistics companies operate. Low operating margin forces companies to be more efficient, which may result in searching for new solutions and, as

Table 3

**Correlation between R&D expenditure and selected financial
and macroeconomic variables of Polish logistics companies (n = 144)**

Variables		r	rho
X.2.1	<i>number of newly established logistics companies</i>	0.001	0.262
X3.1	share of production costs of products in revenues from operating activities	0.776	0.732
X3.2	share of variable costs in revenues from operating activities	0.931	0.901
X3.3	financial result from sales to net result ratio	0.803	0.533
X3.4	net turnover profitability ratio	0.880	0.818
X3.5	financial liquidity ratio I	0.721	0.487
X3.6	financial liquidity ratio III	0.961	0.872
X3.7	net result to total loans ratio	0.971	0.833
X3.8	<i>business result to long-term liabilities ratio</i>	0.187	0.264
X3.9	<i>result of economic activity to total loans ratio</i>	0.024	0.187
X3.10	<i>revenues from total activity (natural logarithm)</i>	0.061	0.362
X3.11	<i>financial costs to the financial result of business activities ratio</i>	0.372	0.387
X3.12	<i>share of the number of enterprises showing positive net profit in the total number of enterprises</i>	0.054	0.072
X3.13	<i>value of bank loans and total loans taken (natural logarithm)</i>	0.053	0.061
X3.14	<i>gross financial result burden – income tax</i>	0.010	0.046
X4.2	number of university graduates	0.684	0.736
X4.3	total number of enterprises	0.777	0.646
X4.4	length of motorways and expressways	0.707	0.492
X4.5	<i>length of public roads</i>	0.193	0.501

r – Pearson's linear correlation coefficient

rho – Spearman's rank correlation coefficient.

Correlation measure proper for a given pair of variables is grey shaded. Variables weakly correlated with investment spending are italicised.

Source: the author's calculations based on the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

a consequence, in R&D activities. Thus, it means that the analysis includes mainly enterprises currently implementing development projects, which thanks to R&D have improved their performance and their investment activity is slowing down. A weak and positive correlation between R&D expenditure and the number of newly established logistics enterprises may support this conclusion. Every newcomer into the sector struggles with entry costs. Therefore, since industry operates at low margins, it must have a competitive advantage resulting from better organisation and ability to reduce costs. This, in turn, forces other competitors to make development efforts.

A very modest positive correlation can also be observed between R&D expenditure and the financial costs to financial result of business activities ratio. As regards other debt-related indices, we can say that development investments are primarily made by companies which use financial leverage. They are also larger operators. It must be remembered, however, that the strength of the analysed debt correlation is low, often negligible. Therefore, it cannot be used as a basis for far-reaching conclusions.

The total population of enterprises, as well as the development of road and motorway networks also positively correlate with R&D expenditure. A positive correlation with the total number of enterprises seems quite obvious – the larger the market, the bigger investment outlays in absolute terms. This correlation also informs us about the intensity of competition in the sector. The size of the market, especially its growth, does not have to motivate enterprises to invest. The adequate level of market development may be a sufficient factor determining the development of the enterprises. Thus, if they decide to invest in R&D it means that market growth is not sufficient or a big population of competitors necessitates development activities.

Infrastructural factors appeared to be a significant factor in the development of logistics companies. There is a positive relationship between R&D expenditure of logistic companies and the length of public roads, expressways and motorways. This correlation is connected with the number of companies. The availability of roads, especially expressways and highways, is a key factor in the choice of location. This is also confirmed by the correlative strength, significantly higher for motorways. The impact of the availability of university graduates is similarly important. Higher education institutions (HEIs) are located mostly in highly urbanised places. This also results in the availability of public roads, in particular motorways. A positive correlation with the number of university graduates may also result from their R&D engagement. In addition, a competitive labour market for young

Table 4

Spearman's rank correlation between R&D expenditure and selected financial and macroeconomic variables of Polish logistics companies (values by voivodships) (n = 9)

Voivodship	X2.1	X3.1	X3.2	X3.3	X3.4	X3.5	X3.6	X3.7	X3.8	X3.9	X3.10	X3.11	X3.12	X3.13	X3.14	X4.2	X4.3	X4.4	X4.5
dolnośląskie	-0.036	0.179	0.179	0.179	0.321	0.179	0.321	0.821	0.000	-0.198	0.018	0.107	0.071	-0.250	0.143	0.250	-0.393	0.714	0.182
kujawsko-pomorskie	0.286	-0.357	-0.357	-0.107	-0.464	-0.107	0.286	-0.036	-0.071	0.000	0.071	0.464	0.071	-0.071	-0.143	-0.321	-0.107	-0.143	-0.036
lubelskie	0.107	0.643	0.643	0.179	0.250	0.286	0.679	0.571	0.559	-0.036	0.054	-0.143	0.000	-0.357	-0.357	0.179	-0.464	0.429	0.401
lubuskie	0.143	0.286	0.357	0.107	0.143	0.107	0.821	-0.036	0.214	0.000	0.071	-0.107	0.143	0.143	0.000	0.071	0.179	0.643	0.055
łódzkie	0.071	-0.643	-0.643	0.071	-0.464	0.321	-0.071	-0.179	-0.786	-0.144	-0.288	0.214	0.036	0.286	0.286	0.071	0.429	-0.393	-0.670
małopolskie	-0.429	0.357	-0.036	0.286	0.107	0.286	0.536	-0.464	0.107	0.018	0.429	0.321	0.143	0.143	0.143	-0.179	0.286	-0.143	-0.306
mazowieckie	-0.429	0.929	0.893	0.286	-0.286	0.357	0.964	0.607	0.357	-0.108	-0.071	0.393	-0.143	0.036	0.071	0.036	-0.108	0.821	0.893
opolskie	0.000	0.214	0.214	-0.107	-0.214	-0.107	0.179	0.214	0.607	0.505	-0.179	0.607	-0.250	-0.464	-0.464	-0.107	-0.536	-0.071	0.357
podkarpackie	0.018	0.739	0.631	0.288	0.252	0.360	-0.126	0.018	0.180	-0.327	-0.306	-0.468	0.090	0.360	0.360	0.396	-0.739	0.847	0.449
podlaskie	0.071	0.357	0.357	0.536	0.750	0.214	0.179	0.143	0.071	-0.234	0.571	-0.071	-0.054	0.143	-0.036	0.071	-0.214	-0.179	0.134
pomorskie	0.054	0.607	0.607	0.214	0.179	0.214	0.714	0.357	0.000	-0.107	0.775	0.536	0.321	-0.107	-0.107	-0.179	0.501	0.607	0.587
śląskie	0.071	0.464	0.464	-0.250	0.107	-0.429	0.250	0.643	0.036	0.429	-0.357	-0.286	-0.429	-0.679	-0.429	-0.321	0.450	0.393	0.523
świętokrzyskie	0.450	0.071	0.071	0.286	0.393	0.357	0.429	0.393	-0.071	-0.107	-0.306	-0.607	-0.429	0.036	0.036	0.107	0.214	0.286	0.073
warmińsko-mazurskie	0.214	0.036	-0.143	0.857	0.607	0.821	-0.143	0.179	0.505	-0.685	0.714	0.143	0.036	0.643	0.607	0.714	0.357	-0.571	-0.182
wielkopolskie	-0.143	0.000	0.000	-0.179	-0.143	-0.250	0.036	0.143	-0.143	0.270	-0.252	-0.357	-0.286	-0.429	-0.536	-0.286	0.143	-0.321	0.000
zachodnio-pomorskie	0.429	0.214	0.286	0.000	0.393	0.143	0.536	0.929	-0.018	0.018	0.214	0.214	0.250	-0.786	-0.714	0.000	-0.393	0.786	0.898

Bolded coefficients indicate high or very high strength of correlation between variables. Markings – as in Table 3.

Source: the author's calculations based on the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

people combined with good prospects for the development of the logistics sector certainly contributes to their interest in this industry. It is confirmed by high popularity of logistics studies, which results in an increased number of graduates employed in the logistics sector.

As we can judge from the data presented in Table 4, the relation between R&D expenditure and other characteristics of enterprises from the logistics sector and macroeconomic categories vary between voivodships. In Wielkopolskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie voivodships, none of the pairs of considered variables is correlated at least at a moderate level. Therefore, financial situation of enterprises does not significantly correlate with R&D expenditure in these voivodships (in the logistics sector).

These relationships are much stronger in Warmińsko-Mazurskie voivodship where the higher the: ratio of the financial result from sales to the net result, net profitability ratio, financial liquidity I ratio, business result to long-term liabilities ratio, revenues from total activity, bank loans, total loans, and tax burden, the higher the average R&D investment expenditures in the sector (and vice versa). These relations are quite strong also in the following voivodships: Pomorskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubelskie, Opolskie, and Mazowieckie. Results for Łódzkie Voivodship are surprising in comparison to other voivodships: correlation coefficients are negative in many cases, though, unlike in other voivodships, R&D expenditures of logistic companies increase with the decrease in the business result to long-term liabilities ratio and the result of economic activity to total loans ratio. There is also a negative relation of development activities and the share of production costs of products in revenues from operating activities and the share of variable costs in revenues from operating activities. The first correlation may result from a wide use of debt-financing in R&D activities. An increase of debt at a constant economic result lowers the ratio. It also indicates a higher risk faced by logistics enterprises in Łódzkie Voivodship. The second dependence may mean better prospects for those companies which can use the operational leverage.

It is also worth noting that the correlation analysis is sometimes difficult to interpret. An example is Łódzkie Voivodship, where the road network (total) does not favour R&D development – a quite strong negative correlation was found. The situation is similar for Opolskie and Podlaskie voivodships, where a moderate negative correlation of investment outlays and the total number of enterprises was observed. A strong negative relation between R&D investments and the value of bank loans and total loans in Śląskie and Zachodniopomorskie voivodships is also difficult to explain.

Variables that most often appear as strong determinants of the R&D investment activity of the logistics sector in all voivodships are: the length of motorways and expressways, the length of public roads, the share of production costs of products in revenues from operating activities, the share of variable costs in revenues from operating activities, financial liquidity ratio III, and the net result to total loans ratio. These variables usually stimulate R&D expenditures. The result of economic activity to total loans ratio, the value of bank loans and total loans, revenues from total activity and the financial costs to the financial result of business activity ratio are also important determinants of R&D expenditures. Apart from the aforementioned exceptions, these variables also contribute to the development expenditure of logistics companies, which confirms prior conclusions. Among the considered environmental conditions the impact of the motorway network development is the most positive (this applies in particular to the western part of Poland: Dolny Śląsk, Lubuskie Voivodship, Zachodniopomorskie, and also Mazowieckie, Pomorskie, and Podkarpackie Voivodships (as well as Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodship but in the opposite direction).

Since individual explanatory variables in many cases are too strongly correlated with each other, the panel model taking into account all the explanatory variables highlighted in earlier analyses showed collinearity, which was not fully justified in substantive terms. Therefore, we used estimates in several stages (options Models 1–3) (Table 5). Some explanatory variables were included in the list of significant determinants of investment activity in any option.

In the first step (Model 1), we adopted characteristics of the financial situation of enterprises, in relative terms, as explanatory variables (X3.1–X3.7). We skipped X3.2 due to close collinearity. All these factors turned out to be significantly related to R&D expenditure. The negative parameter at variable X3.1 (the share of production costs of products in revenues from operating activities) may be surprising. It can be explained similarly to the above presented correlations designated for enterprises from the Łódź region. Other parameters are in line with expectations – assuming *ceteris paribus* that the higher the: financial result from sales to net result ratio, net turnover profitability ratio, financial liquidity ratio, and net result to total loans ratio, the higher the average R&D expenditure. In contrast with these factors, the impact of the business result to long-term liabilities ratio and the financial costs to the financial result of business activities ratio are irrelevant. It confirms the previous conclusions about little significance of debt in the development policy of logistics companies.

Table 5

Estimation results of R&D investment expenditure models for logistic enterprises
(n = 144)

Explanatory variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	p (test t)	b	p (test t)	b	p (test t)
const	162.304	0.02295*	-2165.35	0.06496*	-2336.269	0.00893*
X3.1	-3.128	<0.00001*				
X3.3	4.289	<0.00001*				
X3.4	6.109	0.00001*				
X3.5	5.012	<0.00001*				
X3.6	1.308	<0.00001*				
X3.7	0.795	0.00029*				
X4.2			14.398	0.04233*		
X4.3			121196	0.05477*		
X4.4			0.269	0.00369*		
X3.10					5126.409	0.00193*
Test F	F(15. 90) = 4.361; p<0.00001*		F(15. 93) = 30.818; p<0.00001*		F(15. 93) = 27.804; p<0.00001*	
R ²	0.9742		0.9003		0.9290	
R ² _{adj}	0.9657		0.8965		0.9104	

where: b – structural parameter estimator, p – probability of the test, R² – coefficient of determination, R²_{adj} – adjusted coefficient of determination

Source: the author’s calculations based on the Local Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

When building Model 2 we included infrastructure and macroeconomic determinants of R&D expenditure (X4.2–X4.5). The analysis was extended by adding the examination of the impact of the number of competitors (X2.1). Among these factors, the length of motorways and expressways, the number of university graduates and the total number of enterprises turned out to be significant. The increase in R&D expenditure made by logistics companies is favoured by higher values of these variables. In the context of previous correlation analyses, we may assume that this relationship has its source in the degree of urbanisation. The higher urbanisation, the better

operating conditions for the logistics industry and its capacity to implement R&D effects. Interestingly, the impact of competition concentration in the sector turned out to be irrelevant. The number of newly established logistics companies turned out to be irrelevant as well.

In the last model (Model 3) an attempt was made to include the characteristics of the financial standing of enterprises in nominal terms (X3.10, X3.13, X3.14). Among these factors, the size of the enterprise measured with the natural logarithm of revenues from total activity is significant. It has been demonstrated that larger companies conduct more intensive R&D activities (*ceteris paribus*). It is worth mentioning that all estimated models have good statistical properties (the explanation of the inputs variance is high, group effects are statistically significant, which justifies the use of panel models instead of the classic least squares method).

CONCLUSIONS

The study of the factors determining R&D expenditures does not confirm all the hypotheses formulated at the beginning of the article. First of all, there are no significant relationships with variables related to the intensity of competition. Neither the number of enterprises nor that of start-ups significantly determine the value of R&D expenditures of logistics companies. This may be the result of the above-mentioned significant fragmentation of the market. Small and micro companies operate locally and face structural constraints in access to capital investment financing. It means that very often equity contributed at start-up is the only investment capital. As already demonstrated, capital expenditures are constantly growing, but this is not due to the size of the sector. It follows that R&D activities are undertaken by larger enterprises. Their number does not change as dynamically as the value of R&D expenditures. Therefore, there is no reason to accept hypothesis 1.

Financial performance of enterprises seems to be the most important factor, although the research results are not unambiguous. A strong and positive relationship was found between R&D investment and the share of production costs of products in revenues from operating activities and the share of variable costs in revenues from operating activities. Although the panel model indicates an opposite relationship with one of these variables, it is difficult to find the basis for adopting hypothesis 2. We should assume that the propensity to invest in R&D increases as the operating margin decreases. A low operating margin forces companies to be more efficient, which may

lead to searching for new solutions, which, in turn, triggers R&D. Under such conditions, the company has limited possibilities to use financial leverage, which is vital for its financing policy.

The study showed that profitable logistics companies are more active in R&D activities. This dependence is strong, although it was not confirmed in all voivodships included in the exercise. Yet, this gives grounds for accepting part of hypothesis 3. Profitability of a business seems a natural condition for increasing efficiency by incurring higher debt. However, the research did not show a significant link between the increase of the financial result and debt or financial costs. Such dependencies either do not exist or are statistically weak. The only exception is the change in the net result to total loans ratio, strongly positively related to R&D expenditure. Therefore, we can presume that development activities are accompanied by a conservative financing policy. Nevertheless, there is no indisputable evidence that this is the case; hence hypothesis 3 cannot be accepted in this part. On the other hand, there are no contraindications as to the assessment of liquidity in accordance with the adopted hypothesis. Both liquidity measures are statistically significant and positively relate to R&D expenditure, although this relationship is not observed at the level of voivodships. Therefore, in the light of the performed analyses, hypothesis 3 can be only partially accepted.

The analysis showed that the size of a company and R&D activity correlate positively. Although it is not always true for voivodships, the correlation leaves no doubt at the general level. Therefore, there are no grounds for rejecting hypothesis 4. The impact of urbanisation causes some concerns. A relationship between R&D and the number of enterprises or university graduates was demonstrated. However, development activity is not directly related to the region's wealth, measured with GDP. For this reason, hypothesis 5 can be accepted only partially. The same applies to hypothesis 6. A strong dependence of R&D values on the length of expressways and motorways was observed, but not on that of public roads. This may be the effect of a symbolic increase in the length of public roads in relation to the increase in the length of expressways and motorways (it amounted to at least over a dozen percent annually) in the period under consideration.

Studies of voivodship data also do not allow us to clearly identify local determinants of R&D in logistics companies, although in many places the results obtained are consistent and close to national ones. On the general level, the study showed that R&D activities of logistics firms are primarily carried out by larger companies, which pursue a conservative financing policy based on low indebtedness and high liquidity. This is in line with the

results of previous research and points to the lack of differences between R&D of logistics companies and companies from other sectors. These firms operate in a low margin environment, which significantly limits development opportunities. The study did not confirm the impact of competition on R&D activity, which may result from the growth of the sector itself. However, the availability of road infrastructure and urbanised areas is a factor that indisputably affects R&D.

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DETERMINANTS OF R&D ACTIVITY – ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH LOGISTICS SECTOR

Summary

The aim of the article is to identify factors that significantly affect the level of R&D and to determine the strength of this impact. The research involved 950 Polish logistics companies. Data from the Local CSO Data Bank from 2007–2015 were used for the study. As explanatory variables, three groups of potential R&D determinants of the studied entities were distinguished: intensity of competition, financial performance of the enterprise and macroeconomic conditions. The analysis was based on descriptive statistics, Pearson's correlation analysis and Spearman's rank correlation coefficient and the use of panel models, estimated on the basis of a cross-sectional sample. The statistical survey was carried out both on aggregate national values and using data at the voivodship level. The study showed that R&D activities of logistics firms are carried out primarily by larger companies, which conduct a conservative financing policy based on low indebtedness and high liquidity. These firms operate in a low margin environment, which significantly limits development opportunities. The study did not confirm the impact of competition on R&D activity, which may result from the growth of the sector itself. However, the availability of road infrastructure and urbanized areas is a factor that indisputably affects R&D.

Key words: research and development, logistics, company, Poland

DETERMINANTY DZIAŁALNOŚCI BADAWCZO-ROZWOJOWEJ – ANALIZA POLSKIEGO SEKTORA LOGISTYCZNEGO

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja czynników istotnie wpływających na poziom inwestycji B+R oraz określenie siły tego oddziaływania. Badaniu poddano 950 polskich firm logistycznych. Do badania wykorzystano dane zawarte w Lokalnym Banku Danych GUS z okresu 2007–2015. Jako zmienne objaśniające wyodrębniono trzy grupy potencjalnych determinant B+R badanych podmiotów: natężenie konkurencji, uwarunkowania finansowe przedsiębiorstwa oraz uwarunkowania makroekonomiczne. Analizę przeprowadzono w oparciu o statystyki deskryptywne, ocenę korelacji Pearsona i współczynnika korelacji rang Spearmana oraz zastosowanie modeli panelowych, estymowane w oparciu o próbę przekrojowo-czasową. Badanie statystyczne przeprowadzono zarówno na zagregowanych wartościach ogólnopolskich, jak i posługując się danymi na poziomie województwa. Badanie wykazało, że działania B+R firm logistycznych realizowane są przede wszystkim przez większe przedsiębiorstwa prowadzące zachowawczą politykę finansowania opartą na niewielkim zadłużeniu i wysokiej płynności finansowej. Firmy te funkcjonują w warunkach niskiej marży, która istotnie ogranicza możliwości rozwojowe. Badanie nie potwierdziło natomiast wpływu konkurencji na aktywność B+R, co może wynikać ze wzrostu samego sektora. Czynnikiem bezdyskusyjnie wpływającym na B+R jest natomiast dostępność do infrastruktury drogowej i obszarów zurbanizowanych.

Słowa kluczowe: badania i rozwój, logistyka, przedsiębiorstwo, Polska

ДЕТЕРМИНАНТЫ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКО-РАЗВИВАЮЩЕЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ – АНАЛИЗ ПОЛЬСКОГО ЛОГИСТИЧЕСКОГО ЦЕНТРА

Резюме

Цель статьи - выявить факторы, существенно влияющие на уровень инвестиций B+R [НИКР], и определить силу этого воздействия. В исследовании участвовали 950 польских логистических компаний. В целях исследования были использованы данные, содержащиеся в Локальном банке данных GUS

[Главного статистического управления] за 2007–2015 годы. В качестве объясняющих переменных были выделены три группы потенциальных детерминантов НИОКР исследуемых субъектов: интенсивность конкуренции, финансовые условия предприятия и макроэкономические условия. Анализ основывался на описательной статистике, корреляционном анализе Пирсона и ранговом коэффициенте корреляции Спирмена, а также применении моделей панельных данных, полученных на основе образца поперечного сечения. Статистическое исследование проводилось как на основе совокупных национальных ценностей, так и посредством использования данных на уровне воеводства. Результаты исследования показывают, что деятельность логистических компаний в области НИОКР в основном осуществляется крупными компаниями, проводящими консервативную политику финансирования, опирающуюся на низкую задолженность и высокую финансовую ликвидность. Эти компании функционируют в условиях низкого уровня маржи, которая в значительной степени ограничивает возможности развития. Исследование, однако, не подтвердило влияния конкуренции на активность НИОКР, что может быть результатом увеличения самого сектора. В то же время фактором, влияющим на НИОКР, является доступ к дорожной инфраструктуре и урбанизированным зонам.

Ключевые слова: исследования и развитие, логистика, предприятие, Польша

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Jacek Lewkowicz*

**FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL
AS A CONTRACT DETERMINING FACTOR
– A REASON FOR INTERNAL
BILATERAL INTERDEPENDENCE
BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE**

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is devoted to a firm-specific human capital issue in transaction cost economics and the agency theory perspective. The development of a firm means not only a bigger scope of undertaken projects but also specialisation and innovativeness. Such a specialisation may be strongly linked with the employee's unique abilities. The problem domain of this paper concentrates on relations between the company owner and the employee (manager) possessing firm-specific human capital that is crucial for the whole business strategy of the firm. This sphere is relevant, because in knowledge-based economies the main asset of firms are their knowledge and know-how, especially when they are specific. This, in turn, may lead to contracting problems, which are undertaken in institutional economics.

The analysis carried out in the following sections is based on the synthesis of institutional economics branches. Firstly, it refers to the bilateral monopoly

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category and asset specificity role in transactions organising. Special attention is devoted to vertical integration as a solution to bilateral monopoly problems. Secondly, firm-specific human capital held by the employee is a crucial factor determining relations with the company owner. These subjects make contracts, but the main difference comparing to the organisation of exchange characterised by transaction cost economics is their internal character and the employee's assumed subordination to the principal. However, due to firm-specific human capital the worker has strong bargaining power in contract renegotiations. Some of the most important elements of contracts concern the issue of rewarding. This case is compared with the efficiency wage theory, which assumes that wages can affect the employee's behaviour and reduce costs of organisational supervision. As an extension to this concept, other methods of agent stimulation in order to pursue strategic goals have to be mentioned. The analysis of ownership fraction held by managers can be particularly useful. The agency theory provides well-developed research tools devoted to this problem. There are also other approaches that can be applied to the analysed field, e.g. knowledge management (knowledge division) and industry evolution in the innovativeness context, which is mentioned in the last sections.

The main purpose of this paper is to indicate the most appropriate means of reducing the costs of the organisation of internal transactions in a radical case of very high interdependence between the firm and the employee possessing firm-specific human capital.

Reflections on the mentioned issues are divided into three sections: the first concerns the bilateral monopoly situation, the asset specificity role in the organisation of transactions and vertical integration; the second is devoted to the firm-specific human capital category as well as it deals with the character of the internal bilateral monopoly between the employer and the employee; the third refers to potential solutions to the analysed problems. The purpose of this paper structure is to clearly describe transaction cost economics findings about the transaction organising attitude to special employee's and employer's interdependence within a firm.

A NOTE ON BILATERAL MONOPOLY

A bilateral monopoly occurs in an industry where two firms exist and one of them is the only producer or supplier of a good (monopolist, upstream supplier) and the second is the only buyer of this good (monopsonist, downstream buyer) (Blair, and Kaserman 1987). Subsequently, customers purchase final products.

The monopsonist's and monopolist's roles depend on the market structure and their market power. Additionally, high switching costs linked with idiosyncratic investments are typical for both sides and may affect the transactions (Tirole 1998). The case of being a price-giver or a price-taker refers also to a special relation between the subjects of bilateral monopoly. The supplier is not able to sell goods to other clients and the buyer cannot find an alternative source of commodities. The supplier tries to charge high prices to the buyer. The lone buyer expects to pay a price that is as low as possible. In order to keep the business profitable, both sides of the contract have to make a deal. As a result, firms that create the structures of a bilateral monopoly become strongly interdependent and have to face negotiations.


The contract construction in the case of a bilateral monopoly is very troublesome and sophisticated. Negotiations may take a lot of time and funds before an agreement is reached, if firms manage to do so. The most common factors that complicate relations between the contractors are: information asymmetry, uncertainty and the will to take advantage of eventual bargaining power. Transaction cost economics extends this concept to transaction frequency and asset specificity. Asset specificity is one of the exemplary causes of the existence of bilateral monopolies, because it creates a lock-in effect. It means that sunk investments in idiosyncratic goods result in an increase of trade value between the contractors (Williamson 1983).

There is a conjecture that the firm with higher bargaining power will ultimately enforce the contract shape (Blair, Kaserman, and Romano 1989). The range of prices that can be negotiated by the firms is limited by p_3^U and p_3^D on Figure 1. Price p_3^U maximises the monopolist's profits and p_3^D causes profits acquisition by the monopsonist. The final result of negotiations depends on bargaining power of the firms. Other symbols on the Figure 1 are standard and stand for: D_Q – final product demand, C_T – constant cost of transforming one unit of input x into one unit of output Q , MR_x – marginal revenue from selling x to the downstream buyer, D_x – net marginal revenue product of input x , AC_x – average cost of producing input x , MC_x – marginal cost, MFC_x – marginal factor cost.

Both sides of the exchange can hypothetically avoid this kind of enforcing some negotiation rules thanks to readiness to cooperate and frankness. Another solution to the bilateral monopoly problem can be contracts based on assumed profit distribution. In this case, the product price results from the cost structure and mentioned profit distribution matters. Obviously, it requires mutual cost control (Blair, and Kaserman 1987). Apart from these findings, special attention should be paid to the role of asset specificity in determining forms of the organisation of transactions.

Figure 1

Prices and product quantity in the bilateral monopoly



Source: Blair, Kaserman, and Romano 1989: 832.

ASSET SPECIFICITY ROLE IN ORGANISING TRANSACTIONS

Williamson formalised relations between the level of asset specificity and the form of organising transactions. He examined the impact of asset specificity both on transaction costs and total production costs. Another effectual element of Williamson’s research is linked with the asset specificity case is the contract theory (Williamson 1979). One can refer to classical, neoclassical or relational contractual analysis. The relational approach, concerning long-term, complex contracts related to specific assets, is especially useful for this paper. The choice of the transaction management type depends on the frequency and the level of transaction specificity¹. Vertical integration is proper when transactions are repetitive and the specificity is high. Periodic recurrence of transactions or rare exchange and standard contracts imply market choice. Tripartite management

¹ The assumption regarding the uncertainty and future condition of nature is valid.

is effective when transactions are rare and idiosyncratic. The main reason of trilateral governance are excessive costs of forming a particular organisational structure. Figure 2 contains management structures in relation to transactions characteristics. These considerations can be enriched with the uncertainty factor. Uncertainty does not lead to a switch in the transaction organisational form only when the exchange is conventional. However, uncertainty lowers as the market branch develops.

The division presented below is based only on the organisational structure selection, depending on the transaction costs level. This point of view was expanded by adding the role of production costs (Williamson 1981). Additionally, a more complex approach to organising transactions pays attention to technological aspects likewise, thus exhibits the role of asset specificity.

Figure 2

Management structures and transactions characteristics

		Investment Characteristics		
		Nonspecific	Mixed	Indiosyncratic
Frequency	Occasional	Market Governance (Classical Contracting)	Trilateral Governance (Neoclassical Contracting)	Unified Governance (Contracting)
	Recurrent			

Source: Williamson 1979: 253.

In the case of unspecific assets, it is appropriate to choose a market option (external transactions), because of the production costs and management character. Moreover, market incentives support rigorous costs controls. As the level of asset specificity rises, the exchange becomes more typical for a bilateral monopoly and it is rational to organise transactions within the firm. The relationship between contractors become more tied, which may imply some additional costs of negotiations. The function below expresses a difference between the costs of the market organisation of production and production within the company (Williamson 1981).

$$\Delta G = g(A) = \beta(A) - M(A)$$

Where A stands for the asset specificity level, $\beta(A)$: internal management costs and $M(A)$: market management costs. Because asset specificity growth causes a relative increase in the market management cost level, this function decreases in relation to A . On account of market costs control, $\Delta G > 0$. Williamson implies that the only variable factor is asset specificity (the production volume is constant). Another dependence is that $\Delta C = f(A)$, which describes the difference between the market purchase of a good and internal production. Irrespective of assets specificity (A), this difference is positive, thus ΔC is positive and diminishing. The market remains the most effective form of transaction organisation while $\Delta C + \Delta G > 0$. It could be encouraging because of economies of scale and the range of savings.

The analysis presented above pertains to the choice between the firm and the market. A more complex perspective also allows for a mixed solution that may occur when the level of asset specificity is between A^{**} and A^* points (Figure 3). Then some companies will produce goods and others will buy these products, but none of them will postulate to keep that relationship (Williamson 1998). Mixed management of transactions (a hybrid form) is perceived as useful when the business relationship refers to specific assets and contractors try to be independent (credible commitments). Williamson assumes that the hybrid form is typical for long-term differential contracts (Williamson 1991).


The state institutional system also has a substantial impact on the level of transaction costs (Williamson 1991). Institutions, both formal and informal, can strongly influence transaction costs depending on the organisational structure. Williamson almost does not pay attention to informal institutions. It is crucial in the case of formally unrelated contractors with personal relations and it leads to vertical integration described above. However, Williamson confirms that the role of informal institutions is also important. Moreover, he points out that institutions sometimes are inefficient. The core of Williamson's transaction cost economics is contractual analysis. The contract as a research unit enables us to verify empirically the legitimacy of transaction organisation. Operationalisation of transaction cost economics conceptual apparatus is related to asset specificity measurement.

Another fact is that not only asset specificity is significant for transaction organisation, but also knowledge about goods remaining in trade. Expenditures on goods characteristics verification constitute a noticeable fraction of market functioning costs, which Y. Barzel (1982a) emphasises. An access and possibility to measure asset characteristics depend on the information

asymmetry. All of these areas are considered in the institutional perspective (Barzel 1982b). Transaction costs depend on both the organisational structure and the institutional surrounding of the firm (cf. North 1990). Outlays on quality measurement rise with the degree of production sophistication. Complicated and multi-stage processes require more financial resources to keep the desirable level of quality because of opportunism and high information asymmetry. In this case, production specialisation is crucial. The customer has to verify asset attributes on every stage of production. A direct beneficiary of information manipulation is the supplier. Once more, vertical integration is a suggested institutional solution to the presented problem. Integration entails that the supplier becomes the employee and has no incentives to manipulate the quality. Opposite to Williamson, who emphasises asset specificity, contracts incompleteness, opportunism and bounded rationality, Barzel bases his research on the costs of attribute measurement and his works have an operational character.

Figure 3

Comparative costs of production and management



Source: Williamson 1981: 560.

A different approach to the organisation of transactions is represented by A. Alchian and H. Demsetz (1972), who claim that the advantage of the firm over the market appears as a possibility to measure the effort of people involved in the production process. Difficulties in defining the effort imply ambiguity in wage setting.

K. Monteverde's and D. Teece's (1982) work also refers, *inter alia*, to asset specificity. They point out exceeding costs of production borne by suppliers, which may be implied by asset specificity. They do their research empirically, basing on the automotive industry. Monteverde and Teece also reach the conclusion that assets specificity affects opportunism, supplies instability and quality maintenance. What is more, they refer to business culture as an element affecting behavioural aspects of transactions. Another researcher who refers to the concept of behavioural factors is E. Gal-Or (1991), who proclaims the impossibility of information asymmetry elimination. She states that even very sophisticated contracts are not able to annihilate the risk of opportunism.

The asset specificity issue is analysed also by E. Anderson and D. Schmittlein (1984) as a reason for distribution channel acquisition. P. Joskow (1987) shows in turn that specific assets determine making contracts in the long-term perspective. Although Joskow concentrates on vertical integration analysis, he also accentuates the necessity of a precise transaction cost analysis in terms of internal organisation structures, which may be pivotal after the integration (Joskow 2003). The section below contains more information about the vertical integration process.

VERTICAL INTEGRATION AS A SOLUTION TO BILATERAL MONOPOLY PROBLEMS

Vertical integration occurs when different phases of production, sales and distribution of some goods and other significant processes are combined together in one organisational unit (Coase 1937). Vertical integration is perceived as a management instrument for organising transactions. Firms which are vertically integrated have their own internal hierarchy used for project coordination. By taking over a semi-finished product supplier, the buyer chooses to manage key processes through his company instead of relying on the market.

There are three types of vertical integration commonly indicated: backward, forward and balanced (Perry 1998). Backward integration takes place when a company takes control over its supplier of semi-finished products that are necessary during the final production process. Thanks to that, the buyer is able to use a hierarchical form of management in order to eliminate eventual opportunism and negotiation costs. Another type of vertical integration is forward integration, as a result of which the firm has

control over distribution centres and sales. Balanced vertical integration is some kind of a combination of the backward and forward models: processes dedicated to materials, semi-finished products and sales or distribution are all managed within the company. The chosen type of integration is usually determined by relations with upstream supplies and downstream buyers.

Asset specificity and opportunism could be the reasons why firms decide to integrate. A contract party that is obliged to invest in some specific assets may be forced by the only customer to lower the price below the profitable threshold. On the other hand, the only producer of this good can systematically impose high prices on the customer, who has no alternative. Problems of contractual relations are described in detail in O. Williamson's works.

Williamson (1971) managed to elaborate a synthesis of economic and organisational theories that can be used in transaction internalisation analysis. Because of the market failure, internalised transactions are made better through vertically integrated organisational structures. Vertical integration replaces negotiations and judicial arbitration by top-down management. Transaction costs of the price mechanism appear as executed incomplete *ex ante* contracts (bounded rationality of exchange partners and uncertainty). Additionally, *ex post* changes cause high costs of adjustments or opportunism. A significant fact is that opportunism may be an outcome of asset specificity. When the supplier of the final product has to use some specific semi-finished products, he may suffer their price being overstated (assuming that there are few semi-finished product producers). Moreover, the only customer for semi-finished products is prone to enforce a lower price. The situation described above is likely to be a case of a bilateral monopoly. Associated conflicts are usually frequent, expensive and hard to exclude. Williamson points out significant matters like: behavioural aspects of transactions, informal institutions, management costs and asset specificity. These issues are perceived as factors leading to vertical integration that favours harmonisation of goals and reduction of transaction costs (Williamson 1998). However, it has to be mentioned that another way to deal with opportunism and conflicts is bilateral management (Williamson 1998). The following part of this paper gets to the core of the above formulated hypothesis: the firm-specific human capital category.

FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL

Human capital theory foundations were formulated mainly by T. Schultz (1961) and G. Becker (1975). They claim that people spend money on themselves not only because of current enjoyment but they also take into consideration possible future revenues. These decisions may be treated as investments justified by prospective outcomes. Accumulated knowledge and capabilities are a form of capital, which is associated with human (cannot function autonomously, opposite to physical capital) or organisational relations in general terms (Kogut, and Zander 1992). Schultz (1982) concentrates exclusively on attributes that improve work performance. Human capital can be defined as a supply of knowledge, abilities, health, strength and vital energy present in man. Synthesising, human capital is a set of characteristics that enables a worker to increase his productivity.

Only actions that improve the worker's productivity are perceived as investment in human capital. Naturally, some problems with investment categorisation may occur, e.g. expenditures on alimentation result both in productiveness and individual consumption. Becker (1975) highlights the fact that revenues from investment in human capital may have a monetary or a physical form and are usually made in a long-term perspective. Ways of investing in human capital are for instance: schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin consumption and acquiring information about the economic system (Becker 1962). Those actions raise real income prospects by the improvement of physical and mental abilities. Taking into consideration the thesis of this paper, special attention should be paid to on-the-job training.

The employee's productivity can be raised by learning new skills or perfecting old ones while working (Becker 1962). In this case, future productivity raises only at a cost. Usually, higher level of human capital results in a wage rise. Some exceptions may be caused by discrimination, labour market imperfections or compensating variables such as more pleasant working conditions. Naturally, an increase in the employee's productivity affects positively the firm profits. Two types of on-the-job investment occur: general and special.

General training results in human capital increase that is useful for many firms – obtained skills are commonly applicable. After a perfectly general training, marginal products in many firms would rise by the same degree. The second type of on-the-job training is characterised by the fact that it increases the employee's productivity by a different amount in firm realising this investment than in other firms. A perfectly specific training has no effect

on the employee's productivity in other companies. As a result, rational employers pay the same wage to generally trained workers and a higher wage than could be earned elsewhere to workers with firm-specific human capital.

Another remark on firm-specific human capital states that quit and layoff rates are inversely related to the level of specific training. Firms have fewer stimuli to fire workers with firm-specific human capital and such employees have less incentive to quit because of no equivalent job opportunities (Becker 1962). An effective, long-term contract has to protect employers against quitting and insure employees against being redundant. Optimal contracting leads to higher investment in specific trainings. This paper refers to relations between the employer and the employee linked with firm-specific human capital. Thus, the presented research focuses rather on contracting and the character of transactions between these subjects instead of analysing forms of specific human capital creation (investments) (Becker 1962, Lazear 2009) or wage dynamics (Felli, and Harris 1996, Hashimoto 1981). The next section deals with the groundwork for the possibility to treat relations between the employer and the employee characterised by firm-specific human capital analogously to the bilateral monopoly problem and hence to interpret such relations as the internal bilateral monopoly. It also covers the potential application of transaction cost economics research tools.

INTERNAL BILATERAL MONOPOLY

Similarly to the bilateral monopoly, relations between the employer and the employee with firm-specific human capital involve two subjects. The employer plays the role of an upstream buyer and the employee is the a downstream supplier. Some sort of work provided by the employee is the object of this exchange. Because of the nature of firm-specific human capital, the employer is not able to replace this worker with another one having the same necessary abilities and knowledge. Moreover, the employee has no alternative equivalent job opportunity. Both parties are strongly interdependent. As a result, their relations are characterised by information asymmetry and opportunism. Like in the bilateral monopoly case, it is better for the employee and employer to reach an agreement in renegotiations rather than resign from cooperation. Transaction costs of exchange organisation between the monopolist and the monopsonist in the bilateral monopoly depend on the contract construction and execution effectiveness. Relations within a company in the case of firm-specific human capital also refer to contracting.

The transaction cost economics approach to the bilateral monopoly problem is based on the frequency and specificity of exchange. Undoubtedly,

cooperation between the employer and the employee is very frequent, even permanent. The question is, what could be perceived as a specific asset? The human capital theory assumes that knowledge and abilities accumulated by the worker should be treated as assets. Because human capital is inseparable from a man, the worker can be regarded as a specific asset of the firm. The employee does his job using his unique abilities on the firm's account. What is more, it has to be clearly pointed out that internal provisions have a different nature than transactions between two firms. In addition, firm-specific human capital develops gradually thanks to investments controlled by the firm owner, which is unlikely in the bilateral monopoly situation. The analysed relations caused by firm-specific human capital take place in the conditions of subordination. The employer's authority may be compared with the bargaining power of the firm, but there is a great difference between the market and internal cooperation planes. Vertical integration is recognised as the best solution to the bilateral monopoly problem. The relation between the employee and the employer cannot be vertically integrated, because it is already internal. However, both sides' interests should be convergent as much as possible, which can be achieved by changes in the ownership structure as a form of a reward.

In explicating the question of internal relations it is significant that firm-specific human capital accumulated by the worker in fact belongs to the firm. Taking into consideration interdependency mentioned above, the employee should care about himself as well as about his workplace. Besides wages, this employee is prone to strengthen his corporate position in order to gain some additional bargaining power in contract negotiations. However, those expenditures on employee's rewards that could be understood as non-pecuniary benefits, may be a value added also for the firm.

The corporate position of the employee having unique abilities can be miscellaneous. Due to the analysis simplification, it is assumed in this paper that the employee obtains a managerial position (it is unlikely for him to be treated as an ordinary worker). It does not imply being a CEO, but this employee seems to be at least responsible for managing his department. This assumption is necessary in order to elaborate proposals of solution to the described contracting problems, which refer to the efficiency wage concept and the agency theory presented in the next section.

Taking it all into consideration, because of several fundamental differences, internal relations between the employer and the employee characterised by firm-specific human capital cannot be treated fully analogously to the bilateral monopoly problem (like the internal bilateral monopoly). However, there are conclusions from transaction cost economics that may be very useful in

dealing with the described interdependent relations. The following paragraph is devoted to solution proposals inferred from the efficiency wage theory, transaction cost economics and the agency theory.

SOLUTIONS TO INTERDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL

Efficiency wages

The organisation of internal transactions referring to firm-specific human capital problems can be considered in the view of the theory of efficiency wages. One of popularly cited reasons for the usage of efficiency wages is the stimulation of employees' effort when employers cannot oversee their work completely. Thus, this tool substitutes the costs of monitoring. Another cause is motivation for gaining more human capital and specific abilities. Finally, efficiency wages command employees' loyalty and lead to greater effort (Yellen 1991, Katz 1986). Moreover, low wages may provoke employees not only to less effective work, but also to sabotaging their tasks in order to lower their employer's profits (Akerlof, and Yellen 1990). The efficiency wage model *implicite* assumes that wages are the only way to reward employees. Another view, containing more sophisticated methods of remuneration and ownership, is presented in a separate section.

In general, wages are not the only determinant of effort. Definitely, the key issue is that firms decide to use efficiency wages because of the limited ability to oversee their employees. The firm-specific human capital case generates particular relations, but a typical worker does not shirk in order not to lose the job and become unemployed. This situation can be generalised to difficulties with finding some alternative occupation that will suit held competences (an equal alternative job opportunity) and will provide an appropriate salary. Taking this into consideration, employees expend more effort in the case of high unemployment or high risk of not finding a job that will benefit from their competences. The below expression represents a situation when wages are the only determinant of employees' effort (Solow 1979).

$$e = e(w), e'(\cdot) > 0$$

Where e stands for effort and w for wages. The expanded expression includes alternative wages offered by other firms (w_a) and unemployment (u).

$$e = e(w, w_a, u), e'(\cdot) > 0, e''(\cdot) < 0, e'''(\cdot) > 0$$

The macroeconomic model of efficiency wages concerns the wage adjustment processes of the firm. It is assumed that the company maximises its profits, which result from the difference between production (Y) and expenditures on wages dependent on the number of employed people (L).

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &= Y - wL \\ Y &= F(eL), F'(\cdot) > 0, F''(\cdot) < 0 \\ &\max F(e(w, w_a, u)L) - wL \end{aligned}$$

If the firm was free in choosing the wage level, we could derive the following expression from the first order conditions.

$$\frac{we'(w, w_a, u)}{e(w, w_a, u)} = 1$$

It means that in equilibrium the effort elasticity in relation to wage equals 1. The presented efficiency wage theory exhibits relations between wages, the employee's effort, unemployment and alternative wages. Moreover, it reveals why it is beneficial for companies to offer wages higher than the market clearing level.

Firm-specific human capital requires us to make some restrictions. Firstly, the firm profits can be taken as profits from processes based on the employee who possesses this unusual and crucial human capital. Additionally, it is assumed that the company's strategy concerns mainly these processes. In other words, without the mentioned firm-specific human capital, the market position of the firm deteriorates drastically. As it was presented in the previous sections, the firm-specific human capital we refer to is so unique that there is no other employee with such abilities. As a consequence, no other company would offer competitive goods or services. In fact, we analyse relations between the firm and one employee ($L = 1$).

Going back to the efficiency wage model, the firm-specific human capital case implies difficulties with alternative wages offered by other firms (w_a). We can distinguish two paths. The narrower perspective means that firms would not be prone to offer any wages, because they do not have necessary infrastructure and business know-how connected with this unique human capital. The other possibility states that firms would offer market wages matching the employee's competences omitting firm-specific abilities. Thus,

wages in the second option would be lower than those corresponding to gained firm-specific human capital. The main problem is that both the firm and the employee do not have any market reference in establishing wages. The lack of real market competition in the specific area of the analysed domain of the firm creates disproportional bargaining power of the employer and the employee. Assuming that the employee wants to maximise his utility from gained knowledge, the role of the labour market seems to be negligible. Wage setting becomes a subject of negotiations just between the company and the employee. As a consequence, several problems described within the contract theory and transaction cost economics occur. Conflicts, negotiations and contract creation generate costs affecting business profitability.

The efficiency wage model refers also to unemployment. Naturally, unemployment is a significant element of this theory, but the domain of this paper is firm-specific human capital. Thus, the risk and effects of losing a job, as well as obtaining an opportunity to work without using these specific skills should be taken into consideration. In general, it means lower wages and a sense of failure because of incomplete usage of accumulated human capital. Chances that the dismissed employee will find an equivalent (set on the same firm-specific human capital level) job are minimal. The labour market of employees having firm-specific human capital and firms using it in its core business is extremely inelastic.

This short section showed that the idea of rewarding based only on wages is strongly limited. Obviously, the level of productivity has the main impact on the firm-specific human capital holder's wage. Moreover, because of inelasticity of the bound labour market, wages become the matter of negotiations and exhibition of bargaining power. The irreplaceable employee and no alternative equivalent job opportunities lead to bilateral interdependence between the firm and the employee. The next section contains alternative solutions based on the transaction cost theory and the agency theory.

OWNERSHIP

Reminding the assumptions already made, it is necessary to define precisely the status of the employee characterised by firm-specific human capital. Generally, due to accumulated knowledge and seniority, this employee is responsible for some key processes. Naturally, the employee acts in the owner's interest, but he has a great information advantage resulting from special tasks and firm-specific human capital. Anyhow, he should not

be treated as an ordinary worker. Thus, contracts between the firm's owner (principal) and the employee (agent) are being analysed. This relation corresponds to the agency theory.


Like in the agency relationship, information asymmetry can be assumed *per se*. The agent has access to current information that can be manipulated before being transferred to the principal. As long as the principal is able to verify just the results of undertaken actions, he does not know if the agent realises his tasks with great accuracy and honesty. Because of the disparity of possessed knowledge, the risk of opportunism and departing from the firm targets arises. Information asymmetry can be reduced by supervision and extended monitoring systems, but it is not always remunerative. Like in well-developed corporations, the case of unique projects and specific human capital requires bearing high costs of sophisticated supervision. Problems with information asymmetry take place before contract establishment (*ex ante*) as well as after that (*ex post*). Furthermore, the cited information asymmetry refers also to the employee's real competences. Naturally, when these abilities are extremely specific, the principal has no opportunity to examine them clearly. Thus, the enticement for opportunistic behaviour mounts up (Samuelson, and Marks 2011).

Managers typically try to maximise their own profits, boost up carriers and stabilise current occupation. At the same time, owners would like to maximise the market value and profits of the firm (Walking, and Long 1984). The agency theory states also that managers usually take a short-term perspective unlike principals. It has to be mentioned that the agent having firm-specific human capital may have slightly different objectives. First of all, his own interests are more convergent with the owner's. The main reason for this situation is his knowledge specificity. As long as he is fully dependent on earnings from one company, he is prone to strive in order to improve his financial results. Moreover, such an agent should exert himself to keep his projects as the most important in the firm's strategy. As a result, the manager with firm-specific human capital will take care of both good short-term and long-term condition of the company. However, the analysed problem is very similar to classical agency theory assumptions: relations between the principal and the agent based on information exchange and the costs of opportunism reduction. Risk aversion, bounded rationality and utility maximising behaviour are present. Contractual problems are characterised by moral hazard, negative selection and risk participation. The relation between the principal and the agent, who may want to achieve different goals, is the essence of the problem (Eisenhardt 1989).

The company owner is able to impose on managers acting fully convergent with his goals only when there are no supervision costs. When these costs do not equal zero, a monitoring system will be undertaken only if profits from better control of agents exceed the cost of the adjusted supervision system (Marris 1964). The supervision cost issue is taken up also by O. Williamson who points to the relation between managers' behaviour and costs of measuring their effort. Williamson (1964) managed to show that positive costs of supervision lead to the discrepancy between choices of owners and managers.

Figure 4

Optimal employment level for firm owners and managers



Source: Alchian 1965: 36.

The firm profits (π) depend on the staff size (S), production volume (X) and external factors (E). Assuming that the optimal production volume is equal to $\hat{X} = f(S)$, the following expression is obtained: $\pi = g(\hat{X}, S, \hat{E}) = g'(S, E)$ (Williamson 1964). Profits of the firm are marked as AA curve and managers' utility as UU . Williamson states that managers' choice (point L) will not maximise the owners' profits (point K) if monitoring costs exist.

Also S. Ross (1973) did research on relations between the principal and the agent. He claims that agency relations should be perceived as social interaction between the two subjects. Ross pays great attention to information asymmetry. The key issue is the uncertainty if the employee does his work with

maximal effort. More complex analyses of agency relations are conducted by M. Jensen and W. Meckling (1976).

Jensen and Meckling, apart from the supervision mechanism, propose developing some incentives structure. As an example, an employee who acts differently from the designated strategy is charged with bonding costs. The avoidance of all costs of agency relation is impossible. Manager's decisions that reduce the firm owner's utility generate residual loss. Agency costs are a sum of monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss. A lot of attention is devoted to the supervision issue. In view of firm-specific human capital singularity, monitoring employees with those special abilities is especially difficult and expensive. That is so because such an employee has an opportunity to strongly manipulate information. Of course, it depends also on the manager's position and the ownership structure. For instance, there are differences between monitoring in dispersed ownership and blockholder cases. There are disproportionately high costs of monitoring agents in the situation of dispersed ownership. Thus, rational apathy takes place, because supervision remains unworthy. On the other hand, managers are more prone to realise blockholders' interests instead of fulfilling other expectations. The next paragraph deals with the other mentioned incentive to fulfil the firm strategy – the agent's participation in ownership.

Reward systems are treated as motivators for efficient work and a toll for keeping the best managers in the company for a long time. When an agent gains a portion of the firm shares, besides his own interests, he pursues goals of the whole firm. The thing is that he starts to identify himself with the corporation. Of course, firm-specific human capital naturally causes that the employee takes care about the company but when he also possesses a fraction of shares, the risk of being redundant or completely subordinated disappears. Jensen and Meckling carry out an analysis of the relation between the agent's ownership degree and his tendency to disburse on non-pecuniary benefits. They postulate that a lower fraction of the agent's ownership results in higher expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits instead of investing in strategic projects of the firm. The main conclusion is that the manager's ownership of company shares positively affects the market value of the firm. The interests of the employee having firm-specific human capital may become convergent with those of the employer thanks to this form of rewarding. This method is far more certain than relying on the wage level.

Other notes– knowledge management and industry development impact

As it was mentioned previously, firm-specific human capital may emerge with corporate development and depends on investments made. According to that, the process of the employee's firm-specific human capital development can be somehow designed and planned (Bukowitz, and Williams 1999). Thus, knowledge management methods can be used.

Due to an interactive approach to knowledge management and learning organisation, the firm may implement procedures of knowledge accumulation often identified with knowledge codification. It is necessary to: define the purpose of codification, determine different forms of knowledge occurrence, rate the knowledge in terms of its usefulness and choose the right form of knowledge codification and distribution (Davenport, and Prusak 2000). Thanks to that, special knowledge forming firm-specific human capital can be stored and diffused to other employees. It is significant to concentrate not only on formal skills and abilities, but also on tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966). The worker who holds unique human capital exchanges his knowledge with his colleagues. As a result, his bargaining power, while contracting with the employer, falls down. It happens because this employee becomes less irreplaceable and has to cooperate with the team. Additionally, it can boost the creativeness and innovativeness of the whole organisation. Concluding, management tools also play a role in relations between the employer and the firm-specific human capital holder.

Going back to the innovativeness issue, it is worthwhile to define precisely the time frames for the analysis of the interdependence between the employer and the employee presented in the previous sections. One of the assumptions states that firm-specific human capital evolution is linked with a problem of finding an alternative job opportunity that would correspond to possessed knowledge. Mechanisms of the contract construction should cause long-term convergence of the employee's and employer's targets in order to avoid high costs of renegotiations and internal conflicts. If there is one company which offers goods or services that require using firm-specific knowledge, such an organisation can be perceived as innovative. The entrepreneur is able to obtain profits, e.g. thank to innovation implementation. Corresponding to the Schumpeterian theory of the firm (Schumpeter 1934) and several modern approaches to innovation diffusion theories (Rogers 2003), after the phases of invention and innovation, innovation becomes widespread. Extraordinary profits encourage other companies to imitate innovations. As a result, firm-specific human capital becomes industry-specific human capital

and its holder is able to find an alternative job opportunity in the case of being redundant. It means changes in bargaining power in contracting after some period. The entrepreneur should be, therefore, interested in concluding an optimal contract primarily in order to maximise profits from innovations.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As the hypothesis states, the problem domain of this paper refers to relations between the firm owner and the employee characterised by firm-specific human capital. Problems generated within these relations were analysed using different institutional economics approaches.

Bilateral monopoly problems cause an increase in the transaction costs level. Information asymmetry, opportunism and tedious contract negotiations lower the ability to gain profits of both parties of the exchange. Vertical integration is considered to be the best solution to these issues. Asset specificity as well as transaction frequency (observed commonly in bilateral monopolies) are factors that definitely lead to vertical integration.

The human capital theory provides numerous findings about on-the-job trainings resulting in firm-specific human capital. This unique asset increases the worker's productivity only in one firm. There are some similarities between the described employer-employee relations and classical bilateral monopolies like both sides' strong interdependence or exchange subject specificity. However, due to other features, e.g. the transaction plane, the employee's subordination and a different nature of bargaining power in contracting, it is impossible to accept the assumption that relations between the employer and employee holding firm-specific human capital can be treated as an internal bilateral monopoly. Thus, the first part of the hypothesis has to be negated.

The second part of this paper referred to some proposals of solutions to interdependence caused by firm-specific human capital occurrence. The efficiency wage theory is insufficient in this case because of the employee's inability to find an equivalent alternative job and the absence of attractive wages outside the firm (adjusted to his competences). On the basis of transaction cost economics and the agency theory we were able to come to the conclusion that an offer of ownership fraction proposed to the employee holding firm-specific human capital makes his and the employer's interests convergent and contributes to decreased contracting costs. This solution is the best in the context of long-term cooperation, which confirms the second sentence of the hypothesis.

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FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL AS A CONTRACT DETERMINING FACTOR – A REASON FOR INTERNAL BILATERAL INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE

Summary

As a result of its own strategy, gradual development, vertical integration or other factors, a firm may experience employing a worker with some firm-specific human capital. This situation implies a kind of interdependence between the employer and the employee whose knowledge and abilities can be perceived as a specific asset. Both parties become strongly interdependent: the employer has to rely on the employee and, on the other hand, the employee cannot change his workplace easily. The presented relations are compared to a bilateral monopoly situation in order to examine the possibility of using analogous research tools. This paper identifies difficulties accompanying the functioning of the firm, when the core business is based on firm-specific human capital and contains solutions referring to transaction costs economics and the agency theory.

Key words: transaction costs economics, vertical integration, human capital, specific assets, interdependence, efficiency wages, ownership, agency theory

KAPITAŁ LUDZKI SPECYFICZNY DLA PRZEDSIĘBIORSTWA
JAKO CZYNNIK DETERMINUJĄCY KONTRAKT
– PRZYCZYNA WEWNĘTRZNEJ WZAJEMNEJ ZALEŻNOŚCI
MIĘDZY PRACODAWCĄ A PRACOWNIKIEM

Streszczenie

Firma, wskutek własnej strategii, rozwoju, integracji pionowej, lub innych czynników, może doświadczyć zatrudnienia pracownika o kapitale ludzkim specyficznym dla tejże firmy. Taka sytuacja implikuje pewien rodzaj współzależności między pracodawcą a pracownikiem, którego wiedza i umiejętności mogą być postrzegane jako aktywo specyficzne. Obie strony są silnie współzależne: pracodawca musi polegać na pracowniku, a ten z kolei nie jest w stanie łatwo znaleźć alternatywnej pracy opartej na wspomnianym kapitale ludzkim. Wskazane relacje są zestawione z problematyką monopolu bilateralnego, celem zweryfikowania możliwości zastosowania analogicznych narzędzi badawczych. W ramach tekstu skonceptualizowane zostały czynniki negatywnie oddziałujące na funkcjonowanie firmy, gdy podstawowa działalność opiera się na kapitale ludzkim specyficznym dla firmy. Artykuł prezentuje propozycje rozwiązania tego typu problemu, przy odwołaniu do teorii ekonomii kosztów transakcyjnych i teorii agencji.

Słowa kluczowe: ekonomia kosztów transakcyjnych, integracja pionowa, kapitał ludzki, aktywa specyficzne, współzależność, płace efektywnościowe, własność organizacji, teoria agencji

ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКИЙ КАПИТАЛ, ПРИСУЩИЙ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЮ КАК ФАКТОР,
ОПРЕДЕЛЯЮЩИЙ КОНТРАКТ – ПРИЧИНА ВНУТРЕННЕЙ
ВЗАИМОЗАВИСИМОСТИ МЕЖДУ РАБОТОДАТЕЛЕМ И РАБОТНИКОМ

Резюме

Компания, благодаря своей стратегии, развитию, вертикальной интеграции и другим факторам, может иметь дело с трудоустройством сотрудника, обладающего человеческим капиталом, соответствующим данной компании. Такая ситуация предполагает наличие определенной взаимозависимости между работодателем и работником, чьи знания и навыки могут восприни-

маться как конкретный актив. Обе стороны в значительной степени взаимозависимы: работодатель должен полагаться на сотрудника, которому, в свою очередь, не так уж легко найти альтернативную вакансию в другой компании, соответствующую упомянутому человеческому капиталу. Установлена связь этих отношений с проблематикой двусторонней монополии с целью верификации возможности использования аналогичных инструментов исследования. В тексте были подвергнуты концептуализации факторы, негативно влияющие на функционирование компании, когда основная деятельность основана на человеческом капитале, характерном для компании. Статья содержит конкретные предложения по решению этих проблем, со ссылкой на теорию экономики транзакционных издержек и теории агентств.

Ключевые слова: экономика транзакционных издержек, вертикальная интеграция, человеческий капитал, конкретный актив, взаимозависимость, эффективная заработная плата, теория агентств.

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THE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES¹

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union countries are currently introducing reforms of social and economic policy due to the aging of society, past experiences of the world crisis and as a result of the need to rationalise public expenditures. Development of methods aimed at the optimisation of public expenditures is a significant challenge for both scientists and policy makers. It is crucial for entities implementing employment policy in the era of the formation of the employee labour market and changing the priorities of public intervention. Public employment services (PES's) as the units responsible for the implementation of labour market instruments are the subject of evaluation. European PES's have undergone profound changes, and the present situation is characterised by a combination of reduced budgets, increasing diversity of target groups and rising demands for accountability and organisational performance (Ejler, and Sidelmann 2016).

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However, the assessment of efficiency of these units is a multidimensional problem as it should take into account not only the comparison of inputs and outputs but also the employability potential of regional labour markets. It is worth mentioning that various forms of PES activities do not always have identical goals, therefore, when examining employment effects, it should be remembered that their efficiency is not only examined in the context of employment. Additionally, it is not possible to apply simply any available methods, including all those that prove effective when analysing private entities. The reason for that is that only some of them reflect the peculiarities of the public sector.

The authors propose a method of assessment of efficiency of regional PES's by selecting statistically significant inputs and outputs as well as the environmental variable. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method was used to identify the best performers in the analysed group of regional PES's and to create a ranking in terms of the efficient utilisation of resources. Regional labour offices from two Polish voivodships representing significantly different economic conditions (Podlaskie and Mazowieckie provinces) were selected as decision making units (DMU).


Therefore, to accomplish the set objectives, this article was divided into three parts. The first one, which is an introduction to the selected topic, touches upon the essence and measurement of efficiency of Public Employment Services. The second one is devoted to theoretical considerations about the selected measurement method – DEA. The last part constitutes the major portion of the paper and comprises the case study of two chosen Polish provinces – Podlaskie and Mazowieckie.

Due to the adopted scope of this article, the research methods applied in the first two theoretical parts include an in-depth analysis of the literature on the subject and examination of documents. The third, empirical part constitutes the result of the selected components of the monographic method and, mostly, econometric analyses, including modelling.

EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES – DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT

Public Employment Services have at their disposal a variety of resources and represent a range of organisational components the aim of which is to implement labour market instruments and services. As a result these entities support not only jobseekers but also enterprises seeking employees – Figure 1.

Figure 1



Source: Ejler, N., and Sidelmann, P. (2016) *Application of Process Efficiency Techniques in PES. Analytical Paper*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p. 7.

According to the study by Thuy, Hansen, and Price (2001), four main functions associated with PES's can be determined, such as job broking, providing labour market information, administering labour market adjustment programmes and administering unemployment benefits. When analysing the efforts made by PES's to realise these functions, it is important to distinguish between two concepts: efficiency and effectiveness.

Drucker defines efficiency as doing things right and effectiveness as doing the right things (Drucker, and Maciariello 2005). More precisely efficiency is associated with using the 'right' methodologies in order to skilfully manage resources and thus maximise returns. Effectiveness is about achieving the 'right' outcomes by meeting the demands and expectations of various stakeholders (Ejler, and Sidelmann 2016: 7).

The efficiency and effectiveness of PES's are interlinked and cannot be separated from each other, but to illustrate how the two terms work with regard to the functioning of PES's, efficiency primarily concerns the first three components presented on Figure 1, namely resources, organisation and services/instruments (i.e. 'using the "right" methodologies'), whereas effectiveness is more concerned with the last component, outcomes/impacts (i.e. 'achieving the "right" outcomes').

Vilfredo Pareto's optimality is crucial for the development of the efficiency theory. According to the Pareto criterion, the economy/organisation produces effectively, when it proves impossible to improve the economic well-being of the individual unit without worsening the situation of another entity (Stiglitz 2000: 122).

In 1957 Michael Farrell divided productive efficiency into allocative and technical (Farrell 1957: 253–281). Pareto (allocative) efficiency is the concept that goods most desired by consumers are produced at the lowest cost. Another type of efficiency introduced by Farrell is technical efficiency (also defined as technology efficiency). It refers to the conversion (processing) of resources (inputs) into specified outputs. The evaluation of technical efficiency is determined by the difference between the result of the relationship outputs/inputs achieved by a given entity and the result of such a relationship for the ‘best benchmark’ (which may be theoretically or empirically defined). Technical efficiency can be expressed as the potential to increase the number of outputs at a given amount of inputs or the potential of reducing the inputs used to produce a given quantity of outputs. The technical efficiency level remains under the influence of the scale efficiency of the analysed entity and applied non-scale technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is based on ‘technological capabilities’, but it is not connected with the level of prices and costs (Kozuń-Cieślak 2011: 16).

PES’s use a variety of analytical techniques to measure the level of efficiency of their activity. The most popular methods are the cost-benefit-analysis, the DEA method and evaluations.

The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an analytical technique that is used to compare different courses of action in order to identify the optimal choice. CBA compares various alternatives to ascertain which one creates the biggest benefit (often measured as the highest economic biggest/outcome) at the lowest cost. CBA makes it possible to compare different positive as well as negative effects (for different actors) of different courses of action by measuring them using a common yardstick: most often money (European Commission 2013: 7–8).

It is mostly used to assess and compare the allocative efficiency of PES offices in order to identify the outcome objectives most useful when operationalised to help unemployed people into employment. It is used to compare the allocative efficiency of different alternatives, it is mostly aimed at analysing the ability of different active labour market programmes (ALMPs). In these analyses all the costs and benefits of the transition have to be estimated in order to calculate the total positive or negative economic sum of this transaction. Numerous factors have to be taken into account, i.e. both the costs and benefits of the individual getting a job and the wider societal impact (European Commission 2013: 9).

A similar technique is the cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) that compares different alternatives, assessing which creates the highest effect at the lowest

cost. It is thus necessary within CEA to compare alternatives whose effects are comparable, i.e. measured in the same way.

The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a methodological framework for modelling and thus measuring productive efficiency of production units, which can be private firms or public service provider offices (Andersson, Månsson, and Sund, 2013: 57). The scientific literature on efficiency of PES offices indicates that DEA is the predominant and the best suited framework for analysing productive efficiency of PES's (European Commission 2013: 21).

Evaluation of programmes can be qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative evaluations are mostly focused on assessing the output or outcome of a given programme or a way of organising service delivery. Especially when doing quantitative evaluations it is very important to apply a counterfactual approach, i.e. comparing citizens or organisations affected by the programme under study with a similar group of citizens or organisations that have not been affected by the programme (Ejler, and Sidelmann 2016: 13). Qualitative evaluations, on the other hand, are better suited for investigating why or how a programme or a way of organising service delivery works.

DEA METHOD – THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The indicators most frequently used to measure the effects of active labour market policy undertaken by PES's in Poland arouse numerous doubts, in particular as regards their credibility and the possibility of their comparison between individual territorial units. For example, the disadvantages of the employment efficiency rate include, among others: overvaluation resulting from the methodology of measurement, not reflecting the actual scale of the problem (in the case of trainings and internships by approx. 25% »Supreme Audit Office 2015«) or accepting as an indicator of the effectiveness the number of positions created or retained, not the actual number of the unemployed who, thanks to the activation, obtained employment. Another important problem is the inability to take into account the regional specificity of the territory, e.g. in a situation where only one large employer (offering most jobs in the given area) operates or large production plants have closed down. In connection with the above, searching for the alternative measurement methods, the authors propose DEA as a method of evaluation of PES efficiency.

The DEA method is based on the concept of technical efficiency (TE), which is efficiency of managing inputs (input, legacy or available data) and

converting them (with the use of various transformation processes) into outputs (effects, results, products). It is commonly used all over the world to examine public sector entities (Ruggiero 1996: 553–565), while in Poland it was also applied to analyse higher education (Nazarko et al. 2008) or healthcare sector institutions (Kozuń-Cieślak 2012).

DEA allows one to identify these entities that most efficiently manage their inputs (here: support instruments, financial investments, human resources, etc.), i.e. achieve the best efficiency parameters (measured by the inputs-effects ratio), and consequently, set the empirical limit of efficiency, i.e. the curve marking the cap of production capacity for the group of units being surveyed. The production process, according to the DEA methodology, is any process of transformation of inputs (understood broadly) into outputs, i.e. both public institutions such as schools, hospital or offices and business entities which provide services or manufacture goods may be examined by means of this method.

The concept of efficiency (or productivity) in DEA is the relation of the weighted sum of results produced by the analysed unit to the weighted sum of inputs utilised in the process. For a given set of units or objects (which in the DEA methodology are referred to as *Decision Making Units*, or DMU), the maximum efficiency values of individual objects J are determined with the use of the following formula (Pawłowska 2005: 36):

$$\text{maximum efficiency of object } J = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \mu_{rj} y_{rj}}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_{ij} x_{ij}}$$

where:

μ_{rj} – weight of effect r of object j ,

y_{rj} – effect r of object j ,

v_{ij} – weight of input i of object j ,

x_{ij} – input i of object j ,

with the following limitations:

$$0 \leq J = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^s \mu_{rj} y_{rj}}{\sum_{i=1}^m v_{ij} x_{ij}} \leq 1; k = 1, 2, 3, \dots, J$$

$$\mu_{i,j}, v_{i,j} \geq 0; i = 1, 2, \dots, m; r = 1, 2, \dots, s$$

The DEA method is recommended for preparing analyses of efficiency of those objects whose operations are described by more than one input and effect, and such units definitely include regional PES's. It may be applied even to those units which may not be characterised by the use of efficiency measures based on financial ratios.

In the DEA method inefficient units are compared to other, real objects, not to statistical measuring values, thus the isolation of fully efficient units within a group of units provides others with important information about where to seek benchmarks and good practices in the area of operations being surveyed (Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu 2004). An important benefit of the DEA productivity models (e.g. BCC, which provides for variable scale effects) is a more precise definition of the reason for inefficiency of a given unit, which may arise both from improper use of the desired inputs, resulting in wasting these inputs, and from performing operations in a non-optimal area of scale (Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu 2004).

The selection of variables must be complete and must comprise the unit's most important inputs and effects of operations. Additionally, according to the DEA methodology, the optimal ratio of variables in the efficiency model to the number of objects is 1:3, thus, the recommended number of variables in the model (input variables – inputs and output variables – effects) should not exceed a total of 30% of the surveyed objects, because then the results of the analysis are the most reliable. Therefore, the starting point for determining the number of variables was a smaller voivodship (province) – Podlaskie, which comprises 14 *powiat* administrative units. Hence, 4 variables were included in the basic model (the methodology allowed 4–5 variables to be used as the optimal number) and the choice of these variables is justified by the subject matter and statistics. During the research process, for the purpose of comparison, another model was constructed as well that contained the fifth variable – the environment.

The analysis revealed that environment variables significantly affect the results of actions (technical efficiency results were generally improved). The results of the analysis also allowed benchmark counties and areas which need improvement to be identified. Additionally, the obtained results may constitute the grounds for selecting these factors the change of which may contribute to the improvement of efficiency more noticeably than in the case of other variables.

What is important for the study is the fact that the super-efficiency DEA model was used. It is so because standard DEA provides the classification of DMUs into two groups – efficient and inefficient. Unfortunately only the inefficient ones can be ranked. The model does not allow for ranking efficient DMUs on the efficiency frontier (Bogetoft, and Hougaard 2004: 14–21). At the same time it has a desirable feature of differentiating some of the efficient DMUs that have identical efficiency scores equal to one (100%) in the standard DEA model (Xue, and Harket 2002: 705–710). One

of the methods is a super-efficiency DEA model which makes it possible to differentiate between the efficient DMUs. The basic idea of this approach is to exclude the efficient DMUs from the comparison set, so it cannot be compared against, thus it can obtain a score better or worse than one in the super-efficiency evaluation (Akbarian 2013).

It must be pointed out that DEA is not a flawless method. For example, this method is good at estimating relative efficiency but it means difficulties when DMU is to be compared with a theoretical maximum. Another of its drawbacks is high sensitivity to changes in the group of the analysed units (Berg 2010) – a different set of variables, significantly contrasting values or addition/removal of one of the units may cause serious changes in the results of efficiency of individual units, as well as of the entire group under examination. Nevertheless, this method is recommended to be applied in public sector entities because of its flexibility in selecting variables for the model. It is, however, important to ensure that this selection is thorough and justified in terms of the subject matter and statistics. Several technical efficiency models may also be constructed to study various areas of operations of decision-making units and align the results for the purpose of comparison.

TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF PES'S – THE CASE STUDY OF TWO POLISH REGIONS

PES governance structures vary significantly between the Member States. In Poland PES's include 338 county and 16 voivodship labour offices, the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy and 16 voivodship offices, performing the tasks specified by the law. The entities which are responsible for the implementation of labour market policy are mainly county labour offices. They are decentralised and they are managed on the level of local authorities. These units fulfil all four functions mentioned above but the increasing pressure is put on the third function by the realisation of active labour market instruments – both supply and demand oriented.

The efficiency of PES's in Poland is assessed regularly by the evaluation of two indicators – employment efficiency and cost efficiency. However, these measures do not reflect the assumptions of efficiency relating to inputs and outputs.

The first indicator – employment efficiency (the reemployment rate) is the ratio of the number of the unemployed who, after completing or interrupting participation in a specific form of activation, in a period of

3 months were employed for at least 30 days, to the number of persons who completed participation in a given form of activation (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy 2016: 6). Therefore, this indicator can be considered as a measure of effectiveness and not efficiency.

Whereas, the other indicator – cost efficiency (the cost of re-employment) is the share of the amount of expenditure incurred on a given form of activation to the number of the unemployed who, after completing their participation in a given form of activation, obtained employment for up to three months (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy 2016: 6). This indicator concentrates on the inputs without comparison of outputs.

Moreover, current measures of efficiency of regional PES's in Poland do not take into account the diversification of counties in terms of their employment potential (Kobylińska et al. 2016).

Therefore, the authors used the DEA method to create a model of assessment of the efficiency of regional PES's by extracting substantively and statistically significant input and output data as well as the environmental variable – Figure 2. In the research the BCC model was used.

As the input in the PES's is rather difficult to control (they follow the legal regulations and the algorithm of PES financing included in the Act on the promotion of employment and labour market institutions of 20 April 2004 »with later amendment«), the output-oriented model seemed to be more appropriate for this study. The hierarchy used in the ranking of selected DMUs was provided by the application of the super-efficiency extension.


Data for the analysis were collected from the resources of the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy as well as voivodship labour offices in Bialystok and Warsaw. The time period of the analysis was determined by the availability of the data.

The analysis of the Pearson correlation coefficient between variables allowed for the selection of variables with strongly linear dependence. We selected two input variables – expenditures on active forms of professional activation (I_1) and the number of employees in key positions in the county labour office (I_2), one output variable – outflow from unemployment due to starting work (O). Moreover, the uncontrolled input was extracted – the annual number of vacancies and places of professional activation (UI).

The analysis was carried out for 14 DMUs of Podlaskie province and 39 DMUs of Mazowieckie province.

Tables 1 and 2 present values of basic statistical indicators – the average, standard deviation, the coefficient of variation and the Pearson correlation coefficient for selected variables.

Figure 2



Source: own study.

Table 1

**The basic statistics of variables included in the model of technical efficiency
– Podlaskie province**

Variable	Average	Standard deviation	Coefficient of variation	Pearson correlation coefficient values
				O
I ₁	8,589.14	6,033.18	70%	0.97
I ₂	20.86	20.98	101%	0.96
UI	1,987.43	1,547.68	78%	0.97
O	2,630.29	3,040.53	116%	1.00

Source: own study.

The variables selected for the model listed in Podlaskie voivodship in 2014 were characterised by a high level of volatility. In addition, the input variables and the uncontrolled input variable correlate positively and statistically significantly with the output variable – Table 1.

As in the case of Podlaskie voivodship, the variables selected for Mazowieckie were characterised by a high level of volatility. The input variables and the uncontrolled input variable correlate positively and statistically significantly with the output variable – Table 2.

Table 2

The basic statistics of variables included in the model of technical efficiency
– Mazowieckie province

Variable	Average	Standard deviation	Coefficient of variation	Pearson correlation coefficient values
				O
I ₁	10,692.69	7,689.71	72%	0.88
I ₂	24.74	25.79	104%	0.86
UI	3,356.28	7,130.48	212%	0.90
O	3767.77	4,674.10	124%	1.00

Source: own study.

In the first step, technical efficiency for both voivodships was calculated taking into account two controlled input variables I₁ and I₂ and the output variable O. Next, the relationship between the obtained TE scores and the influence of the environment represented by the variable UI (the annual number of vacancies and places of professional activation) was assessed using the Pearson correlation coefficient. The correlation occurred to be positive (0.46 for Podlaskie province and 0.28 for Mazowieckie province). Therefore, it was statistically justified to include the variable expressing the impact of external conditions on the efficiency scores.

Tables 3 and 4 present the result of the analysis carried out using the Frontier Analyst Application software. It is organised in descending order, so the best performers in terms of technical efficiency are ranked at the top.

Efficiency scores obtained from the BCC-DEA model for Podlaskie province show that among the fourteen studied PES's, six units turn out to be the best practices. Siemiatycki county reached the rank of technically efficient when the uncontrolled variable was included. The remaining eight PES's exhibit varying degrees of inefficiencies. The inclusion of the environmental variable (UI) improved the scores of technical efficiency. The distributions of results for both models (without inclusion of UI and with UI variable) are presented in Figure 3. It can be observed that the groups with lower scores contain a smaller number of units in the second model (with UI), while the groups with higher scores (more than 90%) comprise more units if UI is included.

Table 3

Ranking of PES technical efficiency in Podlaskie province in 2014

DMU	TE (without UI)	TE (with UI)	Super-efficiency (with UI)
Hajnowski	100.00%	100.00%	1,000.00%
Moniecki	100.00%	100.00%	1,000.00%
Sejneński	100.00%	100.00%	1,000.00%
Siemiatycki	64.80%	100.00%	1,000.00%
Białostocki with c. Białystok	100.00%	100.00%	328.10%
Suwalski with c. Suwałki	100.00%	100.00%	165.60%
Bielski	81.70%	93.40%	93.40%
Zambrowski	88.20%	88.20%	88.20%
Kolneński	53.40%	86.70%	86.70%
Augustowski	86.00%	86.00%	86.00%
Wysokomazowiecki	75.00%	76.20%	76.20%
Łomżyński with c. Łomża	68.70%	68.70%	68.70%
Grajewski	68.60%	68.60%	68.60%
Sokólski	54.30%	54.30%	54.30%


Source: own study based on *Frontier Analyst Application* software calculation.

The mean technical efficiency score with the uncontrolled variable amounting to 87.3% indicates good resource management by Podlaskie PES's. However, the result implies that these entities still have 12.7% of room to improve their operating efficiency on average.

The level of technical super-efficiency scores shows that the most distinguished PES's, which can be treated as benchmarks in Podlaskie voivodship, are Hajnowski, Moniecki, Sejneński, Siemiatycki counties. Białostocki county (with the capital city included) and Suwalski county (with Suwałki included) represent lower super-efficiency scores.

Figure 3

The distribution of technical efficiency scores for Podlaskie province



Source: own study.

Table 4

Ranking of PES technical efficiency in Mazowieckie province in 2014

DMU	TE (without UI)	TE (with UI)	Super-efficiency (with UI)
Grodziski	100.00%	100.00%	1,000.00%
Powiat Warsaw	100.00%	100.00%	230.10%
Radomski with c. Radom	58.80%	100.00%	220.30%
Ciechanowski	95.40%	100.00%	111.20%
Wołomiński	77.50%	100.00%	111.20%
Legionowski	74.80%	91.10%	91.10%
Żyrardowski	90.50%	90.70%	90.70%
Powiat Płock	69.40%	86.00%	86.00%
Nowodworski	84.30%	85.90%	85.90%
Ostrołęcki with c. Ostrołęka	62.80%	85.00%	85.00%
Garwoliński	68.90%	84.20%	84.20%
Siedlecki with c. Siedlce	62.00%	83.40%	83.40%


DMU	TE (without UI)	TE (with UI)	Super-efficiency (with UI)
Pruszkowski	81.40%	81.40%	81.40%
Mławski	56.60%	80.40%	80.40%
Miński	66.70%	79.30%	79.30%
Płocki	56.20%	79.00%	79.00%
Płoński	75.60%	78.50%	78.50%
Sokołowski	77.70%	77.70%	77.70%
Gostyniński	71.80%	76.90%	76.90%
Sierpecki	74.20%	76.50%	76.50%
Piaseczyński	76.00%	76.00%	76.00%
Makowski	75.70%	75.70%	75.70%
Warszawski zachodni	65.80%	73.90%	73.90%
Wyszkowski	71.00%	73.10%	73.10%
Szydłowiecki	43.70%	71.90%	71.90%
Otwocki	69.10%	71.40%	71.40%
Przasnyski	60.40%	69.30%	69.30%
Sochaczewski	65.30%	68.90%	68.90%
Kozienicki	62.70%	68.10%	68.10%
Przysuski	51.60%	65.40%	65.40%
Zwoleński	63.20%	65.40%	65.40%
Węgrowski	56.50%	64.40%	64.40%
Białobrzegi	63.20%	63.20%	63.20%
Grójecki	59.10%	59.80%	59.80%
Żuromiński	57.40%	59.20%	59.20%
Ostrowski	53.40%	56.50%	56.50%
Pułtowski	51.20%	53.20%	53.20%
Lipski	36.80%	48.70%	48.70%
Łosicki	39.30%	40.10%	40.10%

Source: own study based on *Frontier Analyst Application* software calculation.

Efficiency scores obtained from the BCC-DEA model for Mazowieckie province show that among all studied PES's, five units turn out to be the best practices. Three of them (Radomski with Radom included, Ciechanowski, Wołomiński) reached the rank of technically efficient when the uncontrolled variable was included. The remaining thirty four PES's exhibit varying degrees of inefficiencies. Figure 4 presents the graphical comparison of the TE score distribution for both models – with and without the uncontrolled variable. The improvement of scores is noticeable in the shift of results towards higher scores. In the group of the best performers (TE = 100%) the number of participants increased more than twice (from 2 to 5) when the uncontrolled variable was included in the model.

Figure 4

The distribution of technical efficiency scores for Mazowieckie province



Source: own study.

The mean technical efficiency score with the uncontrolled variable amounting to 75.9% indicates worse than intuitively expected resource management by Mazowieckie PES's. The result implies that these entities still have as much as 24.1% of room to improve their operating efficiency on average. At the same time, it is noticeable that in many counties in Mazowieckie voivodship the introduction of the environmental variable affected the results.

The level of technical super-efficiency score shows that in Mazowieckie voivodship only Grodziski county represents the group of the most

distinguished PES's and can be treated as a benchmark. The *poviat* of Warsaw (the capital of Poland), Radomski with Radom included, Ciechanowski and Wołomiński counties represent lower super-efficiency scores.

CONCLUSION

Improving efficiency and eliminating expenditure on ineffective services is a key objective for PES's. Therefore, it is important to develop appropriate methods for assessing the efficiency of these entities. Such a method should take into account PES's resources, the results of their activity, as well as the impact of environmental factors.

The conducted analysis shows that the use of the DEA method is justified when testing the PES efficiency, and the results obtained by this method should better reflect the actual use of inputs in relation to the produced effects. What is more, it would be also valuable to create benchmarking based on DEA (a ranking comparison of *poviats* with similar features) instead of comparing very diverse *poviats* across the whole country or even the voivodship.

The DEA method is a way to measure efficiency of PES's, including inputs and outputs and also the environmental variable. In the paper, one of the models of technical efficiency evaluation was presented but a number of alternative input and output measures are possible under the DEA framework, which mitigates or modifies the specific findings of this study.

The conducted study proves the importance of taking into account environmental variables in assessing the efficiency of PES's (which improved the efficiency of the analysed units). Moreover, in some counties, both in Podlaskie as well as in Mazowieckie province, the inclusion of the environmental variable ensured full technical efficiency as in these regions the potential of labour demand strongly determines the activity of PES's.

PES's in Podlaskie voivodship are relatively better at managing their resources than in Mazowieckie voivodship – the mean technical efficiency score in Podlaskie amounted to 87.3% as compared to 75.9% in Mazowieckie.

The obtained results show a clear necessity to continue research in the field of technical efficiency and to deepen the studies aimed at determining the reasons for the diversity in the level of effectiveness observed in PES's located in the analysed counties.

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THE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES

Summary

The authors propose a method of assessment of efficiency of regional PES's by selecting statistically significant inputs and outputs as well as the environmental variable. In the final DEA model variables which show the

positive correlation and statistically significant relationships between input variables and outputs (effects) were selected. Among the environmental variables the one with the strongest relationships with output variables was chosen. For the purposes of the resource management assessment of PES's an analysis of technical relative efficiency of two Polish provinces was conducted using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. These provinces represent a different labour market situation as Podlaskie is one of the peripheral regions and Mazowieckie voivodeship has the best economic indicators in Poland. The analysis has shown that the environmental variable has a significant impact on PES performance (overall improvement in technical efficiency results). The results of the analysis also enabled the identification of benchmark PES's, the identification of areas requiring improvement and the selection of changes that will contribute to improving efficiency more prominently than for other variables.

Key words: DEA; technical efficiency; public employment services; labour market policy

OCENA EFEKTYWNOŚCI TECHNICZNEJ W PUBLICZNYCH SŁUŻBACH ZATRUDNIENIA

Streszczenie

Autorki proponują metodę oceny efektywności lokalnych PSZ poprzez wyodrębnienie danych wejściowych i wyjściowych oraz zmiennej środowiskowej. W modelu z wykorzystaniem metody DEA, zostały wybrane zmienne wykazujące pozytywną korelację i statystycznie istotną zależność pomiędzy nakładami i efektami. Spośród zmiennych środowiskowych została wybrana ta, która wykazuje najwyższą zależność wobec danych wyjściowych. W celu oceny gospodarowania zasobami przez PSZ została wyznaczona ich efektywność techniczna przy użyciu metody DEA. Do analizy zostały wybrane powiaty z dwóch polskich województw, które odznaczają się odmienną sytuacją na rynku pracy – Podlaskie stanowi region peryferyjny, zaś Mazowieckie osiąga najlepsze poziomy mierników ekonomicznych w Polsce. Analiza wykazała, iż zmienne środowiskowe mają istotny wpływ na efekty działania (uzyskano ogólną poprawę wyników efektywności technicznej). Rezultaty analizy pozwoliły również na identyfikację powiatów wzorcowych (benchmarków), wyodrębnienie obszarów wymagających poprawy oraz

wytypowanie tych, których zmiana przyczyni się do polepszenia efektywności w sposób bardziej wydajny, niż w przypadku pozostałych zmiennych.

Słowa kluczowe: DEA, efektywność techniczna, Publiczne Służby Zatrudnienia, polityka rynku pracy

ОЦЕНКА ТЕХНИЧЕСКОЙ ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ В ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ СЛУЖБАХ ЗАНЯТОСТИ

Резюме

Авторы предлагают метод оценки эффективности локальных PSZ путем извлечения входных и выходных данных и переменной окружающей среды. В модели, использующей метод DEA [метод охвата данных], были выбраны переменные, которые показали положительную корреляцию и статистически значимую взаимосвязь между выходными данными и конечными результатами. Среди переменных среды выбрана та, которая выявляет самую высокую зависимость от выходных данных. Чтобы оценить управление ресурсами PES, их техническая эффективность была определена с использованием метода DEA. Для анализа были выбраны повяты из двух польских воеводств, для которых характерна особая ситуация на рынке труда – это Подляское воеводство, которое представляет собой периферийный регион, и Мазовецкое, которое достигло лучших уровней экономических показателей в Польше. Анализ показал, что переменные среды оказывают существенное влияние на результаты деятельности (было достигнуто общее улучшение показателей технической эффективности). Результаты анализа позволили также идентифицировать образцовые повяты (контрольные показатели), выделить регионы, нуждающиеся в улучшении ситуации, и выбрать те, изменение которых будет способствовать повышению эффективности более эффективным образом, чем в случае других переменных.

Ключевые слова: DEA [метод охвата данных], техническая эффективность, Государственные службы занятости, политика занятости на рынке труда

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FRANCE, RUSSIA, USA: ON HEGEMONY, REVOLUTIONS AND WARS

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1. REVOLUTIONS AND WARS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS

It is widely accepted that revolutions, i.e. sudden and violent regime changes occurring beyond the established legal framework and supported by a significant portion of the society can increase the likelihood of becoming involved in an interstate conflict¹. Two critical bodies of research on post-revolutionary conflicts are Maoz's *Domestic Sources of Global Change* (1996: 71–124) and Stephen M. Walt's *Revolution and War* (1996: 18–46). Both authors observe an increased likelihood of an interstate conflict following a revolution². They also describe the struggle between established status-quo powers and new revolutionary regimes which seek to disturb the 'balance of threat' (Walt 1996: 19) in their vicinity. Current research, however, does not examine the relationship between a revolution and instigating a war versus becoming a target.

The main research question is, thus, why do some revolutions lead to becoming a target of military operations and others to their initiation? One hypothesis states that a previously lost war increases the chance of instigating a post-revolutionary rematch. Whereas the democratic or liberal peace

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¹ The period of the increased probability is variously defined but this article will assume that it is about 20 years following the revolution (i.e. the time of political activity of the first generation of revolutionary leaders).

² This is also a prediction made by S. Huntington (1982).

proposition (Danilovic, and Clare: 2007) would suggest that revolutions which embrace more liberal political concepts create less belligerent states. Nevertheless, I theorise that neither a possible return to an old conflict nor the ideology by itself are the decisive factors. Assuming a slightly more neorealist position, I claim that the type of war that follows a revolution is contingent on the regional balance of power and ideology plays a certain role only in the context of that balance. Irrespective of the time, place and ideology, revolutions of weaker states (peripheral revolutions) tend to lead to targeting whereas hegemonic revolutions (i.e. revolutions within states which possess greater military potential than any single one of their neighbours) to aggressive wars of revolutionary spreading. Moreover, most post-revolutionary wars exceed in their magnitude the conflicts that immediately preceded them. Relatively powerful revolutionary states such as France after 1789, Russia after 1919 and Germany after 1933 instigated conflicts in order to spread their ideology and completely remodel the international system. The objective of these conflicts was to establish a vast sphere of influence that would provide the revolutionary state with a guarantee that both domestically and internationally no actors would seek to challenge their claim to power. Conversely, revolutions in smaller states tend to make them targets. The stronger neighbours or the former colonial masters of revolutionary states frequently view such a dramatic political change as a threat to their own legitimacy and foreign policies. The USA, for instance, in the dawn of its history was a weaker state targeted by the British Empire both in the revolutionary period (1775–1783) and then again in 1812. However, by the mid-twentieth century the USA became a status quo power and as such found itself in a position to target smaller revolutionary states, e.g. Cuba.

An additional impact of a revolutionary change is that a wrenching political transition effectively erases previous diplomatic agreements. This creates an opportunity for a hegemonic state to subjugate or incorporate a post-revolutionary state under the pretext of restoring order. It is also worth noting that revolutionary states become increasingly risk acceptant thanks to a new ideological bend that enables the leadership to view itself as the *avant-garde* of new local and global movements. Therefore, the leadership, especially that of a local hegemon, starts viewing its international environment according to the ‘us or them’ logic and views even very risky and expansionistic endeavours as crucial for its survival.

This prediction also draws on power transition theory (Kim, and Morrow 1992). Power-shift theories typically claim that one of the main factors leading to a dyadic war is the dissatisfaction with the regional or global status quo. It

would also seem that in many cases revolutions increase this dissatisfaction. The political messages of restoring lost prestige and power have been applied by numerous revolutionary movements to mobilise a dissatisfied population. This corresponds with Tilly's (1975: 439) concept of a revolution as a victory of one of the competing visions of the state, its economic system, and political structure. Furthermore, Lipset's (1959) observation that every polity requires a robust ideological legitimisation suggests that revolutionary states which succeed in establishing their new vision of society and remain major players in the interstate system create something that can be defined as an ideological spillover.

This phenomenon occurs mainly because revolutions are political developments that often cause the states to undergo substantive changes at the domestic level and toss aside political and social institutions that were previously commonplace in the international environment. In other words, post-revolutionary states need to prove that they were right in decisively breaking the established norms of the pre-revolutionary polity and the neighbouring states. To achieve this end, revolutionary powers possessing a sizable coercive capacity assert themselves by changing their own politics, the politics in their region and – ideally – the whole globe.

Weaker revolutionary governments also have high revolutionary ambitions in the long run but more often than not they find themselves on the defensive. I, however, assume that irrespective of the actual intensions of weaker revolutionary states, the dominant regional powers will assume that they are a potential source of contagion that threatens their interests. Moreover, a revolution can result in creating a hostile neighbour that the existing powers would have to deal with. This is one of the reasons why the Hungarian uprising of 1848 was quenched by the Russian empire (Evans 2000: 181), even though Russia at the time had no direct territorial interests in Habsburgian Hungary and clearly acted as a *gendarme* of the whole Europe. More recently this reasoning provides some explanation for Iran's support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the Teheran's general reluctance to embrace any Sunni led revolution in its vicinity. Similarly, the rise of the Kurdish Autonomy and the activities of Kurdish People's Party in northern Iraq led to Turkey's incursion into the territory of Iraq in 2008 (Tavernise, and Asru 2008). The event intimated that following a revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan and winning full autonomy for the region a larger Turkish invasion can be expected.

2. CASE STUDIES

2.1. Selection and Discussion of Cases

In order to further corroborate the hypothesis this article examines three case studies from different time periods and different parts of the world. The first deals with the French Revolution of 1789 as a trigger for numerous post-revolutionary wars. The French Revolution is an archetypical hegemonic revolution (a revolution within a major regional power) in which one of the preeminent continental powers undergoes a revolution and immediately starts waging wars to spread the new ideology and institutions. Of course, the historical description of the events of the French revolution is well-known, however, the aim of the case study is to examine their conformity with the general theories from the field of modern political science. The other two case studies come from the more recent period and provide analyses of military targeting of smaller revolutionary states following a clearly peripheral revolution. The second case study will deal with Russian military interventions in the Caucasus and the war in Eastern Ukraine, all from the period of 1990–2015. The Cuban revolution of 1959 and the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) will constitute the third case study.

All research of revolutions encounter similar methodological problems. There are few reliable databases that examine such events. Moreover hegemonic revolutions (of major regional powers, defined as states capable of military overcoming each of their neighbours) are so rare that they can be only examined on a case-study basis. Nevertheless, with the help of the database compiled by Jeff Colgan (2012), with a colleague of mine I am currently in the process of creating a research design that will use quantitative methods in a study of a larger number of relatively minor revolutionary events. At this point I am, however, inclined to present a comparative study of three selected cases, including, one typical hegemonic revolution and two analyses of peripheral revolutions.

In my comparative work I rely on Mill's method of agreement (1843: 455). The presented case studies come from different periods and different parts of the world, all of them however display certain similar a pattern. Moreover, to avoid being accused of an ideological bias I present cases that pertain to revolutionary changes with some very different ideological goals, and status quo powers with some very different political and cultural inclinations (the USA and Russia). It is also worth mentioning that the USA and Russia in their history were both revolutionary powers and status quo

powers at different periods. Russia, however, unlike the USA, has never been considered a weaker revolutionary state. Its status in 1917 was, however, more ambiguous than France's in 1789. To put it briefly, in a very short period between 1917–1919 Soviet Russia went from being a target to being a revolutionary hegemon.

2.2. France and Europe the Archetype of a Hegemonic Revolution

Revolutionary France while motivated by the lofty, progressive goals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, ended as a failed imperial project. At the outbreak of the French revolutionary wars, France had a good chance of victory, as well as an opportunity to emerge as a hegemonic force in Europe. This is so because at that time France was Europe's most populous nation and had access to raw materials which could be applied to outfitting a sizable military force. Moreover, France possessed a long history of military innovation and experience in training and equipping well-disciplined infantrymen (Bell 2008: 29–42). In short, it not only had a very modern army, but it was also one the first European states to devise one. As John Childs puts it, 'after 1648 France was the dominant political, military and cultural force in Europe' (2005: 20–30).

Prior to the revolutionary unrest at home, French elites were supporting revolutionary movements in the Americas, the Netherlands, and Hungary (Doyle 1989: 159). These choices were not an intentional attempt at sabotaging the existing monarchist status quo. They were viewed as a rather opportunistic foreign policy decisions intended to undermine the competing powers of the United Kingdom and Austria. While a great revolt had been anticipated in Europe as early as the 1680s, the multi-ethnic and ill-governed Austria was considered the most likely candidate. Tocqueville's (2008: 173) insight stating that revolutions follow rapid technological and economic development rather than periods of economic malaise was still a foreign concept.

Despite the social and political unrest in Europe prior to the French Revolution of 1789, the suddenness and violence of the revolt was a shock for all the neighbouring states. The publication of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution of France* (Burke 1987) soon turned public sentiment in Europe against the French Revolution. The work argued that the revolutionary movement would inevitably collapse due to its inherently weak and abstract ideological foundations centred on pure rationality. Burke claimed that the revolutionary concepts simply ignored the wider complexities of human nature. By 1791 this point of view had become widespread throughout the

continent. Rulers from Scandinavia and Russia to Italy started to actively censor reports on the latest developments in France, mobilise their armies, and spread anti-revolutionary propaganda. The whole of Europe feared what would happen when the leading military power of the continent turns its back on the current international and political norms.

Rather than assuaging old grievances the French Revolution exacerbated the perceived threat posed by Austria and the potential threat that it could pose to France. These fears encouraged the National Assembly to attempt to drag Louis XVI into a pre-emptive conflict and attack Austria before it could fully mobilise for war. Despite the history of Austro-French antagonism throughout the eighteenth century this rivalry became coloured with a new ideological tinge. In 1791 the National Assembly instructed Louis XVI to contact the electors of Trier and Mainz and deliver a novel ultimatum. Louis XVI was told to:

Say to them...that if German princes continue to favour preparations directed against the French. We shall carry to them, not fire and the sword, but freedom. It is for them to estimate what would follow from the awakening of nations (Doyle 1989: 177).

In addition to a newly found desire to export France's revolutionary ideology, the National Assembly realised that the neighbouring states were hesitant to engage in a full-scale war with France. Despite the turmoil of the revolt, France remained a formidable military power, hence, the National Assembly's decision, and ability, to declare war against Austria and its allies on 20 April 1792 (Bell 2008: 123). Following victories over the Prussian and Austrian armies, the National Assembly reiterated its new foreign policy goal of continuing the French Revolution abroad stating that it would 'grant fraternity and aid to all peoples, who wish to recover their liberty' (Bell 2008: 123). This declaration is, indeed, a declaration of war against non-revolutionary Europe for the sake of expanding the 'revolutionary cause'. Of course the military results of this endeavour were initially mixed, in July 1792 Prussia was, for instance, able to march into Champagne. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that being confident in its own strength revolutionary France willingly started the war period on its own in April 1792 by attacking Austria. The attack could be seen a pre-emptive strike following Austria's mobilisation of troops but was an attack nevertheless. Moreover, one buttressed by an extremely expansionistic ideology.

In order to raise the sizable army required for tackling the new challenges, the French government released what Townsend refers to as a 'volcanic natural

force of patriotic citizenship' (2005: 6). Rather than conscripting feudal tenants revolutionary France was able to enlist free men, who were fighting to prevent returning to the state of subjugation, and who sought to liberate neighbouring nations from the same form of feudal subjugation. By doing so Revolutionary France became a more formidable foe than its predecessor. This increased ability to mobilise force conforms with Goldstone's (1982: 187–207) expectation that revolutionary states are frequently more capable of altering the political status quo than their predecessors.

Even though later Napoleon named himself Emperor, his empire was a new political entity which had little to do with the status quo monarchies of Europe which continued to rely on feudal hierarchy and patrimonialism. The desire to fight for the 'cause' and alter the international system in a way favouring the new revolutionary hegemon was something Napoleon clearly pursued. 'I must make all the peoples of Europe one people and Paris the capital of the world', declared the emperor (Bell 2008: 243).

Even after Waterloo and Versailles the old states of Europe never really managed to contain the forces that the revolution had put into motion. Of course, they tried to return to business as usual, reduce the size of the armies and again maintain the upper-class-only officer corps. For some time, between 1815 and 1848 such policy worked, but the Jinn was already out of the bottle. The modern army and modern nation-state formation was well on its way (French 2005: 55–94). One might thus conclude that although France ultimately lost; the revolution won, and it did so largely thanks to being fed with the prodigious military and economic potential of the *Ancien Régime*.

Before Napoleon's ultimate defeat, like any major power which has undergone a hegemonic revolutionary change, France had become increasingly risk acceptant and expansionistic. It strove to create a favourable international environment for the new state and turn popular sentiments away from a possible counter-revolution (Druckman 2008, Russet 1990, Kim, and Morrow 2008). Daniel Bell (2008: 186–223) rightly observed that Napoleon took huge risks on a nearly daily basis. The non-revolutionary state system was initially wary of challenging France, but once the revolution began to forcibly expand from the historic boundaries of France the non-revolutionary regimes started to act to contain and defeat both the French state and its new ideology. Today the wars following the French revolution remain one of the most well document cases of a hegemonic revolution and ensuing expansionistic conflicts.

2.3. Russia, the Caucasus and Ukraine

Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and some of its former European satellite-states (East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) proceeded down divergent developmental paths. Russia did not build closer ties with the West and never experienced a complete democratisation. The former leaders of the Soviet Union were succeeded by their younger protégés, many of whom were tied to the special services of the former regime. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, many former Soviet satellites embarked on a path leading towards democratisation and closer ties with the West. The Russian Federation was not able to forcefully prevent the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc due to its internal instability. There is, however, substantial evidence that hardliners were making such attempts, their faction, however, lost following the unsuccessful Janaev putsch (Andrusiewicz 2016: 302–328).

Nevertheless, after the loss of most of the Eastern European states and the collapse of the Soviet system, Moscow became determined to maintain some form of political influence in Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. It therefore started acting as a typical status quo power in relation to the states from those regions.

In *Competitive Authoritarianism* Levitsky and Way (2010) propose a model explaining why certain post-Soviet states democratised and others either failed to do so, or experienced a volatile and uncertain transition. In addition to variables such as: the power of the government, the structure of the government's resources, the organisational power of the opposition; the researchers focus on Western linkage and leverage as key variables. According to their analysis when strong levels of linkage and leverage with the West are present they create an effect so strong that it can overcome domestic factors. They note that 'In states with extensive ties to the West, post-Cold war international influences were so intense that they contributed to democratisation even where domestic traditions were unfavourable' (Levitsky, and Way 2010: 38). Linkage is operationalised as four distinct forms including: economic linkage, intergovernmental linkage, technocratic linkage and social linkage. Leverage is essentially a measure of the strength of the linkage when utilised by the West to exert pressure for democratic change.

In addition to explaining why certain states have been more likely to democratise, Levitsky and Way also suggest that powerful states or coalitions have an interest in encouraging smaller states to adopt a friendly ideology and suppress unwarranted revolutionary movements. As for the move opposite

to the democratisation efforts, Levitsky and Way describe it using the term: 'black knight effect'. The description of this effect implies that some states support and promote authoritarian systems in neighbouring states and as a result try to counter the democratising peripheral revolutions (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990: 96–111).

Russia is a typical 'black knight' for the former-Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The idea of 'near abroad', encompassing these regions, is a concept deeply embedded in the Russian thought and foreign policy. In the past, when high levels of Western linkage and leverage and its democratising effects on Eastern Europe proved too strong for Russia to counteract, it effectively gave up on some of its foreign policy interests. However, in the Caucasus and Ukraine where ties to the West were relatively weak, Russia actively asserted its interests in an attempt to undermine all revolutionary and separatist attempts. Although, one needs to note a slightly different nature of the Chechen conflict, since Chechnya was, according to all accounts, less inclined to follow the Western-liberal model and more willing to create an Islamic or semi-Islamic republic. Nevertheless, with some important caveats, the Chechen wars can also be classified as a conflict that followed a peripheral revolution.

In the early 1990's Chechnya was a semi-autonomous republic of the Russian Federation. As Kristin M. Bakke notes:

the immediate backdrop to the first Chechen war in 1994 was the Chechen Revolution of 1990–91, which brought the nationalists to power. Initially, the nationalist movement... sought to revive Chechen culture and traditions, but its demands quickly came to encompass political sovereignty (2011: 534).

After the collapse of negotiations in December 1994, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, opted for a military solution to the diplomatic stalemate. Following two succeeding years of conflict, Russian troops withdrew and Chechnya gained *de facto* independence. The First Chechen War broke out when a powerful secessionist movement gained prominence. The movement supported drastic changes in the government and Chechen society with respect to cultural and religious self-identification. What followed these drastic changes, and the efforts to destroy the regional status quo, is a clear case of a major power opting to intervene in a weaker state in order to suppress a potentially contagious revolutionary ideology and re-establish the status quo.

The *casus belli* for the second war between Russia and Chechnya arrived after Aslan Maskhadov defeated a pro-Russian politician in the presidential

race in 1997. Soon it became clear that Maskhadov was unable to demilitarise the Islamist militias that were active in the region. As these groups began to carry out attacks in neighbouring Dagestan (Schaefer 2011: 47–49) effectively trying to spread the idea of an independent Caucasian Emirate, Russia again intervened militarily in 1999 hoping to destroy the movement (Ware 2005: 79–117). This conflict reached its conclusion in 2004 when the authoritarian pro-Russian government was established.

The events that led to a war with Georgia are an even a clearer case of a major non-revolutionary power opting to suppress revolutionary changes in a small neighbouring state. Georgia had often fallen under either Russia's direct rule or existed in its sphere of influence. Given Russia's historical role in the region it comes as little surprise that Georgian independence followed by clear attempts to align with the West was viewed by Moscow as an unwelcomed development.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Georgian leaders who favoured distancing themselves from Moscow had supported other separatist movements within the Russian Federation. Zviad Gamsakhurdi, the first democratically elected President of Georgia was the first head of state to recognise Chechnya as an independent state in 1991. Thomas de Waal goes as far as to call Gamsakhurdi's rise to power (and his attempt to disrupt the historical status quo found in the Caucasus) a 'revolution' (2010: 131).

Following the removal of Gamsakhurdi, Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet Minister of External Relations, emerged as the new President of Georgia. Needless to say, Shevardnadze was an advocate of a return to the pre-revolutionary status quo. As an additional precaution the Russian army also began to militarily support the independence of two break-away regions of Georgia: Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Initially this was of course denied by Boris Yeltsin and his successors. Nevertheless, information confirming disruptive activities consistently emerged in the reports of Western journalists (Almond and Stone 2011: 65–103).

Encouraging these separatist tendencies in the regions created a constant justification for war, which could break out if Georgia again chose to adopt policies that would challenge the status quo in the Caucasus. Following the ousting of Eduard Shevardnadze during the Rose Revolution of 2003, and the rise of pro-Western president Mikheil Saakashvili, Russian fears of losing control over Georgia increased. Russia's main concern was that a dramatic political shift in the Caucasus could later undermine Russian influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. In an attempt to halt Saakashvili's efforts Russia utilised its influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the

words of Ronald Asmus: ‘They [South Ossetia and Abkhazia] became the flash point that would spark this war’ (2010: 54).

Russia’s tactics in the Caucasus clearly underline its status as a major status-quo power within its nearest neighbourhood. The Kremlin seems to be determined to counter any radical power-shift that occurs close to its borders. The developments in Ukraine provides the latest example of this tactic. The ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004 did not incite an intervention only because it was unsuccessful and did not end in a radical political change (Willson 2007). In 2006 the leaders of the ‘revolution’ were forced to accept the post-soviet leader of the pro-Russian status-quo block – Victor Yanukovich as the prime minister. And in 2010 Yanukovich became the president effectively ending the ‘Orange revolution’ and marking its failure. The Russian Federation decided to intervene only when a new revolutionary outburst – the Maidan Revolution forcibly ousted Yanukovich. Following this Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and started to actively support counterrevolutionary movement in Eastern Ukraine (Foxall, and Cichowlas 2014). In spite of a number of incidents Russia up till now has not ventured to conduct an open, fully fledged invasion on Ukraine’s heartland. Nevertheless, at this point the two countries remain in a *de facto* state of war that clearly follows a revolution.

2.4. Cuba and the Bay of Pigs Invasion

In line with the democratic and liberal peace propositions the initial USA’s policy towards revolutionary Cuba was marked by conflict avoidance. The USA, for instance, imposed an embargo on weapon trade with the Batista government during the revolution of 1959 (Leonard 1999: 19) and after Castro’s victory Washington promptly recognised the new government. Still, the available sources (Kornbluh 1998: 5–43) make it clear that the USA fairly early on saw Fidel Castro as a grave danger to its interests in Southern and Central America and a potential source of revolutionary contagion. This article argues that eventually, in spite of the USA’s administration initial reluctance to enter into an armed conflict, the fears of revolutionary contagion proved too great to avoid attempting a military intervention. It would seem that the urge to quench a peripheral revolution can overcome even the democratic and liberal peacefulness.

Looking at the issue from Washington’s point of view Robert Snyder claims that the conflict was triggered by Fidel Castro’s attempts to ‘externalise’ (1999) internal tensions. Snyder’s position is that Castro provoked the conflict with the USA in spite of President Eisenhower’s administration attempts at

normalising the USA – Cuban relations and that he did so in order to be able to rally the revenant political forces around his leadership and fight the growing opposition. As Snyder puts it, even ‘before the U.S. responded to Cuba’s hostility, Castro had used American provocation to remove political rivals’ (Snyder 1999: 276). He also adds that the provoked onset of tension with the USA preceded Castro’s communist ‘coming out’ and his alliance with the Soviet block or any inkling of such an alignment. In short, according to Snyder, nothing intimated a possible conflict before May 1959 and the land reform that led to the confiscation of U.S. citizen’s property. This paper will, however, provide some criticism of Snyder’s approach. Moreover, a ‘provocation’ is a very subjective category. Be it as it may, the USA ultimately was the first one to engage in military actions, thus corroborating the general pattern of anti-revolutionary interventions.

Furthermore, what Snyder fails to acknowledge is that the USA’s intelligence and policy makers were extremely wary of Castro’s regime very early on and saw it as a clear threat to U.S. interests in Latin America. Already during Castro’s visit to the USA in April 1959 Vice President Nixon on meeting him wrote a 12 page confidential memorandum for the Department of State and the CIA. He clearly states in the document that the new leader of Cuba is ‘either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline’ (Johnson 1964: 25) and urged the CIA and the Department of State to act on this suspicions. Moreover, Peter Wyden in his books confirms that, although Castro did not immediately disclose his communist sympathies, it was clear that many of the communist-leaning anti-Batista fighters found their way into his government. On the basis of these facts as early as in December 1959 the CIA chief of Western hemisphere division, colonel J.C. King predicted a ‘real problem in Cuba’ (Wyden 1979: 19). Another famous CIA executive and the main planner of the Bay of Pigs Invasion Jacob Esterline later, during an interview, reflected on his early fears of revolutionary contagion that threatened the USA geopolitical interests using the following words: ‘It seemed to me that something like a chain reaction was occurring all over Latin America after Castro came to power. I saw – hell, anybody with eyes could see – that a new and powerful force was at work in the hemisphere. It had to be dealt with’ (Kornbluh 1998: 7).

We still do not have full access to Cuban archives that would confirm Castro’s policy plans. Indeed, however, we can assume the land reforms and signals of alignment with Moscow were the events that ultimately prompted president Eisenhower to authorise the CIA to ‘train and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to overthrow Castro’ (Johnson 1964: 28).

Members of Brigade 2506 were trained on Useppa Island and in government facilities in South Florida. The training of aircrews was carried out by the Air National Guard in Alabama (Fernandez 2001: 103–112). The CIA also recruited a group of American civilians to fly some of the B-26 bombers that the expeditionary forces were equipped with (Fineman, and Mascarenas 1998). The final briefing and the go order was given by President Kennedy on 12 April 1961 (Wyden 1979: 169), the invasion started on 17 April.

Although in accordance with President Kennedy's wishes there was no open-field involvement of the United States military forces, in the face of the later revealed documents, the Bay of Pigs invasion was clearly an act of a governmental military intervention. The USA not only equipped and financed the expedition but also sent its own citizens to combat. In fact, four American airmen were killed and two CIA operatives were later imprisoned and executed (Wyden 1979: 288–300). The operation failed mainly because the popular support Castro enjoyed precluded a mass insurrection or defection of army units (Schlesinger and Meir 2002: 264). Moreover, the Cuban army was prepared. The officers were well aware of the possibility of the invasion and the Soviet intelligence, in fact, seemed to have been able to provide Castro with the exact date of the landing almost a week before it took place (Loeb 2000). As Wyden notes, based on records of conversations that took place in the oval office, president Kennedy had many doubts concerning the outcome of the operation, he, however, chose not to cancel the operation since this would be tantamount to 'admission that Castro ruled with popular support' and 'it would guarantee that Castro would long be around to harass all of Latin America' (Wyden 1979: 308).

Stephen M. Walt describes the Bay of Pigs intervention as 'a brief, inclusive clash' (Walt 1996: 55) and points out that this conflict resulted from the unwinding of a spiral of fear. According to him, in general, in post-revolutionary conflicts, on the one hand, the dominant powers exaggerate the possible contagion and, on the other hand, revolutionary regimes exaggerate every hostile signal because of their insecurity and history of previous grievances. At the same time Walt downplays the actual scope and effects of contagion. This seems to be a partly erroneous account. History of revolutions suggests that although, not necessarily long-lived, indeed, they are all fairly contagious and costly from the point of view of regional power holders (Weyland 2009, 2012). Thus, in spite of the difficulties, the domestic public opinion costs and low chances of success, the temptation (Wyden 1979: 289–313) to try to suppress a peripheral revolution often proves too great to resist for hegemonic policy-makers, even those of established democracies such as the USA.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The major case studies as well as the preliminary analysis of the available data show some support for the hypothesis that peripheral revolutions usually lead to targeting by major regional status quo-powers. There are, however, certain rare cases when a regional power itself undergoes a revolution and as a result it strives to quickly expand its new ideology and institutions using the military and economic force it inherited from the previous regime. For the sake of brevity, this study examines one case study of a hegemonic revolution, the French revolution. However, both the Russian revolution (especially after 1919) and the rise of National Socialism in Germany can be classified as hegemonic revolutions. The conclusions suggest that all revolutions can potentially lead to major military conflicts, of course those followed by hegemonic revolutions are significantly greater in scope and magnitude.

Revolutions, especially those of the hegemonic type cannot be easily examined using quantitative methods. That is why this article proposes a comparative case-study-based approach. The article is a part of a larger research project that will also include qualitative research of peripheral revolutions. As far as the methodology is concerned, this study uses the word 'revolution' as an ideologically neutral term that pertains to any violent regime change occurring beyond the established legal framework and with a considerable support of the population. It does not assume a more ideologically loaded notion of a revolution that is typically used in structuralism, i.e. a revolution as class emancipation.

Regarding more practical political conclusions, the research suggests that political leaders of states that have recently undergone a revolutionary change are always in an extremely precarious international situation. Their risk acceptance, which is enhanced by a revolutionary success and strong ideological allegiance, can often lead them to making misguided decisions. Even those who inherit considerable military powers from the former states, like revolutionary France and later Napoleonic France, often venture to embark on military projects far beyond their real capacities. The states that have undergone a peripheral revolution, like the present-day Ukraine, Georgia or Cuba, are in an even greater danger. Even their victories, as the Cuban case shows, can lead to political isolation and underdevelopment in the long run. In conclusion, the political leadership of all revolutionary states needs to exercise extreme caution in its foreign policies. Moreover, the case studies suggest that while ideology plays a role and that role is contingent on

the regional balance of power. No revolutionary ideology creates a conflict on its own, it is the fact of adopting a different ideology than that of the local hegemon's that creates a tension.

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FRANCE, RUSSIA, USA: ON HEGEMONY, REVOLUTIONS AND WARS

Summary

The mainstream literature on revolutions points to the conclusion that following the onset of a revolution the probability that a given country will be involved in a military interstate dispute rises dramatically. However, there

are no clear conclusions regarding the probability of becoming an instigator or a target of a conflict. The article examines the types of military actions that the post-revolutionary state becomes involved in. The geopolitical and military factors, which shape a given state's influence within its immediate international surrounding, play a pivotal role. The hegemonic revolutions of regional powers are rare and lead to powerful conflicts during which the hegemon spreads the new ideology and institutions in the international surrounding. The peripheral revolutions of weaker states, on the other hand, typically lead to post-revolutionary military targeting by local hegemons that see any changes to the status quo as a threat to their influences and fear revolutionary contagion. All revolutions seem to make the leadership more risk-acceptant. The article is a part of a larger research project that will include a quantitative analysis of peripheral revolutions. However, at this point it examines three case studies: one hegemonic revolution (France after 1789) and two cases of peripheral revolutions and ensuing wars (the recent Russian activities in Ukraine and the Caucasus and the U.S. Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961). The research uses Mill's comparative method of agreement seeking to present cases from very different historical contexts, it also strives to avoid ideological bias when defining key terms and events. The general conclusions suggest that all revolutionary states are in an extremely precarious situation in spite of different, specific dangers that they may face.

Key words: revolutions, USA, France, Russia, wars, target, instigating

FRANCJA, ROSJA, USA: O HEGEMONII, REWOLUCJACH I WOJNACH

Streszczenie

Literatura dotycząca rewolucji sugeruje, że po rozpoczęciu rewolucji prawdopodobne jest, iż dany kraj będzie uczestniczył w wojskowym sporze międzypaństwowym. Nie ma jednak jasnych wniosków co do prawdopodobieństwa bycia inicjatorem lub celem agresji. W artykule omówiono rodzaje działań wojennych, w które zaangażowane może być państwo po rewolucji. Czynniki geopolityczne i wojskowe, kształtujące wpływ danego państwa, w jego bezpośrednim otoczeniu międzynarodowym, odgrywają kluczową rolę. Hegemoniczne rewolucje regionalnych potęg są rzadkie i prowadzą do silnych konfliktów, podczas których hegemon stara się rozprzestrzenić nową ideologię i instytucje. Peryferyjne rewolucje słabszych państw zazwyczaj pro-

wadzą do wojskowych interwencji pod wodzą lokalnych hegemonów, którzy postrzegają wszelkie zmiany status quo jako zagrożenie dla swoich wpływów i obawiają się rewolucyjnego zakażenia innych państw. Wszystkie rewolucje zdają się sprawiać, że polityczni przywódcy stają się bardziej otwarci na ryzykowne zachowania. Artykuł jest częścią większego projektu badawczego, który obejmie analizę ilościową rewolucji peryferyjnych. Ten tekst rozpatruje jednak tylko trzy studia przypadku: jedną rewolucję hegemoniczną (Francja po 1789 r.) oraz dwa przypadki interwencji po rewolucjach peryferyjnych (ostatnie rosyjskie działania na Ukrainie i na Kaukazie oraz amerykańską inwazję w Zatoce Świń w 1961 r.). Badania wykorzystują klasyczną millowską metodę porównawczą, tzw. metodę „różnicy”. Studia przypadku są bowiem dobrane tak, aby reprezentowały jak najbardziej odmienny kontekst historyczny. Opisując i definiując pojęcia autor stroni też od wszelkich ideologicznych konotacji. Badania opisane w artykule pokazują, że wszystkie rewolucyjne państwa znajdują się w podobnie niepewnej sytuacji, pomimo różnych konkretnych zagrożeń, jakie mogą napotkać.

Słowa kluczowe: Rewolucje, USA, Francja, Rosja, wojny, cel, agresja

Франция, Россия, США: о гегемонии, революциях и войнах

Резюме

В предметной литературе, касающейся революции, содержится тезис о том, что после начала революции в той или иной стране, повышается вероятность того, что данная страна будет участвовать в военном конфликте международного уровня. Нет, однако, четких выводов о том, будет ли эта страна инициатором или жертвой агрессии. В статье рассмотрены виды военных действий, в которых может участвовать государство после революции. Ключевую роль в этом вопросе играют геополитические и военные факторы, формирующие степень влияния данного государства в его непосредственном международном окружении. Гегемонические революции в региональных державах – редкое явление, которое может привести к серьезным конфликтам, в ходе которых гегемон стремится распространять новую идеологию и вводить новые институты. Периферийные революции в более слабых государствах обычно приводят к военным вмешательствам под руководством местной гегемонии, которые воспринимают любые изменения статус-кво как угрозу их влиянию и опасаются революционной «заразы» со стороны других стран.

В результате любых революций, по всей вероятности, политические лидеры становятся более открытыми и готовыми к рискованному поведению. Статья является частью более крупного исследовательского проекта, который будет охватывать количественный анализ периферийных революций. Данный текст посвящен только трем тематическим исследованиям: одна гегемонистская революция (Франция после 1789 года) и два случая вмешательства после периферийных революций (российские действия последних лет в Украине и на Кавказе и американское вторжение в Залив Свиней в 1961 году). В исследовании используется классический сравнительный метод Миλιана, так называемый *метод разностей*. Тематические исследования подобраны таким образом, чтобы они могли представлять в максимальной степени разнообразный исторический контекст. Описывая и характеризуя понятия, автор в то же время избегает любого рода идеологических коннотаций. Исследования, описанные в статье, показывают, что все революционные государства находятся в одинаково неопределенной ситуации, несмотря на различия в том, с какими конкретными угрозами они могут столкнуться.

Ключевые слова: революции, США, Франция, Россия, войны, цель, агрессия

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INTEGRATION THROUGH CONTROL:
THE MODEL OF POWER HIJACKING
AS AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
ON EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

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INTRODUCTION

European integration has created many difficulties for adherents of neo-realism. It is argued (Koukoudakis 2014) that neo-realism is incapable of fully explaining this phenomenon. As such, the EU seems to be vindicating various liberal and neo-liberal approaches to IR, with neo-structuralism as the most important one, capable of creating testable hypotheses that through observations seem to be confirming its main assumptions (Sandholtz, and Stone 2012). With the end of the Cold War neo-realists predicted that integration will collapse or at least come to a halt (Mearsheimer 1990), however this did not happen. Quite the contrary, integration intensified. As a result, the neo-functionalist approaches became dominant. However, neo-realists such as Kenneth N. Waltz (2000) remained sceptical. They consistently maintained that relative gains, control through institutions and complex interdependence are enough to account for integration. With Brexit, the immigration crisis and the euro-crisis as well as the rise of euro-scepticism (Pew Research Center 2016), neo-realists may appear to be making a comeback. It is so because traditional approaches explaining dynamics of integration, like

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a spill-over effect, appear not to account for these phenomena. By showing only positive dynamics of integration they obscure the fact that the process is not deterministic. Advantages offered by integration may be not enough to encourage cooperation, and in fact the spill-over effect may be partially responsible for anti-EU backlash, since increasing interdependency between states does not ease tensions and rivalry between them. On the contrary, it seems that those rivalries are intensified with greater interdependence, especially during the times of crisis – as predicted by neo-realists (Waltz 2000)¹. If integration is net positive, why would countries try to stall or reverse it? How to account for Brexit? Is there any rational explanation of such behaviours or are we forced to think about them in terms of sudden eruptions of ignorance and bad decision-making, in short: errors of judgement?

The paper will argue that such occurrences may stem from attempts at centralisation of decision making in the EU, which creates both incentives for integration as a tool of control over actors within the EU; and for disintegration – as a way of escaping this effect. In doing so the article will try to reconcile elements of neo-structuralist and neo-realist approaches to integration. Due to the fact that this topic is quite demanding, the paper will concentrate, however, only on one aspect of this problem: general state behaviour as a basic unit of the analysis in the process of integration understood mainly as centralisation of the political process. The paper does not discuss economic or social trade-offs of integration. Whatever advantages or disadvantages may be there is outside of the scope of this inquiry. However, the paper will also indirectly show why looking at integration only through lenses of economic gains (neo-structuralist approach) as well as relative gains (neo-realist approach) may be partially misleading, and that calculation whether to join the EU and stay is more a question of how states perceive their ability of winning in a political game of ‘integration hijacking’: imposing command over actors via EU institutions. Thus, integration as well as disintegration is a problem of control, not gains.

The main thesis is by no means an authoritative statement about the facts, quite on the contrary, it is a proposal of an alternative way of thinking about integration, a way that merely may be the beginning of more in-depth research. If anything, the paper should be first and foremost understood as

¹ ‘The impulse to protect one’s identity – cultural and political as well as economic – from encroachment by others is strong. When it seems that “we will sink or swim together”, swimming separately looks attractive to those able to do it’. Waltz, K.N. (2000) ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’. *International Security* 25 (1), 15

a methodological experiment, an attempt to break away from pre-existing methods of looking at the problem.

The reasoning presented in this article is concerned with the description of effects of political interaction as it is, not just intentions. The focus is on the end result rather than on initial motivations. The paper focuses on the outcomes of decisions, the consequences of constraints and real results of human action rather than declaratory statements and ideological motivations that although important, seem not to allow researchers to build framework fully capable of explaining the shaky nature of European integration. In that sense the author accepts to a certain degree the neo-realist perception of international relations. The presented thesis may help to bridge a gap between various perspectives and offer a partial explanation for observed phenomena.

INTEGRATION, CENTRALISATION AND THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The conventional wisdom based on the neo-functionalist theory of the spill-over effect says that economic gains dictate the logic of integration. Benefits of integration in one sphere show that other areas would work more efficiently if integrated too (Małuszyńska 2007). Additionally, integrating one sector of activity reveals that it can function better if those attached to it would be integrated too. Integration in the neo-functionalist approach is an independent, self-propelling occurrence resulting from increasing intra-border transactions, which then create a need for supranational organisations solving problems resulting from such contacts, which in turn creates a better environment for more intra-border transactions. Over time this leads to the creation of supranational institutions dealing with conflict resolution and management of supranational interest groups. The last step is cross-border governance (Sandholtz, and Stone 2012).

Since integration promotes more integration, and it requires political mechanisms that will guide and govern it, we can observe that centralisation will be also encouraged – tighter economic integration requires tighter political integration, and centralisation is the result.

This is a logical conclusion of the neo-functionalist approach. In order for economic integration to occur one has to design a political mechanism that will steer the way in which this is supposed to happen. Without such a mechanism members of a union would not be able to decide on particular

solutions. Any decision requires some agreement on how to proceed, and future cooperation requires settlement of the rules of this cooperation. Thus, economic integration requires a political process: a way through which parties agree on norms binding for all of them. Without an agreement on the rules of cooperation there would not be any integration. All members would still operate under separate set of norms, and would be able to change them irrespective of consequences for others. Thus no true unification would happen, since integrated economy requires uniformity of rules and compliance to them. That is why it is reasonable to expect that integration will necessitate the creation of some kind of a political mechanism that will be servicing it. By definition, the existence of such a mechanism will be a form of centralisation.

Neo-realists view European integration very differently. Before the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War they perceived integration as a response to the existence of superpowers, a logical result of power-play and rebalancing (Waltz 2010). After the end of the Cold War it was argued that the European Union is based on the logic of complex, deep interdependence which allows stronger states to control weaker ones. International institutions that serve as a front for this are in fact rooted in national, not international interest (Milward 2000), can and are used by stronger powers to control weaker ones (Waltz 2000)². The European Union, just like NATO, has outlived its purpose and has been maintained because it has been in the interest of the strongest stake-holders, allowing them to control other countries. As for law, institutions, norms and rules neo-realist maintained, following the work of Stephen D. Krasner who argued that throughout the last four centuries the values and preferences of strong states dictated the shape of international law and institutions, 'applied in a discriminating fashion only to the weak' (Krasner 1994), that European norms are just tools of domination. A similar, but methodologically separate view was expressed by Moravcsik (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1995). Technically speaking his view is detached from

² 'Realists, noticing that as an alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it mainly as a means of maintaining and lengthening America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states. (...) The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests'. Waltz, K.N. (2000) 'Structural Realism after the Cold War'. *International Security* 25 (1), 20; Waltz was making here a remark about NATO, however the example of this institution outliving its purpose was used in the context of EU examination; Waltz was suggesting that the situations are the same.

neo-realism, although it had roots in it and should be more appropriately classified as a version of liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik's approach assumes that convergence of views and preferences about integration happens between group of powerful countries, which later on achieve agreement through the process of bargaining; products of this process are then imposed on reluctant and/or weaker states through side-payments. Thus, his views are to a certain degree consistent with the neo-realist approach (states – basic units; relative gains, powerful actors), but at the same time they are close to the neofunctionalist perception (emergence from within the state – not from its environment; convergence of views/attitudes).

Thus, one can conclude, that although very different and at odds with each other, all approaches – neo-functionalist, neorealist and liberal intergovernmentalist – agree about the existence of centralised rule-making through some political, formalised and institutionalised process. What they disagree about is who really makes decisions, what motivates them, and whether the outcome is stable.

The paper proposes an approach that links those similarities through a single mechanism of state behaviour, named 'integration hijacking', whose existence and operation depends on the establishment of a centralised political process.

A political process is the way in which society decides about the rules (laws) binding for it (Merriam-Webster 2017). In a unitary state a single political process encompasses all matters of the state, and thus society. In others, like a federation, local governments have reserved competences, separate from that of central government. Regardless of the way the political process is organised the fact remains that there is a political order from which other orders originate – the political process is the source of laws, and laws decide about the way society functions. As Acemoglu and Robinson in *Why Nations Fail* (2012) argue, the political process is a crucial component in the nation's success or failure. Their theory suggests that most countries have problems with becoming successful and wealthy because of the nature of their political systems that are exploitive and exclusive; they are designed to serve only the socio-economic interests of chosen elites, and that these elites defend their ability to control the political process, because it is the sole basis of their individual success and group stability. In short, the elites create such rules for society that would suit them, not the public good, even if it is detrimental to the country in the long run. In doing so they prohibit proper development and progress, since progress means instability due to creative destruction, and instability means that that system can be opened

to competition; or that those on top of it may be exchanged. Either way, it means risk of losing control, and therefore is not preferred.

Although Acemoglu's and Robinson's book concentrates on national, not international politics, their conclusions sound familiar to the one made by neo-realists about the European Union (control through institutions, rules serving those with more power). Since European nations do integrate, it is not unreasonable to assume that one could use this approach for inter-state politics. Normally states cannot influence one another in the way society influences itself – via a centralised political process; however this is not the case with entities such as the European Union. Power to impose rules can be used by both non-governmental organisations and governments alike. There is no contradiction. Due to that reason Acemoglu's & Robinson's approach is not inconsistent with liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism.

Partial application of Acemoglu/Robinson's theory in conjunction with Moravcsik's view on integration allows us to draw conclusions that powerful stake-holders in the EU should be inclined towards such a design of rules and norms as to support and protect their interest first and foremost, even on the expense of weaker partners. Moreover, since integration – as neo-realists argue – blurs the lines between national and supranational organisations, it is not unlikely that not only states, but also other actors, such as companies, could use the same methods to influence the (now) centralised political process to protect their interest on the expense of public one or that of competition. In fact, as adherents of public choice theory argue, this is precisely what has been already observed (Butler, E., 2012). Thus, in many aspects the EU as a state bloc actually appears to have the dynamic of a government without being a country.

NEOREALISM MEETS NEOFUNCTIONALISM: CHANGE OF PRIORITIES, TOOLS AND PERSPECTIVES AS A RESULT OF THE ENVIRONMENT CHANGE

If the boundaries between methodologies and theories indeed are difficult to see, and some convergence is observed then perhaps such convergence is the result of objective reality, since those approaches try to see and report on the same occurrences. However, because they use different methods of analysis and define goals as well as main actors differently, they tend to be at odds with each other. The paper will propose a partial possible solution to that problem by changing the interpretation of goals of state actors.

Our starting point will be the neorealist framework and the explanation of integration as outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his already mentioned *Structural Realism after the Cold War* (2000). However, once integration starts, although states remain prime actors, the dynamic observed by Moravcsik becomes prevalent. The bargaining process occurs, as a result of convergence of views between main powers. This convergence is the result of increased trans-border transactions, in accordance with mechanism outlined by neo-structuralist theory. Thus, the paper assumes that although the process of integration starts because of neo-realist reasons and initially it is driven by security concerns; soon actors within nations start to influence their own governments towards integration (liberal intergovernmentalism), leading to the convergence of views on integration and the beginning of spill-over effects (neo-functionalism). However, all this time states are a necessary intermediary between all agents, factors and institutions, as predicted by neo-realists. The state behaviour changes with a change of the environment in which it operates. However, its goals remain the same – they are just being pursued in a different way. States are now constrained by complex interdependency and are entangled in attempts to control one another. The mechanism of this control is ‘integration hijacking’, described in the next chapter. Therefore, states remain the key agents and actors, linking the process of integration together. They are neither replaced by supranational organisations, nor are they independent from them, instead they are a necessary link between all, forming a feedback loop, where states create rules, that thanks to lobbying, negotiations, side-payments and bargaining go through supranational institutions (the centralised political process), ending in influencing other states (the localised political process). The bargaining and side-payments are elements of this process, while bottom-up pressure created by an increased amount of intra-border transactions is being siphoned through state institutions and therefore becomes a propellant for their actions, which are directed at maintaining control over their environment, integration being a side-effect.

As a result of integration and centralisation, the tools, views and goals of main actors – states – change. They no longer operate in a pure neo-realist environment. Instead, they are now pressured from the bottom by neo-structuralist currents to integrate; but they do so not in order to merely satisfy needs of these currents, but rather to secure a controlling position *vis a vis* other states within a new, liberal intergovernmental environment, where bargaining is a key method of balancing power of other actors. The purpose of this bargaining is not only to gain more power, as neo-realist would argue;

neither an economic gain is that important in itself. But states rather try to use the dynamic of integration against one another to get a higher level of freedom of action for themselves, while restraining others. Restraining can be a relative asymmetric gain, but it can also be control achieved through institutions (neo-realism).

In order to explain this thesis we need to reinterpret the neo-realist credo centred around anarchy, self-help and power.

States tend to accumulate power to gain security, but this security is essentially derived from their degree of freedom of action, which flows from the amount of power at their disposal. A country with a bigger army, for instance, has more freedom of action *vis a vis* other states with smaller ones. It has an option of imposing its will on others thanks to its military might if it so chooses. This additional option increases its range of possibilities and therefore – freedom. The more depends on the pure will of the state with regard to interactions with other state actors, the more secure it is. For example, if a state is weak, it faces constraints in the form of interests of other states. It has to take them into account. However, when it is strong, it can but *doesn't have to* take them into account. Thus, it has a higher level of freedom of action. The very existence of this strength creates constraints on actions of others. They immediately take it into account while planning their responses and moves.

Thus, states pursue power in order to get more freedom of action. Anything that limits this freedom of action is a threat to security. Asymmetrical gains, for instance, have such effects; the increase of power of one state is a relative loss for others, thus it translates into limitations of their freedom of action.

The above re-interpretation of the classical neo-realist approach concentrates on the effects of actions, not merely tools that are used. This re-interpretation is necessary in order to understand how in a different environment states are going to behave similarly to neo-realist predictions, but they will do so in a very different way. This new environment is political centralisation.

Political centralisation of Europe as a result of integration means that states are sacrificing their sovereignty by becoming part of a bigger structure that will be able to impose on them obligations that they would normally not, perhaps, accept. It follows that they will be no longer capable of controlling their fate on their own to the same degree. The Member States of the EU lose part of their sovereignty, at least in the practical sense (formally, according to international law, all states remain sovereign regardless, they merely agree not to use their competences in some areas, however here we will not use the legal definition of sovereignty).

But sovereignty does not mean autarky. Autarky is independence from other states in real terms, self-sufficiency. Sovereignty is merely ability to decide about one's actions. Decisions can be influenced by circumstances, they can be the result of objective constraints – like the existence of stronger states with opposing interest; however the key component is intact: the ability to decide freely on the basis of available information. Freedom in this context means lack of need to think about interest of other actors (states). The only thing that shapes the limits of this freedom is the actor's will and his power (ability to transform his will into action, disregarding will of other actors if necessary). This allows the pursuit of one's interest as one sees fit. This freedom is what neo-realist observe and concentrate on, describing it as self-help, pursuit of one's interest.

In political arrangements such as a federation or a unitary state this freedom no longer exists, since when it comes to relations between participants of it as well as relations with third parties the central government has the authority. Thus, it is the central government that has true sovereignty, not participants (subjects, citizens, members) of the state, regardless of their power. They are bound by law, rules of allowable conduct. Breaking this arrangement is typically not thinkable, due to the way the system is set up (central authority's monopoly on violence, and/or hostile attitude towards a rule-breaker by other participants of the system). A participant of the state may regain sovereignty by seceding, but until that moment he is constrained by the existing agreement. He may influence the active regime, play by the rules of it, but he is not the regime himself.


In short, states in this context are separate, independent political processes that produce effects exclusive for a given population. As already discussed in this paper a *political process is the way in which society decides about the rules (laws) binding for it*. By becoming part a state association of some sort, such as the EU, states agree to create a new, joined political process that will be in some aspects more important than their own. Its products, that is decisions, will constrain them through the creation of legal obligations, translating into obligations for their citizens.

The form of an agreement forming a government can be varied – the European Union is neither a unitary state nor a federation and arguably it is not a government in a strict sense. However, for the purpose of this paper this is not important, because the fact that the European Union limits to a certain extent freedom of actions of its members through sets of rules and laws produced by designated institutions (centralised political process) is all that matters. It is the fact of centralisation of the political process that is our concern.

Although some areas of sovereignty may be protected from the effects of centralisation due to the way the agreement creating it was set-up, others are not. Therefore, states in the European Union have less freedom than outside of it. From the point of view of the neo-realist perspective interpreted in the way presented in this paper freedom of action is paramount this means that states will have a tendency to perceive the EU as a sub-optimal solution even if it gives them higher levels of economic output or better military security. Because these gains do not make-up for the lost sovereignty. It is so, because the EU imposes limits on freedom of action, and it is freedom of action – not gains – that states seek. A gain without freedom to use it is useless to them. Therefore, states should not prefer entering the EU even if faced with objective benefits of such a decision. To ignore that would be forfeiting a vital element of security calculation. Yet, we not only observe that this is not the case, but we see constant attempts of deepening integration, many new countries wish to join, others propose enlargement of the Union – all in addition to events such as Brexit. These opposing forces have, however, one common source, and therefore are part of the same phenomenon: the existence of the centralised political process, required for integration. It is both sought as a tool of control of other states and feared as a device of domination and can account for a seemingly contradictory situation in which states still want freedom of action, but are entering the arrangement limiting it. A more traditional neo-realist view of state sovereignty may not be sufficient to explain this phenomenon precisely because integration seemingly offers many aspects of power that states seek; at the same time eliminating a need for it by getting rid of the anarchical environment. However, thanks to the ‘translation’ of states goals from power to freedom we can retain the neo-realist logic of state behaviour in the new environment such as the European Union.

Figure 1

Not centralised political processes




Anarchical international environment – various countries of various power levels (here: size) compete. Circles represent independent political processes.

Source: the author.

Figure 2

Centralised political processes



Creation of a supra-state organisation such as the European Union (blue area). A centralised political process emerges, linking political processes of state actors. Now they can influence each other in a political way. Please note that the centralised political process does not encompass the entirety of competences of its participants (blue area vs. white area inside the circles).

Source: the author.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA:
INTEGRATION THROUGH CONTROL?

The idea that an overarching, pan-European political process will be created, with some prerogatives reserved for a central body, encourages states to engage in integration once it starts, but not in order to achieve a stable union. Rather states do so in order to be able to influence decisions of other participants through a centralised regime. The desired outcome is to position oneself in the process of centralisation/integration in such a way so that one will maintain a higher level of freedom of action than other participants. In other words, members of the EU want to retain more sovereignty, while allowing its erosion for other participants. This aspect is consistent with the neo-realist perspective, as well as liberal intergovernmentalism, and does not disregard neo-functionalism. The goal of states in this equation is not merely to become more powerful through increased economic efficiency, but rather to make sure that through the process of centralisation that leads to integration they will retain as much of freedom of action as possible in the emerging legal order, even at the expense of other participants.

In other words, the behaviour of states does not change, they still try to get as much freedom as possible. But since in the European Union this is not possible in a classical way –through the acquisition of more power only; they switch to control the EU political process and therefore its laws. Through

them they try to limit freedom of action of others, while retaining as much of it for themselves. In the end this causes the process of integration to be manipulated, so that it will serve the needs of the manipulating state/states – now and preferably also in the future. This phenomenon can be called hijacking.

Hijacking is a behaviour of a state within a centralisation process. A centralised political system is then used to impose such legal solutions so that state pushing them will gain advantage over other participants of the political process. This advantage – relative gain in the neo-realist terminology – is generally translated into a higher level of freedom of action. This may be achieved in various ways – either by suppressing the ability of other members to influence political process or by creating such rules that would allow faster accumulation of power for the state within the union (but not necessarily outside of it – power within a legal entity is usually based on rules and norms, not force, thus what gives power within the geometry of the EU may be useless as power-enhancer outside of it). What leads to this result is the question of circumstances. Gaining more power allows the state to become more capable of hijacking in the future due to the possession of more resources, influences or things for exchange (for instance: the state may agree to withdraw support for certain policy in order to gain support for another one – this is bargaining and side-payments known from Moravcsik's approach). Hijacking can serve short and long term interests of the state. An example of a short term goal would be the protection of minimum wage laws in the transportation industry on a territory of a given country, demanding that other participants of the common market have to obey them too, even if they operate from areas of a lower minimum wage (Polska Agencja Prasowa 2015). A long term advantage can, for instance, mean more national seats in the EU parliament or a voting system that creates preference for the given state and its allies (Henzel 2014), cementing their freedom of action over other members. Noticeably an attempt at hijacking prompts response from other states. They also engage in similar actions, mimicking moves of the country with the initiative. For instance, in response to the introduction of protection measures of the national law in Germany from the supremacy of the European one (*Re Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft/Solange*, 1986), Poland attempted to make such changes in its constitutional order too as a countermeasure (*Verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland of May 11th*, 2005). Therefore, hijacking is not limited to actions that influence the centralised political process directly, but include anything that can have such a practical effect.

In short, the ability to protect the local political process from influences of central government is good, but to be able to protect it and influence other local processes through the centralised political process of the EU is much better. Thus, although a given Member State may be unwilling to dominate others, in order to protect itself from such a possibility it is forced to act in this way. The danger of allowing others to hijack the process of integration paired with advantages if one is successful in it (the ability to dominate other states, ensuring a privileged position within the union, creation of preferential rules, hindering development of rivals, etc.) creates a situation corresponding to the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Particularly, it has a striking resemblance to a nuclear arms race.

Although some benefits from non-hijacked integration may be appealing, whereas hijacking may create costs, problems, instability and failure of the project, it is still more rational to follow the hijacking strategy. It is so because the risk of not doing so is too great. In this situation norms, rules and laws are an equivalent of a definite military advantage akin to a nuclear bomb. Achieving such an advantage may be costly, and absolute benefits lesser than in the scenario without additional expenses. But the vision of a rival failing to gain a similar advantage and thus being left unprotected while we engage in advantage acquisition is too attractive. And the same time the danger of being in a situation of lack of build-up, while rivals decide to gain an advantage, prompts states to exercise hijacking as the only rational option. The result is negative for the stability of the European Union: since the only rational choice is to attempt hijacking, all members attempt it, contributing to the instability and failures of integration, as well as its inefficiencies. There is no actor that cares for the European public good, only actors that care for their own. This problem can be presented on the following decision matrix.

Figure 3

Model of integration hijacking

	Country B, Engage in hijacking	Country B, Do not engage
Country A, Engage in hijacking	-1, -1	2, -2
Country A, Do not engage	-2, 2	1, 1

A decision matrix representing the phenomenon of hijacking.

Source: the author.

In the above matrix the Nash equilibrium is -1,-1 for both countries. Noticeably mutual not engaging in hijacking gives positive result of 1,1 for both players (balanced integration, gains for everyone *vis a vis* the rest of the world), but the option of engaging while the other player does not engage brings much higher benefits: 2, and a much better relative position *vis a vis* the other player: 4 points. At the same time both integration building and collapse of the project have the same relative effect (net result for balance of power: zero. When integration is successful both states gain equally, thus no one is stronger. If both engage in hijacking, both loose equally. Nobody gains an advantage).

This explains the lack of stability of the integration process, and why states may perceive integration and centralisation as dangerous, but at the same time they are willing to risk their development (therefore why we see more integration next to Brexit, for instance). No country wishes to be a 'victim' of integration, but all prefer to be in control over centralised laws. The goal is to make one's local political process a vital piece of the central one, while (preferably) not allowing other local processes to have equal access and influence. States simply see central government and unified laws as a tool of domination, a tool of power.

A centralised political process is a promising tool for controlling others. Perhaps even better than traditional tools of international politics. It has lower risks (no danger of military retaliation, sanctions, etc. if played by the rules) and higher rewards (ability to influence other members whether they want it or not with little constant effort). But more importantly, a state that decides to participate, has a possibility – through hijacking – to achieve such gains in power that would translate not only into a better position within the EU, but also outside of it. States have an option of behaving like lobbyists in public choice theory – creating concentrated gains for themselves at the expense of other members. Instead of the ideal of collaborating members that help each other to boost their stance on the international stage; hijacking presents an option of being able to use resources and power of others regardless of their consent. It is just a question of arranging the inner order of the EU in a correct way, being a successful lobbyist in a sense. In this, the results are akin to what Acemoglu's and Robinson's theory of wealth creation predicts. Control of the political process is a key prize for any group/power/actor, allowing it to remain in a dominant position within society/group. The key is to remain on top and to make rules that will benefit those on top. Since the centralised government allows for such an impact, all seek control over it.

The same mechanism is also responsible for reluctance to continue the integration process as well as attempts at escaping it. Once a member fails systematically at hijacking or ceases to see it as a viable, beneficial option, he may simply decide to 'drop out' of the game. Hijacking would be, therefore, responsible for both successes of European integration (understood as spreading and deepening of it, not whether it is stable and beneficial for all in the same way) and its failures (like Brexit).

Moreover, the game represented by the decision matrix in Figure 3 is repeated constantly, and states take this fact into account, calculating their future hijacking decisions. Sometimes they may choose to withdraw or consent to hijacking by other members only so that in the next game they will be able to use that as a bargaining chip so that the previous winner may be more willing to agree to withdraw or to support a proposition that is not good for its interests. Therefore, although hijacking is a win-lose type of game, it can actually encourage cooperation. This appears to be consistent with liberal intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik's approach, but also presents certain similarities to ideas of public choice theory like logrolling and vote trading (Butler 2017). Therefore, further investigation of the topic may reveal long term strategies and explain choices made by states that normally would seem counter-intuitive.

A process of integration that is propelled by hijacking is most probably not going to produce results satisfying for public good of its members, or aggregated public good of the EU in general. However, despite that the ability to hijack may be compelling enough so that states might still participate in a failing integration process, because of perceived security gains achieved thanks to hijacking.

All of this is, however, to a certain degree separate from the actual, tangible fruits of integration such as increased economic efficiency or interdependency. The hijacking thesis is not designed to explain the entirety of integration dynamic, but rather possible reasons for discrepancy between popular attitudes, state rhetoric, state behaviour and its actual results; while to a certain degree reconciling opposite theoretical approaches that try to explain integration.

The concept of attractiveness of hijacking may help to add another layer of understanding why states decide to integrate, and what partially motivates them to choose counterintuitive options that are not accounted for in other integration and disintegration theories.

CONCLUSIONS

The slow-pace of European integration, constant instability, managing of policies from crisis to crisis, secessionist tendencies and lack of success in carving common security – all of those and more are most probably the result of the fact that the EU was at least partially created (and is still propelled) by integration hijacking. The shape of European institutions, the way of functioning of the EU as a whole is a result of this.

Hijacking is the only rational response of a country participating in the integration process, because it allows it to protect its sovereignty, which is required to maintain levels of freedom of actions as high as possible. Freedom of action is a key goal for all states seeking security. At the same time hijacking offers more attractive gains than just those received through balanced good-for-all integration, or a regular power play as envisioned by neo-realists. It can not only boost one's power, but it also can limit costs of achieving it in terms of losing sovereignty. At the same time this phenomenon is responsible for failures of integration. Hijacking is successful only when the other side does not engage in it. If both engage (and if parties are rational – they will) the result may be negative for the stability of the integration process. Every hijacking move can be countered by a similar one, contributing to lesser stability of the union and imperfect promotion of public good. The logical result of iterated hijacking may be counterintuitive in the end – a closer union that nobody profits from, where everyone is at perceived net loss, yet no one is willing to break away. A result in some way similar to the nuclear arms race. All of that is detached from the actual or perceived gains and losses that integration actually creates.

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INTEGRATION THROUGH CONTROL: THE MODEL OF POWER HIJACKING AS AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW ON EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

Summary

The following paper presents a possible new explanation for the European Union's turbulent integration. By combining elements of game theory, neo-functional theory and its neo-realist account as well as devoting special attention to liberal intergovernmentalism it presents a method of thinking about the way in which European states function and calculate their behaviours in relation to integration efforts. Through that it attempts to build an initial framework for an alternative way of thinking about integration and disintegration of the European Union. Countries attempt to control one another through products of a centralised political process, imposing limitations on freedom of action of others: the more control, the less freedom of action and the more integration as a result. The same mechanism can be both responsible for tendencies of integration as well as disintegration, since countries that fail to increase their ability to control others see that as an asymmetrical gain for others, and tend to opt out from integration, or to disassociate themselves from the project altogether.

Key words: integration, European union, game theory

INTEGRACJA PRZEZ KONTROLĘ: MODEL PRZEJMOWANIA WŁADZY JAKO ALTERNATYWNY POGLĄD NA INTEGRACJĘ UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Streszczenie

Niniejsza praca przedstawia możliwe wyjaśnienie powodów burzliwego przebiegu integracji Unii Europejskiej. Poprzez połączenie elementów teorii gier, jak również neo-funkcjonalistycznej teorii integracji, wspólnie z neo-realistycznym jej ujęciem z szczególnym uwzględnieniem spojrzenia liberalnego intergovermentalizmu, przedstawia sposób, w jaki państwa UE funkcjonują i kalkulują swoje zachowania w relacji do wysiłków integracyjnych. Poprzez to artykuł podejmuje próbę zbudowania wstępnej propozycji ramowej dla alternatywnego spojrzenia zarówno na integrację, jak i dezintegrację Unii Europejskiej. Kraje podejmują próby wzajemnego kontrolowania się poprzez produkty scentralizowanego procesu politycznego, narzucając ograniczenia na swobodę działania innych krajów w myśl zasady, że im więcej kontroli, tym mniej swobody działania dla innych. Jako efekt uboczny powoduje to więcej integracji. Ten sam mechanizm odpowiedzialny jest więc zarówno za integrację, jak i dezintegrację Unii Europejskiej, gdyż kraje, które nie odniosą sukcesu w przejmowaniu kontroli, interpretują to jako asymetryczne korzyści dla innych państw. Powoduje to tendencję do wykluczania się z integracji lub w skrajnych przypadkach opuszczania UE.

Słowa kluczowe: integracja, Unia Europejska, teoria gier

ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ ЧЕРЕЗ КОНТРОЛЬ: МОДЕЛЬ ПЕРЕХОДА ВЛАСТИ В КАЧЕСТВЕ АЛЬТЕРНАТИВНОГО ВЗГЛЯДА НА ИНТЕГРАЦИЮ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА

Резюме

Настоящая работа представляет собой возможное объяснение причин турбулентного курса интеграции Европейского союза. Объединив элементы теории игр, а также нео-функционалистическую теорию интеграции, с ее неореалистическим подходом, с особым акцентом на необходимость учета либерального интергенерализма, автор исследования представляет способ функционирования и поведения стран ЕС в отношении интеграционных уси-

лий. В связи с этим автор статьи пытается создать первоначальное рамочное предложение для альтернативного взгляда как на интеграцию, так и на дезинтеграцию Европейского союза. Государства предпринимают попытку контролировать друг друга посредством продуктов централизованного политического процесса, налагая ограничения свободы действий других стран в соответствии с принципом, что, чем больше контроля, тем меньше свободы действий для других. Это чревато побочным эффектом, который приводит к большей интеграции. Тот же механизм отвечает как за интеграцию, так и за дезинтеграцию Европейского союза, поскольку страны, которые безуспешно пробуют принять на себя функции контроля, трактуют это как асимметричную выгоду для других стран. Это влечет за собой тенденцию к исключению из интеграции или, в крайнем случае, выхода из ЕС.

Ключевые слова: интеграция, Европейский союз, теория игр.

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THE ROLE OF THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE IN THE PROCESSES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN 1991–2004

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INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam world order took place at the turn of the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century. The Gorbachev reforms carried out from the second half of the 1980s did not heal the situation in the USSR, which contributed to the gradual breakup of the Eastern Bloc at the turn of the decades. Other states, former USSR satellites, gained more and more independence, and then gradually regained their full sovereignty.

At the same time, the collapse of a stable, bipolar world order created numerous dangers. The new world order emerging at that time was not very legible, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 a number of Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, found themselves in a grey security zone (Balcerowicz 2001: 107–108). They were states that did not belong to any alliance, neither did they create any, and at the same time they did not decide to be neutral or uninvolved (Balcerowicz 2001: 108).

Political changes began in Poland before the final collapse of the Warsaw Pact. They were initiated by the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki formed in August 1989, after the partially free parliamentary elections held on 4 June. These elections ended with the success of the current democratic opposition,

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which won almost all seats allocated for candidates not belonging to the Communist Party.

In his speech of 12 September 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki referred to the question of Poland regaining full sovereignty saying, 'We want to live worthily in a sovereign, democratic and law-abiding state' (Mazowiecki 2007: 149). In the part concerning foreign policy he expressed the desire to open Poland to Europe and stated: 'we have to catch up, especially in cooperation with the countries of the European Economic Community and the United States' (Mazowiecki 2007: 163).

Such formulation of goals at the beginning of the transformation process was evidence of a desire to change the vectors of foreign policy without simultaneously violently breaking relations with the USSR, which was impossible at the time due to existing numerous political, economic and military connections. The speech, however, signalled the desire for rapprochement with the West.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski was appointed the minister of foreign affairs in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government. He became one of the architects of Polish foreign policy. In his speech on 26 April 1990 *Government information on foreign policy* among the priorities he mentioned the co-creation of the European security system and building new links with European organisations and groupings, in particular with the European Communities and the Council of Europe. At the same time, he stressed the importance of cooperation with neighbours, the USSR, with which Poland was linked through the described network of connections, and reuniting Germany (Skubiszewski 2007a: 179). In April 1990 Poland was already seeking to become a member of the Council of Europe, and contacts with the Western European Union and NATO were established.

In the following months Poland's aspirations for the complete reorientation of foreign policy and entry into the structures of the Western world became increasingly clear. These ambitions included European integration and rapprochement with NATO, guaranteeing security for numerous European states, which are also its members. For Poland, distancing itself since 1989 from the alliances within the Warsaw Pact and then being in the 'grey zone' of security after its collapse on 1 July 1991, cooperation with NATO and the Western European Union became a matter of special importance.

One of the first steps to bring Poland closer to integration with Western structures and to quickly deepen the relations was the signing of bilateral agreements with the most important Western countries. The agreements concluded with the most important countries of the European Communities,

especially France and the Federal Republic of Germany, were particularly important in this respect.

Since the beginning of the nineties, Poland attached great importance to relations with France. This country was seen as a traditional, even if not always reliable ally of Poland. Close relations with this state were even defined by the then minister of foreign affairs as ‘one of the canons of Polish foreign policy’ (Skubiszewski 1994: 20). Unfortunately, after the reunification of Germany, the French side did not support rapid European integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This resulted from concerns about its own position on the continent. French politicians assumed that through the possible extension of the EC, Central European states, including Poland, could become satellites of Germany. As a result of the fear of possible domination of reunited Germany the French side imposed on the Community the priority of deepening integration before enlargement. In this situation, a success of Polish diplomacy was the signing of *the Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity between the Republic of Poland and the French Republic* on 9 April 1991 (Kuźniar 2012: 63). This is still a basic document regulating the relations between the two countries. For the Polish side, the provisions that were included in the second article of the Treaty were particularly important. After a passage on the development of political cooperation between the two countries, France’s positive attitude towards Poland’s European aspirations is described. ‘The French Republic is committed to supporting the development of close relations between the Republic of Poland and the European Communities’ (*Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity between the Republic of Poland and the French Republic*, drafted in Paris on 9 April 1991). Unfortunately, this Treaty did not become the basis for France’s support for Poland’s European and Atlantic aspirations in the coming months.

Parallel to signing the Treaty with France, relations with reunited Germany were legally regulated. Two agreements were signed with this country. The first one is *the Border Treaty* concluded on 14 November in Warsaw. This document finally confirmed the course of the western Polish border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse. The other agreement was *the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation*, signed in Bonn on 17 June 1991. It contains many important provisions regulating bilateral relations. In the context of European integration, the eighth article of the Treaty, concerning Germany’s support for Poland’s aspirations to membership in the European Communities, was of particular importance (*Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation*, signed in Bonn on 17 June 1991).

Two months after signing *the Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation* in Bonn, a tripartite cooperation between Poland, Germany and France was initiated. This form of contacts was supposed to break France's reserve to Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Its aim was to strengthen Polish-French contacts and to create an opportunity to convince local decision-makers about the advisability of supporting Poland's European aspirations. The tripartite cooperation was also intended to dismiss France's concerns about Germany's possible endeavours to dominate the European continent. By cooperating in this shape, Paris would have an insight into the actions of Germany. For the Polish side, the Triangle was to be a significant new platform for dialogue.

The first meeting in the new formula took place in Weimar on 28–29 August 1991. At the end of the meeting ministers of foreign affairs of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, France, Roland Dumas and Poland, Krzysztof Skubiszewski signed the *Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers of France, Poland and Germany on the Future of Europe*.

This document consists of ten points, the first ones of which relate to political and economic changes in Europe at the turn of the eighties and nineties, emphasise the need for cooperation and the continuation of the European integration process. The seventh point refers to the issue of 'comprehensive support' for the reforming Central and Eastern European countries and the support of France and Germany for the rapprochement of Poland and 'other new democracies' with the European Community, which was particularly important for Poland. At the end of the Statement, a declaration is made stating that the ministers have decided to meet annually and also additionally if necessary (*Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers of France, Poland and Germany on the Future of Europe*, Weimar, 29 August 1991). In the intention of the initiators of the meeting in August 1991 the Weimar Triangle was not supposed to be an organisation in the understanding of international law, but rather a discussion and consultative forum. In this framework representatives of the three countries had an opportunity to exchange views on important aspects of tripartite relations and international politics. It was also expected that its work would contribute to strengthening Polish-German-French cooperation (Koszel 2006: 17).

For the Polish side the support of the two largest countries of the European Communities for its aspirations for European and transatlantic integration was very important. The seventh point of the quoted *Joint Statement* explicitly underlined this support, in this way already at its dawn the Weimar Triangle became an instrument whose essential goal was to work to overcome

the division of Europe, and thus lead to European integration. Weimar's cooperation was also supposed to be a message about the interest of the two most important countries in the region in the successful transformation of the Central European region (Koszel, 2016)

Integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures was also a priority for Polish foreign policy. It encompassed deepened cooperation with the European Communities, and then the European Union and the Western European Union. In the Euro-Atlantic dimension, Poland aspired to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. Both goals were closely related, because they concerned Poland's cooperation with Western structures, which for many years had been complementary in the sphere of the Euro-Atlantic system.

Over the years, the Weimar Triangle in fact became one of the tools that helped to achieve this goal, since the tripartite cooperation helped the Polish side to fulfil its aspirations to strengthen cooperation and then to become a member of NATO and the European Communities.

The process of Poland's accession to the structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation lasted many years. At the very beginning of the political transformation, the Polish side could not unequivocally express its will to join the North Atlantic Alliance – Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact formally existing until 1 July 1991 was an obstacle. The political declaration on Poland's will to enter into the Pact structures was made in 1992 by then prime minister Jan Olszewski. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Krzysztof Skubiszewski described it in his speech of 8 May 1992 as a prospective target (Skubiszewski2007b: 243). The intention of Poland to join NATO was announced in a binding manner in the *Assumptions of Polish Security Policy* adopted by President Lech Wałęsa on 2 November 1992 (Turczyński 2015: 24).

At the beginning of the nineties, the Alliance did not show the will to quickly accept new members. It was obvious that the position of the United States would be decisive in this respect. The first step towards rapprochement was the granting of an observer status to the parliamentarians of Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the USSR by the NATO Assembly in November 1990. A year later, on 20 December 1990, the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was held. This council became a forum for cooperation between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, states formed after the collapse of the USSR and European countries with the status of neutral states. In the following months, during the talks between NATO decision-makers and Polish leaders, statements were made about the fact that 'the door to NATO is open for you' (statement by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner from March 1992)

and about the support of the NATO Assembly chairman for Polish efforts to become a member of this organisation.

Another important initiative towards rapprochement with the Alliance was the 'Partnership for Peace' programme. It was presented by US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin on 20 October 1993 to NATO defence ministers as a new initiative of cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bojczuk-Czachór 2014: 54–56). On the one hand, the programme provided for the participation of troops in joint missions, but it did not envisage to provide post-communist countries with a guarantee of security or obligatory assistance of the Alliance in the event of a security threat. Moreover, this document does not mention the expansion of the Alliance. Due to the lack of alternatives to this method of strengthening cooperation, Poland joined the 'Partnership for Peace' programme signing the Framework Document on 2 February 1994 (Otlowski 2002: 38; 42).

The decision of the Bill Clinton administration regarding the invitation of first candidates to NATO during the Madrid summit in July 1997 was crucial for enlarging the Alliance. At the time, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were officially invited to negotiate on joining the Alliance. After the completion of the negotiations, the protocols on joining NATO were signed in December 1997. They were still the subject of ratification by the members of the Alliance (Fiszer 2002: 78–79). The German Bundestag and Bundesrat ratified the protocols in March 1998, even before the US Senate, both houses of the French parliament did it in May and June 1998. Poland officially became part of the Alliance on 12 March 1999, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Bronisław Geremek, handed over the act of Poland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to the US Secretary of State, Madelaine Albright. The USA's position was crucial throughout the many-year process of approaching and joining the Alliance, although the dangerous situation in the Balkans at that time had an impact on the positive course of the accession negotiations (Fiszer 2002: 78–79).

We cannot overlook the significance of the support, though expressed with varying intensity, of the Weimar partners for the process of bringing Poland closer to the North Atlantic Alliance. The shift of the NATO border to the east was beneficial from the point of view of Germany, because it meant filling the discussed 'grey zone' of security, which began just behind the eastern border of the country. The stability of Central and Eastern Europe was also important for France, which from 1966 remained outside the military structures of the North Atlantic Alliance (Koszel 2006: 43–44). Since 1991, France has pursued the so-called double detente policy, it consisted in getting

closer to NATO's military structures and, at the same time, in attempts to create a European pillar of security. It is significant that most of the activities undertaken by the French side towards Central and Eastern Europe were carried out jointly with Germany. Thanks to such a conduct, it was able to minimise the possible threat of German domination in this region, which the French side was afraid of since the reunification of this country in 1990 (Mickiewicz 2002: 119). One of the manifestations of this policy was the establishment of institutional military cooperation with Poland. The official agreement on cooperation in this field, *the Agreement between the National Defence Ministry of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of France on the Establishment of Cooperation in the Field of Defence*, was signed on 15 June 1992. At the same time, on 25 January 1993 the Polish side signed *the Agreement between the National Defence Ministry of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany on Cooperation in the Military Field* (Mickiewicz 2002: 119).

In the initial phase of the Weimar Triangle, the support of both these countries for Polish aspirations for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance was not univocal. At the second meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Triangle in French Bergerac, on 24 April 1992, the role of the OSCE was underlined, and proposals for cooperation with the Western European Union were mentioned. Possible membership in the Alliance was defined as a long-term goal. This position is reflected in the *Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and Poland* from Bergerac. It states that the goal of the three countries is 'To build free and united Europe, based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE and the Paris Charter' (*Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers of France, Poland and Germany*, Bergerac, 24 April 1992). In the context of cooperation with NATO, a general statement is made 'On the other hand, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has started to play a prominent role in the cooperation between the members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central Europe, Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe' (*Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers of France, Poland and Germany*, Bergerac, 24 April, 1992).

The meeting of the foreign ministers of the Triangle in Warsaw on 11–12 November 1993 brought the consent of Germany and France to support the Polish association with the Western European Union. With this declaration, both countries confirmed their support for Poland's tightening of ties with the European and Euro-Atlantic security structures. Poland obtained the status of an associate partner of the Western European Union in May 1994 (Halamski, and Kazana 1997: 18).

The year 1994 brought also the extension of Weimar cooperation to the meetings of national defence ministers. The fact that in 1994 consultations at this level took place three times indicated the increase of support of the German and French sides for Polish integration with the North Atlantic Alliance. Joint exercises of the armed forces of three countries were initiated (Bogusławska 2000: 9). In addition, this support was also expressed during the annual consultations of foreign ministers in September 1994 in Bamberg, Germany. Unfortunately, it was not connected with the declaration regarding the date of accession to NATO (Bogusławska 2000: 24).

After a period of increased cooperation, military contacts between the Weimar partners cooled down. In 1995 and 1996 there was no meeting of defence ministers. Their revival took place in 1997. The reason for this was the approaching prospect of Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. New forms of Weimar cooperation were created, *the Initiative of the Ministers of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic and the Republic of Poland Regarding the Intensification of Tripartite Political-Military and Military Cooperation* played an important role in this field. This document was signed by the Ministers of Defence of Poland, Germany and France in Warsaw on 3 February 1997. The initiative aimed at adding a new dimension to the previous military cooperation and expressed the partners' will to develop a common position in the most important political and military issues. Another goal was also to intensify military cooperation, to this end, the creation of a Joint Military Coordination Group was announced, the task of which was to develop a three-year cooperation programme. The programme of tripartite military cooperation was to include conducting at least once a year joint exercises with the participation of all types of armed forces, a meeting of defence ministers and intensification of staff exchanges (*Initiative of the Ministers of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic and the Republic of Poland Regarding the Intensification of Tripartite Political-Military and Military Cooperation*). The described initiative gave an impulse for significantly closer cooperation. Statements regarding the annual manoeuvres of all types of armed forces are particularly important in this document. This meant extending the existing cooperation in this area. This document was also a gesture towards Poland, striving to give Weimar cooperation a more institutionalised character (*Engere militaerische Zusammenarbeit vereinbart*). A cooperation plan for 1998–2000, described in the document, was also created and approved at the next meeting of defence ministers in Weimar in 1997.

In the second half of the nineties, the Weimar Triangle was an important instrument for the Polish side to implement the priorities of Polish foreign

policy (Halamski 1998: 148). Due to the approaching membership in NATO, issues related to security policy became a particularly important element of tripartite cooperation during this period (Bogusławska 2000: 6). For these reasons, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, elected president of the Republic of Poland in 1995, sought during bilateral talks with Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac to give the Weimar Triangle a higher rank by launching consultations at the level of heads of state and government. The first meeting in the Weimar format at this level took place on 21 February 1998 in Poznań (Koszel 2016: 67–68). At the meeting of President Jacques Chirac, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President Kwasniewski's guests assured him that Poland should integrate with the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union as quickly as possible. Western leaders promised Poland their support in this regard (*Kohl und Chirac befürworten eine schnelle Integration Polens*). The consultations of defence ministers of the three countries took place in subsequent years fairly regularly, also after Poland's accession to NATO.

For the Polish side Weimar cooperation was one of the elements of actions the aim of which was to maintain the support of Western countries for its aspirations for membership in the structures of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although, as I have already mentioned, the position of the United States was decisive in this respect, the support of Germany and France certainly helped Poland to become a member of this alliance. In this context, the support of both these countries for the Polish association with the Western European Union was not without significance. Joint military exercises carried out since 1994, extended under the Initiative of February 1997, brought together the structures of the German and French armies remaining in the Alliance and the Polish Army.

The tripartite military cooperation, joint exercises, together with the forms of cooperation with NATO, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participation in the 'Partnership for Peace' programme were a signal of Poland's approach to Euro-Atlantic security structures. For Poland, it was particularly important in the discussed period, because it enabled it to gradually leave the described 'grey zone' of security. In this respect, the support of the Weimar partners, although not always so univocal, contributed to the implementation of this strategic goal of Polish foreign policy in accordance with the wishes of the Polish side.

The other most important goal of Polish foreign policy was accession to the European Union. The Polish road to membership in this organisation was several years longer than to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The procedure of the accession of a new country to the European Union is a multi-stage process. It begins with the submission of an application for EU membership to the Council of the European Union. After the European Commission has drawn up its opinion on the application at the Council's request, the Council unanimously decides to open negotiations. The negotiations end with the draft accession treaty, which must be approved by an absolute majority of votes by the European Parliament. At the last stage, the Council of the European Union must unanimously approve the project. Then the treaty is signed by the Member States and the candidate country. The ratification of the treaty by the member countries and the candidate country proceeds in accordance with their internal regulations. The candidate country also conducts a referendum on joining the Union. The last stage is the entry into force of the accession treaty and amendments to the Treaty on the European Union at a given date (Dyńia 2006: 88–89).

In the case of countries whose economy and political conditions do not allow direct admission to the EU, association agreements are concluded before taking steps leading directly to membership of the Union. The purpose of the association is to enable gradual preparation for joining the Union (Dyńia 2006: 90). Poland also went along this path from association to full membership of the European Union.

Rapprochement with the European Communities was one of the main strategic goals of Poland, clearly articulated since the beginning of the political transformation in 1989. Already on 25 May 1990 Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski submitted in Brussels an official motion regarding the commencement of negotiations of the Association Agreement with the Communities (Willa 2016: 174). *The Europe Agreement Establishing an Association between the Republic of Poland and the European Communities and their Member States* was negotiated on 16 December 1991. It came into force after ratification on 1 February 1994.

The Europe Agreement established the main framework for the integration of Poland with the European Union created at that time on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty. Already a few weeks after the entry into force of the Europe Agreement, the Polish side submitted an official application regarding joining the European Union (Czachór 2009: 39). Three years later, in July 1997, the European Commission presented an Opinion on the applications of associated countries, including Poland, regarding membership. On this basis, the Commission recommended the European Council to start accession negotiations, among others, with Poland. During the summit of the states and governments in Luxembourg on 12–13 March 1998, it was

decided to launch bilateral Intergovernmental Conferences with six countries, including Poland (Czachór 2009: 40–41).

Poland's accession negotiations consisted of two stages. The first of them was a review of the compliance of Polish legislation with EU law. In the other one, the Polish side prepared negotiating positions on 31 negotiation areas. In December 1999 in Helsinki, the European Council prepared a 'negotiation road map'. It contained a timetable planning their completion in 2002. The signing of the Nice Treaty on 26 February 2001, which carried out a certain institutional reform of the European Union, gave a new impetus to the negotiations.

The finalisation of the negotiations with Poland took place during the Copenhagen summit in December 2002. The accession treaty was signed on 16 April 2003 in Athens. After the referendum, which was conducted on 7–8 June 2003 and was successful for supporters of Poland's accession to the Union, Poland became a member of the European Union on 1 May 2004 (Kreile 2004: 655).

Providing support for bringing Poland and other 'new democracies' closer to the European Community was one of the reasons why the Weimar Triangle was brought to life. The seventh point of *Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland on the Future of Europe* signed in Weimar on 29 August 1991 says: 'France and Germany support all efforts to bring Poland and other new democracies closer to the European Community. They insist on the rapid conclusion of Association Agreements (...), support the development of political dialogue' (*Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland on the Future of Europe*, Weimar, 29 August 1991).

After Poland signed the Association Agreement with the EC in December 1991, the issue of closer links and European integration was the subject of discussion during subsequent consultations of foreign ministers (Koszel 2016: 67). This was reflected in the declarations being the result of tripartite consultations. In the *Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Poland and Germany* (Bergerac, 24 April 1992), there is a statement about the satisfaction of Germany and France with the signing of association agreements by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, both western partners of Poland declared to make every effort to ensure that the prospect of accession to the EU can be realised when the economic conditions are fulfilled (*Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers of France, Poland and Germany*, Bergerac, 24 April 1992). Also in the next document, created during the meeting in Warsaw in 1993, there are numerous references to issues related

to European integration. Already in the first point, the ministers declared that the common goal of the three states 'is to build united, democratic and free Europe' (*Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers of Poland, France and Germany*, Warsaw, 12 November 1993). In the third point, there was a statement, important for the Polish party, regarding granting Poland and other associated states membership in the European Union, after they met the necessary conditions. In addition, the support of the Weimar partners in the process of achieving membership in the Union was expressed (*Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers of Poland, France and Germany*, Warsaw, 12 November 1993).

Similar words can also be found in the document that crowns the Bamberg summit of 15 September 1994. It contains the announcements of extending tripartite cooperation, Germany and France express their satisfaction with the entry into force of the Europe Agreement. They also promise to help Poland 'to better meet the conditions of accession' (*Declaration of Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland*, Bamberg, 15 September 1994). At the initial stage of Poland's European integration the unequivocal expressions of support expressed by the two most important players on the European arena were valuable to Poland. They were a testimony that Poland was not alone in its efforts, and although it had to fulfil all the requirements necessary to enter the ranks of the Member States of the Union, it could count on a certain favour, assistance from the Weimar partners. Regular meetings made it possible to build mutual trust between politicians and to personally explain some of the doubts on an ongoing basis.

The Weimar Summit in Poznań in 1998 was a success of Weimar cooperation on the plane of European integration. Both President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl stressed that Poland should become a member of both NATO and the European Union as soon as possible (*Kohl Und Chirac befürworten eine schnelle Integration Polens*). From the point of view of European integration, the Poznań summit of the Triangle was also of symbolic significance, as it was held shortly before launching accession negotiations with Poland in March 1998.

During the next Weimar Summit, which took place in French Nancy on 7 May 1999, President Kwaśniewski thanked his Western partners for help in preparing Poland for membership in the Union, but the talks were largely dominated by the Kosovo crisis (*Kosovo-Krise Hauptthema beim Weimarer Dreieck*). Both during that summit and the January meeting of foreign ministers of the three countries, devoted to a large extent to European integration, no specific deadlines for possible Poland's accession to the European Union were mentioned.

One of the reasons for this was the change in the position of the German Chancellor which took place in autumn 1998. Helmut Kohl, known for his special support for Poland, was substituted by Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder. Initially, the government of Chancellor Schröder confirmed the will to follow the foreign policy of his predecessor, but at the same time focused on greater pragmatism in German foreign policy (Fischer 2017: 374). During the reign of Gerhard Schröder, the opinion, which was supported since the beginning of the nineties by France, that enlarging the European Union by new members required its institutional changes began to consolidate (Koszel 2016: 69–70).

Appropriate solutions in this regard preparing the EU for enlargement were provided by the Treaty of Nice, which was adopted during the EU summit in this city in 2000 and came into force on 1 February 2003. In the meantime, the third Weimar Summit took place on 27 February 2001 in the German town of Neustadt an der Weinstrasse. Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac announced that Poland would belong to the first group of countries from Central and Eastern Europe that would become members of the European Union. President Kwasniewski mentioned real chances that Poland would be able to take part in the European Parliament elections planned for 2004 (*Schröder, Chirac Und Kwasniewski sprechen über EU-Politik*). The summit in Neustadt was the next step on the road to bringing Poland closer to the European Union. In the period preceding the end of the accession negotiations, each meeting with the Western partners was of considerable importance, as it enabled the discussion on current divergencies in negotiated topics and possible approximation of positions.

The last Weimar Summit before the enlargement of the European Union was held in Wrocław on 9 May 2003. It took place partly in the shadow of the conflict within NATO concerning the American intervention in Iraq, which began on 20 March 2003. The Polish side joined the coalition under the US command, which attacked Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein. Germany and France strongly criticised this conduct. Such conditions of the meeting had an impact on the content of conversations in a large part devoted to this conflict. However, the communication summarising the discussion contained Germany's and France's appreciation of Poland's will to travel the path to accession and the words about expecting Poland's return to the European family (*Summit of the Weimar Triangle in Wrocław, 9 May 2003, Statement of the President of the Republic of Poland*). These words were of great symbolic importance in the face of Poland's expected accession to the European Union, especially due to the fact that during the summit in Wrocław the possibility

of further cooperation in the Weimar formula after the accession of Poland to the Union was also discussed.

In line with the expectations expressed during the summit in Wrocław, less than a year later the European Union enlarged by 10 countries, including Poland. The enlargement of the Union, which took place on 1 May 2004, closed an important stage in the functioning of the Weimar Triangle. The informal platform for consultations of the three countries, launched in 1991, played an important role in favour of the integration processes in Europe in the years 1991–2004.

Despite the variable intensity of contacts, partly caused by the weakening interest of France in this form of cooperation, it was possible to maintain a certain continuity of meetings at the level of foreign ministers during the first 13 years of the functioning of the Triangle. Weimar cooperation was also consistently expanded to consultations of national defence ministers and other ministries, parliamentary cooperation, and finally summits with the heads of states and governments. Regular meetings in the first phase of integration were for the Polish side an important demonstration of support for its aspirations in the field of European integration. This support, expressed by two strong European countries, constituting the motor of integration, was an important sign for both Poland and other countries. In this respect, Poland was in a privileged position, none of the other countries aspiring to membership in the Western structures could count on such a form of cooperation. Polish-German-French military cooperation, although carried out with varying intensity, also contributed to bringing the Polish Armed Forces closer to the Western structures, which was of particular importance before Poland's admission to NATO. On the one hand, the military cooperation reduced the alienation of Poland remaining in the 'grey zone' of security since 1991, on the other hand, it led to better preparation of our army for accession to the structures of the North Atlantic Treaty.

From the second half of the nineties, and especially in the period immediately before Poland's accession to the European Union, the subject of accession negotiations was discussed at various levels of Weimar cooperation. Regular tripartite dialogue was conducive to the approximation of positions. Although in the context of the accession negotiations with the EU, bilateral relations with Germany and France were decisive, the Weimar Triangle's actions supported them significantly. They were also a symbol of the continuation of good relations, especially the subsequent Weimar summits.

Apart from the cooperation at the ministerial, parliamentary and military levels maintained from the very beginning of the Triangle, regional cooperation

also had certain significance for European integration. Its expression was, inter alia, the Agreement on Regional Cooperation and Partnership between Pomeranian Voivodeship, the Middle Franconia District and the Limousin Region of 8 February 2001 (*Agreement on Regional Cooperation and Partnership between Pomeranian Voivodeship, the Middle Franconia District and the Limousin Region*, 8 February 2001). Such initiatives enable citizens of the three European countries to better understand one another and to deepen ties between them, which is a great value for the European integration process.

CONCLUSIONS

The activities of the Weimar Triangle significantly contributed to the European integration processes on many levels. Despite its different intensity, since its establishment in 1991, it remained a permanent element of the policy of Poland, Germany and France. Since 2004, despite many perturbations and recurring doubts about the strategic goals of the Weimar Triangle, the tripartite cooperation has continued. The fact that this form of cooperation continues, despite difficulties, may indicate the still existing potential for meetings of representatives of the three large European Union countries. Each of them represents different, characteristic for its region, interests that can be discussed from various perspectives. Perhaps numerous challenges that the crisis-hit European Union is facing now will in future lead to the formulation of a new programming document for Weimar cooperation that will set further strategic goals for it.

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THE ROLE OF THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE IN THE PROCESSES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN 1991–2004

Summary

In the year 1989 Poland began to reform its political and economic system. In parallel it started to implement the processes of Europeanization. Rapprochement with the western structures became the main objective of the Polish foreign policy. The ultimate goal was the full membership of the NATO and European Union. The Weimar Triangle was established in August

1991, it was one of the tools which should help Poland in achieving this objective. Regular meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Polish, German and French politicians took place within this area of cooperation. In the article I analyse the actual impact of this form of cooperation on the processes of European integration in the years 1991–2004.

Key words: Weimar Triangle, Poland, Germany, France, European Union, European integration, political changes

ROLA TRÓJKĄTA WEIMARSKIEGO W PROCESACH INTEGRACJI EUROPEJSKIEJ W LATACH 1991–2004

Streszczenie

W 1989 roku rozpoczęły się w Polsce procesy przemian politycznych i gospodarczych. W ich wyniku już na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych głównymi celami polskiej polityki zagranicznej stały się akcesja do Unii Europejskiej i uzyskanie członkostwa w NATO. Jednym z narzędzi, które miały pomóc w ich realizacji był, powołany do życia w 1991 roku, Trójkąt Weimarski. W ramach tej nieformalnej płaszczyzny polsko-niemiecko-francuskiej współpracy, miały miejsce regularne spotkania ministrów spraw zagranicznych oraz innych polityków trzech państw. W artykule poddany jest analizie wpływ tej formy kooperacji na procesy integracji europejskiej w latach 1991–2004, w szczególności na przyjęcie Polski w szeregi Unii Europejskiej i NATO.

Słowa kluczowe: Polska, Niemcy, Francja, Unia Europejska, przemiany ustrojowe, integracja europejska, Trójkąt Weimarski

РОЛЬ ВЕЙМАРСКОГО ТРЕУГОЛЬНИКА В ПРОЦЕССАХ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ В 1991–2004 ГОДАХ

Резюме

В 1989 году в Польше начались процессы политической и экономической трансформации. В результате в начале 90-х годов основными целями польской внешней политики стали присоединение к Европейскому союзу и членство в НАТО. Одним из инструментов, призванным способствовать их

реализации, был созданный в 1991 году Веймарский треугольник. В рамках этой неофициальной платформы польско-германо-французского сотрудничества состоялись очередные встречи министров иностранных дел и других политиков – представителей этих трех государств. В статье анализируется влияние этой формы сотрудничества на процессы европейской интеграции в 1991–2004 годах, в частности, на вступление Польши в Европейский союз и НАТО.

Ключевые слова: Польша, Германия, Франция, Европейский союз, политические реформы, европейская интеграция, Веймарский треугольник

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THE TREATY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURSHIP
AND FRIENDLY COOPERATION OF 17 JUNE 1991
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
ORIGIN, AIMS AND IMPLEMENTATION.
SUCCESSSES, FAILURES AND PROSPECTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS
IN EUROPE

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INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the conference topic, *The Republic of Poland's Treaties of Good Neighbourship after 1990: Good Neighbourship in the Face of Migration Challenges*, my paper discusses the *Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation of 17 June 1991*. Taking into consideration the conference subject matter and objectives, I present its origin, aims and significance for Polish-German relations, their present state and prospects in the context of the migration crisis in Europe and its security. Polish-German relations, as the history of Europe shows, have always gone beyond bilateral frameworks and have been extremely important for its security. For years, scientific publications have highlighted that there

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is a typical linkage between Polish-German relations and the international situation in Europe. This is also happening now. Polish-German relations, especially political ones, have considerably deteriorated over the last two years. The situation on our continent has become complicated too.

In 2015, European states, including Germany and Poland, faced one of the biggest challenges after the end of the Cold War in the form of a migration crisis connected with a massive influx of people from the states neighbouring the European Union, i.e. mainly from the Middle East and North Africa. It was one of the side effects of the so-called Arab Spring, which was initially expected to bring about democratic changes in the political, economic and social situation in those states. Unfortunately, in practice it contributed to the collapse of many states in North Africa and the Middle East and to the destabilisation of the whole region, which also has great geo-economic and geostrategic importance for the whole world. It resulted in domestic wars and many international conflicts. It triggered massive migration movements and caused a migration crisis in Europe, which divided the EU and had impact on the relations between its Member States, including Polish-German relations. At the same time, the migration crisis showed that the EU states favour national interests over the Union's, especially in crisis situations, and revealed the lack of common foreign, asylum and migration policy, which constitutes a serious threat to Europe's security (Dahl, and Dzudzik 2018: 18).

The migration crisis also revealed many international problems, human tragedies and suffering as well as intolerance and prejudice against people in need. It divided nations and stirred things up in the EU. It also showed the lack of unity and unanimity of the EU states in solving difficult problems. When Western European states were confronted with a new situation, Central and Eastern European states demonstrated far-reaching separation from the problems connected with the massive migration. Growing differences between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe resulted in hasty and unconsidered decisions imposing specified quotas of immigrants for entry into all Member States, on the one hand, and strengthening isolationist tendencies and provoking allegations of a lack of European solidarity in the face of the immigration crisis, on the other hand. They had influence on bilateral relations, including Polish-German ones, which have been in deep crisis since 2015. According to Piotr Gajdziński, 'Germans (...), who are not much-loved in Polish high society, are slowly being pushed onto the historically assigned position of the enemies of the Republic of Poland. They used to have their ups but for a short time. In December 1970, when Poland signed a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, Jan Szydłak,

a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, worried about who the authorities would use to make Polish people frightened and to integrate the nation with the use of that fear' (Gajdziński 2018: 3).

Today, 73 years after World War II and 27 years after the adoption of *The Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation of 17 June 1991 between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Polish authorities are trying to trigger aversion to Germans by demanding war reparations and accusing them of supporting the former Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the 'total opposition' in Poland. According to the German side, the issue of war reparations is closed from the legal and political point of view but it is not against experts' discussions of the issue. On the other hand, Polish experts are saying that Poland has not concluded any binding agreement solving this problem with Germany and that the government of the Polish People's Republic abandoned its demands for reparations in 1953 under the pressure from Moscow. German experts are trying to prove that there was a sovereign Polish State in the 1950s and its decisions are binding in terms of international law as well as that the PPR's representatives were consistent in their stand concerning abandonment of reparations. Inter alia, the then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Winiewicz, did it during the negotiations concerning the Treaty signed on 7 December 1970, in which the Federal Republic of Germany recognised the border on the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse as permanent and inviolable. German experts agree with the thesis formulated in Poland that no peace treaty or agreement regulating the issue of reparations has been signed with Germany but, in their opinion, after the 2+4 Treaty of 1990 providing legal grounds for the reunification of Germany, the chapter of the war and its consequences was closed (Jabłonowski, Janowski, and Sołtysiak 2018: 20, Sulowski 2002b). Moreover, they believe that the fact that Poland has not raised the issue of reparations for so many years, i.e. has silently approved the lack of them, gives evidence in favour of Germany, and that the case is subject to a limitation period. German politicians also argue that: 'As a result of the war, Germany lost one fifth of its territory with its natural resources and infrastructure for the benefit of Poland. The loss of these lands meant that Poland gained enormous property. We recognised the new borders although this aroused controversies in our country. In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany paid 2.6 billion euros worth of compensation to Polish victims of the Nazi crimes. The Federal Republic of Germany paid compensation worth 73.4 billion euros in total. The sum does not include the value of property left in the lost territories' (Wellmann 2017: 2, Schulz

2017: 11)¹. I do not fully agree with the opinions because the issue is more complex and the truth is usually somewhere in-between. In 1953, Poland's sovereignty was limited and its foreign policy was totally subordinated to Moscow. Apart from political and international-legal aspects concerning war reparations, there are moral aspects that the German party should also take into consideration (Fiszer 1990, Fiszer 1994). Polish demands for reparations are not understood in Germany today and are not conducive to future Polish-German joined projects (Jastrzębski 2017: 1–40, *Völkerrechtliche Grundlagen und grenzen kriegsbedingte Reparationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Deutsch-polnischen Situation* 2017: 1–27, Nickel 2018: A12, Czapliński 2005: 79–109, Wieliński 2017: 5).

Immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, who seemingly spread dangerous diseases and are commonly associated with Muslims-terrorists, invited by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, are enemies used today to frighten Poles in order to unite them around the ruling party (Law and Justice) (Dahl 2016: 241–262). According to the German media, Poland let Germany down when it faced difficulties in 2015–2017 as a result of the influx of over one million immigrants. It is true that we did not provide assistance to our neighbour. Germans, as opinion polls show, felt disappointed and disillusioned with our attitude because, according to a well-known proverb, a friend in need is a friend indeed. In the face of the migration challenges, which exceeded the financial and organisational possibilities of Germany, Poland should have been equal to the task and offered help. However, we forgot that Germans had helped Polish immigrants after the November Uprising in 1830 and the introduction of martial law in December 1981. Many refugees from Poland found protection and support in Germany then. Not only treaty obligations or historical experiences teach us that it is necessary to respect neighbours and cooperate with them. I am not discussing the ethical and religious aspects, including the Christian principle of mercifulness and duty to help those in need. We disappointed the European Union and our Western neighbours and we lost an opportunity to improve our image on the international arena. The fact is that 'Solidarity' was born in Poland and a lot is said about the necessity of solidarity between nations and states of uniting Europe. On the other hand, it was the Federal Republic of Germany which supported us in our striving to join NATO and the European Union (Ziemer 2005: 48–65, Ciesielska-Klikowska 2015: 45–64).

¹ Wellmann, K.G. (CDU MP).

After the collapse of communism in 1989, Poland had to undertake steps to strengthen sovereignty and ensure its secure position on the international arena. The plan was to achieve it through strong linkage between Poland and the West, i.e. the accession to the European Communities and NATO. To do this, it was first of all necessary to reconcile with Germany, which after the reunification in 1990, became our direct neighbour and was already deeply rooted in the Euro-Atlantic structures. It increased our opportunity to 'return to Europe' and to be linked with the Western system of security. This new neighbour became the most important partner to Poland on the way to NATO and the EU membership. It must not be forgotten. Polish-German cooperation and friendship between our nations should be continually strengthened because there is no alternative to it.

1. ORIGIN OF THE POLISH-GERMAN TREATY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURSHIP AND FRIENDLY COOPERATION OF 17 JUNE 1991

The Autumn of Nations of 1989 initiated by historic social and political changes in Poland quickly spread to other Central and Eastern European countries. Like in Poland, also in other Soviet bloc countries, a great system transformation started then and led from communism to capitalism, i.e. to social market economy and democracy. The processes resulted in the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Fiszer 1992, Fiszer 2016a: 1–6).

With the reunification of Germany, new chapters opened in the history of Polish-German relations as well as the history of entire Europe. The main foreign policy aim of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who became Polish Prime Minister on 24 August 1989, was to achieve a historic breakthrough in the relations with Germany. The task was entrusted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, a renowned lawyer and expert in Polish-German relations. Polish foreign policy objectives concerning Polish-German relations were transparent: evaluate and close the past, lay strong foundations of the development of future relations and build united Europe in cooperation with Germany (Holzer 1998: 47, Holzer, and Fiszer 1996).

Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government was the first in the states of the Warsaw Pact, which as early as 1989 was in favour of the German nation's rights to reunification and self-determination of its future provided that united Germany did not pose a threat to any other country. Taking a stand that the reunification of Germany may be conducive to Poland's national and state

interests, the government announced readiness for Polish-German moral reconciliation. In his first address as Prime Minister on 12 September 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki emphasised, inter alia, that: 'We need a breakthrough in relations with the FRG. Both countries' communities went further than their governments. We are counting on clear development of economic relations and want real reconciliation similar to that which took place between German and French people'².

At the same time, the then German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, also recognised reconciliation with Poland as one of the main aims of Germany's foreign policy. On the other hand, in Poland's foreign policy after 1989, there were voices that it was necessary to build a Polish-German union of interests, the implementation of which was dependent on the definite recognition of Poland's western border by reunited Germany (Fischer 1998: 25). The conclusion of such an agreement was especially urgent for the Polish party, which expected economic assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany in the forthcoming economic transformation processes (Jacobson, and Tomala 1992, Teltschik 1991).

The process of Polish-German reconciliation and development of a Polish-German union of interests started after Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Poland on 9–14 November 1989. In the joint announcement adopted on 14 November 1989 containing 78 points, both parties expressed their will to develop new grounds for mutual relations. It was emphasised that: 'The Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany are aware of their special responsibility for the policy of peace, agreement and cooperation in the interest of people and nations in Europe. (...) Remembering about the tragic and painful pages in history, they are determined to develop their relations taking into consideration the future and acting as models of good neighbourship' (Tomala 1996: 167, Koćwin 1992: 122–125).

Finally, the *Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on the Confirmation of the Frontier between them* was signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Poland) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Germany) in Warsaw on 14 November 1990. The document, containing a Preamble and four Articles, definitely confirmed the Polish-German border on the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse, and closed the way to further speculations on that subject matter (Traktat 1991). In the Preamble, both parties emphasised that they would be striving for reconciliation between the two nations and expressed readiness to act for

² *Gazeta Wyborcza* 13 September 1989, p. 2.

the 'European peace order', in which borders shall not constitute reasons for dispute between states and shall guarantee permanent peace and freedom on the European continent.

The signing and implementation of the treaty confirming the border between Poland and Germany constituted a breakthrough in the process of the normalisation of mutual relations and building foundations of cooperation between Germany and Poland in all fields of life. After the conclusion of the Frontier Treaty, the work on another treaty that was to regulate the peaceful coexistence of the two states was accelerated. Negotiations took place in the period between 1990 and 1991 and were conducted successively in Bonn and Warsaw. The German side first of all wanted to regulate the issues concerning the German minority in Poland. The priority of the Polish side was to obtain international support for our aspirations for integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures and the reduction of Polish debts. Finally, the *Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation* was signed in Bonn on 17 June 1991. The Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation was founded in the same year. Thus, solid grounds were established for the development of cooperation in many areas, from political and cultural to social, economic and political ones. It was successively developed in the years to come (Traktat 1991, Cziomer 1998: 34, Barcz 2007: 151–152).

The Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation is preceded by a Preamble which refers not only to history but also common interests and the necessity of overcoming divisions in Europe and ensuring its security. Next, there are 38 articles. The initial ones refer to the necessity of cooperation and consultation at various levels. Article 8 lays down a very important statement for Poland that the FRG shall support Polish striving for membership of the European Communities. Successive articles emphasise the need to develop economic cooperation between the two countries, the issue of regional cooperation, environment protection, etc. Article 20 was especially important for the FRG because it awarded Polish citizens of German origin the national minority status. The issue was a priority for the German side from the beginning of the negotiations. The successive issues laid down in the document concern, inter alia, cultural cooperation and care for places of worship. Moreover, both parties committed themselves to strengthening cooperation in international organisations (Traktat 1992).

Both the above-discussed treaties were ratified by the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Bundestag of the FRG in October 1991 and entered into force on the same day after the Presidents of both countries signed them on 16 January 1992. The Frontier Treaty of 1990 closed the

painful chapter of the Polish-German history and the Treaty of Good Neighbourship of 1991 opened a new chapter of relations between the two states based on the union of aims concerning the development of a peaceful order in Europe, on the common system of values, i.e. the rights, freedom, democracy and the idea of the state ruled by law, on the union of interests and responsibilities, on common desire for agreement and reconciliation between Poles and Germans. The ideological foundations of this treaty were accompanied by actual solutions to many matters of previous contention and long-term programme of cooperation with emphasis placed on economic, financial, youth-related, cultural and regional fields. In 1990–2016, 200 various agreements, contracts, treaties or joint announcements were signed. Both states entered the road to reconciliation and development the of Polish-German union of interests (Stolarczyk 1997: 14–16, Fiszer 1996: 15–17, Malinowski 1997). Therefore, Rolf Nickel, a German ambassador in Warsaw, is right to recall that: ‘Reconciliation has been a basis for our relations with Poland for decades. We are grateful to Polish people who outstretched their hands to us, starting from the Polish bishops’ letter of 1965’ (Nickel 2018).

2. IMPLEMENTATION, SUCCESSES AND FAILURES ON THE ROAD TO RECONCILIATION AND GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND GERMANY

Democratic Poland and reunited Germany became sovereign states and, at the same time, direct neighbours. The political system differences and ideological barriers in Polish-German relations disappeared. The problem of borders and national minorities lost former significance, especially after Poland’s accession to the European Union, which was backed by the FRG. Obviously, to tell the truth, it is necessary to mention that Poland failed to negotiate the national minority status for over one million Poles living in Germany at the time although the German government had managed to negotiate one for half a million Germans living in Poland.

However, we have to remember that signing the Frontier Treaty and the Treaty of Good Neighbourship Relations required that both states arrive at a difficult compromise for more important reasons. Summing up, regardless of certain shortages in the second treaty, signing them was a milestone in the history of Polish-German relations. Thanks to them, the relations entered a new phase covering other spheres in the years to come, and cooperation in economic, cross-border, scientific, cultural and military fields, and on the

international arena developed especially dynamically. Regular consultations of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and meetings of the heads of all more important ministries were very important as they served to determine cooperation details in all the fields by signing successive agreements and contracts. Parliamentary cooperation also developed and backed the governmental contacts. On the other hand, contacts of political parties played a less important role because of the differences in the party systems existing in the two countries. German parties did not have direct partners in Poland. The niche was filled to some extent by foundations associated with the main political parties in Germany, which opened their offices in Poland: the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (CDU), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (SPD), the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FDP) and the Hanns Seidel Foundation (CSU), maintaining regular contacts with particular formations and parties, and opinion-forming circles in Poland (Cziomer 98: 27–45, Dobraczyński 1996, Tomala 1996a: 77–104, Pflüger, and Lipscher 1994).

After the Frontier Treaty and the Treaty of Good Neighbourship had been signed, regional and cross-border cooperation between Poland and Germany developed dynamically although political contacts between federal states and Polish voivodeships were not too intensive for many reasons, for example, the different character of political and administrative structures in the two countries as well as diverse competences of the executive and the legislative of the two states.

Analysing the political results of Polish-German relations at the turn of the twenty first century, it is necessary to mention the extension of bilateral cooperation towards multilateral cooperation within Polish-German-Danish military contingent or with France within the Weimar Triangle, which accelerated Poland's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union. The Weimar Triangle became an important instrument serving to include Poland in the stream of European politics and integration of the Third Polish Republic into the Euro-Atlantic structures. It is necessary to draw attention to the Euro-Atlantic direction of Polish-German cooperation especially in the context of Poland's aspirations and striving for accession. Without the support from Germany, which in fact acted as Poland's advocate in accession negotiations with NATO and the European Union, our efforts might have taken more time and our membership might have been obtained on less favourable conditions (Michałowski 2002: 145–147, Sulowski 2002a).

Analysing the effects of Polish-German relations after 1989 and the conclusion of the Treaty of Good Neighbourship, it is necessary to emphasise

their evident intensification in all branches of life. Thanks to that, in 1995 the relations were said to be excellent both in Poland and the FRG. The Polish and German press reported that they aroused hope and served both states and the entire post-communist Europe well. Nothing indicated that they could change when Helmut Kohl left the political scene in Germany and the Social Democratic-Green coalition led by Gerhard Schröder (SPD) formed the government in 1998. It was believed that Schröder would find a common language with the post-communists (Democratic Left Alliance) ruling in Poland at the time and would continue the multilevel Polish-German cooperation. However, it did not happen.

The first programme documents and announcements made by G. Schröder's government did not indicate a change in Germany's foreign policy towards Poland, the United States or Russia, which Polish politicians were afraid of. Everything suggested that Chancellor Helmut Kohl's policy would be continued. A broad coalition agreement of 20 October 1998 mainly focused on social and economic issues and did not pay much attention to foreign policy. The part entitled *Good Neighbourhood and Historic Responsibility* first of all made reference to the relations with France and then Poland, the Czech Republic and Israel, and Russia was mentioned together with Ukraine: 'The new Federal Government shall continue to develop (...) good relations with Russia and Ukraine. It shall aim to ensure stability in the area by supporting democratic, social and economic reforms' (Aufbruch, and Erneuerung 1998, Tomczak 2006: 15–30). On the other hand, in the government declaration presented in the Bundestag on 10 November 1998, Chancellor G. Schröder focused on relations with the United States, also spoke about relations with France, the UK and Poland, but did not mention Russia at all³.

Initially, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government outright ostentatiously emphasised that it was going to continue Helmut Kohl's bilateral and multilateral foreign policy. At the same time, it opted for bigger pragmatism in Germany's foreign policy aimed at strengthening the position and sovereign role of the FRG on the global political arena. However, the situation changed in 2002 with the US attack on Iraq. A new debate on the principles and directions of Germany's foreign policy started in the FRG. The debate became one of the main elements of the Bundestag electoral campaign scheduled for 22 September 2002. The SPD/Green coalition objections and Chancellor Schröder's anti-American rhetoric activated the debate over the

³ Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Deutschen Bundestag. *Bulletin, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* 1998 74.

continuation and changes in Germany's foreign policy. It was considered whether, in the face of clearly colder relations with the United States, one could already speak of abandoning the Atlantic political direction adopted by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950s. There was also a rise of concern about the fact that Schröder decided to focus on the development of relations with France and Russia, which disturbed well developing relations with many European Union Member States, especially those that decided to back the American intervention in Iraq, including Poland (Malinowski 2004: 10–14, Kosman 2013: 398–402, Miszczak 2005: 79–109).

It should be remembered that for Poland the period 1998–2003 was the time of the accession dialogue determining the EU membership conditions and the first years of our NATO membership (since 12 March 1999). Our membership of NATO, obtained thanks to the support from the FRG, contributed to the increase in Poland's security and the perception of it as a stable country. On the other hand, the conditions of Poland's membership of the EU were laid down in the accession treaty concluded on 16 April 2003. After the accession referendum on 7–8 June 2003, on 1 May 2004 Poland became a EU member. This way, thanks to Germany's active support, the main objective of Poland's foreign policy after regaining sovereignty in 1989, i.e. joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions: NATO and the European Union, was fulfilled (Ciesielska-Klikowska 2015: 25, Miszczak 2005: 79–109).

From the period of 2002–2003, there was a clear turn in the FRG's foreign policy and, thus, its continuity was brought to a halt in comparison to the period of 1990–1998. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder justified it saying that the FRG was a normal state, i.e. a state, which finished the stage of evaluating the past and, as a result, should implement an independent policy following the German *raison d'être*. He often repeated that, similarly to the neighbours, Germany had its 'reasonably understood national interests' and that 'Germany's policy should be a policy of its own recognised interests', and that 'one's own interests should not be denied, they should be articulated' (Miszczak 2005: 87–88).

Schröder's turn in international policy triggered anxiety in Germany and all over the world, also in Poland. There were concerns that reunified Germany was ready to negate the post-war policy and again become a threat to Europe's peace and security (Kiwierska, and Tomczak 2011: 24–25, Miszczak 2012: 117–291, Erler 2009). The Federation of Expellees (*Bund der Vertriebenen* »BdV«) representatives and its new leader, Erika Steinbach, heated the atmosphere making statements demanding compensation for German nationals forcibly expelled from the territory of Pomerania, East

Prussia, Silesia and the Sudetes, as well as awarding them the right to return to their former real estates (Ciesielska-Klikowska 2015: 54–56, Wolff-Powęska 2004: 5–12).

The change in the FRG's foreign policy under the leadership of Chancellor G. Schröder did not remain without influence on Polish-German relations in the period 2003–2005, when their continuity was also interrupted compared to those at the time of Helmut Kohl's chancellorship. Apart from the international situation, the situation in both countries undoubtedly had impact on Polish-German relations. Poland's attempts to fulfil the conditions laid down by the European Union and the transformation and adjustment of Eastern Germany (the former GDR) to Western Germany certainly did not facilitate mutual contacts. The prospects for Poland's accession and then membership of NATO and the European Union were undoubtedly conducive to mutual relations but dissonance was not avoided here either, and the FRG was responsible for that (Koszel 2008, Holzer, and Fiszer 2001).

The 60th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II was one of the most important events in Polish-German relations during Schröder's chancellorship. The FRG's President and Chancellor paid a visit to Poland in 1999 to take part in the celebrations. This was the first time in history when this type of event was celebrated together. A year later, we celebrated the millennium of Polish-German neighbourhood. During inter-governmental consultations in April 2000, both governments kept saying that Polish-German relations were as good as never before. The 10th anniversary of signing the Frontier Treaty of 14 November 1990 and the 30th anniversary of the Frontier Treaty between the FRG and Poland of 7 December 1970 took place in 2000. Visiting Poland on this occasion, Gerhard Schröder guaranteed that during the approaching summit in Nice, Germany would approve of such solutions that would facilitate Poland's accession to the European Union (Brössler 2003: 43, Stolarczyk 2010: 13–15). It was a significant promise to Poland because in the course of the accession negotiations in the period from 1998 to 13 December 2002, the Polish party faced many difficulties, which often originated from the FRG's uncompromising stand. For example, as far as the issue of free movement of people was concerned, Schröder's government wanted to protect the domestic labour market and was for the introduction of the longest possible transition period for Polish workers, which was finally agreed to last seven years. Agriculture was another controversial area in Poland's accession negotiations, on which Germany had big influence. At the beginning of the negotiations concerning this area, the FRG was against awarding whatever subsidies to farmers from the new Member States.

Eventually, during the last phase of the accession negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2002, an agreement was reached that there would be rising funds for subsidies for Polish farmers from the European Union common budget. At the beginning it was 25 to 35% of resources that farmers from the pre-2004 Member States were entitled to. But the level could be raised to 65% (Lorkowski, and Ostrzyniewska 2004: 282–285, Stolarczyk 2010a: 522).

The agreement between the governments of Poland and the FRG on compensation for workers forced to work for the Third Reich during World War II was a very important issue solved at that time. Unlike Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government, Gerhard Schröder's government distanced itself from German expellees' restitution claims addressed to Poland and agreed to definitely solve the painful problem. In mid-2000 the German Bundestag established the Foundation 'Remembrance, Responsibility and Future' (EVZ), which was to distribute funds provided by the German government to partner organisations. The two governments agreed what sums would be paid to the victims and people forced to work, not only those from Poland but also from other states. The total fund accounted for DM 10 billion, of which Poland was awarded DM 1,812 billion (Stolarczyk 2010: 522).

In the context of continuity and changes in Polish-German relations, the dispute concerning the war in Iraq at the turn of 2003 played the most important role. From the very beginning of the crisis concerning Iraq, the German government's stand was totally different from the Polish stand. France, Russia and China supported Germany (Varwick 2003: 257, Szabo 2006).

In the meantime, on 31 January 2003, Prime Minister Leszek Miller signed the famous letter of the eight, which in some sense was a Polish declaration of solidarity with the United States in the Iraqi conflict. Poland, the member of NATO since 1999, wanted to show the world and the American ally in particular that it was a responsible and loyal partner. Apart from Poland, also the UK, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Hungary, Spain and the Czech Republic signed the letter. It caused consternation in the states that were against the United States' war in Iraq. The German press reported that it divided the European Union and led to the isolation of Germany on the international arena (Szubert 2003: 156–158). Miller's government made a gaffe, failing to inform the German party about its decision, to which it was obliged in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 17 June 1991, which envisaged 'consultations in order to agree on their stand in international matters' (Tomala 2004b: 123–124, Michałowski 2004a: 132–135).

The fact that Poland and Germany found themselves on two sides of the conflict between Iraq and the United States had a negative impact on

Polish-German relations. Germany believed that Poland showed ingratitude to its Western neighbour and strived to play a superpower role. In Poland, on the other hand, Germany's stand on the intervention in Iraq was assessed as a betrayal of Trans-Atlantic interests. The FRG was accused of having superpower ambitions and returning to the so-called 'special German way' on the international arena. None of the parties was able to understand its neighbour's attitude. The political dialogue deteriorated and this influenced Polish-German relations in the European Union. Poland could not rely on Germany's support in many areas. It was especially evident during the talks on the constitutional Treaty on the European Union. Mainly because of Germany's stand, the Treaty contains many provisions that are disadvantageous for Poland, especially in comparison to the Treaty of Nice signed on 26 February 2001 (Chyliński 2012: 204–205, Stolarczyk 2010a: 500–501).

Until the end of Gerhard Schröder's chancellorship, the German party did not change the policy towards Poland, which resulted in far-reaching stagnation in Polish-German political relations. The Polish side was irritated by the disrespectful attitude of Chancellor Schröder's government to Polish concerns about close cooperation between the FRG and Russia. On the other hand, the German side seemed to completely misunderstand Polish concerns and often expressed malicious counter-arguments. Maybe, the Polish party treated German-Russian rapprochement too emotionally. Undoubtedly, history and the syndrome of German-Russian cooperation without Poland's knowledge, which used to have a tragic end for our country, i.e. resulted in partitions of Poland, was also a reason (Cziomer 2005a: 256–257, Guział 2006: 31–47, Fiszer 2016b: 11–34).

In the period 1998–2005, however, economic and trade cooperation between Poland and Germany developed successfully. Two stages of it can be distinguished: 1998–2003 and 2004–2005, i.e. before and after Poland's accession to the European Union, which Chancellor Schröder's government supported, as I mentioned earlier. With respect to this, we observed continuity in Polish-German relations. At that time, trade exchange between our countries was systematically growing exceeding USD 40 billion in the year of Poland's accession to the EU (2004). German direct investments were growing year by year, which proved that Poland was an attractive country for German investors. Cross-border regions and Euroregions established there, *inter alia*, the Spree-Nysa-Bóbr Euroregion and the Pro Europa Viadrina Euroregion, played an important role in Polish-German trade exchange. The development of cross-border cooperation considerably accelerated Polish

economy integration into the European Union economy (Brocka-Palacz 2006: 16–19, Kasperska-Sporek 2004: 253).

In Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's era, cultural relations and military cooperation between Poland and Germany developed quite well. As far as this is concerned, it was continued rather than changed. Chancellor Schröder founded the Willy Brandt Centre at the University of Wrocław in Poland, which is still operating. The 2005 Polish-German Year was undoubtedly one of the most important cultural events at the time of Schröder's government. The event was a nice feature finishing mutual relations in the period of Schröder's chancellorship.

Many researchers and experts believe that the period 1998–2005 was a very difficult time for Polish-German relations and that the era of Gerhard Schröder's chancellorship brought the process of building the 'Polish-German union of interests' to a halt. I believe that the opinions are too far-reaching. In my opinion, many significant differences in the aims and tasks of the two states' foreign policy and the ways chosen to achieve them were only revealed in the period. But, in spite of everything, in the discussed period the political dialogue continued between the two states, also within the Weimar Triangle. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government supported Poland's striving for membership of NATO and the European Union, without which it would be very difficult for Poland to achieve those objectives so strategic for our foreign policy. The differences, in my opinion, mainly concerned Poland's and the FRG's interests and aims pursued within the Euro-Atlantic system and principles of its functioning (Cziomer 2005a: 252–260, Lipowicz 2005). Despite these differences, it was at the time of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's government when Poland joined NATO and the EU. This strengthened our position in Europe and in the world. At the same time, for the first time in the history of Poland and Germany, we became allies and were on the same side of the barricade, i.e. in the same block of democratic and sovereign states.

After the successive snap election to the Bundestag in 2005, which Gerhard Schröder lost, Angela Merkel, who comes from East Germany and knows the taste of life in the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, became Chancellor of the FRG (Stępin 2014). Jadwiga Kiwerska emphasises that: 'Angela Merkel was a new type of a political leader in Germany. She represented the third post-war generation that was not emotionally bound up with pro-Americanism of the 50s and 60s like Kohl's generation and was not shaped by emotions of 1968, including strong anti-Americanism as in the case of Schröder and Fischer. (...) Convinced that the improvement of relations

with the USA lies in the interest of Germany, she was ready to act to improve it. She understood that it would serve to strengthen the Trans-Atlantic system, which is a key element of the international order. But first of all she wanted to contribute to a change of anti-American moods in Germany' (Kiwerska 2001: 242). One of her biographers writes that she has some features of the Sphinx. She is impenetrable, she says very little about her past and she does it reluctantly. Her grandfather's Polish roots were her long hidden secret: he changed his surname Kaźmierczak to Kasner in the 1930s. Angela Merkel triggers opposing emotions among Germans and European politicians, and in Poland, where she was voted the most popular foreign politician in 2012 for the fifth time, following the former victories in 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2011 (Kiwerska 2001: 9, Wieliński 2013a: 11–17).

The government that Angela Merkel formed in 2005, the so-called great coalition of CDU/CSU–SPD, made a successful attempt to readopt Adenauer's principles in Germany's foreign policy: the Atlantic orientation and abandonment of choice between Washington and Paris. Angela Merkel's chancellorship was also conducive to the depersonalisation of Moscow-Berlin relations, which resulted from Gerhard Schröder's relations with Putin, which went beyond official contacts and have been maintained up to now. It was during Schröder's chancellorship that the relations between Berlin and Moscow were described as strategic ones (Guział 2006: 31–47).

In general, Angela Merkel managed to overcome the most painful effects of moves of Schröder's government, inter alia to re-establish allies' trust in Germany and to stop the European policy crisis. Germany regained its position of a reliable and loyal partner of the United States and an active member of the European Union. It became a strong link in the Euro-Atlantic system being a guarantee of Europe's, including Poland's, security (Kiwerska 2001: 230–255, Bowers 2009).

Angela Merkel's government also proclaimed continuity and intensification of cooperation with neighbours, especially Poland. At the same time in Poland, after the parliamentary election won by Law and Justice (PiS) and a failure to form a government with Civic Platform (PO), PiS, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defence (Samoobrona) formed a coalition in 2005, which symbolised hard conservative turn in Polish policy. The election of Lech Kaczyński for President of the Republic of Poland consolidated the situation. The German party greeted the new government led by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and then Jarosław Kaczyński with clear dislike and disapproval accusing it of radical nationalism, provincialism, contentiousness and egoism not only in contacts with the German neighbour but also with

the whole European Union. Misunderstanding, controversies and distrust occurred in both countries. According to Bogdan Koszel: ‘Politicians and journalists started speaking about a crisis, regression and “kitsch” in relation to Polish-German reconciliation. The common attainment of neighbourhood worked out with a lot of effort starting in 1989 was more and more often questioned. The right side of the Polish political scene accused Germany of relative treatment of the historical process and crimes committed by national socialists, and “expellees”, Erika Steinbach and the Prussian Trust became frequently used catchwords’ (Koszel 2008: 5–6).

No sooner had Angela Merkel found a common language with a Polish Prime Minister than Donald Tusk formed a coalition government composed of Civic Platform (PO) and Polish People’s Party (PSL) in 2007. The normalisation of seriously impaired relations with Berlin was one of the main aims of Donald Tusk’s government. Referring to the relations between Poland and the FRG in his first address, Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed the willingness and determination to strengthen strategic partnership with Berlin and said: ‘I guarantee that these relations will bring satisfaction to the entire European Union and both partners’ (*Expose Premiera [Prime Minister’s First Speech]* 2007, Koszel 2009: 193–206, Cichocki 2006: 23–25).

Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s first address in the Sejm was a signal to Angela Merkel that with the change of power on the Polish political scene, there was also a positive reorientation in Poland’s policy towards the FRG. Thanks to that, the moment PO-PLS coalition formed a government, which was in power in Poland in the period 2007–2015, the relations between Berlin and Warsaw returned to the right track with advantages for both states and their nations and the security in entire Europe. Their character was based on partnership and neighbourhood. The situation changed after the presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015, when PiS won and came to power. Beata Szydło’s and Mateusz Morawiecki’s governments have returned to the practice of 2005–2007, which hinders good neighbourhood relations between the two states, which have considerably deteriorated over the last two years.

3. PRESENT STATE AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE

The present state of Polish-German relations, especially political ones, arouses anxiety on the two banks of the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse, as evidenced by the latest visit of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in Berlin on 16 February 2018 and his talks to Chancellor Angela Merkel (Wieliński 2018: 3). Polish and German diplomats straightforwardly say that discussion on many bilateral issues must be started from the beginning. As I wrote in the Introduction, the subjects heavily burdening the present Polish-German relations concern the violation of the rule of law in Poland, of which Germany accuses us, and war reparations, to which Poland returns, the new Baltic Sea gas pipe Nord Stream 2 being prepared by Gazprom, the building of which Germany supports against Poland's stand, and relocation of immigrants, which Germany advocates and the present Polish government is decidedly against (Kublik 2018: 3, Górny 2017).

The stream of immigrants growing continually since the middle of 2015 resulted in a serious migration crisis in the European Union, which the European Commission tried to solve by their relocation (distribution) between the European Union Member States. Polish government decided in July 2015 to receive 5,000 refugees within the EU relocation system. The new Beata Szydło's government withdrew from the agreement and, at the beginning of April 2016 the Sejm adopted a resolution on the state's migration policy, which stipulated that: 'The Sejm of the Republic of Poland expresses a decisive protest against whatever attempts to establish the EU constant mechanisms of allocation of refugees or immigrants. The elements of refuge and immigration policy should remain the competence of the Polish State. It is especially important from the point of view of growing social tensions resulting from excessive waves of migration from the Middle East to Europe'⁴. At the end of 2016 the Sejm adopted two more detailed resolutions concerning the issue. In the first one adopted at the end of October 2016 MPs recognised the obligation to receive refugees from the EU countries that are under migration pressure, under the threat of financial penalty for each

⁴ *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 1 kwietnia 2016 r. w sprawie polityki imigracyjnej Polski. [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 1 April 2016 on the immigration policy of Poland.]*, Monitor Polski 2016, item 370.

refugee refused entry, as violating the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 [3] Treaty on the European Union)⁵. In the second resolution adopted at the beginning of December 2016, the Sejm maintained its stand as of April 2016 and emphasised that the adoption of a constant mechanism of automatic allocation of refugees constitutes ‘the violation of Member States’ competence in the field of social security, internal security policy and integration policy, which is laid down in the Treaties’⁶.

According to research findings, from the very beginning Poles have been against the relocation and the tendency has been observed up to now. 53% of the respondents expressed such an opinion in May 2015; the number fell a bit in September as it was 48%; and at the end of 2015, the percentage was higher again and accounted for 64% in December. Such an attitude remained unchanged practically throughout the whole 2016 to reach 67% at the end of the year. In April 2017, almost three quarters of the respondents (74%) were against the relocation and the tendency remained unchanged until autumn 2017. Polish respondents justified their attitude mainly speaking about their concerns about financial costs and a decreased level of security (Górny 2017: 84–87).

What is interesting is the fact that, at the same time (spring 2017), public support for Poland’s membership of the European Union was the highest since March 2014 and it reached 88% (only 8% of the respondents were against our country’s membership of the European Union). At the same time, the respondents perceived the European integration mainly through

⁵ *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 21 października 2016 r. w sprawie uznania projektu rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady w sprawie ustanowienia kryteriów i mechanizmów ustalania państwa członkowskiego odpowiedzialnego za rozpatrzenie wniosku o udzielenia ochrony międzynarodowej złożonego w jednym z państw członkowskich przez obywatela państwa trzeciego lub bezpaństwowca za niezgodny z zasadą pomocniczości.* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 21 October 2016 on the recognition of a draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person as incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity.] *Monitor Polski* 2016, item 1070.

⁶ *Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 grudnia 2016 r. w sprawie propozycji ustanowienia unijnego korekcyjnego mechanizmu alokacji uchodźców oraz mechanizmu solidarności finansowej.* [Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 2 December 2016 on the proposal to establish an EU corrective mechanism for the allocation of refugees and the mechanism of financial solidarity.] *Monitor Polski* 2016, item 1183.

the prism of ensuring security to the Member States by way of combating terrorism, protecting borders and defence policy (CBOS 2015: 2, 14–15).

At present, European media reports are very critical about the Polish government. Most Germans do not perceive the present Polish government as a reliable partner in the European Union. Answering the question whether the present Polish government is still a reliable partner to the European Union if one takes into consideration the growing differences in the opinions about the admission of refugees, the future of Europe or the European values, as many as 56% of the respondents say NO, and only 27% say YES. As far as Poles' opinions are concerned, only 44% of the respondents say YES, and 32% say NO. Statistically, most often managerial staff and company owners are convinced that the present Polish government is still a reliable partner to Germany. In Germany, the differences between particular groups do not play an important role, however, young people relatively often do not know the answer to this question. Germans who visit Poland, especially regularly, are more often convinced that the present Polish government is a reliable partner to Germany. Similarly, people whose assessment of the situation in Poland or Polish features of character is higher assess Polish government better, too. Poles as well as Germans who recognise the present Polish government as a reliable partner to the European Union more often than others assess the state of Polish-German relations as good and less often treat the above-discussed problems as serious in Polish-German relations. Poles and Germans agree that developing relations with a neighbouring state, their state should focus on cooperation and compromise rather than the protection of its own interests. In both countries most of the respondents think so. Polish society is divided in the assessment of which party's economy benefited more from Polish-German relations. The biggest group believes that both countries benefited equally (36%). Only a slightly smaller number of respondents (32%) believe that Germany benefited more. Poles are divided in their opinions on whether Germany treats Poland as an equal partner in the EU. Similarly to former years, the group of people who believe that Germany does it rarely or never (47%) outweighs the group of respondents who believe that it always or often happens (39%). Similarly, many groups of respondents believe that Germany contributes to overcoming the immigration crisis (44%) as well as to its aggravation (39%). Two thirds of Poles do not notice a military threat from Germany. Similarly, there is an opinion that Germany constitutes a political threat to Poland although the percentage of people who share this opinion decreased by 4% (from 61% in 2015 to 57% in 2017) (Łada 2016: 5–6, Łada 2017: 5–6).

However, everything indicates that the migration crisis will have an enormous impact on the international situation in Europe and Polish-German relations. The resulting growing populism and nationalism in Europe as well as in Germany and Poland constitute a threat to the EU and further integration and security in Europe. The leaders of the EU and particular states and European societies will have to struggle with the consequences for many years to come. Far-reaching cooperation and solidarity of all European states, including Poland and Germany, based on friendship and reconciliation may play an important role in overcoming them.

CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the theory of international relations called the English School, Poland is a perfect example of a peripheral state, i.e. one the position of which is outside the core of the international community. Today, Poland also appears to be a culturally ambivalent country, the identity of which is based on Eastern as well as Western threads. At the same time, culturally, politically and economically, the state declares for the West and assesses its own achievements in comparison to it. Having the features of the Western culture, with the use of rhetoric, Poland is trying to show that it is its part and that the West needs it. Defining itself in comparison to 'the worse others', whose role in relation to Poland is played by Russia and other eastern neighbours: Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine, serves this positive attitude. Russia is used mainly to present our own achievements in a positive light, to prove that Poland is a Western European state. Other Eastern neighbours serve as a specific camouflage: Poland adopts a paternalistic attitude towards them, which is typical of a former colonial empire, and persuades them to follow the same way of development and get closer to the West. At the same time, on the European Union or NATO arena, the East serves Poland to show its important role of a Western ambassador to the East and an Eastern ambassador to the West. Because of its unclear (Eastern-Western) cultural situation, Poland tries to play the role of an intermediary necessary to both sides to create and maintain relations with each other. Sociological research conducted in Poland and in the West confirms this type of objective diagnosis. It shows that Poland demonstrates attitudes that are not understood in Western cultures, e.g. attachment to tradition, cultivation of history, patriotism interpreted as nationalism, resentment and devotion to family values and Christian religion, and in recent years also rejection of liberal

values and migrants by the government formed by Law and Justice. These features compose the representation of Poland in the West, which classifies it as a peripheral state (Grzyski 2016, Wierzbicki 2009, Lewandowski 2008).

At the same time, the history of Poland shows that we have always had problems with establishing our relations with the West and the East, especially our direct neighbours, i.e. Russia and Germany. For Russia, in its international policy, we have always been the 'far' West, and for Germany, the 'far' East. Poland was a too weak peripheral country in Europe and that is why it was exposed to the loss of independence and sovereignty, which it actually lost after the third partition for 123 years and after World War II for 45 years. Only the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 opened the way to the normalisation of sovereign Poland's relations with its neighbours, including Russia and Germany. Only then, Poland was able to decide about its foreign policy, national and international security and find a place in the post-communist and democratic Europe on its own. Polish road to freedom and Europe was long and tortuous because, regardless of some promises, the West imposed many difficult conditions, the fulfilment of which was a requirement for our membership of the Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e. NATO and the European Union. The Russian Federation also opposed it because Poland was to remain within the domain of its influence. For Poland, Russia was the most important partner and a threat existing in the East. However, at the same time, for the Russian Federation, Poland was not a priority in its foreign policy. In Russia, there was a dominant tendency to omit or disregard the importance of Poland's position in Europe (Szkop 2012: 30–33, Przybyła 2013: 67–89, Jakimowicz 2000, Kozhemiakin, and Kanet 1997: 35–36).

Poland's admission to NATO and the European Union, against some forecasts, has not resulted in better relations with Russia. Despite hopes for a reset and opening of a new stage, there has been no 'farewell to distrust' in Polish-Russian relation. Polish-Russian relations are still in a deep crisis. Therefore, Poland should take care of its good neighbourhood relations with Germany, which is its ally in NATO, and a partner in the European Union. This is the only way to avoid the new Rapallo and Russian-German treaty similar to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939, which led to World War II.

One can imagine what would happen with Poland and its security if we did not belong to NATO and the European Union, the most important links in the Euro-Atlantic system, which today, regardless of many difficulties, is still a guarantee of security in Europe and in the world. It also constitutes

a foundation of development of versatile cooperation between Poland and Germany. The European Union and NATO, in order to increase efficiency of functioning of the the Euro-Atlantic system, as well as Poland and Germany must intensify their cooperation and as quickly as possible overcome a series of internal and international problems which impair their mutual relations and endanger our security and peace in Europe. It is necessary to climb to a higher level of mutual relations, i.e. to develop a mature and pragmatic state of partnership between Poland and Germany in Europe, in which governments and political elites in Germany will more than ever before take into consideration interests and needs of Poles, especially within the European Union and NATO, and those in Poland will consistently continue to implement the message and system of values of the Treaty of Good Neighbourship.

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THE TREATY OF GOOD NEIGHBOURSHIP
AND FRIENDLY COOPERATION OF 17 JUNE 1991 BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
ORIGIN, AIMS AND IMPLEMENTATION. SUCCESSES, FAILURES
AND PROSPECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE

Summary

The aim of the article is to present the origin of the Polish-German Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation of 17 June 1991 and its significance for the process of reconciliation and development of versatile cooperation between Poland and Germany in the context of the present migration crisis in Europe. The author formulates a few interesting theses and tries to answer many questions concerning Polish-German relations in the period 1989–2018 and their conditions and prospects. Over the last two years, Polish-German relations, especially political ones, have considerably deteriorated. The international situation in Europe has also become more complicated. One of the reasons of the situation is the immigration crisis resulting from a massive influx of people from the Middle East and North Africa. The immigration crisis has divided the European Union and has affected relations between its Member States, including Polish-German relations.

Key words: Treaties, Poland, Germany, reconciliation, cooperation

TRAKTAT O DOBRYM SĄSIEDZTWIE I PRZYJAZNEJ WSPÓŁPRACY
Z 17 CZERWCA 1991 R. MIĘDZY RZECZĄPOSPOLITĄ POLSKĄ
A REPUBLIKĄ FEDERALNĄ NIEMIEC: GENEZA, CELE I REALIZACJA.
SUKCESY, PORAŻKI I PERSPEKTYWY W KONTEKŚCIE
KRYZYSU MIGRACYJNEGO W EUROPIE

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie genezy polsko-niemieckiego Traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 17 czerwca 1991 r. oraz jego znaczenia dla procesu pojednania i rozwoju wszechstronnej współpracy między Polską a Niemcami w kontekście obecnego kryzysu migracyjnego w Europie. Autor formułuje kilka interesujących tez i próbuje odpowiedzieć na wiele pytań dotyczących stosunków polsko-niemieckich w okresie 1989–2018 oraz ich uwarunkowań i perspektyw. W ciągu ostatnich dwóch lat stosunki polsko-niemieckie, zwłaszcza polityczne, uległy znacznemu pogorszeniu. Sytuacja międzynarodowa w Europie stała się również bardziej skomplikowana. Jednym z powodów tej sytuacji jest kryzys imigracyjny spowodowany masowym napływem ludności z krajów Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej. Kryzys imigracyjny podzielił Unię Europejską i wpłynął na stosunki między jej państwami członkowskimi, w tym stosunki polsko-niemieckie.

Słowa kluczowe: Traktaty, Polska, Niemcy, pojednanie, współpraca

ДОГОВОР О ДОБРОСОСЕДСТВЕ И ДРУЖЕСТВЕННОМ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ
ОТ 17 ИЮНЯ 1991 Р. МЕЖДУ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ ПОЛЬША
И ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКОЙ ГЕРМАНИИ: ГЕНЕЗИС,
ЦЕЛИ И РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ. УСПЕХИ, НЕУДАЧИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ
В КОНТЕКСТЕ МИГРАЦИОННОГО КРИЗИСА В ЕВРОПЕ

Резюме

Целью статьи является представление генезиса польско-германского договора о добрососедстве и дружественном сотрудничестве от 17 июня 1991 года и его значение для процесса примирения и развития всестороннего сотрудничества между Польшей и Германией в контексте нынешнего миграционного кризиса в Европе. Авторы сформулировали несколько любо-

пытных тезисов и предпринял попытку найти ответы на многие вопросы, касающиеся польско-германских отношений в 1989–2018 годах, а также их условий и перспектив. На протяжении последних двух лет польско-германские отношения, прежде всего в области политики, значительно ухудшились. Осложнилась и международная ситуация в Европе. Одной из причин сложившейся ситуации является миграционный кризис, вызванный массовым притоком людей из стран Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки. Миграционный кризис поделил Европейский союз и повлиял на взаимоотношения ее государств-членов, в том числе на польско-германские отношения.

Ключевые слова: Договоры, Польша, Германия, примирение, сотрудничество

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IMMIGRANT VOTERS IN POLAND – BEING JUST ‘RIGHT BEHIND THE CORNER’

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INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses challenges connected with the political participation of immigrants and/or third country nationals (TCNs) in Poland and provides both legal and policy information on its framework. Drawing on both official statistical data and research findings the paper reports empirical results from the comprehensive qualitative study DivPol¹. Taking into account the ethnic composition of contemporary European communities, within the scheme of

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
¹ DivPol was an EU-project designed to initiate, assess, support and evaluate diversity development processes with regard to ethnic diversity in political parties in eight EU Member States from 2012 to 2014. The project aimed to raise awareness and develop practical recommendations and tools to promote diversity development in parties and improve the chances of participation for third-country nationals. Research institutes, universities, NGOs and ministerial bodies, migrant organisations and political parties in eight EU Member States were involved. In the 20-month project run-time over 500 politicians of immigrant and autochthon backgrounds, representatives of migrant organisations and experts were interviewed, attended workshops or participated in dissemination events. The project was co-financed by the European Commission from the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. Its findings regarding Poland in respect to other countries participating in the project are released in Polish (Iglicka, Gmaj 2015b) and English (Iglicka, Gmaj 2015a.).

the DivPol project the researchers assessed diversity in the composition and programmes of the European Union Member States’ main political parties and the ideas about immigrants’ participation.

In Poland the topic of political participation of immigrants is still waiting to find its place in the public debate in general, and within/among political parties specifically. There are some reasons explaining why the topic has not found its place in the public agenda yet. Firstly, according to the Constitution, Polish nationality is a precondition for active participation in political life in Poland. Secondly, however, and in fact a year after the DivPol project was accomplished some trends in settlement migration into Poland changed. Interestingly, as far as international comparisons are concerned, in 2015 Poland took the third place in the whole EU with regard to the ‘naturalisation rate’, i.e. acquisition of citizenship per 100 resident foreigners (see Figure 1). In Poland 3.7 per hundred non-national citizens were granted citizenship, while in the EU-28 as a whole just 2.4.

Figure 1

Naturalisation rate (acquisition of citizenship per 100 resident foreigners), 2015



Note: Data on the number of non-national residents refer to 1 January 2015

⁽¹⁾ provisional

⁽²⁾ estimated

Source: Eurostat 2017.

However, due to the legal limitation stemming from the Constitution rules for political participation of immigrants, research coverage on immigrants' political participation is rather weak in Poland. So far, examples of naturalised politicians in the public sphere who succeeded in Polish elections to the Lower Chamber of the Parliament are presented as proof of the openness of the Polish society as well as the political party to which the immigrant belongs. In the media their example is used to initiate a discussion about everyday relations between the vast Polish majority and those who have arrived in Poland from distant regions, or about the MPs' possible engagement in international relations between Poland and their countries of origin.

2. LEGAL PREREQUISITES AND REGULATIONS WITHIN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PARTIES

2.1. Legal prerequisites to vote (at the local, regional, national and EU level)

Until 2004 active and passive voting rights were restricted to Polish citizens. However, due to the requirements that Poland had to fulfil in order to join the European Union, amendments to the Law on local elections (2004) extended these rights in local council elections to citizens of the EU Member States residing permanently in the given district. The EU nationals residing in Poland can also take part in elections to the European Parliament. It is regulated by the Act on elections to the European Parliament (2004). However, in national elections, both active and passive rights are still restricted to Polish citizens exclusively. The rest of foreigners residing in Poland cannot benefit from any voting rights since Poland has not ratified the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level.

2.2. Who is allowed to join a political party?

According to the literal wording of Article 11 of the Polish Constitution (1997), the freedom of association in political parties is reserved for Polish citizens.

'Article 11. Par. 1. The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom for the creation and functioning of political parties. Political parties shall be founded on the principle of voluntariness and upon the equality of Polish citizens, and their purpose shall be to influence

the formulation of the policy of the State by democratic means’. (Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997)

This limitation is also present in the Act on Political Parties (1997).

‘Article 2.1. Citizens of the Republic of Poland who have reached the age of 18 years may join a political party as its members’. (Act on Political Parties 1997)

Such an approach is justified by an interpretation *a contrario*. It is also indicated that the right of association in political parties belongs to the rights and freedoms inherently related to national sovereignty and independence, and it is unacceptable that foreigners benefit from them (Opinia z 14 września 2012 r. dot. interpretacji art. 11 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i możliwości ewentualnej nowelizacji ustawy z dnia 27 czerwca 1997 r. o partiach politycznych [Opinion of 14 September 2012 on the interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the possibility of amending the Act of 27 June 1997 on political parties]).

However, the European Commission called on Poland to change the existing law (16 April 2012). The Commission’s request referred to membership but also to the right of establishing a political party. The Commission called on Poland to provide these opportunities to citizens of other EU Member States residing in Poland. The Ministry of Administration and Digitisation (currently the Ministry of Digitalisation) and the Ministry of the Interior (currently Ministry of the Interior and Administration) take two opposite positions on this call. The former is convinced that the European Commission’s request is legitimate and that amendments should be made to the Act on political parties. The Ministry of the Interior does not accept the EC’s criticism and suggests that further dialogue is necessary. Finally, the Government Legislation Centre (GLC) recommended ‘a modification of the Act on political parties’. It stated that extending the possibility of membership in political parties to EU citizens would ensure fuller implementation of their voting rights in Poland and a potential conflict between the national law and the EU law would be eliminated. Furthermore, according to the GLC, the modification of the Act on political parties does not affect the scope of Polish sovereignty since the national level is still an exclusive domain of Polish citizens. Other EU nationals associated in political parties will not be able to take active and passive part in elections to the Lower and Upper Chambers of the Parliament as well as in the Presidential election. They will not be able to run for positions such as the Ombudsman or the

President of the National Bank of Poland. What is more, it is inappropriate to claim that granting certain rights to Polish citizens is tantamount to banning non-citizens from exercising these rights. Therefore, on the basis of other constitutional values, it is possible to extend the opportunity of membership and establishing political parties for those who are not Polish citizens in order to allow them to influence local government policies and the policies of the European Union (Opinia z 14 września 2012 r. dot. interpretacji art. 11 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i możliwości ewentualnej nowelizacji ustawy z dnia 27 czerwca 1997 r. o partiach politycznych [Opinion of 14 September 2012 on the interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the possibility of amending the Act of 27 June 1997 on political parties]). In conclusion, non-Polish citizens are currently excluded from the membership of any political party in Poland.

3. IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN POLAND – MAIN DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL FEATURES


For centuries Poland has been continuously a country of net emigration. Until 1989 immigration was virtually non-existent. Since the collapse of communism the inflows of foreign nationals have been steadily growing, however, by European Union (EU) standards, both the stock and flows of foreign residents have remained relatively low because most of foreigners coming to Poland have been circular or short-term migrants whose propensity or ability to settle down has been low. Simultaneously, especially since 1 May 2004 when Poland accessed to the EU, the outflow of labour migrants has intensified and reached an unprecedented level. In the year 2015 there were about 2.5 million Poles engaged in migration (mostly for economic reasons), 80% of them stayed in foreign countries (mainly the UK and Germany) longer than a year (Iglicka 2001a, 2001b, 2002)

Although the number of persons granted Polish citizenships is rather low, the trend is increasing. In the years 1992–2016 Polish citizenship was granted to 51,121 foreigners (Central Statistical Office). However, it should be stressed that almost half of naturalised persons acquired Polish citizenship in the years 2011–2016.

During the last 25 years the main recipients were citizens of the former USSR: Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians and Armenians. The Vietnamese and German citizens constituted further major groups.

Figure 2


Acquisition of Polish citizenship (including acquisition of restored citizenship) in the years 2013–2016



Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the Central Statistical Office data (updated 31 January 2018a).

Figure 3

Acquisition of Polish citizenship (including acquisition of restored citizenship) in the years 2013–2016 by country of previous citizenship (five leading countries)



Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the Central Statistical Office data (updated 31 January 2018a).

Unfortunately, there are no data on the political participation of naturalised persons which could justify making sweeping statements regarding their entire population. Available information refers to the rare individual immigrants who are politically active at the local and national level.

The situation has changed dramatically quite recently. For the first time in a long history of migration, Poland has become a land of immigration rather than emigration. Poland, a country of 38 million, is already home to over one million Ukrainians. Most of them decided to emigrate after the military conflict erupted in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Most did not flee the war but its economic consequences: a recession that lasted two years, unemployment

and the plunging currency. Their community consists of migrants staying on the basis of permanent and temporary stay permits and a huge number of circular migrants staying in Poland up to six months in a year.

Since 2014 the number of foreigners willing to legalise their stay in Poland has been increasing steadily. At the end of 2017 about 325,000 foreigners held documents entitling them to stay in Poland. Temporary stay (up to 3 years) is still a dominating form. In 2017 it constituted 88% of all applications. Remaining 10% referred to permanent stay and 2% to a long-term UE resident permit. Almost 65% of all applications were submitted by 20–39 year old persons (Office for Foreigners) that indicates that labour migration predominates. On the one hand, it is a response to labour force shortages experienced by the Polish economy due to the post-2004 increase in emigration of Poles to Western Europe and, on the other hand, as it was hinted above, economic downturn and political instability in Ukraine. Ukrainian citizens have always been prevailing among other immigrants to Poland. This phenomenon has been already described in the literature from the migratory system perspective, see e.g. (Iglicka, and Weiner 2008). However the strength of Ukrainians' dominance has been rising significantly since 2014. The increase in the immigrant stock in Poland is also mainly due to Ukrainians, although other groups are visible as well.

The above mentioned statistics do not cover short-term migrants, mainly Ukrainians, who worked in Poland on the basis of the employers' declaration, both officially and in a shadow economy, for less than 6 months in a year. In 2017 Labour Offices registered about 1,800,000 of such declarations (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy).

Indeed, as the Polish economy experiences a dynamic growth (4,6% annual growth in 2017 »estimation by the Central Statistical Office 2018b«) and unemployment has never been so low since the transition to the market economy in the early 1990s (registered unemployment rate at the end of 2017 was 6.6% »Central Statistical Office 2018c«), the labour shortage is real in many sectors and regions and is exacerbated by the emigration of around two million Poles, usually young ones. Even if the trend is now towards the return of emigrants, this movement is still modest and is not sufficient to solve the problem.

4. ACTUAL STATE OF REPRESENTATION IN MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Although individual parties do not present information about the number of their members on official websites, it is justified to claim that in Poland, there are no mass-scale parties, except the biggest one – PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/Polish Peasants’ Party) – that has approximately 140,000² members. The currently ruling PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/Law and Justice) has about 30,000 members. PO (Platforma Obywatelska/Civic Platform) and SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Democratic Left Alliance) have about 17,000 and 20,000 members respectively. Other existing parties are much smaller, e.g. Solidarna Polska (Solidarity Poland) has 5,000 or Twój Ruch (Your Move) has 3,000 members.

Such low numbers of people participating in political parties in a country with the population of approximately 38 million can be explained as the heritage of 45 years of the post-war communist period.

In the case of Poland, due to popular reluctance to join parties, it seems that political parties are focused on attracting potential voters rather than potential party members. As a result, ‘in practice, political parties act as pressure groups rather than mass structures and this is a weakness of our political life. Well, there are massive structures, representing mass membership and treating it more seriously, for example PSL and SLD’. (E1) However, as opinion polls show, parties are perceived as primarily living their own lives, their own problems and struggles which have nothing to do with citizens’ everyday life concerns (Public Opinion Research Centre »CBOS« 2013).

Summing up, party membership is rather rare in Poland. People registered in political parties, apart from active members, do not make up even one per cent of eligible voters. Except one or two parties, it is also difficult to talk about mass-scale parties having a longer history.

4.1. Current data on how many migrants and/or TCNs are sitting in the Parliament as representatives of their parties

Since membership in political parties is restricted to Polish nationals, in this paper we refer to naturalised immigrants only. So far, three naturalised TCNs have been elected to the Polish Parliament³. The first one is Hubert

² All data on the number of members are quoted from the mass media: Skomra (2016), Zespół wPolityce.pl (2016), Polish Press Agency from polskieradio.pl (2012) and Sikora (2017).

³ It is worth mentioning another case of a naturalised MP – Nelli Rokita – who sat in the Polish Parliament; she is German, and moved as a child from the USSR to Germany (1976). In 1994 she married a Polish politician – Jan Rokita.

Ranjan Costa (elected as a member of Self-Defence/Samoobrona in 2005), who originated from Bangladesh. The second one is John Abraham Godson, originating from Nigeria (a former member of Civic Platform/Platforma Obywatelska and later Poland Together/PolskaRazem), first (2010) he replaced another MP, who was elected for President of one of Polish cities, and then he was re-elected in 2011. The third one – Killion Munyama originating from Zambia – is a member of Civic Platform/Platforma Obywatelska. He was elected in 2011 and then re-elected in 2015. All the three politicians had been working as councillors at the local level.

These MPs do not raise claims on behalf of immigrants and do not refer to immigrants as potential supporters, because immigrants' votes cannot provide political success to naturalised candidates. To be elected, they have to appeal to the Polish electorate for their support. Hubert Ranjan Costa, John Abraham Godson and Killion Munyama entered the Parliament as representatives of mainstream parties⁴. They do not perform as representatives of immigrants but rather as representatives of their party and/or region.

As far as regional and local parliaments are concerned there have been only a few cases of naturalised councillors and even a commune leader (a village leader). The latter originated from Yemen; before being elected a commune leader he had been offered to run for the councillor position, but he refused. 'I have never imagined myself in the role of a politician. A commune leader is different. He has to act and not to conduct public debates' (Bziuk 2007).

5. EXISTING RESEARCH OVERVIEW

Until now no in-depth study has been conducted in Poland that could show how immigrants benefit from political freedom. Available studies concentrate on different ethnic groups or categories of immigrants and, furthermore, the issue of their associations is only a part of each research project. In this context,

⁴ Representatives of historical minorities follow a similar strategy. They enter the Parliament as members of mainstream parties. Germans are the only minority representatives of which successfully enter the Parliament thanks to: (1) their spatial/regional concentration, and (2) the special regulation for national minorities (they do not have to achieve a 5 per cent threshold that is obligatory in the elections to the Polish Parliament). Other minorities are too territorially dispersed.

it is worth recalling the results of the surveys on participation in associations⁵ and organisations, conducted among Ukrainians and the Vietnamese settled in Poland. It turned out that only 15 per cent of Ukrainians belong to any organisations. Among them, most were members of trade unions⁶ (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2007). This can be interpreted in terms of individualistic attitudes dominating among Ukrainians: they are rarely members of any organisations and if they are, it is to protect their individual interests. Such a tendency was confirmed by establishing the first Trade Union of Ukrainian Workers in Poland (Międzyzakładowy Związek Zawodowy Pracowników Ukraińskich w Polsce [Inter-enterprise Trade Union of Ukrainian Workers in Poland]) in 2016⁷. Probably, due to the short linguistic and cultural distance to the Polish majority, Ukrainians settled in Poland do not need support of ethnic organisations (Stefańska 2008). On the contrary, the Vietnamese settled in Poland are much more likely to get organised, as they experience a sense of alienation, which is the result of both cultural and linguistic distance and a different appearance in the very homogenous Polish society. More than a third of the respondents belonged to Vietnamese associations, nearly half of them to more than one. Three-quarters of the respondents said that they had participated in events offered by Vietnamese organisations during the last 12 months preceding the survey (Grzymała-Kazłowska 2007).

⁵ Freedom of association is a constitutional guarantee. It is regulated by the Law on Associations (1989), which defines an association as a ‘voluntary, self-governed and permanent organisation, set up for non-profit purposes’ (Article 2(1)). Unless the statute of an association states otherwise, all foreigners may join existing associations. However, only permanent residents of Poland may set up such associations. This restriction does not apply to foundations, which may be formed by all persons, regardless of their residence status, but they have to be located in Poland.

⁶ Article 59 of the Polish Constitution (1997) guarantees the freedom of membership in trade unions and employers’ associations. Statutory law other than in cases dictated by international commitments must not limit the scope of this guarantee. Another act regulating membership in trade unions is the Act on Trade Unions (1991).

⁷ In May this year the Inter-Enterprise Trade Union of Ukrainian Workers was established in Poland, with the primary objective to ‘protect dignity, rights and interests related to paid employment’. The union was established under the auspices of the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych – OPZZ), which coordinated and provided guidance in the process of its establishment. Representative of OPZZ say that in this way, as a Polish Trade Union, they pay back a debt to their Western colleagues, who had helped to organise Poles after 2004 (European Migration Network, n.d.).

Political challenges arising from migration-related diversity were covered by one of the working packages of the EMILIE research project⁸. The analysis focused on voting rights and civic participation. Taking into account the fact that voting rights are limited to Polish nationals, five models of immigrants' political participation were elaborated. The first one refers to immigrants' cooperation with historical ethnic/national minorities. Those immigrants who are co-ethnics of old minorities recognised in Poland might rely on the support of old minorities, including also political channels such as old-minority representatives who are, e.g. members of mainstream parties. The second model refers to Muslim immigrants, who are a religious and not ethnic/national minority. In this case, we observe a process following the Western pattern of political representation. It is embodied by the Muslim League, which relies on the support of converts who seem to replace the old minority Muslims. The third model is based on seeking allies among Polish politicians in order to create a platform consisting of immigrants different in appearance from the Polish majority. The aim is to present a vision of integration from the perspective of a person who stands out among the Polish homogeneous majority. The fourth model is represented by the arrivals from socialist Vietnam. They try to be invisible in the political sphere. They focus their activities on self-support and maintaining their ethnic identity and culture. Finally, the fifth model is characteristic of immigrants focused on the political situation in the country of their origin. It refers to Chechen, Belarusian and Vietnamese dissidents or the Palestinians (Gmaj 2011).

The report 'Political participation of third country nationals on a national and local level' (Kaźmierkiewicz, and Frelak 2011) is based on secondary data and small-scale research – seven interviews with both politicians and immigrants. It concentrates on the institutional framework (opportunities and constrains) for immigrants' civic and political participation. Among its main findings is the tendency noted by the interviewees to perceive immigrants as guests. This tendency is especially strong among local-level politicians and officials. Another crucial conclusion is the opinion the representatives of migrant organisations have on Polish authorities, which, according to the immigrants, do not have the will to promote immigrants' activism. In their opinion, the authorities are not interested in issues related to integration but in controlling access to the labour market and the Polish territory.

⁸ A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship: Legal, political and educational challenges – EMILIE was a three-year research project funded by the European Commission Research DG, Sixth Framework Programme (2006–2009).

6. DIVPOL RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1. Description of the empirical phase – methodology and general information on the interviews and interviewees

In the case of Poland materials were collected in April–July 2013. They were mainly face-to-face interviews; only two were conducted on Skype. All of them were recorded. There were two focused interviews with migrant organisations (NGO1; NGO2⁹), with four and five people respectively. 18 members of seven political parties¹⁰, one former party member¹¹ and two non-party councillors¹² were reached individually. Furthermore, three experts – Professors of Law were interviewed¹³. All, except the last three above-mentioned interviews, were based on the list of questions designed for the DivPol project and adjusted to the Polish situation and to the situation of a particular interview. Only one interview with a migrant organisation was in English, all the others were in Polish. All in all, 33 persons were interviewed (see table x in the Annex).

It was an extremely challenging task to encourage politicians to discuss the topic of immigrants’ political participation in Poland. Because of that, whenever it was possible, we asked questions designed for different modules during one interview. For example, an interviewee first responded to questions designed for an outreach, campaign or lobbying staff within the party, and then he answered questions for the module for a politician without an immigrant background. As a result, five categories of interviewees were established:

- Politicians with a migrant background (individual interviews with four persons, including three party members and one non-associated councillor)
- Politicians without an immigrant background (thirteen individual interviews)

⁹ The abbreviations are used when we quote interviewees.

¹⁰ We label them PP1_1 – PP7_1, which can be explained as: the first party, the first interviewee; the seventh party, the first interviewee. The list of parties: PJN (Polska jest Najważniejsza/ Poland Comes First); PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/Law and Justice); PO (Platforma Obywatelska/Civic Platform); PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/Polish People’s Party); SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Democratic Left Alliance); PPP (Polska Partia Pracy/Polish Labour Party); Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement)

¹¹ Labelled FP_1

¹² Labelled NP_1 and NP_2. The NP_2 used to be a party member.

¹³ Labelled: E1, E2, E3 respectively.

- Outreach, campaign or lobbying staff within the party (six individual interviews)
- Inner-party gate-keeping personnel (three individual interviews)
- Migrant organisation representatives (two organisation focus groups, nine persons interviewed)

It should be also pointed out that between collecting interviews (2013) and writing this article (2018) some changes occurred in the Polish political landscape. They affected our interviewees' affiliation. In short, one of the parties changed its name; another one was incorporated into a newly emerged party¹⁴. One of our interviewees was excluded from his former party and later became one of the founders of a newly emerged formation. In order to avoid confusion, the authors have decided to recall the current state of the phase of collecting interviews.

6.2. Access and entry into a party

6.2.1. Reasons for joining and ways of entering a political party

Four interviewees classified as politicians with a migrant background were asked about the motivation for their political engagement in Poland. It should be stressed that all of them are very well educated. They are graduates of Polish universities, although they also have some academic experience from abroad. One can find academics among them. That makes them outstanding. Yet, before having started their political career and having been later elected representatives, they had already been well established (including professional and family life) in Poland and recognised in their local communities.

What is interesting, political party membership was not the reason of their success in communal/municipal elections. Some current members of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament (the Sejm) were elected at the municipal level before joining a political party. It is also worth noting that there exists a village councillor who consciously avoids entering any political party. He is convinced that at the commune level political affiliation can be a disadvantage, adversely influencing relationships with his neighbours:

¹⁴ Ruch Palikota (Palikot's Movement) became Twój Ruch (Your Move) and PjN (Polska jest Najważniejsza/Poland Comes First) was incorporated into Polska Razem Jarosława Gowina (Jarosław Gowin's Poland Together) currently Porozumienie Jarosława Gowina (Jarosław Gowin's Accord).

‘[It is important that] politics does not dominate relations [at the local level] because it may cause disagreements between neighbours and (...), let’s say, crises between a councillor and the residents’. (NP_1)

A non-migrant councillor raised concerns of a different nature:

‘I’ve really seen people being raked over the coals, having their conscience violated. I saw councillors who got a sudden stomach pain just because they wanted to leave the session, because they knew that they could not vote for something, and they were forced to do so. They were late hoping that something had been already voted on. They did not want to participate in the session because they were afraid of different types of sanctions for their lack of subordination to the party. They were forced to vote against their beliefs and against the people they represented. This is a huge drawback in the way of functioning of a local government. A local government is closest to citizens and it should represent their interests, the expectations of residents. (...) However, I observe that it is not a rare case that councillors vote against the interests of their constituents because they follow their party line. Unfortunately, partisanship prevails over self-government in Poland. The idea of self-government is brought up on the occasion of local elections every fourth year’. (NP_2)

The above-mentioned arguments point out some reasons why interviewees have resisted joining a political party although they work for their local communities’ benefit. Some people who are active at the local level do not accept the idea of transferring the national-level conflicts to their local communities. Their diagnosis of the contemporary Polish self-governance system is not positive. It can be described in short – too much politics, too little care about the needs of the constituency. One of the interviewees, labelling himself ‘an idealist’, explained:

‘And despite various proposals, I have decided to become an independent councillor (...) Having no connections with the opposition or the coalition reduces the chance of implementing various motions. It is obvious. But on the other hand, it is a very big comfort – firstly, psychological, and secondly, you can actually represent the interests of residents, your constituency’. (NP_2)

What are the reasons for joining a political party pointed out by migrant interviewees? They joined a political party when they realised that in order to make their social visions come true, it is better to be a part of a bigger structure.

‘Without politics and engagement in a party that has a real impact on social life I would be just one of many doctors who are not heard. Thanks to politics, I manage to implement at least a tiny part of my plan’. (PP5_3)

‘Already in 2001, I wanted to join [the name of the party] but my application was not treated seriously (...) they did not respond so I left that idea aside for the moment. Then, [the name of the party] turned to me. They wanted me to run for a county councillor. But at that moment, I was not convinced that this was what I really wanted to do’. (PP3_1)

Finally, he came to the conclusion that as a member of a political party, he could achieve more of his social aims. He submitted his application to the Civic Platform and it was accepted.

A decision on joining a political party can be undertaken when a politician thinks about political career at a higher level.

‘I became a party member before Regional Assembly elections. I made the decision then as it is much more difficult to be elected at this level being outside a party’. (PP3_2)

In the case of a person who has already been experienced as a councillor in a county, joining a party half a year before an election is reasonable both from his point of view and for the political party efficiency.

‘I cannot deny that they were looking for a potential candidate to the Regional Assembly, a candidate who can overcome other candidates. So it was also a political party initiative’. (PP3_2)

To conclude, in the case of so-called elected politicians with a migration background, the motivation for becoming politically active in a party appeared when they were recognised by local communities due to their professional position and social activities. Joining a political party was just another step in their mature life. The politicians discussed above belong to the first-generation immigrants. They were naturalised in Poland. What is also characteristic – they did not arrive in Poland as typical labour or settlement migrants. They came to Poland for educational reasons; there is also a missionary among them. All of them met their wives in Poland and started a family here.

Being recognised due to their professional position, engaging in social life and local community before becoming a party member is not unique for politicians with a migrant background. The same is also observable among other politicians.

‘I was non-party, independent, active in the local government structures (...) Local governments are strong. If they are as cohesive and unitary as in [the name of the city], people do not fight against each other, you know, there is a competition... but... in short, local circles decided that I should be an MP. And they took care of that and finally, I became an MP’. (PP3_4)

However, it seems that in the case of politicians without a migration background, a more typical political career starts after graduating from secondary school, usually at university, therefore still at the beginning of their professional life.

‘At university, I was always interested in politics. It was an interesting time (...) I wanted to take part in these changes. For a young man, engagement in politics is a way to observe and to change the reality. (...) I made a calculation – which party programme suited me best (...). (FP_1)

‘The moment I decided to work in the public or political domain or in general in this area of activity was after secondary school graduation. So it was the period between finishing school and beginning studies at university’. (PP2_2)

‘I began to observe my own hometown. More and more things began to bother me (...) in fact most of the people of the older generation assumed that it was no use bothering and acting since it would bring no good result anyway. It is such a typical stereotypical way of thinking. I started my adventure with politics from creating a youth branch of one of the small opposition parties. I was too young to join a political party. (...) With first successes (...) I became even more motivated. And then in 2006, I think, one of the MPs asked me to be a candidate in local elections. At the beginning, I was very sceptical, but then I realised that it could be the next step to getting these very small or bigger things for my local community. I was a candidate as a member of the party’. (NP_2)

There are at least a few reasons to become politically active in a party, as it has been already shown above. Firstly, our interviewees pointed out a desire to make a real impact on social life at different levels, starting at the commune and finishing at the national one. Secondly, they mentioned the pragmatic conclusion that outside the party system it was much more difficult to have such an impact. Therefore, they chose a membership in a party even though ‘politics [was] only a tool to implement [their] plans and aims’. Thirdly, the interviewees mentioned that during their previous activities they had cooperated tightly with a party so their decision to formally access seemed to be a simple confirmation of the fact and a kind of manifestation of their loyalty, e.g.:

‘I was not a party member and I was invited to run from the PO ticket (the list of candidates). I became an MP, I was a member of the party club in the Parliament, so after a year I came to the conclusion that formal accession to the party was in good taste and it was a manifestation of loyalty. Especially as I was a candidate of the party and I share its views’. (PP3_4)

Fourthly, activities undertaken in a party can be an area where creative potential of interviewees is employed: ‘Everything was so fresh and spontaneous. It was just cool. We had a great time establishing this party. At the beginning, we had a great time. We made friends’. (PP7_1) Earlier,

our interviewee made an attempt to join one of the already existing parties. However, she was deterred by its ‘numbness’. A new party appearance was the best moment for her to start her activities in a political party.

This list of motivations is for sure neither exhaustive nor complete. First of all, we managed to reach a limited number of interlocutors. Secondly, from a psychological point of view, it is not astonishing that interviewees wanted to make a good impression on the researchers both as individuals and as party members. Nevertheless, it is also worth presenting a more general picture shown by one of former party members who decided to continue his activities at the local level, but without any party affiliation:

‘In the last few years I have seen many motivations to be a candidate in local elections. People were motivated because their wives could lose a job or “I have to because I got fired” or because “I need money”. I started with the assumption that I did not have to, but I could and I wanted to. So when it is possible, I am engaged in the local government. But I also have other options in my life – I can work as a scientist’. (NP_2)

None of our interviewees could point out any particular programme or procedure that introduces new party members into the political party activities. They were convinced that new members get accustomed to party activities thanks to the existing structures and interpersonal relations.

‘Political parties have different kinds of sub-groups or units within the organisation, more or less formal ones, that group people who share particular problems. I mean youth groups of political parties, groupings of certain professions or focused on certain topics. They function very well. They help to adapt more consciously to the party’s activities and to find one’s own place in a given formation. It is based on personal contacts and exchange of ideas with people who are in a similar situation or who face similar problems. People share experiences and jointly develop some models of cooperation or even patterns of action. They design common goals’. (PP4_2)

‘If there is a need, we run special courses. We offer a great range of such activities. These classes are designed, for example, with regard to age. We run a summer school for leaders; each year about 100 people who want to be political activists participate in it. (...) Secondly, before local elections, we always conduct a regional training [to teach them] how candidates should prepare for these local elections. We present information about legal issues, but also we train them in ... social engineering or marketing, which gives them chances to win in the elections’. (PP5_1)

‘I was made a member [of an academic group]. I preferred the Widzew Łódź group – linked to the district of the city I am residing in, but (...) there were different factions within the party and the faction [of the person who recommended me] didn’t belong to the Widzew Łódź group, and he wanted to have me on his side. So he recommended me for the academic group. At that time, I didn’t realise that... I realised that later’. (PP3_1)

6.2.2. Topics of interest of TCN politicians/politicians with a migrant background

On the basis of our interviews, it can be said that in the case of politicians with a migrant background, their topics of interest in the party are determined by their professional profile, e.g.:

‘I have seen the effects of a lack of medical care or its low quality. Therefore, this area of activity is the most important for me’. (PP5_3)

‘First of all, I am an economist and I specialise in international finance. I have always been interested in finance and public finance in general, including local government finance. This was the area that interested me most. Besides, there is also international cooperation, economic cooperation between a region in Poland and regions abroad. (...) The party utilises this potential’. (PP3_2)

Since citizenship is a precondition for party membership, immigrants who joined political parties had a good position in their professional domain. They did not start their activities in a party as young people who are at the earliest stages of their professional career. They had been already recognised in their communities as specialists, active in the public domain. Nevertheless, even in the case of new party members who are highly skilled professionals, some obstacles may appear. These obstacles are related to the resistance of senior party members to newcomers.

‘When it comes to obstacles, these are little things, mainly based on the fact that despite his knowledge, a new member is treated as not very qualified just because he is new in the party or he is new in certain party activities. (...) Older members think that a new member knows less and his opinion is disregarded. (...) In my case, it did not take long to change this attitude. I knew what I wanted and I said it, which is obviously important for the functioning of any organisation and I think... I do not know, it took three months, six months...’. (PP3_2)

6.2.3. Links between parties and migrant organisations

Any discussion about links between parties and migrant organisations is rather impossible in the case of Poland. None of our interviewees could point out any examples of such connections. It is better to talk about cooperation of individual politicians with migrants, as it is in the case of one of our interviewees who keeps more or less formal relations with Vietnamese and Syrian groups living in Poland; or in the case of a representative of the old

Ukrainian minority¹⁵, who is more aware of immigrants' problems since he has an affection for his co-ethnics arriving in Poland from Ukraine. One can also observe some attempts of African immigrants to initiate some kind of cooperation with politicians; however, the results are still far from satisfactory, as we learned from the representatives of a migrant organisation.

One should be aware that migrants' organisations are still very new in Poland and they are not strong enough to be recognised as partners by political parties. However, growing dynamics of their development cannot escape the researchers' notice. Especially, Ukrainians' students organisations deserve attention¹⁶. One should take into consideration the fact that one of the unintended consequences of Russia's actions in Crimea will be the reinvigoration of the Ukrainian diaspora's interest in and support for Ukraine from abroad – and putting to the test their ability to leverage their global presence for the benefit of those in the country itself. It means, e.g. that a part of Ukrainians in Poland may be more focused on their ethnic/national issues, which may be used for various political reasons not necessarily conducive to Polish interests.

6.3. Immigrants as elected/appointed representatives of political parties (representation and participation)

When we discuss the issue of political involvement of migrants in the narrow context used in the DivPol project, as membership in political parties and passive and active participation in elections, we should stress once again that in Poland it is limited to holders of Polish citizenship. Unfortunately, there is no definite data on the political participation of naturalised persons. However, due to the changes in immigration trends to Poland the potential is growing. Political parties reached in our research do not collect data on their members or candidates for membership that could constitute a party's immigrant database. Therefore, the DivPol research did not provide hard data in this area. Our interviewees were of the opinion that questions about one's immigration background are not crucial compared to sharing political

¹⁵ Old national and ethnic minorities recognised by the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Languages of 2005 are as follows: national minorities: Armenian, Belarusian, Czech, German, Jewish, Lithuanian, Russian, Slovak, and Ukrainian; ethnic minorities: Karaim, Lemko, Roma and Tatar.

¹⁶ Congresses of the Polish League of Ukrainian Students (Liga Ukraińskich Studentów w Polsce) were organized twice in 2016 and 2017.

attitudes or party convictions. What is more, questions about one’s confession or ethnic belonging are treated as confidential and should not be asked.

On the one hand, the method of gathering and elaborating socio-demographic data on candidates and party members employed by political parties can be labelled as an ‘HR approach’. Let us recall the concise words of a politician and inner party employee: ‘these are rather basic data on age, education and profession. We try to treat members as potential staff, so we can turn to them for assistance in creating our political programmes. Therefore, we rather concentrate on their interests, professions and educational attainments’. (PP5_2) ‘On the other hand, these data are elaborated for organisational issues like mailing, meetings, etc. They are also the basis for assessments of potential preferences, trends, problems or challenges shared by people engaged in a given political party. Finally, they are collected ‘in order to know what party we are’ (PP1_1), in other words, to find out who supports a given party in terms of age, sex, level of education and place of residence, which is especially important in the case of small-scale parties that have been established in the few recent years.

The interviewed politicians agree that political participation of immigrants is influenced by an attitude prevailing in the Polish society:

‘The majority [of Poles] would like to be an adherent to a party, not its direct actor, meaning a party member. (...) The reluctance to engage directly, not in political, but in party life; this is the reason why in many communities we observe the development of electoral, but non-political, committees. It is better not to be perceived as someone associated with a particular political party (...) unfortunately, party membership, sometimes helpful, can also be disadvantageous. Just to be on the safe side, it is better to be outside a party but have precise political preferences. So if the Polish society is so wary, immigrants are even more wary’. (PP3_3)

The wariness can be interpreted from a very down-to-earth perspective, particularly at the local community level. It is related to the development and successful implementation of very concrete solutions to problems experienced by residents in their everyday life. Let us recall the words of a naturalised independent (non-party) councillor:

‘At this level, stressing one’s political affiliation, political language is not good because these are local issues and they don’t need big politics; (...) national level politics to dominate these relations; because it can usually lead to disagreements in neighbourhood relations, or further problems in contacts between a councillor and local residents. Yes. Therefore, when I speak to people, I do not stress my political opinions’. (NP_1)

Regrettably, it seems that at least some of the immigrants share not only the wariness but also disapproval of Polish politicians:

‘They shout at each other, they criticise and waste their time. That is why I say I hate politics. Because a politician is supposed to do something for the people who elected him, who support him. So he must do something for the people and I do not think that Polish MPs (...) do something good for the people. Even the Polish people are already fed up with these politicians in the government (...) because they do not see any improvements (...) They have the same mentality, in all parties they have the same mentalities, even if they have a lot of, as they call it, intellectuals, but most are not intellectuals and do not even want to improve (...) to consult other people’. (NGO_1)

CONCLUSIONS

‘Many political parties in Europe face a shrinking membership base because of general disenchantment with politics. With globalisation and worldwide migration European societies are becoming increasingly diverse. This is posing new challenges to European democracies, which need to engage each new generation in their political systems. Political parties play a key role in this process. As organisations holding legislative and governing powers, parties need to reflect diversity within their ranks. The participation of immigrants in party politics is crucial for both immigrants and the long-term cohesion of these democracies. However, parties are still struggling with this’. (CJD Hamburg + Eutin 2014: 7)

As for Poland the issue of political participation of immigrants is not yet on the agenda. The issue of immigration to Poland has been placed so far only in an economic and demographic context. Quite recently politicians and policy makers have become more aware of the nation’s difficult demographic situation stemming mainly from low birth rates, huge emigration and aging trends. This is the reason why the question of immigration started to be perceived in a public discourse as one of the means to reduce the above mentioned problems. Such an approach puts emphasis on the Polish economic and demographic interests mainly. However, political parties’ interest in attracting people with an migration background in order to entice more supporters thanks to the migrants’ votes, although neglected, seems to be just ‘right behind the corner’. One can find some signs of potential party openness in the future if/when the law is changed, which can be labelled as informal favourable factors supporting political participation of immigrants:

‘There is no such a category as citizen/non-citizen in discussions, simply because all the members of the party are Polish citizens, but ... we are a party tightly related to self-government. We are a mass party. The crucial thing for us is the role, the function that

local communities could have in the country. And consequently, for someone who does good and useful things and feels related to their local community, there is always a place in PSL. (PP4_2)

Immigrants do not put forward demands for political rights understood in a narrow sense as party-political participation and voting rights. It seems to be related to the economic character of migration and quite harsh, in comparison to other EU countries, economic situation in Poland. Immigrants focus on earning a living rather than on party-political participation. They do not differ from Poles, who are passive in political life. Reluctance to active party membership characteristic of them might have an impact on immigrants' behaviours. Moreover, the majority of settlement migrants in Poland originate from the former USSR countries, where politicians and political parties, similarly to Poland, do not gain broad social respect. Another significant group originates from Vietnam and in general they do not want to be engaged in politics. They concentrate on other issues, e.g. earning money – as much as possible, children's education, etc. They search for ways of expressing and satisfying their interests through other than political channels.

Political profiles of interviewees with a migrants' background were determined by their professional interests. They did not perform as representatives of immigrants but rather as representatives of their party and/or region. It seems that citizenship is generally treated as a prerequisite for full political participation. And it is not only an opinion of politicians without a migration background but also those who are naturalised in Poland. Therefore, it seems that one cannot expect politicians with a migration background to devote their attention to the topic.

It should be taken into consideration that Polish society might be unprepared for broadening political rights for immigrants, e.g. in the context of historical experiences. Therefore, even residents who are interested in politics in Poland and who would like to vote at a local level have mixed feelings about that. Undoubtedly, the introduction of a broader scope of political rights for non-citizens in Poland should be preceded by a social campaign.

‘They will think Ukrainian immigrants constitute the largest group in fact. So who would get the political rights? Ukrainians – those who came from Volhyn, who killed our people, and now they get political rights. I am not saying that this will be the main theme of the whole campaign, but it might appear’. (NGO_2)

‘Radicalisation can be quite a danger. Foreigners living in Poland now do not have voting rights or political rights and Poles tolerate them as those who live and work here and pay taxes. However, political parties may use foreigners to radicalise voters, to make them

feel unsafe, pointing out that immigrants with political rights might be dangerous. Such a situation may change positive attitudes of Poles to hostile ones towards immigrants just because of the perception of such a threat'. (NGO_2)

As for institutions one should be aware that migrants' organisations, although still new in Poland and not strong enough, are developing rapidly as, e.g. Ukrainian Trade Unions or Ukrainian Student Associations. They may be recognised as partners by various political parties searching for voters or support. Some students originating from Eastern neighbouring countries show interest in the Polish political and legal order and they search for opportunities for collaboration with organisations involved in the public domain like foundations, think-tank organisation and universities:

'I can see that my students from the East know how the Polish state institutions work better than their Polish peers (...) It is proof of their determination and their thirst for knowledge. They are interested in these issues'. (NP_2)

The authors do hope that DivPol findings as a pioneering study on political participation will stimulate further, in-depth research. What barriers need to be overcome to increase the participation of immigrants in Poland? And what arguments, if any, are there to make the case for the diversity and long-term cohesion of democracy?

Annex Table 1

List of interviews

Abbreviation/ Label	Political Party/Organisation	Migration background	Type of interview
PP1_1	PJN (Polska jest Najważniejsza/ Poland Comes First)	No	Individual interview
PP1_2	PJN (Polska jest Najważniejsza/ Poland Comes First)	No	Individual interview
PP1_3	PJN (Polska jest Najważniejsza/ Poland Comes First)	No	Individual interview
PP2_1	PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/Peace and Justice)	No	Individual interview
PP2_2	PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/Peace and Justice)	No	Individual interview
PP3_1	PO (Platforma Obywatelska/ Civic Platform)	Yes	Individual interview
PP3_2	PO (Platforma Obywatelska/ Civic Platform)	Yes	Individual interview

Abbreviation/ Label	Political Party/Organisation	Migration background	Type of interview
PP3_3	PO (Platforma Obywatelska/ Civic Platform)	No	Individual interview
PP3_4	PO (Platforma Obywatelska/ Civic Platform)	No	Individual interview
PP3_5	PO (Platforma Obywatelska/ Civic Platform)	No	Individual interview
PP4_1	PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/ Polish People’s Party);	No	Individual interview
PP4_2	PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe/ Polish People’s Party);	No	Individual interview
PP5_1	SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Democratic Left Alliance)	No	Individual interview
PP5_2	SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/ Democratic Left Alliance)	No	Individual interview
PP5_3	SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Democratic Left Alliance)	Yes	Individual interview
PP5_4	SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Democratic Left Alliance)	No	Individual interview
PP6_1	PPP (Polska Partia Pracy/ Polish Labour Party)	No	Individual interview
PP7_1	Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement).	No	Individual interview
FP_1	Former party’s member	No	Individual interview
NP_1	Non-party councillor	Yes	Individual interview
NP_2	Non-party councillor (Former party member)	No	Individual interview
E_1	Expert	No	Individual interview
E_2	Expert	No	Individual interview
E_3	Expert	No	Individual interview
NGO_1	Fundacja dla Somalii (Foundation for Somalia)	Yes	Focused interview – 4 persons
NGO_2	Fundacja Nasz Wybór (‘Our Choice’ Foundation)	Yes	Focused interview – 5 persons

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IMMIGRANT VOTERS IN POLAND – BEING JUST ‘RIGHT BEHIND THE CORNER’

Summary

This paper addresses challenges related to political participation of immigrants and/or third country nationals (TCNs) in Poland and provides both legal and policy information on its framework. Drawing on both official statistical data and research findings the paper reports empirical results from the comprehensive qualitative study DivPol. The authors do hope its findings will stimulate further, in-depth research on barriers that need to be overcome

in order to increase the participation of immigrants in Poland, and support discussion on arguments, if there are any, to make the case for the diversity and long-term cohesion of democracy.

Key words: immigration, political participation, Poland

IMIGRANCI WYBORCY W POLSCE – BĘDĄC „TUŻ ZA ROGIEM”

Streszczenie

Artykuł porusza wyzwania związane z polityczną partycypacją imigrantów i/lub obywateli państw trzecich w Polsce. Autorki przedstawiają prawny i polityczny kontekst, oficjalne statystyki oraz wyniki badania DivPol, mając nadzieję, że przyczynią się one do dalszych badań nad barierami, które trzeba pokonać, aby zwiększyć zaangażowanie imigrantów w Polsce w sferze politycznej. Chciałyby również przyczynić się do dyskusji, w której argumenty dotyczyć będą z jednej strony różnorodności, a z drugiej długoterminowej spójności społeczeństwa w ramach demokracji.

Słowa kluczowe: imigracja, partycypacja polityczna, Polska

ИММИГРАНТЫ В КАЧЕСТВЕ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЕЙ В ПОЛЬШЕ – НАХОДЯСЬ «УЖЕ ЗА УГЛОМ»

Резюме

В статье затронуты проблемы, связанные с политическим участием иммигрантов и/или граждан третьих стран в Польше. Авторы представляют юридический и политический контекст, официальную статистику и результаты исследования DivPol, надеясь, что они будут способствовать дальнейшему исследованию барьеров, которые необходимо преодолеть, чтобы увеличить вовлеченность иммигрантов в политическую жизнь Польши; а также дальнейшему развитию дискуссии, аргументы в ходе которой будут связаны с многообразием, а, с другой стороны, с долговременным сплочением общества в рамках демократии.

Ключевые слова: иммиграция, политическое участие, Польша

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Mikołaj Kukowski*

DEVELOPMENT AND SHIFT OF US OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN (1945–1951) IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to present the shift in American occupation policy in Japan – its reasons and consequences. I would like to describe the development of US position referring to Japan, changes in Americans' thinking about this country and its future role in the world.

1. BEFORE THE OCCUPATION

1.1. American attitudes towards Japan at the end of the Second World War

On 22–26 November 1943 the Cairo Conference took place. The Cairo talks, which were preliminary to the Teheran Conference, concerned especially the question of the Far East.

American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

They declared that Japan should be stripped off of all the islands in the Pacific which she had seized or occupied since the beginning of the First

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World War in 1914. Japan should be expelled also from Chinese territories – Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores, which she had stolen and all other territories taken by violence and greed. Korea should become free and independent.

The three Allies agreed also to continue operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan (Maki 1961: 119–120).

As far as the Pacific Islands were concerned, it referred to islands north of the equator such as: the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas. They were former German colonies, entrusted to Japan under the mandate of the League of Nations after the First World War.

Its claims to these islands had been supported before by Britain at the Versailles Peace Conference. Britain had done it in return for Japan's support for her pretensions to the Pacific islands south of the equator.

Japan violated its mandate upon these islands and started to fortify them. Because of their good location, during the Second World War they served as stepping stones in the conquest of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.

In Versailles the US opposed the Japanese Trusteeship on these territories. In Cairo the US insisted on taking back these Pacific islands from Japan and on locating American bases there.

According to the Cairo agreements, Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores should be returned to China. In the case of these two islands, there were no obstacles to fulfill the agreements after the war.

But as far as Manchuria was concerned, there were some problems. Americans considered also the possibility of giving Russians control over Manchurian railways and a warm water outlet at Port Arthur (Fleischer 1945: 69). Independence of Korea and its full freedom from Japanese control were agreed upon.

It should be stressed that by inviting Chiang Kai – shek, Roosevelt wanted to enhance China's role (Kimball 1984: part II, 608). China was the only East Asian nation then which was not conquered by the Japanese. Thanks to Chinese resistance the Japanese army of over a million men had to deal with regular troops and guerrillas. These men could not be used in other places and it was very helpful to the US army. The American president concluded that China would play an important role in Asia. Churchill's opposition to the decolonisation of India assured him in his opinion. Roosevelt thought about a common Sino-American sphere of influence in East Asia and the Pacific (Kimball 1984: part II, 609). This plan only enlarged Allies' concern about the unconditional surrender of Japan and taking back of territories plundered by Japan.

Apart from the Cairo talks, the Tehran Conference took place from 28 November to 1 December 1943. Joseph Stalin promised to join the fight against Japan, after Germany's defeat. But for Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt the front in France and the situation in general was a bigger problem.

Roosevelt's intention to strengthen China remained the same. The reflection of it was the American stand during the Cairo Conference. The best way to implement it was to weaken Japan. According to the document of 4 May 1944 prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, the US had two basic aims concerning Japan:

- 1) to prevent future Japanese threat for the US and Pacific countries,
- 2) to establish a Japanese government which will respect rights of other countries and its international obligations.

These aims were intended to be achieved in three phases:

- 1) implementation of surrender conditions and submission of Japan to hard occupying discipline as unavoidable retribution for military aggression,
- 2) Japan should stay under strict supervision which would be weakened when it shows readiness and ability to live in peace with other nations,
- 3) the ultimate aim of the US is the correct fulfillment by Japan of its duties in a family of peaceful nations.

This document also contained practical measures, such as: full disarmament, elimination of extreme organizations, introduction of democratic values (GPO 1945: 591–592). Thus, this document reflected the will to proceed with hard policy towards Japan. Supporters of the so called 'hard peace' approach were satisfied. American president F.D. Roosevelt was one of them.

The Yalta agreement was drawn up in the same spirit. On 4–11 February 1945 the second wartime summit of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill was held in Yalta on the Crimean coast. They agreed to Soviet entry into war with Japan in two or three months after Germany's defeat.

The conditions were as follows (among others):

- 1) return of the southern part of Sakhalin, occupied by Japan, to the Soviet Union,
- 2) handing the Kuril islands over to Russia,
- 3) preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic),
- 4) China will retain sovereignty in Manchuria, but the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad will be jointly operated by the established joint Soviet – Chinese Company,
- 5) the commercial port of Dairen (Dalian) will be internationalised. Port Arthur will be leased as a naval base of the USSR.

The Yalta agreement contained also Soviet readiness to conclude a pact of friendship with China and establish cooperation between them for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke (Maki 1961: 120–121). Americans realised that the Soviet Union's entry into war against Japan would shorten the conflict and save lives of many American soldiers.

At the end of the war and after Roosevelt's death (12 April 1945) the another approach towards Japan became prevalent – the so called 'soft peace' approach. Supporters of it agreed upon the idea of weakening Japan and destruction of Japanese imperialism.

However, they wanted to preserve some traditional internal Japanese institutions – one of them was the institution of the Emperor. One of the 'soft peace' supporters was Joseph Grew, a former ambassador to Japan.

On 2 July on the basis of the material prepared by Grew, Secretary of Defence Henry L. Stimson gave a memorandum to Truman. It concerned the prolonged Japanese capitulation and contained the assurance that the US did not exclude leaving the constitutional monarchy system with the current dynasty.

The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 did not comprise this assurance, which was considered to be controversial.

Thus, it said about:

- 1) an opportunity that should be given to Japan to end the war,
- 2) the authority and militaristic advisers that caused suffering of Japanese people. It suggested that those who had misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest should be replaced,
- 3) it announced that the Cairo Declaration would be carried out and the Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and minor islands,
- 4) disarmament of Japanese forces and permission for them to return to their homes,
- 5) punishment to all war criminals,
- 6) establishment of democratic tendencies – freedom of speech, of religion and respect for fundamental human rights,
- 7) promise to withdraw forces which would occupy Japan if these objectives were accomplished.
- 8) calling upon the Japanese government to proclaim an unconditional surrender of all Japanese forces. The alternative of it was only utter destruction (Maki: 121–123).

Thus, the Potsdam Declaration did not show any greater deviation from the 'hard policy' track on the American side. However, the discussion which

was carried on in the US about future policy toward Japan showed diversity of opinions there. One may call the text of the Potsdam Declaration a little bit 'softer' in that sense that it did not talk only about Japanese losses of territories and spheres of influence, but it also indicated rights it would have in the future.

1.2. Developments at the end of the war

In July 1945 Japanese military strength amounted to: 2 million men on home islands; under 2 million in Korea, Manchuria, China and Formosa; over 200,000 in French Indo-China, Thailand and Burma; over 500,000 in the East Indies area; over 100,000 in the by-passed Pacific Islands. So in sum, there were 5 million Japanese soldiers (Stimson, Bundy 1947: 618).

Americans realised that these soldiers would fight to the end and their surrender might save many American casualties. Therefore, this was one of the reasons of their decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 (Truman 1965: 463)¹. On 8 August Soviets went to war with Japan.

These two factors caused the change of the position of the Japanese government. Before that they had been against the Potsdam Declaration (at least officially). On 9 August three members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War – Premier Kantaro Suzuki, Minister of Foreign Affairs – Shigenori Togo and Minister of Navy – Mitsumasa Yonai were in favour of the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. Their only reservation was retaining of monarchy. The War Minister, General Korechika Anami, and two Chiefs of Staff, Yoshijiuro Umezu and Soemu Toyoda, expressed three more reservations:

- 1) Japan would not be occupied,
- 2) the Japanese should be allowed to disarm and demobilise their own forces,
- 3) war criminals would be tried by Japanese courts.

The members of the Council could not reach an agreement.

¹ According to Harry S. Truman (1965: part I, 463) the list of Japanese cities which might be targets was prepared by a staff headed by Henry Stimson – American Secretary of War. Those were: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. Kyoto – a center of military activity was excluded from that list because of Stimson's reservations. He stressed cultural, national and religious meaning of Kyoto to the Japanese.

On 9 August the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki (Truman 1965: part I, 470)². At the conference which took place a day later the Emperor proposed to accept the Potsdam Proclamation only with reservations concerning upholding of the monarchy system. The Emperor's proposal was accepted unanimously.

Japan offered to surrender through Swiss way (Truman 1965: 471)³. On 11 August Henry Stimson answered that since the surrender the power of the Emperor and the government would be subjected to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (Stimson, Bundy 1947: 627)⁴.

On 13 August Tokyo was raided by Allied planes. Next day (14 August) the Supreme Council of Japan and the cabinet met in the presence of the Emperor. They agreed on surrender. That day the Emperor recorded his rescript ending the war. It was broadcast the following day.

General Douglas MacArthur was selected for the post of the Supreme Commander for the Allied forces. American allies – the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China accepted this proposal. MacArthur was given the 'supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Powers concerned' (Truman 1965: 383–384).

General Order No. 1 was prepared – the directive to the Japanese forces in the field which had to surrender. It was announced officially on 2 September 1945. Thus in China, Formosa and in Indo-China north of the 16th parallel they were to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek. A Russian commander would

² Harry Truman (1965: 470) reports that at first a target for the second bomb was Kokura, but because of the weather it was given up. Niigata was too distant. Thus, Nagasaki was chosen.

³ (Truman 1965: 471) In the Japanese government statement there was the following sentence: 'The Japanese government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on 26 July 1945 by the Heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain and China and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler'.

⁴ President Harry Truman asked Stimson (1947: 627) for advice and he answered that Americans 'have to continue the Emperor ourselves under our command and supervision in order to get into surrender the many scattered armies of the Japanese who would own no other authority and that something like this use of the Emperor must be made in order to save as from the score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas all over China and the Netherlands. He was the only source of authority of Japan under the Japanese theory of the state'.

take their surrender in Manchuria, Korea north of the 38th parallel and on Karafuto (Sakhalin). In Southeast Asia south of the 16th parallel and from Burma to the Solomons the Allied representatives were Lord Mountbatten and the Australian commander with the exact demarcation line between them. Finally, in Japan, the Philippines and Korea south of the 38th parallel the surrender would be accepted by General MacArthur (elsewhere in the Pacific – Admiral Chester Nimitz) (Truman 1965: 484).

But Generalissimo Joseph Stalin announced reservations to General Order No. 1. He proposed in his message dated 16 August 1945 to include the northern part of the Island of Hokkaido in the region of surrender of Japanese forces to Soviet troops. According to him the demarcation line on the Hokkaido island should be drawn from the city of Kushiro in the east to the city of Rumoi in the west. He explained his proposition as a compensation for the Japanese occupation of Soviet Far East in the years 1919–21. President Truman in his request of 18 August rejected this plan (Truman 1965: 486). In the meantime General MacArthur radioed his first message to Japan. He ordered the Japanese to send their representatives to him to Manila in order to discuss the formal surrender ceremony and the arrival of occupation troops. On 2 September the ceremony of surrender took place aboard the American battleship ‘Missouri’ in the Tokyo Bay. This began the formal occupation of Japan.

2. OCCUPATION – THE FIRST PHASE

2.1. First months after surrender

Two days after the surrender ceremony the Emperor addressed his people personally in the Diet for the first time in history. He ordered them to submit to the terms of surrender. This submission was necessary ‘to re-establish in the future Japan’s position of trust and respect in the world’ (MacArthur 1964: 280). On 6 September President Truman approved a document on ‘Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’, which was written on 29 August. It was distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and to US departments and agencies for their guidance.

The ultimate objectives of the US toward Japan were:

- 1) assurance that Japan would not become ‘a menace to the US or to the peace and security of the world’,
- 2) establishment of a peaceful government which ‘will respect the rights of other states’ and ‘will support the objectives of the US’.

These objectives would be achieved by the following means:

- 1) limitation of Japan's sovereignty to the home islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku,
- 2) complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan. Militarists were to be totally eliminated from political, economic and social life,
- 3) the Japanese people would be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and human rights such as freedom of religion, assembly, speech and press,
- 4) the Japanese would be given an opportunity to develop an economy for themselves' (United States 1968: 628).

Military occupation of Japanese home islands was a means to carry into effect the surrender terms and to achieve objectives stated 'the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan'. The nations that had taken part in the war with Japan were welcomed in the occupation forces, but they were to be under the command of SCAP designated by the US. In the case of any differences of opinion among the Allied powers, the policies of the US would prevail.

As far as economic objectives were concerned, the document mentioned the destruction of the existing basis of Japanese military strength by enforcing a programme aimed at 'the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment or use of any military force'. Moreover, industries or branches of production which had prepared Japan to war were to be eliminated. The document envisaged the organizations of labour, industry and agriculture on a democratic basis. A wider distribution of income and ownership would be favoured.

The policy of the Supreme Commander should be:

- a) to prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of people who had been involved in war activity,
- b) to support a programme for the dissolution of large industrial and banking combinations.

The memorandum stated that the Allies 'will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage' of the economic plight of Japan. 'It will be necessary for them [the Japanese] to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities'. The Allies would not prevent the accomplishment of these tasks. Japanese authorities' control over economic activities would be subjected to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

There would be reparations for Japanese aggression. Referring to international trade in this document, it was written that Japan would be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods

for peaceful purposes and to export goods. Control over it would be exercised by SCAP. Japanese authorities were barred from giving to any Japanese business preferential opportunities to the enterprise of any foreign country (United States 1968: 628).

On the same day that 'the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' was approved by President Harry Truman (6 September), he drafted with Admiral William Leahy and General George Marshall a statement for General MacArthur. It contained the exposition of his authority as SCAP. According to it, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government was subordinated to him. The control of Japan was to be exercised through the Japanese government, but he would be able to act directly if it was required. The full effect would be given to the statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration.

On 1 November the document 'Basic Initial Post-Surrender Policy' was prepared. It confirmed and repeated the objectives of the military occupation of Japan, which had been drawn up in 'the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' of 6 September. It specified more concretely the aims and means to achieve them (US 1968: 633–652).

On 27 December in Moscow two bodies were established. One of them was the Far Eastern Commission. It consisted of representatives of the USSR, the UK, the US, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth. Their functions included the right to formulate policies and 'review any directive issued by SCAP with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished'. However, the Commission was able to take action with majority of all the representatives, including the concurrence of four powers: the US, the UK, the USSR and China. The Allied Council for Japan had also limited rights and supervisory power (US 1968: 628)⁵. Therefore, the US and SCAP could practically carry out their own policy without obstacles.

In the first period of the occupation the US proceeded with some reforms in Japan important for its future. These included: the Constitution, the land reform, the dissolution of combines, the political and economic purge.

⁵ (US 1968: 628) Provision no. 6 stated that in the case of disagreement between a member of the Council and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP 'will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission'.

2.2. Major reforms

2.2.1. Civil Liberties

Before the new constitution was created on 4 October 1945 the occupation authorities had proclaimed directives which were called after the bill of rights. Their aim was the removal of restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties. The Japanese government had to abrogate laws which maintained restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of expressing opinions on the Emperor and the Imperial Japanese government (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 1949: 463). It demanded also:

- 1) the release of political prisoners,
- 2) abolition of all organizations and agencies created to carry out laws which restricted civil liberties,
- 3) removal of people who directed these organizations (SCAP 1949: 464).

The Bill of Rights was preceded by memorandums referring to the annulment of press censorship of 10, 24, and 27 September 1945.

On 15 December 1945 the SCAP directive discontinued the dissemination of Shinto as a state religion. Shinto-national Japanese religion, which had been used by nationalists and militarists as an explanation and excuse for military expansion, was excluded from state's 'sponsorship, support, perpetuation and control' (SCAP 1949: 460–462). The Bill of Rights and directives connected with it constituted a background for a new constitution and democratization of the Japanese state and society.

2.2.2. The Constitution

A new Constitution was probably the most important achievement of the occupying forces in Japan. First talks about a change of the constitution took place between General MacArthur and Prince Fumimaro Konoe a few months after the beginning of the occupation. Konoe, however, was then classified as a war criminal. Therefore, Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara appointed a special committee to deal this matter under the chairmanship of Dr Joji Matsumoto (The Constitutional Problem Investigating Committee). They were working for three months.

The first draft of the new constitution was submitted in January 1946 (MacArthur 1964: 300). But it did not satisfy MacArthur. He regarded it as nothing more than rewording of the old Meiji constitution. Thus, he ordered key officers in his government section to draft a new constitution for Japan. General Courtney Whitney, a former Manila lawyer, became a chief of this team.

The Supreme commander stressed three points which he wanted to see in the new Japanese constitution:

- 1) Japan was to renounce war forever, abolish her armed forces and pledge never to revive them,
- 2) while sovereignty was to be vested in the people, the emperor was to be described as a symbol of the state,
- 3) the peerage was to be abolished, and the property of the Imperial Household was to be reverted to the state (Gayn 1973: 20).

In February 1946 General Whitney met with the Japanese. He told them that General MacArthur was not satisfied with their constitutional draft and regarded it as totally unacceptable. Therefore, he brought a document approved by the Supreme Commander. After that he left, giving them time to read it. When he returned the Japanese argued that this draft was ‘totally un-Japanese’ in its spirit and tradition. Whitney threatened that if they did not agree to it, MacArthur would place it before the Japanese people, over the heads of the government. The Japanese government tried to detain the draft but finally they capitulated.

The Supreme Commander allowed only one main government modification referring to the re-establishment of the Upper House of the Diet – the House of Councillors (in the American draft there was uni-cameral legislature).

The constitution was approved by the Lower House in August 1946. The following month the Upper House did the same. It was proclaimed by the Emperor the law of the land on 3 November and it came into effect in May 1947.

According to the constitution the House of Representatives – the Lower House of the Diet became the ‘highest organ of the state power’. The cabinet could summon sessions, but a vote of at least one-fourth of the total membership of either house was required. The Lower House could override an Upper House veto:

- a) on money bills and treaties – by a simple majority vote.
- b) on other matters – by two-thirds of the votes.

The cabinet was collectively responsible to the Diet. Two houses had to appoint the prime minister, but in the case of disagreement the decision of the Lower House prevailed. The cabinet with no-confidence vote in the Diet was obliged either to resign or to dissolve the House of Representatives within ten days and hold a new election (MacArthur 1964: 302)⁶.

⁶ According to General MacArthur (1964: 302): ‘The form of government is a combination of the American executive system and the British parliamentary one’.

Either house could conduct investigations of the government, demand the presence and testimony of witnesses and access to official records. The new Election Law lowered the voting age from twenty-five to twenty and enfranchised women (MacArthur 1964: 304)⁷. In the constitution there was also a provision for amendment by national referendum. The change came into effect if two-thirds of the Japanese electors had decided something.

Article 9 of the constitution (the so called no-war clause) was very important. It provided that the Japanese people forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation. Therefore, the right of belligerency of the state would not be recognised, and land, sea, air forces would never be maintained⁸.

Another significant change concerned the role of the Emperor. The constitution sanctioned the retention of the Emperor as ‘the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people’. His authority was limited to the ceremonial functions of a constitutional monarch. The national treasury took over his wealth and estates. He became dependent on appropriations voted annually by the Diet. The Imperial Household Ministry – formerly independent – was converted into the Imperial House Office under the jurisdiction of the prime minister.

In the US there was great resentment towards the retention of the Emperor (MacArthur 1964: 280). They saw him as a hindrance to a wholly democratic system. As it turned out, he had been a participant in decisions which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor (Bisson 1993: 26–27). But even opponents of the Emperor confirmed that his abdication would increase instability in the Japanese government. General MacArthur realised that abdication of Emperor Hirohito might cause real difficulties with the implementation of occupation policy in Japan. Many people regarded the Emperor as a divine being, even after his renunciation of divinity on 1 January 1946. He was a symbol for the people and his humiliation might not have helped the Allies and their policy toward Japan (Bisson 1993: 27). Contrary to his retention⁹.

⁷ (MacArthur 1964: 304): More than 13 million women registered their votes for the first time.

⁸ (MacArthur 1964: 303): The no-war clause was proposed to General MacArthur by Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara. When MacArthur agreed, Shidehara said: ‘The world will laugh and mock us as impracticable visionaries, but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets’.

⁹ MacArthur (1964: 288) wrote about the Emperor: ‘He played a major role in spiritual regeneration of Japan, and his loyal co-operation and influence had much to do with the success of occupation’. Truman (1965: 570) mentions Dr Karl T. Compton, the

Other important provisions were contained in a number of articles which one may call the Japanese ‘Bill of Rights’. The word ‘Jinken’ (‘human rights’) was used for the first time in Japanese. Before they had known only duties. ‘Jinken’ comprised freedom of thought, the right to maintain the minimum standard of living, equal rights of husband and wife.

The new Japanese constitution was a ‘product of American brains’ but ‘broadly acceptable to the people of Japan’ (Storry 1960: 253). It connected modern liberal tendencies (human rights, no-war clause) and conservative ones (retention of the Upper House, the Emperor – though without power and only with ceremonial functions, strong government)¹⁰.

2.2.3. The Zaibatsu Dissolution and Economic Purge (1945–48)

‘Zaibatsu’ (‘financial clique’) played the greatest role in the Japanese economy. They were family trusts which controlled the finance and economy, in general. One may see their beginning in the early years of Meiji Restorations (1868). Then, when state owned enterprises proved unprofitable, they were sold at bargain-based prices to Zaibatsu. In the 20s of the twentieth century Zaibatsu and bureaucracy reorganised the economy on the basis of cartels. During the Second World War Zaibatsu were interested in colonial expansion and contributed money for militarist purposes. They became strong especially as a result of the development of Japan’s heavy industry.

One could include Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Yasuda to the main Zaibatsu enterprises. Mitsui – the largest one – employed 2.8 million people before the occupation (1.8 in Japan) (Bisson 1954: 25). Zaibatsu controlled 90 percent of the Japanese industry (MacArthur 1964: 80). These organizations were combinations of a modern holding company with feudal loyalty. Officers were fully subordinated to the controlling families (Hadley 1973: 86–87).

Americans came to the conclusion that one of the main initiatives in occupied Japan should be the Zaibatsu dissolution and economic purge. The concept of it was based on the provision taken from ‘the United States

president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who had spent some time in Japan and wrote in his memorandum that one of the factors of ‘the apparent eagerness of practically all the Japanese...to help us...’ was ‘the fact that the emperor had ordered their cooperation and hence they could give it without feeling of disgrace or disloyalty’.

¹⁰ MacArthur (1964: 301) wrote: ‘The new Japanese constitution is really an amendment to the older Meiji one. I felt that by using this particular device we could insure a continuity, and continuity is important in Japan’.

Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' dated 29 August 1945. In part IV concerning the economy it was stated that destruction of the economic basis of Japanese military strength should take place. This aim was to be achieved by implementing SCAP policy which should:

- 1) prohibit the retention of people connected formerly with the war machine in the economic field,
- 2) favour a programme of the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations (SCAP 1949: 425).

Knowing American intentions Zaibatsu leaders prepared a plan for their own dismemberment called the Yasuda Plan (name derived from the Yasuda Zaibatsu). It was submitted by the Japanese government to SCAP on 4 November 1945. According to this plan the firms of Mitsui Honsha, Yasuda Hozen-sha, Sumitomo Honshu and Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Honsha agreed on the voluntary dissolution. The plan provided for a transfer of all securities of any firm and corporation owned by the holding companies to a Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC). This commission was to be established by the Japanese government. Its functions were to proceed with the liquidation of all property transferred to it.

The holding companies would also cease to exercise direction or control of all enterprises whose securities they owned. The directors and auditors of these companies would resign from all offices held by them. Moreover, all members of the Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo and Iwasaki families would resign from all offices held by them in enterprises. Preference in purchase of the securities transferred to the HCLC and offered for sale would be given to employees of the company involved. If these were corporate shares, democratization of membership would be ensured (by the limitation of shares that may be purchased by a single purchaser). The transferred property title of ownership (offered by HCLC) would not be purchased by holding companies and members of Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo and Iwasaki families.

On 6 November the proposal was accepted by MacArthur. In his directive he stressed that his intention was to ensure a wider distribution of income and ownership in Japan and to encourage democratic forces (Bisson 1954: 81–82). The Yasuda Plan followed it.

However, this plan was criticised in US as too 'soft'. Some American businessmen proposed much further going steps. On the other hand, the Japanese government obstructed the implementation of the Yasuda Plan¹¹.

¹¹ (Campbell 1948: 150) Japanese leaders Yoshida or Shidehara descended from the same social class as zaibatsu.

Finally, in April 1946 Imperial Ordinance 233 made the dissolution plan legally binding, but it did not comprise the offer of the family members to 'resign from all offices'. In July 1946 SCAP instructed the Japanese government to include this. In December the government amended Imperial Ordinance 233 according to that order.

On 4 July 1947 the economic purge was promulgated. It referred to persons who had held key positions in the economy since 1937 (the outbreak of the war in China). The key officers in 245 companies lost their positions. In practice, they could shift to one of thousands of companies which had not been listed among these 245 companies (Hadley 1973: 91). By November 1947 67 holding companies were resolved or were in the process of dissolution. The Commission took control of over 4,260 of their subsidiaries. Over 7 thousand executives were fired from these companies (Campbell 1948: 150).

In early 1947 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) proposed a law dissolving Zaibatsu permanently into small competing companies ('FEC 230'). It provided divestment of creditors, managers, stockholders and other individuals who had 'exercised controlling power of all corporate security holdings, liquid assets and business properties'. They were to be forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings and 'acquiring positions of business or governmental responsibility at any time during the next ten years' (Newsweek 1973: 112). The directive also stated that assets should be transferred to cooperatives of small entrepreneurs and trade unions.

This directive resulted in two laws: 'Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and the Methods of Preserving Fair Trade' and 'Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power Law'. The first prohibited the creation of private monopolies. The latter was a deconcentration law which implemented the main 'FEC230' decisions. These two laws were passed by the Japanese Diet in late 1947. They met with a bad reception in the US and Japan, especially of businessmen. They saw it, particularly the Deconcentration Law as a means that could destroy the country's economy and benefit only Communists (Campbell 1948: 151). The policy outlined in 'FEC230' went too far according to many important American politicians (Livingstone 1973: 113–115).

In March 1948 the Drapper-Johnston mission was sent to Japan. A report from that mission contributed largely to the shift in the American attitude towards Japan. Early 1948, when this mission took place, is treated as the end of first period of the American occupation and the beginning of the second phase.

2.2.4. Political Purge

In the Potsdam Declaration dated 26 July 1945 it was written: ‘There must be eliminated the authority and influence of those who had deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking into war conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world’ (Gordon 1993: 413). In the political part of ‘the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ it was specified more precisely. High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, General Staff and leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations would be purged.

Directives concerning the purge were issued to the Japanese government on 4 January 1946. It ordered it to establish a programme of removal of officials of the national government and to bar the following categories of people from the election to the Diet and from reappointment:

- 1) category A – War Criminals,
- 2) B – Career and Special Service Military Personnel; Special Police Officials; Officials of War Ministers.
- 3) C – Influential Members of Ultrationalistic, Terrorist or Secret Patriotic Societies.
- 4) D – Persons Influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Imperial Rule Assistance Society, etc.
- 5) E – Officers of Financial and Business concerns involved in Japanese Expansion.
- 6) F – Governors of Occupied territories.
- 7) G – Other militarists and ultrationalists.

A supplemental directive was added to the purge directive which demanded the dissolution of the existing ultrationalist and secret patriotic societies.

By 4 January the Government screened 8,899 persons. 1,067 people were barred or removed from government service (SCAP 1949: 29). However, a small scale of the purge was criticised in Japan and the US. Under this pressure the purge was extended. On 4 January 1947 the Japanese government promulgated the extension of the purge to the local level. 717,415 people were screened and 201,815 of them were purged. In this extended purge 7 categories were specified (SCAP 1949: 553):

- 1) War Criminal Suspects,
- 2) Career Military Personnel,
- 3) Ultrationalist Societies,

- 4) IRAA (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) and Affiliates,
- 5) Expansionist Organizations,
- 6) Governors of Occupied Areas,
- 7) Additional Militarist and Ultrationalist
 - economic
 - Public Information Media
 - Ex-Servicemen's Associations
 - Miscellaneous others (including Special Higher Police, Butokukai, etc.)

In early 1948 the 'reverse course' of the occupation stopped the purge process. Gradually they returned to public life.

The purge was strictly connected with the process of prosecution of war criminals. On 19 January 1946 the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo was established. It judged main criminals and was equivalent to this in Nuremberg. In May that year it began the trials of accused people, among them were three former prime ministers (Tojo, Keiso and Hirota). On 12 November 1948 the Tribunal sentenced 7 persons to death (including Tojo and Hirota); 16 got life imprisonment; two ministers of Foreign Affairs, Togo and Shigemitsu, received 20 years and 7 years in prison respectively, two accused men died during the trial and one was acknowledged as mentally ill.

2.2.5. Land Reform

Japan had experienced rural poverty until the early years of the occupation. Two main reasons of such a state of affairs were surplus population and inequalities in land distribution. Therefore, on 9 December 1945 General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to conduct a rural land reform in order to 'destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmers for centuries of feudal oppression' (Calder 1988: 251). In his memorandum he pointed out the ills of the contemporary agrarian structure of land. These were:

- 1) 'intense overcrowding of land' – almost half of the farm household in Japan tilled less than one and half acres each,
- 2) 'widespread tenancy under conditions highly unfavourable to tenants' – three-fourths of Japanese farmers paid rentals amounting to half or more of their annual crops as tenants,
- 3) 'a heavy burden of farm indebtedness combined with high rates of interest on farm loans' – because of indebtedness fewer than half of farm households were able to support themselves on their agriculture income,

- 4) 'government fiscal policies which discriminated agriculture in favour of industry and trade' – much higher interest rates and taxes on agriculture than those in commerce and industry,
- 5) 'authoritative government control over farmers and farm organizations without regard for farmer interests' – arbitrary crop quotas restricted the farmer in the cultivation of crops for his own needs or economic advancement.

The programme of the rural land reform should contain:

- 1) 'transfer of land ownership from absentee land owners to land operators',
- 2) 'provisions of purchase of farm lands from non-operating owners at equitable rates',
- 3) 'provisions for tenant purchase of land at annual instalments commensurate with tenant income',
- 4) 'provisions for reasonable protection of former tenants against reversion to tenancy status'. (SCAP 1949: 575)

After MacArthur's directive the government presented to the Diet a bill to amend the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law. It was called the first land reform. It allowed landlords to keep up to five hectares of their property. By some estimates it would have affected less than one-third of tenanted land. However, conservative politicians of the Diet perceived it as a threat to the traditional leadership in villages (Calder 1988: 250).

MacArthur dissatisfied with the government proposal pressed for more radical measures. They should lead to the main objective which was to transform the cultivators of 80 percent of tenanted farmland into independent farmers (Campbell 1948: 149). In October 1946 the Diet passed a law which was the second land reform. According to this law all leased-out land of village owners in excess of one hectare was to be purchased by the state and resold to tenants. Owners, who farmed the land were allowed to keep 3 hectares (Hall 1979: 291). Paying rents in kind became forbidden, only cash payment was permitted. In a short time 2 million hectares changed their owners (Fukatake 1973: 188).

Before the war only 30 percent of farmers were owner-cultivators. After the reform the number of owner-cultivators grew by 1.7 million households and the number of tenant households decreased (Calder 1988: 251). By February 1948 3,489 million acres assigned for redistribution were purchased by a proper commissions. 0,536 million acres were resold to tenants (Campbell 1948: 149).

The execution of this law met many problems. The implementation of the reform on the local level was the responsibility of the elected Land

Committees. Many of them were dominated by landlords. Moreover, landlords wanted to evict tenants in order to get more land for themselves. In practice this law did not forbid completely the return of land to land lords (Livingstone 1973: 192).

Another step which was taken was the abolition of the conservative agricultural associations – ‘nokai’ in December 1947. Through them local elites had influenced the countryside since the mid-Meiji period. Instead of these, politically independent agricultural cooperatives – ‘nokyō’ came into being. It followed the passage of the Agricultural Cooperatives Law of 1947. American occupation authorities insisted on government’s lack of intervention in their affairs. They should be organised and run autonomously to strengthen democracy and pluralism in the countryside (Calder 1988: 251–252).

Meanwhile on 4 February 1948 SCAP submitted to the Japanese government a memorandum calling for the acceleration of the land reform (SCAP 1949: 575). MacArthur remarked there that efforts had been made by ‘certain adversely affected interests’ to obstruct the land reform programme. Therefore, he directed the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to instruct land commissions to purchase all land subject to the Land Reform Law without delay. Also, he suggested the Japanese government to take action against persons who obstructed the implementation of the land reform measures (SCAP 1949: 577). It induced the government to further action in the reform implementation.

2.2.6. Educational System

The reform of the educational system in Japan was one of the most important objectives of American occupation authorities. In ‘the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ of 29 August 1945 there was a provision that militarism and ultra-nationalism should be eliminated from the educational system. Moreover, former military and naval officers and other exponents of these doctrines should be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions (US 1968: 630).

On the other hand, the Japanese should be allowed to get to know the history, culture, and institutions of the US and other democratic countries. It was repeated in the directive ‘Basic Initial Post-Surrender Policy’ of 1 November 1945, which also contained a clause saying that excluded teachers should be replaced by ‘acceptable and qualified successors’. Also, military and paramilitary training in Japanese schools was to be forbidden (US 1968: 641). Americans realised the ‘importance of winning over the children’.

Therefore, after the beginning of the occupation some preliminary steps were undertaken, such as the introduction of a ban on spreading ‘militarist and ultra-nationalist thought’, a purge of teachers, revisions of textbooks and suspension of some courses (especially the course of morals – ‘shushin’)¹².

But the most important step in the educational field was its decentralisation. It had been suggested earlier by the United States Education Mission, which had stayed in Japan since March 1946. According to it, the educational functions should be exercised by prefectural and local administrative agencies. The Ministry of Education should only be an advisory institution for them in professional and technical matters. It should no longer hold control over local schools.

These recommendations were approved by the Japanese Educational Reform Council created in August 1946. Therefore, on 15 July 1948 the Board of Education Law was adopted. In general, it followed the suggestions of the US Education Mission. It exempted education from direct control of the Ministry of Education. The Boards of Education were established, which were put in charge of all schools except private schools and higher education institutions. Their control included: the curriculum, the selection of textbooks and the hiring and dismissing of personnel. The members of the board were elected locally for terms of four years. The boards had a power to participate in the compilation of budget. The Ministry of Education became an advisory body (Livingstone 1973: 51). Moreover, in prefectures new universities were established¹³.

This whole reform contributed largely to the appeasement of authoritarian atmosphere in Japanese schools. It eliminated nationalism from it and encouraged democratic tendencies in society.

3. OCCUPATION – THE SECOND PHASE

3.1. Reversed course – reasons.

The second period of the American occupation in Japan began in early 1948 (for some analyst late 1947). The dominant policy of this phase was reconstruction. Therefore, the US abandoned the idea of complete Zaibatsu dissolution. Americans allowed Japan to possess some military forces (police) and to rebuild its economic strength. Many politicians and businessmen

¹² (MacArthur 1964: 312) Over 25 million new textbooks were distributed then.

¹³ Following the American pattern, where each state of the union has its university.

previously 'purged' reappeared in public life. Reparations which Japan had had to pay to its victims were reduced, and in the end terminated. The end of the second phase and the end of the American occupation in general took place on 28 April 1952. Then the Treaty of the San Francisco Conference came into force. At that conference the Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and other countries (8 September 1951).

There were two main reasons for the reversed course in American policy toward Japan in the second phase of the occupation. The changing international situation was the first reason, the other cause was economic. Both were connected with each other, although the political cause seems to be of major importance.

Americans stopped to supply the Japanese economy on such a scale as they had done before, but on the other hand they spent considerable sums of money on their military facilities and bases in Japan. The change of American policy in the field of economy was on account of the fact that their new economic policy in Japan helped them to achieve a political aim, which was to make that country democratic and stable. Besides, new policy in Japanese economy reduced the US expenditures on the continuing occupation.

The shift of American policy toward the occupied country resulted mainly from political reasons.

3.1.1. International context

American had realised a potential threat of Soviet domination before the Cold War period started. Therefore, they opposed so strongly and successfully the Soviet share of the occupation of Japan (MacArthur 1964: 285)¹⁴. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had a strong anti-Communist attitude and perceived the soviet rule as a 'godless concept of atheistic totalitarian enslavement' (MacArthur 1964: 293).

On 30 August 1946 the 'Baltimore Sun' published an article by Russel Brines. He wrote that thought the military phase of the occupation was completed, the American army might have to stay there to hold 'the eastern anchor of a worldwide American line against the Soviet Union and communism' (Livingstone 1973: 234).

In Japan MacArthur presented openly his support for the conservative wing in Japanese politics. He called Japan 'the westernmost outpost of

¹⁴ Harry Truman (1965: 455) wrote: 'the experience of Potsdam now made me determined that I would not allow the Russians any part in the control of Japan'.

our defences' and 'Switzerland of the East' (Livingstone 1973: 235–236). International developments assured MacArthur and other American officials in their opinions. General Marshall's Mission in China failed on 29 January 1947. Moreover, Chinese Communists were systematically overcoming Kuomintang (Guomindang) forces. On 1 October 1949 the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed. China became a projected US enemy in Asia.

As far as the situation in Europe was concerned, American president Harry Truman gave a speech to the US Congress on 12 March 1947. He pledged American support for 'free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures' (Alan Palmer 1990: 397). Its intention was to prevent Soviet domination and the spread of communism.

Soviets supported communist guerrillas in other countries, whose operations aimed at introducing a Communist type of government there. The Truman doctrine referred mainly to Greece (and Turkey), which were a vivid example of such a case. The Marshall Plan, proposed for the first time on 5 June 1947, had the same aim. It was a plan for European (mostly Western-European) economic recovery in order to strengthen these countries and exclude them from Russian political influence. After the communist revolution in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade from summer 1948 till spring 1949 the bi-polar division of Europe and the world became a reality.

Because of these events Japan started to be perceived by the US as a potential part of its security system. Therefore, an American objective should be (as George Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department, wrote in early 1948): 'to devise a policy toward Japan which would assure the security of that country from communist penetration and domination as well as from the military attack by the Soviet Union and would permit Japan's economic potential to become once again an important force in the affairs of the area, conducive to peace and stability' (Kennan 1950: 381).

In October 1949 58 million dollars were appropriated by the American Congress for military constructions on the Okinawa island as a response to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The presence of American military forces there contributed to the prevention of Chinese invasion of Taiwan (Livingstone 1973: 237). The outbreak of the Korean War (1950) only confirmed the American sense of adequacy of their policy toward Japan¹⁵.

¹⁵ In his memorandum presented to British Premier Attlee on 4 December 1950 President Truman (1965: volume II, 456) suggested 'steps which might be taken to strengthen

3.1.2. Economic reasons

Japanese economy had been in a bad condition by the end of the war. Most of public money had been given to support the war machine. There were problems with tax collection at that time and just after the surrender (MacArthur 1964: 307). Americans appropriated large sums for aid from the beginning of the military occupation of Japan. For instance in the year 1947 Japan experienced a new economic crisis. The US gave Japan 1,652,296 tons of food in the first nine months of 1947 (Campbell 1948: 156–157). According to the budget of the Department of the Army for 1949, 410 million dollars were assigned to be spent on supplies and food for Japan.

Such a situation could not last longer. That annual ‘dole’ was too expensive. Therefore, the US government concluded that Japan could not be still such a burden for American taxpayers. As early as 21 January 1948 General Frank McCoy, an American member of the Far Eastern Commission, announced that the US would not subsidise the Japanese economy. The international situation only encouraged the US to reorient its economic policy toward Japan. They understood that they needed democratic Japan with a stable economy.

3.2. Japanese economy in the second phase

3.2.1. Deconcentration

As I have mentioned in chapter 2, in March 1948 the Drapper-Johnston economic mission took place. After that the Johnston Committee prepared a report. It contributed largely to a reversal of the course toward Japan. They concluded that Japan’s first economic need is increased production.

The Committee pointed out three main deficiencies in physical means available to Japan:

- 1) lack of essential raw materials,
- 2) the bad condition of many existing factories,
- 3) the poor state of transport.

non-communist Asia’. These were: ‘restoration of considerable self-government to Japan, the acceleration of efforts to obtain a Japanese peace settlement, the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defence, the greater utilisation of productive capacity to strengthen the capabilities of the free world, and the prompt admission of Japan into international organizations’.

It was also said that the threat of reparations cramped much of Japan industry, especially heavy industry. Referring to the programme of the Zaibatsu dissolution (though not directly) they wrote that ‘the possible disturbing effect should be alleged by care not to hurt production, and by limiting reorganisation to the minimum necessary to insure reasonable competition’ (Livingstone 1973: 120).

As far as further developments within FEC 230 are concerned, the US withdrew its support for it on 12 March 1948. Moreover, the number of 325 companies designed under the Deconcentration Law to dissolution was reduced to 100 in July 1948. The Deconcentration Review Board released further companies from the dissolution process. Thus, only 19 remained for deconcentration. In practice, when 9 corporations had been dissolved, the Board announced the end of the deconcentration process (Kawai 1960: 147). The final outcome of the Deconcentration Law was a victory of the Pentagon and conservative powers in the US (Livingstone 1973: 132).

George Kennan referring to the idea of deconcentration wrote that ‘the measures themselves could only have been eminently agreeable to anyone interested in the future communisation of Japan’ (Kennan 1950: 388).

3.2.2. Dodge Plan

Joseph Dodge went to Japan in February 1949. He was a conservative banker from Detroit, who had been asked by Drapper to take over the Japanese economy. Dodge began his plan of budget cutting and deflation. The intention of this programme was to establish a capitalist, self-supporting economy in Japan by 1953. In a short time it led to mass unemployment. Joseph Dodge argued that ‘an increase in unemployment will in turn lead to increased efficiency of labour and a greater production’ (Livingstone 1973: 135).

In December 1949 SCAP allowed the ‘dumping’ practices by the removal of the price floors on export. The Japanese should lower the prices and therefore their products would be more competitive. Following the Dodge Programme the government increased the price of essential services (commuter trains and staple foods) and controlled wages. The Plan succeeded in achieving a balanced budget and a single exchange rate for imports and exports by June 1949. But the next year the reform showed its full impact on the Japanese economy. The output fell to one-third of the 1931 level, investment to one-half of the 1949 level (Livingstone 1973: 137–138). People lost their jobs.

This tragic situation was changed by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Japanese economy got the boost by US procurement purchases.

Japanese factories manufactured many supplies useful for American and UN troops in Korea. The economic indicators grew up. By the end of 1951 the Japanese industrial production reached its level from the 30s (Storry: 1960: 255). The household saving rate during the 1950–52 period amounted to 10–15 percent (Gordon 1993: 284). Thus, the Korean War brought a recovery to the Japanese economy¹⁶.

3.2.3. War Reparations

The reversal of the American stand was quite evident in the issue of war reparations. In ‘the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ of 6 September 1945 there was a provision that reparations for Japanese aggression should be made. For this purpose Japanese property and goods:

- a) located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan,
- b) located in 4 main islands, if such ‘goods or existing capital equipment and facilities ... are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces’ would be transferred.

On the other hand, ‘no form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the programme for Japan’s demilitarisation’ (US 1968: 632).

In November 1945 the Edwin Pauley mission in Japan took place. In his letter to General Douglas MacArthur and President Truman dated 6 December Pauley concluded that ‘Japan retains more industrial capacity than she needs or has ever used for their civilian economy’. Therefore ‘the removal of the surplus, especially to neighbouring Asiatic countries, will help to raise their industrial standards and all living standards without depressing the standards of Japan’ (Livingstone 1973: 83). Pauley proposed that following plants and equipment should be included into programme of reparations:

- 1) half of the capacity for the manufacture of machine tools,
- 2) tools and equipment:
 - a) in army and navy arsenals,
 - b) in the entire aircraft industry of Japan,
 - c) in all plants manufacturing ball and roller bearings,
 - d) in all plants manufacturing aircraft engines,
- 3) all equipment accessories in twenty shipyards,
- 4) all steelmaking capacity in excess of 2.5 million tons per year,

¹⁶ By 1957 the economic recovery was complete (Wall 1964: 42).

- 5) all facilities for the production of magnesium, for the preparation of aluminium and reduction of aluminium,
- 6) half of thermal (coal) electric generating plants of Japan,
- 7) all contact process sulphuric acid plants, except those necessary to recover the waste gases of zinc, lead, copper and other heavy metal smelters,
- 8) the most modern large Solvay process soda-ash plant in Japan,
- 9) twenty of the most modern large plants for the production of caustic soda and chlorine (Livingstone 1973: 84–85).

Pauley's report (which was the summary quoted from his letter) was delivered to the Far Eastern Commission. The Commission partly agreed with Pauley's arguments. But recognising the period of 1930–34 as 'a yardstick for determining Japan's proper standard of living' the commission allowed Japan to retain a higher level of pig iron, steel, shipping (Campbell 1948: 153).

Because of a disagreement concerning the implementation of the suggestions of the Far Eastern Commission from 1946, in April 1947 the United States government ordered the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to distribute 30 percent of the initially available reparation pool to four principal war-devastated countries as follows (US 1968: 1017):

- 1) China – 15 percent.
- 2) Philippines – 5 percent.
- 3) United Kingdom (for Malaya Burma) – 5 percent.
- 4) Netherlands (for Netherlands East Indies) – 5 percent.

On 19 June 1947 in 'the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' it was stated that reparations should pursue policies set forth by the Far Eastern Commission. However, they should not 'prejudice the defraying of the cost of the occupation and the maintenance of the minimum civilian standard of living' (US 1968: 658).

In the spring of 1948 the Drapper-Johnston mission to Japan took place. As I mentioned earlier it claimed that 'the threat of removal for reparations hang over much of Japan's industry'. The report showed that the Japanese economy was operating with large deficit, despite living standards remaining at the minimum level. Therefore, it suggested a 45 percent reduction of the dismantling plan proposed by Pauley.

On 12 May 1949 Frank McCoy, an American representative of the Far Eastern Commission, presenting the Japanese reparation problem stated that:

- 1) 'The deficit Japanese economy shows little prospect of being balanced in the near future and to achieve eventual balance will require all resources at its disposal'.

- 2) 'The burden of removing further reparations from Japan could detract seriously from the occupation objective of stabilising the Japanese economy and permitting it to move toward self-support'.
- 3) 'There is little or no prospect of the FEC agreement on a reparations initiative by the US over the past three years to assist the FEC in reaching such an agreement. Without agreement on a share schedule, the existing FEC policy decisions regarding reparations are incapable of implementation'.
- 4) 'Japan has already paid substantial reparations through expropriation of its former overseas assets and, in smaller degree, under the Advance Transfer Programme' (US 1968: 1023–1024).

Thus, McCoy concluded that the US would not act to seek possible additional reparations from Japan. Indeed, no further reparations were delivered until the end of the American occupation (1952). However, the problem of reparations remained present and it returned during the talks concerning the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951.

3.3. Purge

The problem of the political purge in the second phase of the American occupation of Japan reflects perfectly the change of US policy toward this country. The purge process which took place in the first period of the occupation caused mixed feelings also among American officials¹⁷.

Thus, on 3 March 1947 a Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board was formed to re-screen those who considered themselves unjustly purged. But occupation authorities annulled about 150 purge charges out of more than 1,000 cases (Yoshida 1961: 161). The Board finished its activity. Simultaneously after 4 January 1947 the purge was extended. As I mentioned earlier 201,815 people were purged as a result of it.

In January 1949 Japanese prime minister Shigeru Yoshida was granted General MacArthur's permission to set up the second Appeal Board. The chairman of the Board Tadaichiro Tanimura met the Chief of the Government Section – General Courtney Whitney. Whitney told him that the Board should only consider cases where an error of judgment of the purge ordinances

¹⁷ George F. Kennan (1967: 389) concluded that 'the indiscriminate purging of whole categories of individuals, sickeningly similar to totalitarian practices, was in conflict with the civil rights provisions of the new constitution that we ourselves had imposed upon the Japanese'.

had occurred. Also those cases which had involved unfairness should be considered.

At the beginning of the Board's activity 10,000 persons were de-purged out of 32,000 re-examined cases. In October 1950 33,250 young officers were also exonerated. The outbreak of the Korean War accelerated that process (Yoshida 1961: 162).

On the fourth anniversary of the Japanese constitution General Ridgeway (who had replaced MacArthur as SCAP in April 1951) allowed the government in his memorandum to 'review existing ordinances issued in implementation of directives from this headquarters, for the purpose of evolving through established procedures such modifications as past experience and the present situation render necessary and desirable' (Livingstone 1973: 92).

Ridgeway's memorandum was used by the Japanese as a legal base for further steps to reverse the purge. In June 1951 the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee replaced the Board. 177 thousand persons were released from the purges. The Appeal Committee created in November added 9,000 people to this amount (Yoshida 1961: 164). By 28 April 1952 (the date of coming into effect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty) only 8,710 persons were still purged (Livingstone 1973: 37). And finally, the San Francisco treaty abolished all laws and ordinances relating to the purges (Yoshida 1961: 164).

Also the so called 'red-purge' process was bound with the process of purge rehabilitation. It was a massive removal of Communists and fellow travellers from jobs in the government, media and private industry in the years 1949–51. American occupation authorities perceived them as a major threat and obstacle to economic and political stabilisation of Japan.

On 3 May 1950 General MacArthur attacked in his Constitution Day speech the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). He described it as an alien destructive power which through weapon of strikes and riots wanted to wreck the whole economy. MacArthur also suggested outlawing the JCP¹⁸. On 30 May 1950 in Tokyo Communists organised 'a rally for the rising of the people' in which several officers of US forces were injured. In retaliation for it MacArthur purged from public life leaders of the Communist party in June 1950. In the same month the JCP organ 'Akahata' ('Red Flag') was

¹⁸ (Yoshida 1961: 235) General MacArthur proposed it for the first time in his Fourth of July message in 1949. He said that Communists used freedoms 'to destroy those freedoms'.

suspended¹⁹. By the end of 1950 11,000 people connected with Communists were fired from their work in private companies. Additionally 1,200 lost their jobs in governmental services (Livingstone 1973: 75).

In summary, in the period of 1949–51 20,997 Communists and fellow travellers were fired from work in the government, media and private industry (Livingstone 1973: 37).

3.4. US-Japan Security Treaty and Peace Treaty

On 17 March 1947 General MacArthur said at the press conference in Tokyo that time had come to finish the occupation and draw up a peace treaty with Japan. He added that Japan fulfilled the requirements of the Potsdam Proclamation and its provisions (Kawai 1960: 31). In July 1947 the US suggested to other nations from the Far Eastern Commission holding a conference to discuss the problem of peace with Japan. But the Soviet Union rejected this offer. Instead of it Soviets insisted on a Foreign Ministers' Conference between the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. The US did not agree to that and it reached a deadlock (Yoshida 1961: 245).

On the other hand, that situation was fortunate for the US. Thanks to it Americans got time to reverse their policy toward Japan and implement it²⁰. International developments such as: the Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Berlin's blockade and the situation in China encouraged such steps. By the end of 1949 it was evident that the US did not plan the withdrawal of its military forces from Japan.

Referring to the future peace treaty with Japan George Kennan said that: 'while the treaty would not itself provide for the retention of American bases in Japan, it would be accompanied by a separate agreement with the Japanese government sanctioning such an agreement; and that if all this was not agreeable to the Russians, as it obviously would not be, we would not hesitate to conclude both treaty and agreement without them' (Livingstone 1973: 236–237).

¹⁹ (Yoshida 1961: 239) It was a punishment for the publication on its front page of a large photo of Kim IL Sung, the Prime Minister of North Korea, immediately after North Korean forces attacked the Republic of Korea.

²⁰ As G.F. Kennan (1967: 376–377) wrote: 'the resulting deadlock now gave us opportunity to review the situation and to have a new look at our thinking and our policies generally with relations to Japan'.

Meanwhile at the turn of 1949 the Peace Study Group on Peace Settlement for Japan was established. It consisted of 60 persons, among them many Tokyo University professors. On 15 January 1950 they released a statement, whose summary conclusions were as follows:

- 1) 'If we Japanese are to express any wish at all on the question of the peace settlement for Japan, there could be no other alternative but the complete overall peace'.
- 2) 'The condition of economic self-support for Japan cannot be attained through a separate peace'.
- 3) 'As for Japan's security after the peace settlement, we favour the status of inviolable neutrality and also would like to be admitted to the United Nations'.
- 4) 'We stand opposed to giving military bases to any country under any pretext'. (Livingstone 1973: 253).

Although these suggestions were not likely to change the Japanese government's and American stand on that issue, Yoshida did not agree primarily to Japan's rearmament and US bases at his meeting with American negotiator John F. Dulles in June 1950. But the outbreak of the Korean War a week later changed the situation drastically. During his second visit to Japan in January 1951 Dulles proposed a mutual security pact between the US and Japan, as well as a peace treaty. At that time it was met with a good reception of Premier Yoshida (Yoshida 1961: 266). Yoshida in return for his permission for American bases in Japanese territories asked for increasing of Japanese land and sea forces. The American envoy agreed to that (Yoshida 1961: 267–268).

On 9 February 1951 a document was signed which specified the stage reached in the peace negotiations. On 18 April another Dulles-Yoshida meeting took place. Dulles informed the Prime Minister about the demands for reparations and limitations of the Japanese rearmament which had been raised by the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, he had managed to persuade these countries to accept the American policy. On 14 June a complete agreement was reached between the US and Great Britain on the draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty (Yoshida 1961: 252).

The main provisions of this draft had not been altered and it was finally signed at the San Francisco Conference on 8 September 1951. The draft stated that Japan would recognise the independence of Korea and would renounce all right, claim and title to:

- 1) Korea including the Qualpart Island and other islands adjacent to Korea,
- 2) Formosa and the Pescadores,

- 3) The Kurile Island and southern Sakhalin,
- 4) The Pacific Islands formerly mandated to Japan by the League of Nations. Japan would also accept UN Security Council decisions concerning these,
- 5) The Sparty and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (Keesing's 1952: 11681).

Japan was also to agree to US administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the Bonin Island, the Volcano Islands, the Ryukyu Islands (south of the 29 degree North latitude) and the Marcus Islands. As far as security was concerned Japan would accept the following obligations of the UN Charter:

- a) to settle her international disputes by peaceful means,
- b) to give to the UN assistance in action taken in accordance with the Charter and not to give such assistance to a state against which the UN takes such action.

The Allied Powers recognised Japan as a sovereign nation possessing 'the inherent right of collective and individual self-defence'.

Referring to the occupation forces in Japan it was provided that all of them would be withdrawn not later than 90 days after the coming into force of the peace treaty (Keesing's 1952: 11681).

The third major question in the peace treaty draft – the problem of reparations – aroused many objections. Many countries opposed to such 'soft' treatment of the Japanese in that matter. Because of the pressure from countries such as France, the Netherlands, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines article 14 a of section 'Claims and property clauses' was reworded on 13 August. In the following provision there were three significant corrections: 'It is recognised that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for damage and suffering caused by her during the war. Nevertheless, it is also recognised that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if she is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time to meet her other obligations'.

In the first sentence which originally said '...should in principle pay reparations' the words 'in principle' were deleted. The phrase 'adequate reparation' was substituted by harder 'complete reparation'. The third change was the phrase 'not presently sufficient' instead of original 'lacks of capacity' (Keesing's 1952: 11683). Thus, the final text was made a little bit more punitive for Japan but not enough to satisfy all the countries admitted to the Conference (Latourette 1957: 278).

As far as China is concerned, the US successfully opposed inviting the People's Republic of China to the Conference. The American position became especially uncompromising since China had entered the Korean

War (27 November 1950). During British-American talks (April–June 1951) the British government suggested consultations with the government in Communist China in Peking about the Japanese peace treaty. This proposal was rejected by the US. A spokesman of the US State Department Michael MacDermont announced that the US government ‘recognised the Nationalist government of China and does not contemplate discussions with the Peking regime on the Japanese peace treaty’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11500).

On 8 June John Dulles arrived in London. He had to deal with a difficult diplomatic task. The British government, which recognised the Peking regime as a legitimate government of China wanted to invite it to the San Francisco Conference. But Dulles reached a compromise settlement. In the end it was negotiated that neither Communist nor nationalist China would be admitted. Furthermore, Japan could sign a separate treaty with whichever government of China it chose to recognise. Both Chinese governments, Communist and Nationalist, denounced the Japanese draft treaty and the fact of not being invited to the conference. Peking’s propaganda showed the draft treaty as a ‘violation of international agreements’ which was ‘basically unacceptable’ to the Chinese people. It described the document as ‘a war treaty made to utilise Japan’s military potential for the invasion of Asia’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11683). Also Taipei (Taibei) government was disappointed. It demanded its rights to take part in the San Francisco Conference. Taiwan warned that the US stand ‘seriously damaged the traditional friendship between the Chinese and Americans’. The Japanese Peace treaty without Nationalist China would be ‘lacking in moral force and legal justification, and would leave the indelible blot on the history of Allied cooperation in resisting aggression’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11684)²¹.

On 5 September 1951 during the San Francisco Conference Andriey Gromyko, the Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, tried to introduce a resolution calling for the participation of Communist China. That attempt was ruled out of order by president of the conference Dean Acheson. His ruling was supported by 45 votes to 3.

On the other hand, many Japanese officials wanted to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China at that time. However, the Japanese premier Shigeru Yoshida did not do it because of the threat that the US Congress could refuse to ratify the peace treaty (Livingstone 1973: 243).

On 24 December 1951 Yoshida wrote a letter to John Foster Dulles to demonstrate Americans his aversion to Communist China. He concluded in

²¹ Japan signed a treaty of peace with nationalist China in April 1952.

his letter that: 'there are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist party in its programme of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the present government of Japan'. Therefore, as Yoshida wrote 'the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist government of China'. The Japanese prime minister also added that his government 'is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the national government of China, if that government so desires, a treaty which will re-establish normal relations between the two governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace' (Livingstone 1973: 249–250).

The question of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the San Francisco Peace Conference was strongly backed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, it had its own objectives toward the Japanese Peace Treaty.

On 7 May 1951 the Soviet government submitted to the US Ambassador in Moscow a note rejecting the proposed American draft. It proposed that the draft of the Peace Treaty should be drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers comprising of representatives of the United States, the Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Other countries which had taken part in the war with Japan should assist in drafting the treaty. According to Russians the peace treaty draft should safeguard interests of China and contain assurance that Japan 'would not enter into any coalitions against any of the States that participated in the war against Japan'. Soviets demanded also that 'no foreign state should have troops or military bases in Japan after that period of time' (Keesing's 1952: 11499).

The USA rejected the Soviet proposals (including the most important one concerning the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers) in its note of 20 May. The US declared that the draft treaty reflected real interest of China, particularly articles under which Japan would renounce all her former special rights and interests in that country.

Responding to Soviet complaints about possible remilitarisation of Japan and the retention of occupation troops, Americans wrote that 'the US government is satisfied that Japan's war making power is destroyed'. Furthermore, 'the United States has completely disarmed the Japanese military forces under its control and has assured that they now lead peaceful and productive lives'.

As far as Japanese entrance into a coalition against any of its former war enemies was concerned, the US answered that in the draft there was such a general provision. According to it, Japan refrained from the threat or use

of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (following the UN Charter). Referring to the presence of foreign troops in Japan Americans stated that they ‘would not be willing to deny to Japan what the UN Charter refers to as the inherent right of collective self-defence’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11499–11500).

On 10 June the Soviet Union presented the next note to the US government. It repeated its demand of drafting the Japanese peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Soviets wrote that because of the absence of Communist China and the Soviet Union in drawing up the treaty, the treaty was ‘primarily directed against these states, and is of an aggressive nature’. Russia called the future US-Japan defence agreement a ‘camouflage’ for the continued American military occupation of that country after the conclusion of the peace agreement.

Soviets claimed that the peace treaty should be ‘omnipartite and not separate, for which purpose no single country which took part in the war against Japan must be excluded from the preparation and signing of the treaty’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11685). In their reply Americans reiterated the arguments from the note of 20 May. Finally, on 12 August 1951 the Soviet Union accepted the invitation to the San Francisco Conference although its objectives to the draft remained.

At the conference the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andriey Gromyko said in his speech that the treaty ‘made no provisions for the withdrawal of occupation forces’, it ‘cleared a path for Japanese participation in aggressive blocs under the aegis of the United States’ and that its ‘real purpose’ was to ‘tie Japan hand and foot to the military alliance headed by the United States and directed against the Soviet Union and China’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11722). Finally, the USSR refused to sign the treaty.

On the same day when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed (8 September 1951) US secretary of state Dean Acheson and Japanese Premier Shigeru Yoshida signed the US-Japan bilateral Defence Pact. Under its provisions Japan agreed to the indefinite retention of US forces ‘in and about Japan’ in order to prevent any aggression against it. The preamble of it contained (as it had been promised to Yoshida) the assurance that ‘Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression...’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11724)²².

²² (Livingstone 1973: 242) According to many analyst, it violated the no-war provision (article 9) of the Japanese constitution.

The provisions of the Defence Pact stated also that Japan would not grant any third power any bases without US consent, and conditions of American forces disposition would be agreed between the two governments (Keesing's 1952: 11724). The operative part of the Pact was the Administrative Agreement which was signed on 28 February 1952.

It finally came into effect on 28 April 1952, the same day and hour as the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Pact. On that day the American occupation of Japan was formally finished.

CONCLUSIONS

Americans appeared in Japanese history for the first time in a significant way in 1853 when American commodore Matthew Perry arrived with battleships to the seaport of Uraga and demanded opening of Japanese harbours for international commerce.

Because of it and the general pressure of Western countries which wanted to open the Japanese market for their products, the Japanese carried out a reform (the so called 'Meiji reform') to strengthen their economy and make it able to compete with other countries. After that Japan became a strong imperialist state.

The occupation of Japan in 1945–51 by the US was its second mark on Japanese history. In the first phase of it (1945–48) Americans introduced major reforms which made Japan politically more similar to Western democracies (the Constitution, educational system) and changed partially its social structure (land reform).

However, the US did not succeed fully as far as this latter aim was concerned. In the second phase they abandoned the programme of the Zaibatsu dissolution, also the purge of war criminals was not carried out to the end (the purge of communists was initiated instead). Furthermore, Americans healed the Japanese economy, they included that country into world's political system and made it a political and military ally.

The draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty was the result of negotiations and a compromise between a 'softer' approach of the US and more punitive one of the Great Britain. Afterwards, the text of the San Francisco peace treaty was the outcome of the next compromise between the liberal stand of the US and Great Britain and claiming positions of other countries (particularly Burma, Indonesia and Philippines). However, the US defended successfully its new ally from being too much hurt by the provisions of the treaty. In

exchange Japan had to agree to American military bases on its territory and being in the US sphere of influence.

As I have mentioned before, the most important reasons for the change of American policy in Japan were international developments connected with the Cold War such as: the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the blockade of Berlin in the years 1948–1949, the Greek Civil War in 1946–49. Finally, the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 caused the remilitarisation of Japan and its political and military bonds with the US. As G.F. Kennan wrote: 'The Korean War demolished whatever slight possibility might ever have existed for a Russian-American understanding in relation to the problems of that region, based on the neutralisation and demilitarisation of Japan. What was later to occur in China made it doubly unfortunate that such an understanding ever existed' (Kennan 1967: 296).

One should stress that many American officials had appreciated Japan's importance before. G.F. Kennan thought that 'if at any time in the post-war period the Soviet leader had been confronted with a choice between control over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitatingly have chosen the latter'. Therefore, Americans 'could feel fairly secure in the presence of a truly friendly Japan and a nominally hostile China – nothing very bad could happen to us from this combination; but the dangers to our security of a nominally friendly China and a truly hostile Japan had already been demonstrated in the Pacific war' (Kennan 1967: 374–375).

The personal attitude of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, toward the Japanese was also an important factor. He thought that 'the Japanese are a proud, sensitive and industrious race' and respected them (MacArthur 1964: 309). MacArthur also advocated a peace treaty with Japan already in the early years of the occupation.

In April 1951 he was substituted by General Matthew Ridgeway. At that time the international situation was clear. The division of the world into two opposite political blocks – capitalist (led by the US) and communist (led by the USSR) was a reality. Thus, General Ridgeway continued implementing in Japan American occupation policy, whose aim was evident – making Japan a political and military ally of the US.

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DEVELOPMENT AND SHIFT OF US OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN (1945–1951) IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Summary

This article presents shifts of US occupation policy in Japan in years 1945–1951. America's changing position towards that country at the end of the Second World War, as well as in the first and second phases of the occupation is discussed. The international context of this process is presented and described.

Key words: American occupation in Japan, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), US – Japan Defence Pact, Second World War, Japan remilitarisation, Drapper – Johnston mission to Japan, (Red) purge in Japan, zaibatsu dissolution, 'Jinken' – human rights, Dodge plan

ROZWÓJ I ZMIANA AMERYKAŃSKIEJ POLITYKI OKUPACYJNEJ W JAPONII (1945–1951) W KONTEKŚCIE MIĘDZYNARODOWYM

Streszczenie

Artykuł ten opisuje zmiany polityki okupacyjnej USA w Japonii w latach 1945–1951. Omówiona jest tu zmieniająca się postawa Ameryki wobec tego państwa pod koniec II wojny światowej, a także w pierwszej i drugiej fazie okupacji. Przedstawiony oraz opisany jest także kontekst międzynarodowy tego procesu.

Słowa kluczowe: Amerykańska okupacja w Japonii, naczelny dowódca wojsk sprzymierzonych (SCAP), pakt obronny USA-Japonia, druga wojna światowa, remilitaryzacja Japonii, misja Drapper'a-Johnston'a w Japonii, (czerwona) czystka w Japonii, rozwiązanie zaibatsu, 'Jinken' – prawa człowieka, plan Dodge'a

РАЗВИТИЕ И ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ОККУПАЦИОННОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ В ЯПОНИИ (1945–1951) В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ

Резюме

В статье описываются изменения в политике оккупации США в Японии в 1945–1951 годах. Рассматривается претерпевающее изменения отношение Америки к этой стране в конце Второй мировой войны, а также на первом и втором этапах оккупации.

Кроме того, представлен и описан международный контекст этого процесса.

Ключевые слова: Американская оккупация в Японии, главнокомандующий союзными войсками (SCAP), Договор о взаимном сотрудничестве и гарантиях безопасности между США и Японией, вторая мировая война, ремилитаризация Японии, миссия Дрейпера-Джонстона в Японии, «чистка красных» в Японии, решение *дайбацу*, 'Jinken' – права человека, План Доджа

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R E V I E W S

Tomasz Idzikowski*

LONGIN PASTUSIAK,

PREZYDENT DOBRYCH INTENCJI. POLITYKA ZAGRANICZNA BARACKA OBAMY
[*PRESIDENT OF GOOD INTENTIONS. FOREIGN POLICY OF BARACK OBAMA*]

AKADEMIA FINANSÓW I BIZNESU VISTULA, WARSZAWA 2015, SS. 267

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The end of George W. Bush's presidency fell on the unfavourable period of the economic crisis and the deterioration of the image of the United States on the international arena as a result of external actions he had undertaken. The time when Barack Obama began his presidency required him to quickly begin the implementation of the assumptions which he presented as a candidate under the common slogan of 'Change'. They concerned mainly the idea of getting out of the economic crisis quickly, reducing unemployment or improving healthcare for Americans. The issue of foreign policy was also present, and among the most important points of Obama's plan we can distinguish, among others, the intention to withdraw from expensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new reset of relations with Russia, striving to reduce nuclear arsenals, and rebuilding trust on the international arena. We know that despite the efforts of the president and his administration, many of these problems have not been solved to this day.

Professor Longin Pastusiak's monograph is the study entitled *Prezydent dobrychintencji. Polityka zagraniczna Baracka Obamy* [*President of Good Intentions. Foreign Policy of Barack Obama*]. The author of the publication is a highly respected political scientist, specialist in the field of issues related to the United States and its practices, holding in his career positions in permanent delegations to NATO and the Western European Union.

The monograph is divided into sixteen chapters. Each of them raises a different problem related to President Obama's foreign policy, from the

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time of his candidacy for the post of Commander-in-Chief, to the problems and challenges the 44th President faced just before the end of his term.

The author's goal was to analyse the actions taken by President Obama in the field of foreign policy, both in the global and regional dimension. Already in the introduction to the book the author rightly notes that the beginning of Barack Obama's presidency fell on a time which was very difficult for Americans, especially in socio-economic terms. At the same time, he points out that: 'US voters assess the president primarily according to the effectiveness of solving internal, social and economic problems'. As a result, foreign policy has actually receded into the background in recent years. However, the improvement of internal conditions went hand in hand with the reconstruction of the image of the USA on the international arena, the image that had been undermined by the actions of the previous president – George W. Bush. Therefore, Barack Obama took action also in the field of foreign relations, although his administration was not able to implement all of his endeavours in the way he assumed.

In the first chapter, the author discusses the path that Barack Obama followed on the way to obtaining the nomination for the presidency of the United States. Starting from his birth in Hawaii, which is still being questioned by his opponents, through his achievements in the process of engaging in social campaigns, to the post of an Illinois senator. Obama's path to the White House was spectacular considering his origin and the fact that he came from outside the main establishment, as he called Washington in general. Nevertheless, as the author rightly points out, the future president had a unique gift of winning people over and he also willingly cooperated with representatives of the competitive party. The chapter finishes with a brief description of the views on the foreign policy issues of the three main presidential candidates – Barack Obama, Hilary Clinton and John McCain.

The second chapter of the monograph contains a much more in-depth analysis of Barack Obama's views on international affairs from the period when he was a presidential nominee. The author advances the thesis that the US president gained his position and won the election because his electoral programme was more credible than that of his rival from the Republican Party – John McCain. One can certainly agree with the thesis, but it is worth adding that the period of his candidacy was also a time of behind-the-scenes activities that drew the image of the Republican as a direct continuator of George W. Bush's policy. Considering public opinion polls in the United States, a significant portion of Americans blamed the Iraq war for economic problems in the US, which is why in some areas of domestic and foreign

policy, Barack Obama's candidacy corresponded to changes awaited by society at the time.

In the next chapter of the monograph, the author analyses the beginning of Obama's presidency. The author rightly observes that the first months turned out to be divergent from Barack's expectations. Despite of a good beginning, internal problems quickly emerged and they effectively hampered the implementation of the new president's ideas. The author also draws attention to a heated discussion that took place in the world after Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize.

The fourth chapter concerns Barack Obama's debut on the international arena and the first foreign contacts established by the new president. The author defines Obama's very enthusiastic reception in many countries during his travels as a reset. It is worth noting, however, that the president was also accused of excessive pragmatism and generalities.

The author devoted the following chapter of the monograph to the analysis of the fight against terrorism as an element of Barack Obama's foreign policy. The author rightly sums up successes in this field as moderate. The greatest one was the liquidation of Osama bin Laden in 2011, which resulted in a significant increase in public support for the president. At the same time, Obama departed from his predecessor's rhetoric and involvement in so-called global fight against terrorism, reduced the use of conventional troops and significantly increased the scope of the use of combat drones. The author rightly classifies the implementation of the plans to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan and persistence in the matters of Pakistan as successes of the president.

The sixth chapter of the publication touches on the subject of Barack Obama's approach to the Islamic world. The author rightly notes that the new president started with making a small but meaningful gesture by making the first call to the President of the Palestinian Authority, thus sending a signal to the world that he intends to seek a new path in relations with the Islamic world. At the same time, throughout the presidency, the new president took great care to not put Islam together with words such as terrorists or jihad in his speeches. This change of practice resulted in a significant increase in support for the USA in selected Arab countries, though it did not last long. The use of drones in military operations, his passive attitude to the situation in Egypt, and poorly evaluated activities that did not prevent the emergence of ISIS, all these elements caused a rapid drop in support for Obama in Muslim countries.

In the next chapter of the monograph the author describes the problem of ending the US military intervention in Iraq. As he rightly notes, the withdrawal of land forces contributed to increased internal problems of Iraq. At the same

time, Barack Obama adhered to his position of not re-engaging in a war in that country, which in spite of increasing popularity of the president resulted in a decrease in his ranking in the sphere of foreign policy and the fight against terrorism.

The eighth chapter concerns, as the author himself defined it, Obama's Achilles heel, or the war in Afghanistan. The author points out that the US president from the very beginning claimed that Afghanistan was the source of terrorism and problems, not Iraq. The chapter contains an analysis of Barack Obama's activities from the moment of taking office until the end of the war in Afghanistan.

In the next chapter of the monograph the author analyses Euro-Atlantic relations during Obama's presidency. He also drew attention to the problem of tapping European leaders and its consequences in the construction of a positive image of the USA among its European partners. The author also stressed the fact that President Obama achieved a success in obtaining the mandate of some NATO countries in the fight against the Islamic State and increasing defence spending.

The tenth chapter raises the important problem of a reset of relations with the Russian Federation. The author draws attention to the most important points of the reset, such as signing the START II treaty, at the same time he also mentions problems on the Washington-Russia line concerning, among others, the anti-missile shield and the situation in Ukraine.

The subsequent chapter of the monograph concerns the shift that occurred in US foreign policy in relation with Asian countries. The author describes the promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement by President Obama and the strengthening of cooperation with Asian countries. He is also correct in his observation that by visiting selected countries of the region, the president wanted to slow down the growth of the sphere of influence of the People's Republic of China.

In the twelfth chapter the author analyses the US-China relations. He aptly states that Americans recognise the PRC not only as an economic competitor, but also a potential military threat due to large military investments made in recent years. The intensified foreign policy of Barack Obama in Asia did not lead to a substantial improvement in contacts with China, which is afraid of the encroaching US influence. At the end of the chapter the author points out that one of Obama's notable successes in the PRC was the fact that both countries reached an agreement on reducing CO₂ emissions in specified quantities and time frames.

The next chapter of the monograph discusses the problems of the Middle East. The author analyses Barack Obama's engagement in the continuation of peace processes in the region. He discusses the problems of Egypt and points out that the new president moved much closer to Palestine, which was criticised by Israel. The author rightly summarised Obama's policy by paying attention to good intentions and willingness to get involved, but without any significant successes.

The author devoted the fourteenth chapter to the subject of the new US partnership with Africa. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the administration of President Obama was concerned about the growing involvement of China on the continent. Unfortunately, the US president did not achieve notable successes in Africa to reverse this trend and develop economic cooperation, despite high costs incurred by American taxpayers.

In the next chapter, the author discusses US foreign policy towards Latin America. He notes the dissonance between Obama's words about cooperation and the promotion of democracy in the region and the lack of significant reactions to the coups and overthrow of democratically elected authorities in Paraguay and Honduras. The author advances the thesis that the situation of Latin American countries changed more than US policy in the region, which contributed to the lack of effectiveness of the applied strategy.

In the last chapter of the monograph, the author presents an analysis of Polish-American relations during the presidency of Barack Obama. The author extensively debates the issue of building an anti-missile shield as the dominant topic in the relations of our country with the US, and at the same time advances the thesis that at present there are no unsolved problems between our countries. It is difficult to agree with this assertion when we look at the matters from the Polish point of view. Polish citizens are still waiting for the visa issue unresolved for years. The missile shield issue has not been finally resolved either and still arouses a lot of doubts and emotions in our country, which is why, I think, there are still topics our countries need to continue working on, although it is now the legacy of the next US president.

The monograph by Longin Pastusiak describes many aspects of President Obama's foreign policy. The study is at a high substantive level and written in understandable language, analysing the subject matter very thoroughly. An additional advantage of the monograph are the final remarks contained in it, in which the author succinctly and briefly analysed the problem of the internal situation of the US and the impact of the establishment on changes that left a mark and led to a change in foreign policy of President Barack Obama.

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Tomasz Olejarz*

JÓZEF M. FISZER, TOMASZ STĘPNIEWSKI,
*POLSKA I UKRAINA W PROCESIE TRANSFORMACJI, INTEGRACJI I WYZWAŃ
DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA EUROPY ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ*
[*POLAND AND UKRAINE IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION, INTEGRATION
AND CHALLENGES FOR THE SECURITY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE*]
INSTYTUT STUDIÓW POLITYCZNYCH POLSKIEJ AKADEMII NAUK,
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Polska i Ukraina w procesie transformacji, integracji i wyzwań dla bezpieczeństwa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej [*Poland and Ukraine in the Process of Transformation, Integration and Challenges for the Security of Central and Eastern Europe*] – an analysis by prof. Józef M. Fiszer and Tomasz Stępniewski, PhD, prof. of the Catholic University of Lublin is devoted to the problems of the evolution of the position of Poland and Ukraine from the point of view of the specificity and dynamics of three processes: political, systemic and economic transformation, European integration and the safety deficit of Central and Eastern Europe identified and analysed in the geopolitical scale. The work consists of 6 substantive chapters (chapter 1 – „Transformacja ustrojowa i integracja państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej z Unią Europejską. Sukcesy i porażki” [‘Systemic transformation and integration of Central and Eastern European countries with the European Union. Successes and failures’]; chapter 2 – „Polityka zagraniczna Polski po 1989 roku wobec małych państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” [‘Polish foreign policy after 1989 towards small countries of Central and Eastern Europe’]; chapter 3 –

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„Kryzys Unii Europejskiej i jej przyszłość. Nowe wyzwania i zagrożenia dla integracji i bezpieczeństwa Europy” [‘The crisis of the European Union and its future. New challenges and threats to Europe’s integration and security’]; chapter 4 – „Wojna Ukrainy o niepodległość, pamięć i tożsamość” [‘Ukraine’s war for independence, memory and identity’]; chapter 5 – „NATO, ukraiński kryzys i szara strefa bezpieczeństwa Europy Wschodniej” [‘NATO, the Ukrainian crisis and the grey security zone of Eastern Europe’]; chapter 6 – „Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej w dobie kryzysu ukraińskiego” [‘Eastern policy of the European Union at the time of the Ukrainian crisis’]; initial and final reflections of the authors, as well as a bibliography and a bilingual resume in English and Russian. An important substantive value of the book is its analytical ‘horizon’ and temporal dimension. The beginning of the period under consideration is the geopolitical reevaluation of 1991 (the collapse of the USSR and the departure from the bipolar system of international relations), and the emergence of independent Poland and Ukraine (1989–1991). The end of that period is constituted by current internal events in Ukraine and the European Union, but first of all by an analysis of the impact of external threats characterising the post-Soviet area en masse, from the point of view of the current phase of the course and consequences of the conflict caused by Russia in Ukraine (and other so-called ‘frozen’ conflicts). Regarding the workshop and the methodological aspect, it should be noted that the work is widely documented, both in terms of quantity and quality (the most up-to-date documents, reports, analyses, monographs, collective works, articles and scientific papers, journalistic and popular science materials, press articles and websites found by authors during a meticulous query at home and abroad are referred to in the book). The literature of the subject is thus pluralised and interdisciplinary, characteristic of the fields of political science, International Relations, economics, sociology, etc.

The first three chapters of the study by Józef M. Fiszer characterise and analyse (without avoiding unequivocal appraisals and assessments) the specificity of systemic changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, thus leading to the statement (the author’s main thesis) that after the initial euphoria resulting from the recovered freedom and sovereignty there have come – as inevitable and unavoidable – difficulties of the transformation period, and the path to a democratic system and free market economy has turned out to be more complicated in social and political reality than previously anticipated and assumed. It is exemplified by the example of Poland, where the political transformation after 1989 and the economic reforms

introduced at that time caused a shocking rise in prices, and at the same time generated the effect of a decline in real income and standard of living of a large part of Polish citizens (an increasing scale of stratification of income and material resources and the actual pauperisation of society). In Józef Fiszer's opinion, after the overthrow of communism the remaining countries of Central and Eastern Europe either adopted the transformation direction similar to that of Poland (Poland was perceived as a positive 'model' of transformation and democratisation), or considerably attenuated it, limiting consciously and intentionally the growing social and political costs. At the same time, they made smaller or larger mistakes, which still spark off political and intellectual disputes and spontaneous discussions 'inside' these countries (including Poland).

Thus, the evolution of Central and Eastern European countries and the transition from communism to parliamentary democracy and free market economy – through the transformation of the political, social, economic and cultural system that took place in 1989–1991 and later through their Europeanisation (the processes of 'anchoring' CEE countries in the EU) were neither simple nor easy. It certainly did not run in a linear and uninterrupted manner. On the contrary, it was a highly complex, complicated process, even now arousing intense social and political emotions. Moreover, according to the authors of the book, there is still no real, participative (civic) democracy in the new EU Member States, despite the quarter-century of political transformation and progressing Europeanisation processes. The quality and difficulties resulting from the condition of Central and Eastern democracies today, despite high hopes and optimism accompanying their creation, still leave wide field and space for further assessments, reconstruction of results or even (re-)interpretation of their character and specificity, as evidenced by this study.

In the next part of the book Tomasz Stepniewski's analysis of the dynamics and nature of the processes of Europeanisation and the related effects of the so-called 'great enlargement' of the European Union in 2004 to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is important in explanative and cognitive terms. In this volume, not only an in-depth attempt to reflect on the significance of EU enlargement for Central European Member States is made, but also specific systemic problems of Eastern European countries, as well as political, economic, socio-cultural difficulties in transformation processes are indicated and mental challenges are highlighted – the legacy of *homo sovieticus* which permanently hinders tightening of multilateral

cooperation, for example between Ukraine and the European Union. The third area of the analysis concerns security problems in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular Russia's war with Ukraine. A reference is made here to the causes, course and possible consequences of the conflict for Ukraine (for its 'outside-the-bloc' status, for its 'unitary' state character, for the future of its 'multi-vector' foreign policy), as well as for the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe and for the collective security system within NATO. The *per procura* war between Russia and Ukraine has implications not only directly for Ukraine, it also poses a challenge to the security of the entire post-Soviet area, to European and transatlantic security, and questions the shape of future relations between the Russian Federation (*politique du fait accompli*), the European Union and the entire transatlantic environment.

The presentation of the evolution and redefinition of the state of security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe is a separate chord of the study. The way of exemplifying and grading problems related to the typology of threats and the assessment of the state of security in Central and Eastern Europe draws the reader's attention. It should be stressed that the main intention of the author (Tomasz Stepniewski) in the second phase of the analysis and the specific *idée fixe* of this part of the book appears to be a synthetic look at the problem of the security deficit, primarily through the prism of regional conflicts, the war between Russia and Ukraine, from the point of view of the confrontation carried out by Ukraine over its full independence, memory and identity. According to the political scientist, a stake in the political-military 'hybrid' confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is the real nature of independence and subjectivity of the modern Ukrainian state, but also an attempt to break with the eternal and permanent dependence on the Russian Federation – on the socio-cultural plane (in the matter of common memory, history, religion, etc.) and on the political and economic ones (the specificity of the political regime of Ukraine and the problem of energy security and transit of raw materials to/via Ukraine). According to the author, as a result of the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine the 'divorce' of Ukraine from Russia assumed a lasting and deeply polarising nature. Thus, we are witnessing gradual 'signing out' of Ukraine and Ukrainians from the post-Soviet political space. More importantly, permanent crises in Ukraine (successive 'revolutions'), and above all the armed conflict lasting since 2014, have changed the way of thinking about the security of Eastern Europe and, more broadly, entire Europe (one can even say that the conflict in Ukraine is a symbolic ending and epilogue of the interna-

tional order established after the Cold War). Secondly, according to Tomasz Stępniewski, the lack of reflection on the change of the security situation in Eastern Europe may have far-reaching consequences for the entire collective security system of states functioning within NATO. The security system of Eastern Europe (more widely of the post-Soviet area and the related Black Sea area) is perceived as extremely complicated, above all due to its multi-dimensionality and complexity (military, energy, ethno-political, geo-cultural aspects, etc.). As a result of the growth of the geostrategic importance of this area, there appear and accumulate further problems complicating the already complex situation in the region. As a consequence, the lack of a coherent NATO strategy towards the post-Soviet area does not contribute to stabilising and increasing the sense of security of this part of the world still vulnerable to turbulence and sensitive to destabilisation.

As far as the analysis of the European Union's eastern policy in the twenty first century is concerned (to which the author devotes a separate chapter), it should be noted that it is constantly modified due to changes in its 'parameters' and processes taking place 'inside' the EU. The extension of the geopolitical azimuths of the European Union to the countries of Central Europe (in particular to Poland) contributed – according to Stępniewski – to a change in the Community's approach to the entire post-Soviet area. Until the enlargement of the EU towards the East, the Community did not see the need to strengthen relations with the post-Soviet states, because Russia-first philosophy dominated in its policy. After 2004 and after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, we have been observing a slow change of the 'eastern paradigm' of the EU and its attitude to the problem of the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this phase of the study, the author analyses in a synthetic way the European Union's policy towards selectively chosen entities, showing the lability of the internal situation of the EU (crises faced by the Community), and then investigates the situation of the eastern neighbourhood countries (through the prism of the Eastern Partnership policy), stressing the so-called 'Ukrainian crisis'.

It is worth emphasising that the study by Józef M. Fiszer and Tomasz Stępniewski entitled *Polska i Ukraina w procesie transformacji, integracji i wyzwań dla bezpieczeństwa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* [*Poland and Ukraine in the Process of Transformation, Integration and Challenges for the Security of Central and Eastern Europe*] deserves recognition and appreciation not only in the scientific environment because of the importance of the issues it undertakes, the complexity of structure, the specificity of problems and dilemmas it describes, the high level of culture of narration and the analytical

qualifications of the authors. The analysis succinctly clarifies and explains to the reader often difficult and complicated research matter regarding the addressed problems and issues. A merit of the study, which does not require special promotion, is the high analytical competence and intellectual courage of the authors, especially in the process of formulating specific diagnoses, hypotheses and assessments of the studied social and political phenomena and processes. The book is, therefore, a valuable and authoritative voice and a contribution to the discussion on the ‘condition’, challenges and political future of the region of Central and Eastern Europe.

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