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## WSTĘP

Rok 2022 zaczął się dla Polski i Europy niezwykle tragicznie. Rosyjska agresja na Ukrainę zapoczątkowana w nocy 24 lutego zmieniła rzeczywistość, do jakiej od dziesiątków lat przywykliśmy. Rzeczywistość ta nie pozwalała nam dopuszczać myśli, że w XXI wieku, w sercu Europy, może dojść do konfliktu zbrojnego. Wydarzenie to z pewnością zmieni sposób postrzegania międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych, gospodarczych, społecznych, czy kulturowych na lata, o czym bez wątplenia będziemy pisać na łamach naszego czasopisma.

Numer 1/2022 tradycyjnie podzielony został na dwie części: pierwsza zawiera artykuły naukowe, a druga recenzję opublikowanej już pracy. Problematyka tego wydania koncentruje się wokół zagadnień ekonomiczno-politologicznych, mających wysoce problemowy i utylitarny charakter.

Rozpoczynamy od artykułu autorstwa Józef Fiszera pt. *Dlaczego upadł Związek Radziecki? Przyczyny i skutki dla Polski, Europy i świata*. Autor przedstawia dogłębną analizę uwarunkowań oraz przesłanek wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych dla upadku Związku Radzieckiego, a także jego skutków dla Polski i jej miejsca w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Ukazuje zmiany geopolityczne, które dokonały się wówczas w Europie i na świecie, oraz ich wpływ na reorientację polityki zagranicznej Polski na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Lektura tego artykułu – mimo że bezpośrednio nie dotyczy on wojny w Ukrainie – pozwoli zrozumieć procesy zachodzące w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, które były jedną z przyczyn rosyjskiej agresji z lutego 2022 roku.

Kolejny tekst napisali badacze z Nigerii: Kayode Wakilie Olawoyin oraz Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde. Analizują oni wykorzystanie narzędzi informacyjno-komunikacyjnych i odpowiedzialność przywódców politycznych oraz osób sprawujących urzędy publiczne w samorządzie lokalnym w południowo-zachodniej Nigerii. Autorzy poprzez przeprowadzone badania ilościowe dowiedli, że przy użyciu odpowiednich technologii ICT narzędzia w społecznościach wiejskich poprawią lokalne zarządzanie.

Artykuł Aleksandra Żołnierskiego i Grzegorza Sowuli stanowi z kolei interesującą analizę roli kapitału społecznego w kreowaniu innowacji na podstawie omówienia jednego z polskich instytutów badawczych. Tekst opiera się na metodzie studium przypadku, za pomocą której przedstawiony został Instytut Technologii Materiałów Elektronicznych.

Czwarte opracowanie, autorstwa Piotra Stolarczyka, to próba odpowiedzi na pytanie o wnioski z neoklasycznych i keynesowskich poglądów na temat funkcjonowania makroekonomii w czasach kryzysu. Autor omawia implikacje polityki makroekonomicznej dla sytuacji w Polsce, posługując się bogatym aparatem badawczym i empirycznym.

Przedostatni tekst, autorstwa Marcina Bobruka, ukazuje zastosowanie analizy ekonomicznej w procesach decyzyjnych w obszarze zarządzania innowacjami. Celem tego artykułu jest wskazanie możliwości użycia uznanych i szeroko przyjętych narzędzi analizy ekonomicznej w odniesieniu do wszystkich, w tym określanych jako trudno mierzalne, aspektów inwestowania w innowacje. W tekście zaproponowana została również struktura realizacji tego typu analiz oceny inwestycji.

Pierwszą część niniejszego numeru zamyka tekst autorstwa Arkadiusza Cygana dotyczący polityki klimatycznej Wielkiej Brytanii. Autor w interesujący sposób ukazuje politykę klimatyczną tego kraju w kontekście The Climate Change Act. Tekst ten może stanowić cenny obszar poznawczy w zakresie rozumienia polityki klimatycznej Wielkiej Brytanii.

W części drugiej kierujemy uwagę na recenzję Zbysława Ziemackiego. Autor recenzuje książkę autorstwa Noreeny Hertz *Stulecie samotnych. Jak odzyskać utracone więzi*, opublikowaną przez Wydawnictwo Słowne w 2022 roku.

Życzymy wszystkim przyjemnej lektury oraz zachęcamy do współpracy z naszą Redakcją i z Uczelnią Łazarskiego, jedną z najlepszych szkół wyższych w Polsce.

*dr Adrian Chojan*  
*Redaktor Naczelny*

## INTRODUCTION

The year 2022 started for Poland and Europe extremely tragically. The Russian aggression against Ukraine that started at night on 24 February changed the reality we had been used to for dozens of years. That reality did not let us even think that there might be a war in the heart of Europe in the 21st century. The events will certainly change the way of perceiving international political, economic, social or cultural relations in the future, which we will undoubtedly write about in our journal.

The 1/2022 issue is traditionally divided into two parts: the first one contains scientific articles and the second one - review of publication. The problems discussed focus on economic and political issues that are debatable and utilitarian in nature.

We start with the article called *Why did the Soviet Union collapse? The reasons and effects for Poland, Europe and the world* by Józef Fiszer. The author presents an in-depth analysis of the circumstances as well as domestic and international premises of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its consequences for Poland and its position in Central and Eastern Europe. He also presents geopolitical changes that took place in Europe and the world and their influence on the reset of the Polish foreign policy at the turn of the 21st century. Although the article does not concern the war in Ukraine directly, reading it may help to understand the processes that are taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and were the reasons for the Russian aggression in February 2022.

The next article was written by researchers from Nigeria: Kayode Wakili Olawoyin and Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde. They analyse the use of information and communications technology tools and accountability of political leaders and public office holders in the local government in Southwestern Nigeria. By means of quantitative research, the authors prove that the appropriate use of ICT tools can improve governance in rural communities.

The next article by Aleksander Żołnierski and Grzegorz Sowula is an interesting analysis of the role of social capital in the creation of innovation



based on the presentation of one of the Polish research institutes. The text is a case study of the Institute of Technology of Electronic Materials.

The fourth article, by Piotr Stolarczyk, attempts to answer the question about conclusions drawn from neoclassical and Keynesian opinions on the functioning of macroeconomics at the time of a crisis. Using a sophisticated research and empirical apparatus, the author discusses the implications of macroeconomic policy for the situation in Poland.

The text by Marcin Bobruk presenting the application of economic analysis in the decision-making processes in the area of innovation management closes the first part of the issue. The article is aimed at identifying the possibilities of using recognised and widely adopted tools of economic analysis in relation to all, including those described as difficult to measure, aspects of investing in innovation. The article also proposes the structure of implementation of this type of analysis of investment assessment.

The first part of this issue ends with a text by Arkadiusz Cygan on the climate policy of Great Britain. The author presents the country's climate policy in an interesting way in the context of The Climate Change Act. The text may be a valuable area of research in understanding Great Britain's climate policy.

In the second part of the issue we draw attention to review of scientific monograph. Zbysław Ziemacki reviews a book *Stulecie samotnych. Jak odzyskać utracone więzi* by Noreena Herz, published by Wydawnictwo Słowne in 2022.

We wish you a pleasure of reading and encourage you to cooperate with our Editorial Board and Lazarski University, one of the best higher education institutions in Poland.

*Adrian Chojan, PhD*  
*Editor-in-Chief*

A R T Y K U Ł Y I S T U D I A

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A R T I C L E S A N D S T U D I E S

**Józef M. Fiszer\***

# WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION COLLAPSE? THE REASONS AND EFFECTS FOR POLAND, EUROPE, AND THE WORLD

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## INTRODUCTION

At the end of December 2021, it will have been 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, established after the Russian Revolution and the overthrow of tsarism in Russia. Despite numerous problems, for almost 70 years this entity, which was unprecedented in the history of international relations, existed in the international arena. Just like its establishment in 1922, its collapse also came as a big surprise to politicians and researchers of international relations. It caused radical changes on the political map of Europe and the world. It was also of great importance for Poland and its foreign policy.

The article is dedicated to the internal and international causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its geopolitical consequences for Poland's foreign policy at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as well as its place and role in international relations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Many scientific publications have been written on this subject in Poland and around the world, and in particular, a lot has been written about the factors, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and geopolitical consequences for Europe and the world. Although it has been thirty years since this historic and groundbreaking event for the world, it remains in the centre of interest

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\* Józef M. Fiszer, Ph.D., Professor, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Science, e-mail: fiszer@isppan.waw.pl, ORCID: 0000-000-3-2461-4341.

of historians, political scientists, and experts in international relations who investigate how it could happen, why a country which is so powerful in every respect (an empire, a superpower)<sup>1</sup> fell like the proverbial house of cards. They are still seeking answers to many questions related to this event. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 surprised the whole world, although its agony began in the late 1970s, and was accelerated by the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan<sup>2</sup>. The collapse of the Soviet Union came as a surprise to both the international community and the people living in the Eurasian empire. Nobody expected that a power of this rank could collapse quickly and bloodlessly. Researchers and politicians had been speculating for years about the prospects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and wondering how to accelerate it, but no scenario worked out in practice. The Soviet Union de facto disintegrated in an evolutionary, peaceful manner, and did not lead to a bloody revolution or world war as it happened when it was established. Some of the scenarios assumed it. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established in 1922 after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the overthrow of tsarism and the civil war in Russia, which claimed millions of lives<sup>3</sup>.

The purpose of the article is to analyse the internal and international rationale of the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and its consequences for Poland's foreign policy and its place in Central and Eastern Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It shows the radical geopolitical changes in Europe and in the world caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is assumed that with the collapse of the USSR, the post-war Yalta-Potsdam order also collapsed, the Cold War ended and the process of building a new international order in the world began, which continues to this day.

In the article, the author seeks answers to several research questions concerning the internal and international causes of the collapse of the USSR

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<sup>1</sup> In 1991, the USSR covered an area of 22,402,200 square kilometres, and had a population of 293,047,571 million, and a powerful army of over 5 million soldiers with about 10,000 nuclear warheads and missile vehicles to transport them. For more see: R. Zięba, *Rokowanie w sprawie ograniczenia wyścigu zbrojeń i rozbrojenia*, "Stosunki Międzynarodowe", vol. 15, pp. 123–138.

<sup>2</sup> The decision to intervene in Afghanistan was made in Moscow in the evening on 12 December 1979, but no documents were officially published. The war in Afghanistan lasted ten years and cost the USSR about \$100 billion. See: H. Ćwięk (ed.), *Interwencja ZSRR w Afganistanie*, "Res Politicae", Wydawnictwo im. Stanisława Podobińskiego Akademii im. Jana Długosza, Częstochowa 2013, pp. 56–57.

<sup>3</sup> G. Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire 1552–1917*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1997; R. Pipes, *Czerwone imperium: powstanie Związku Sowieckiego*, Magnum, Warszawa 2015.

in 1991 and its geopolitical consequences for Europe and the world, as well as for Poland's foreign policy: to what extent did the Revolutions of 1989, which began in Poland, accelerate the collapse of the USSR and how did it affect the reorientation of Poland's foreign policy and the transformation of the political system in Poland and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe? To what extent did the fall of communism in Poland in the summer of 1989 and the Revolutions of 1989, which spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe, contribute to the disintegration of the Soviet Empire? The author puts forward and verifies several theses and hypotheses related to these research questions. The main thesis of the article is that the collapse of the Soviet Union, apart from many internal (economic, political, social) and international causes, was to a great extent caused by the Revolutions of 1989, i.e. by the process of dynamic and radical system changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It resulted in the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact, which were the pillars of the USSR and the states of the bloc. Moreover, the author states that Poland's foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR was realistic, adequate for the international situation, and consistent with Poland's *raison d'état*. However, nowadays in the era of Russia's neo-imperial policy of Vladimir Putin, it should be more assertive and extend beyond Central and Eastern Europe. It should be based on the Euro-Atlantic system and close relations with Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. An important role in Poland's foreign policy should also be played by such informal groupings as the Three Seas Initiative and cooperation with the countries of the Visegrad Group and the Weimar Triangle. The author believes that after 1991 Poland's Eastern policy towards the post-Soviet states – especially Ukraine and Belarus – was too passive, excessively focused on weakening and isolating Russia. In practice, it did not achieve the assumed goals; it failed and should be reviewed. The so-far orderly, constructivist international order, which has been disintegrating in front of us, as well as Russia's geopolitical aspirations, including its integration with Belarus or recent Russia's escalating actions on the border with Ukraine, show how much Poland needs not only secure alliances and modern armed forces but also a realistic and far-sighted foreign policy.

The article analyses not only the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and its geopolitical consequences but also internal and international conditions as well as goals, directions, opportunities, and threats for Poland's foreign policy at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the context of the emerging new international order in Europe and the world after the collapse of the

USSR and the end of the Cold War. The most important task for Poland's foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR was to ensure its broadly understood security through accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, and since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century until today it has been strengthening its position and role in NATO and the European Union, and the international arena in general. This is an urgent task because contrary to what some researchers write<sup>4</sup>, the role of Poland in the international arena has been decreasing since 2015, and its foreign policy is short-sighted, as it has been subordinated to the immediate (electoral) interests of the ruling PiS (Law and Justice) party, which plays the anti-EU, anti-German, and anti-Russian card. This leads to animosity among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and is not conducive to cooperation between countries belonging to the Visegrad Group or the Weimar Triangle<sup>5</sup>. Together with the EU and NATO countries, especially with Germany, France, and the United States, Poland should talk to Russia and fight for peace and democratic reforms in Belarus and Ukraine. It is necessary to return to comprehensive cooperation with Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Georgia and to support their efforts to join the Euro-Atlantic structures.

As for the methodology, the author mainly refers to classical realism, the theory of foreign policy, neoliberalism, and constructivism. On the other hand, the dominant research methods in this article are a critical analysis of documents, source materials, and literature on the subject. These theories and research methods are known and well described in the literature on the subject. Therefore, the author does not mention them in the paper or present their essence, because that would be "reinventing the wheel"<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> W. Paruch, *Polityka transatlantycka rządów Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (2015–2019: przesłanki (part 1)*, "Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej", no. 18(2020), 4, pp. 221–245.

<sup>5</sup> M. Kokot, *Pozorna jedność Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Czesi i Słowacy dają kosza Orbaniowi*, "Gazeta Wyborcza", 19.02.2021, p. 13; B. T. Wieliński, *Klub marionetek Putina w Budapeszcie*, "Gazeta Wyborcza", 2.04.2021, p. 4; J. M. Fiszer, M. Czasak, *Trójkąt Weimarski. Geneza i działalność na rzecz integracji Europy w latach 1991–2016*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Deutsch Polnische Wissenschaft Stiftung, Warszawa 2019.

<sup>6</sup> J. Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2007; A. Skolimowska, *Konstruktoryzm w studiach europejskich*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Łośgraf, Warszawa 2013; K. Kasianiuk, *Analiza systemowa jako narzędzie w badaniach instytucji politycznych. Uwagi wstępne*, "Studia Polityczne", no. 2, vol. 45, 2017, pp. 169–192; M. Kozub-Karkut, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych a badanie polityki zagranicznej*, "Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations", no. 4, tom 52, 2016, pp. 34–50.

The author attempts to present the internal and international factors of the collapse of the Soviet Union analysed in the article and its geopolitical consequences for Poland's foreign policy and its place in Central and Eastern Europe in a holistic manner, both in theoretical and utilitarian terms and on a broad background of changes in Europe and the world. This required a wide source query and an analysis of the already rich Polish and foreign literature on this subject. It comprises published documents, monographs, articles, and studies as well as information from the press and the Internet.

## 1. Factors that caused the collapse of the USSR

In Poland and the world there are numerous books about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but this issue is still of great interest to historians, political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, researchers, experts of contemporary international relations, politicians, and journalists. The reasons and effects of the collapse of the USSR are analysed over and over in the light of various research theories<sup>7</sup>. Why? Because the disintegration of such a powerful state in every respect (area, population, natural resources, armed forces etc.) was one of the crucial events of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which had a huge impact on international processes in Europe, Asia, and around the world. Undoubtedly, it has become the accelerator. It largely contributed to the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam order, the end of the Cold War, and the beginning of a new chapter in the general history of Europe and the world. It also had far-reaching consequences for Poland's foreign policy and its place in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The effects of the collapse of the USSR in 1991 are still noticeable in the international arena and evoke positive and negative emotions among researchers of international relations and politicians around the world, as well as among people in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and other countries that were founded on the ruins of the communist empire. For many of them, it was a shock, it raised hopes and at the same time fears for their future<sup>8</sup>. It is worth quoting the famous Vladimir

<sup>7</sup> C. Wohlforth, *Realism and the End of the Cold War*, "International Security", no. 3, 1994; R. G. Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993. W. Marciniak, *Rozgrabione imperium. Upadek Związku Sowieckiego i powstanie Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Wydawnictwo Arcana, Kraków 2001.

<sup>8</sup> W. Marciniak, *Mapa i pamięć o imperium. Kartograficzne symbole nostalgii postsowieckiej*, [in:] W. Marciniak (ed.), *Inne wymiary polityki*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN,

Putin's statement that the fall of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. *Nota bene*, this assessment determines Russia's international policy under Vladimir Putin's rule, whose strategic goal is to rebuild at least a substitute for the former Evil Empire, as Ronald Reagan described the USSR on 8 March 1983<sup>9</sup>. As the heir to the great empire, the Russian Federation cannot accept the loss of its superpower position and role in the world. Vladimir Putin builds his and Russia's prestige in the international arena by contesting the new, post-Cold War world order and disregarding the norms of international law the examples of which are Russia's aggressive policy towards Georgia and Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014<sup>10</sup>.

Among numerous factors that led to the fall of the Soviet Union, there are, in general, internal and external, objective and subjective, as well as historical, cultural, political, economic, social, ideological, and international ones. Researchers analyse the factors through the prism of various research theories, but the results of their research are similar. They show that the USSR was an artificial creation, based on a utopian, false communist ideology, and its political system was unreformable, detached from social, political, economic and cultural reality. According to theories of empires and their history, such as the Roman Empire, each empire, due to its nature, sooner or later is doomed to collapse. It is not able to ensure the integrity and security of borders, assimilate so different ethnic and national groups, and merge the conquered territories into one efficient, durable state. In the light of the theory of constructivism, the rise of the USSR was associated with the simultaneous degradation of the identity of the former Russian Empire, and its disintegration was caused, inter alia, by the progressive weakening of

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Warszawa 2013, pp. 149–151; A. Zubow (ed.), *Istoriija Rossii. XX wiek: 1939–2007*, Wydawnictwo Nauka, Moskwa 2009.

<sup>9</sup> S. Hoffmann, *Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War*, Ballinger, Cambridge 1983, pp. 154–155; G. P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, Charles Scribner's Sons, Nowy Jork 1993, pp. 266–267; R. Ištók, D. Plavčanová, *Russian geopolitics and geopolitics of Russia: phenomenon of space*, "European Journal of Geopolitics", no. 1, 2013, pp. 61–94.

<sup>10</sup> J. M. Fiszer, T. Stepiński, K. Świder, *Polska – Ukraina – Białoruś – Rosja. Obraz politycznej dynamiki regionu*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2019; K. A. Kowalczyk, *Geopolityczne dążenia współczesnej Rosji*, "Przegląd Geopolityczny", no. 27, 2019, pp. 78–92; J. M. Fiszer, *Zadania i cele polityki zagranicznej Władimira Putina*, [in:] "Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna", no. 1(52), 2016, pp. 167–201; R. D. Asmus, *Mała wojna, która wstrząsnęła światem. Gruzja, Rosja i przyszłość Zachodu*, Wydawnictwo Res Publica Nowa, Warszawa 2010.



the dominant, i.e. Soviet identity, and the strengthening of the identity of the enslaved nations and states. This led to the emergence of dissident movements and political opposition in the USSR, e.g. the Democratic Party of Russia, the Popular Front of Latvia etc. Along with the economic crisis and social discontent that had been growing in the Soviet Union since the end of the 1970s, they increased their power and forced its authorities to make concessions in internal and international politics<sup>11</sup>.

In the context of the above, the important reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union included the termination of the agreement on the establishment of the USSR by the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) (March 1990), the decisions of the Baltic republics to adopt the Declaration of Independence (March-May 1990), particularly the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on 12 June 1990 at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian SFSR, which many researchers consider the actual collapse of the USSR<sup>12</sup>. Other union republics, as well as autonomous republics, such as Tatarstan, North Ossetia, South Ossetia, and even Transnistria, which did not have a separate status, made similar decisions<sup>13</sup>. The author believes that the Revolutions of 1989, which started in Poland and by the end of 1989 brought about the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, also contributed to this<sup>14</sup>.

On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became a new leader of the Soviet Union and contributed to the détente in relations between the East and the West, especially for US-Soviet relations. He was aware of the difficulties in the USSR and the entire Eastern Bloc. He wanted to save communism, and for that, he needed the détente and help from the West<sup>15</sup>. Therefore, to the surprise of all, in April 1985 he announced a programme of reforms,

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<sup>11</sup> A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, Penguin Books, London 1991, pp. 11–19; S. Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982.

<sup>12</sup> J. Ołędzka, *Współczesna Rosja 1991–2011*, "Humanities and Social Science", no. 1, 2014, p. 133.

<sup>13</sup> W. Materski, *Od cara do "cara". Studium rosyjskiej polityki historycznej*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warszawa 2017, p. 194.

<sup>14</sup> J. M. Fiszler, *The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Sejm and Senate Elections in 1989. Systemic Transformation in Poland and its Consequences for Europe and the World*, "Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna", no. 3(66), 2019, pp. 139–163.

<sup>15</sup> V. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2007, pp. 278–279; O. A. Westad, *The Global Cold War. A World History*, Penguin Books, New York 2018, pp. 364–372; H. A. Kissinger, *Dyplomacja*, Philip Wilson, Warszawa 1996, pp. 864–871.

the so-called perestroika and glasnost in the sphere of foreign and domestic policy, which in practice turned out to be counterproductive, i.e. accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union. These reforms were put in place too late, were not sufficient, and did not enjoy the support of the public. There was dissatisfaction throughout the Soviet Union with the policies implemented by Gorbachev. According to the polls, there were complaints about a drop in living standards, and more than half of the respondents expected an economic disaster. The weakness of the authorities was also criticized. There were demands for a stronger government, and most respondents said they did not trust the authorities. The vast majority expected the system to collapse. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who at that time fought for the reunification of Germany and often met with M. Gorbachev, wrote: "In my opinion, it was influenced by the fact that at some point the concept of Gorbachev's reform ceased to function in the Soviet Union. The economic factor was certainly decisive here. And thus the precursor of perestroika became its passive observer. The development of events surpassed him"<sup>16</sup>.

From the very beginning, the goal of the USSR was territorial expansion and political demonstration in its immediate vicinity - in Europe and Northeast Asia. Until 1945, the main rivals were the local powers and Germany. After World War II, the United States became the main competitor of the USSR in both these regions, and the US-Soviet rivalry was global and covered all areas of life, especially the economy, defence (arms race), science, technology, culture, ideology, propaganda, and international politics<sup>17</sup>.

With the intensification of the Cold War, Eastern Europe became the strategic area of the Soviet Union's expansion, mostly "liberated" by the Red Army by May 1945. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into the USSR, as well as the eastern part of Poland and East Prussia, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, Czechoslovakian Carpathian Ruthenia, and three scraps of territory on the border with Finland. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania were made USSR satellites shortly after the war. In 1948 and 1949 Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic respectively joined the so-called bloc of socialist countries.

The Soviet leaders were also interested in expansion in the Persian Gulf region, particularly in the oil-rich Iran bordering the Soviet Union. In addition, during the Cold War, Moscow sought sphere of influence and allies

<sup>16</sup> H. Kohl, *Pragnąłem jedności Niemiec*, Świat Książki, Warszawa 1999, p. 22. See also: J. Holzer, *Europa zimnej wojny*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2012, pp. 837–838.

<sup>17</sup> J. J. Mearsheimer, *Tragizm polityki mocarstw*, Wydawnictwo UNIVERSITAS, Kraków 2019, p. 236.

in almost all regions of the Third World, including Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. Interestingly, the USSR did not pursue territorial conquests and their annexation, but only tried to make the states politically and economically dependent on each other and involve them in global rivalry with the United States. This policy, carried out under the slogans of “international socialism” and “brotherly help”, was very expensive for the Soviet Union and became one of the important reasons for its collapse<sup>18</sup>. It was based on the calculations of relative power, not on political and international realism and communist ideology, which Moscow only referred verbally to. As Barrington Moore writes: “In the international sphere, Russian rulers used primarily the methods of Bismarck, Machiavelli, and even Aristotle, and not the guidelines of Marx or Lenin. They saw international relations as an inherently unstable balance system best described by theories of balance of power”<sup>19</sup>.

The almost 45-year-long, very costly rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States for control over Europe and hegemony over the world, and the accompanying arms race brought the Soviet empire to the edge of an abyss. In 1989, after a very costly, ten-year-long intervention and the defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and under the influence of the Revolutions of 1989 that began in Europe, the USSR was forced to change direction in its foreign policy and with pain it had to abandon its Eastern European empire. Due to this, the Cold War ended, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved, and the Soviet Union itself, at the end of 1991, disintegrated into fifteen sovereign states<sup>20</sup>.

Almost all analysts who studied these events concluded that the Cold War was over because the leading Soviet politicians, and especially Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, looked at international relations differently<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> B. Kisiel, *Ruch państw niezaangażowanych w nowych warunkach międzynarodowych*, “Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, no. 7–8, 1991; J. Prokopczuk, *Azja, Afryka i Ameryka Łacińska po drugiej wojnie światowej*, PISM, Warszawa 1983.

<sup>19</sup> B. Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1950, p. 408; W. Zubok, K. Pleszakow, *Zimna wojna zza kulis Kremla: od Stalina do Chruszczowa*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1999.

<sup>20</sup> A. Bryc, *Cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, pp. 16–18; H. Cwiąg (ed.), *Interwencja ZSRR w Afganistanie...*, pp. 59–61.

<sup>21</sup> J. J. Mearsheimer, *Tragizm polityki mocarstw...*, p. 247; A. Korboński, F. Fukuyama (ed.), *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1987.

Namely, instead of striving to increase the relative power of a failing state, they put its economic development first along with limiting the use of force by introducing a system of liberal values and norms. In other words, they abandoned traditional realism in favour of believing in the benefits of international cooperation. The author agrees with Professor John J. Mearsheimer's thesis, who writes that: "The more facts of the decline of the Cold War there are, the more it becomes clear that the original interpretation of Soviet policy was incomplete, if not entirely wrong. An important cause of the collapse of the USSR was the inefficiency of its economy, unable to compete technologically with the world's leading countries"<sup>22</sup>.

The Soviet leaders, led by Gorbachev, until the very last moment were under impression that by having access to Western technologies and loans, it would be possible to stop the economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in order to obtain help from the West, Moscow chose détente in international relations, i.e. by means of ending the war in Afghanistan, reducing tensions in Europe, starting a disarmament dialogue with the United States, abandoning senseless and costly ventures in the countries of the Third World and liberalizing the system in the USSR. The Soviet leaders, led by Gorbachev, de facto did not intend to abandon the principles of political realism, but to suspend it for a while in order to save the Soviet Union from collapse. Their calculations and the selected strategy prove that the main goal of states is to maximise power as a way to protect themselves against the temptations of their rivals<sup>23</sup>.

Unfortunately, the agony of the Soviet Union could not be contained. It was accelerated by the so-called the August coup on 19 August 1991. It was an attempt to take power by force by the so-called State Committee on the State of Emergency, headed by vice-president Yanayev. As Professor Wojciech Materski writes: "The main goal [of the coup] was to block the signing of the new federation formula, and consequently - as the "rebels" assessed - to block the collapse of the Soviet Union. The coup was stopped thanks to the determination of Moscow's society and the attitude of the president of RSFSR (the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) Boris Yeltsin who immediately announced his decree and took control over power structures in the territory of the Republic (troops and formations of

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<sup>22</sup> J. Mearsheimer, *Tragizm polityki mocarstw...*, p. 249.

<sup>23</sup> R. G. Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993; C. Wohlforth, *Realism and the End of the Cold War*, "International Security", no. 3, 1994–1995, pp. 91–129.

the Ministry of Defence, the Committee for State Security, the Ministry of the Interior)”<sup>24</sup>.

During the coup, on 19–21 August 1991, Boris Yeltsin issued a number of decrees that directly led to the collapse of the USSR. A few days after the foiled coup, M. Gorbachev decided to step down as the secretary general of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and on 29 August 1991, the parliament of the Russian SFSR, followed by the republican parliaments, decided to legally ban the activities of the CPSU and to sequester its property. Thanks to this, the system of the Soviet party-state actually collapsed. In Viskuli near Brest on 8 December 1991, Yeltsin, who hated M. Gorbachev, together with the president of the Ukrainian SSR (the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Leonid Kravchuk, and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Stanislav Shushkevich, signed the so-called the Belovezha Agreement on the dissolution of the federation and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place – the organisation with the characteristics of a confederation, which was first notified to the United States, and only later to M. Gorbachev. His protests were left unnoticed. The agreement was contrary to the USSR constitution of 1977 and, in fact, had the features of a coup d'état. It should be noted that it was almost identical to the agreement on the establishment of the Soviet Federation of December 1922. In a sense, it closed the “Soviet circle” by consigning it to the ash heap of history<sup>25</sup>.

Boris Yeltsin insisted, and within two weeks the remaining union republics joined the Belovezha Agreement. On 16 December 1991, on the emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the European Communities on the accession agreement with Poland, a statement was adopted recognising new international entities established after the collapse of the Soviet Union<sup>26</sup>. Shortly after, on 26 December 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union adopted a declaration on its dissolution, and the day before the act was

<sup>24</sup> W. Materski, *Od cara do “cara”...*, p. 195; A. Koreżakow, *Borys Jelcyn: od świtu do zmierzchu*, Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, Warszawa 1998, pp. 95–112.

<sup>25</sup> W. Marciniak, *Rozgrabione imperium...*, pp. 184–186; K. Świder, *Ewolucja elity władzy w Związku Radzieckim i Rosji w kontekście przemian ideowych, politycznych, społecznych i ekonomicznych*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych, Warszawa 2013, p. 127; W. Materski, *Od cara do “cara”...*, p. 197; P. Kuspys, *Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw – stan faktyczny i perspektywy*, “Biuletyn Opinie”, no. 10, 2009, pp. 2–26.

<sup>26</sup> A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, *Unia Europejska–Rosja*, [in:] J. Juchnowski, M.S. Wolański (ed.), *Studia nauk społecznych i humanistycznych*, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Wrocław 2008, p. 615.

supposed to be initialled, M. Gorbachev resigned from the function of the president of the USSR and handed the function of head of the armed forces with codes for nuclear weapons use over to B. Yeltsin. On 30 December 1991, a meeting of the CIS states was held in Minsk, which finally sealed the fate of the USSR<sup>27</sup>. Thus, almost on the anniversary of its establishment (30 December 1922), after 69 years, the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a subject of international law and disappeared from the political map of the world.

## 2. The Effects of the collapse of the USSR on Poland's foreign policy and its place in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century

The collapse of the Soviet Union had far-reaching consequences for the entire world and especially had great significance for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It caused radical geopolitical and geo-economic changes in the region. Until now, countries dependent on the USSR, under the strict control of Moscow, could not conduct sovereign internal and foreign policy in accordance with their *raison d'état* until the collapse of the "Evil Empire". The Revolutions of 1989, which began with the systemic transformation in June 1989 in Poland, quickly spread to all the countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. Although it led to the collapse of communist regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which – as it has been already mentioned – accelerated the collapse of the USSR, Soviet troops were still stationed in these countries as part of the Warsaw Pact, and until 1991 limited the possibility of pursuing a fully sovereign foreign policy due to unpredictable reaction of Moscow. Poland is an example of this because, until the collapse of the USSR, it had to pursue a cautious, double-track foreign policy towards Moscow and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> M. M. Kosman, *Konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński o Krym (2014–2019)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, Bydgoszcz 2020, pp. 13–14.

<sup>28</sup> J. L. Gaddis, *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, "International Security" 1992–1993, no. 3, vol. 17, pp. 54–59; R. Kuźniar, *Ewolucja zewnętrznych uwarunkowań polskiej niepodległości*, "Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations", no. 1 (vol. 54), pp. 21–39; J. M. Fiszer, *Transformacja ustrojowa w Polsce po 1989 roku oraz jej sukcesy i porażki*, [in:] J. Wojnicki, J. Miecznikowska, Ł. Zamecki, *Polska i Europa w perspektywie politologicznej*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2020, pp. 73–98.

After the collapse of the USSR, Poland primarily tried to strengthen its sovereignty and position in post-communist Europe. To this end, it tried to settle all disputes with its neighbours. The strategic goal of Poland's foreign policy was to strengthen its security by joining the Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e. NATO and the European Union. Moreover, until 2004, Poland was still too weak to assume the role of a leader or a regional power. It was only in 2005–2007, i.e. after Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004, when the cabinet of PiS (Law and Justice party) set such a goal. Unfortunately, premature elections and the PO–PSL (Civic Platform–Polish People's Party) coalition coming to power hampered the plans. On the other hand, in 2007–2015, the Polish authorities opted for an alliance and cooperation with big neighbours: Germany and Russia, and the United States. At the same time, Poland supported pro-Western tendencies in the foreign policy of Ukraine and Belarus, but these countries pursued a policy of balancing between Poland and Russia and between Russia and the European Union. Poland's eastern policy encountered opposition from Russia and, contrary to appearance, did not enjoy the support of most European Union countries<sup>29</sup>.

After joining NATO on 12 March 1999, and the European Union on 1 May 2004, like other member states, Poland has not completely lost its national sovereignty and cultural identity, although there are politicians who think so. However, our political sovereignty has been limited, but this is the case whenever a state voluntarily becomes a member of an alliance or international organisation, as it has to comply with the organisational and legal rules. However, it gained new allies and partners for cooperation, as well as the greater trust of neighbours, and it began to be perceived as a democratic, stable, and predictable country. Poland has become an active participant in international relations. Poles strove at all costs to integrate our neighbours with NATO and the European Union. The efforts have been successful: Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Lithuanians, our direct and more distant neighbours in the region today are Poland's allies and partners. Polish people continue to support the efforts of Belarusians and Ukrainians to

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<sup>29</sup> J. Tymanowski, *Ukraina między Wschodem a Zachodem*, Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2014; O. Barbarska, *Polityka Wschodnia Unii Europejskiej jako część składowa polityki zagranicznej UE*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2018. J. M. Fiszer, *Zadania i cele polityki zagranicznej Władimira Putina*, "Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna", no. 1 (52), 2016, pp. 167–201; O. Czarny, *Die Ukraine und die Europäische Union: Stand und Perspektiven bilateraler Beziehungen*, Diplomica – Verlag, Hamburg 2009.

join NATO and the EU and should seek an agreement with Russia. After 2004, i.e. after joining the EU, Poland took over the management of its eastern policy i.e. by undertaking subsequent initiatives: from the European Neighbourhood Policy to the Eastern Partnership. Once again, it encountered sharp opposition from Russia and the ambivalent stance of most European Union countries, including Germany and France, which are in favour of cooperation with Moscow.

In 2005–2007, after our active participation in the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine became a manifestation of the negative trends in Poland’s eastern policy. Despite the threats it posed, this problem opened the way for a wider diplomatic action by Warsaw within the European Union, consisting in the promotion of its preferences in relations with the East. The Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute convinced Europe that it is necessary to ensure diversification of energy sources and new transit routes, which would free the European Union from the negative actions of Russian monopolists in this sector. It should be added that regarding the issue of energy within the EU there has never been unanimity between the “old fifteen countries” and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. That is why Poland’s initiatives to solve the problem of energy security encountered resistance from individual states, including the neighbours who were afraid of Moscow’s reaction. This was the case with Warsaw’s offer to solve the problem of energy security by creating a special pact, commonly known as “NATO energy”. Ultimately, the project was not approved within the EU. To other partners, it seemed inadequate to the political situation prevailing on the Old Continent, due to the idea to unite NATO countries, the European Union, and the territories of Russia’s “near abroad” within one organisation. The EU member states argued that the idea resembled a kind of cartel, aimed strictly at Russia’s interests, which could not be understood. It was commonly argued that the solutions proposed by Poland proved the lack of proper understanding of European politics. Priority was to be given to the recommendations of the European Commission, published as the so-called green paper<sup>30</sup>.

It is quite commonly read in the literature on the subject that after joining NATO and the European Union, Poland, having achieved the strategic goals of its foreign policy, seems to take a rest and failed to develop a new concept of foreign policy. It is pointed out that Poland has adopted a reactive

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<sup>30</sup> P. Świeboda, *Strategiczne wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej. Kształtowanie zewnętrznego wymiaru polityki energetycznej*, Raport demos Europa – Centrum Strategii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2006, pp. 12–19.



attitude, that it has tried to stay in the mainstream, the direction of which was determined by other powers – the United States in NATO and Germany and France in the European Union. It should be emphasised that Poland's efforts to join NATO and the EU were not treated by Poland as an end itself or a panacea for solving all the problems that faced new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, but both these structures were, are, and should be considered important instruments for implementing the assumptions of the development and security strategy of Poland and other countries in the region, especially our neighbours.

Moreover, as it has been already mentioned, Poland's foreign policy should consistently aim to achieve Poland's leadership position in Central and Eastern Europe and a significant role in Euro-Atlantic structures. This status is real for our country, as demonstrated by the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine and the subsequent situation in that country, especially the Russian-Ukrainian war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. Poland's leverage here consists in the geopolitical location, size, and potential, as well as good relations with the United States. At the same time, Poland cannot think of itself in the category of an endangered country, surrounded by countries that wish us no good or are even enemies.

Unfortunately, as Roman Kuźniar writes: "There are periods in the history of Poland when our country has difficulties with conducting a regular foreign policy. Normality in foreign policy is somehow unacceptable. There is megalomania, loss of sense of reality, desire, behaviour like "one against all", slogans and gestures of a "proud nation" that is allegedly more "proud" than others, and therefore others must recognise its claims to prestige, its role, accept its ideas of what Europe should look like etc. (...) Poland is characterised by its periodic inability to perform an ordinary, and therefore careful, well-thought-out, professional, precise, predictable, and consistent foreign policy, in which important goals are achieved with appropriate measures, in which interests can be distinguished from empty gestures, and real influence on the environment is distinguished from superficial and impermanent signs of prestige. This normality of foreign policy is sometimes unacceptable to the Polish political class."<sup>31</sup>

However, the reason for the weakness of Polish foreign policy is not the specificity of some Polish politicians and the shortcomings in the substantive preparation of Polish diplomacy and many of our diplomats, but rather

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<sup>31</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2008, p. 319.

objective factors. According to some researchers, Poland is a country too big to remain in the group of small European countries, and at the same time too small (weak) to be treated as a European superpower. Polish politicians try to solve this dilemma by pursuing policy in an exaggerated way, which in practice does not give the expected results and is a source of frustration. In order to avoid this, it is worth recalling the advice of Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, who often said that: “the Republic of Poland is not a superpower and should not pursue a policy in an exaggerated way. Poland is a regional state and its interests do not extend beyond the European continent”<sup>32</sup>.

Poland lies in Europe and should pursue its basic national interests with the help of the European Union and NATO. Therefore, it is in our national interest to shape the further process of European integration in such a way so as to make the Union more consistent and efficient, and to strengthen its international position. The European Union should be a pillar of Poland’s economic security. Within the Union, we should especially cultivate relations with our neighbours – big and small ones. In relations with smaller neighbours, we should be guided by the principle of disinterested kindness, consider and support their needs and demands, thanks to which Poland will gain a strong position in the region, the status of a regional power, and a leadership position among small countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the Atlantic Alliance should be treated as the foundation of Poland’s security policy. Not only because of its strength and credibility in the Euro-Atlantic and global security environment but also because it is a platform for the strategic unity of the West, i.e. close ties between Europe and America and its political and military presence on the Old Continent. For Poland, both are irreplaceable. Poland should also cultivate and develop comprehensive relations with the United States, but at the same time, we should not support those directions (aspects) of Washington’s policy that do not serve the interests of the West, or the stability and peaceful international order, and undermine the credibility of NATO, the EU, and the UN, or are designed to create unnecessary conflicts and divisions in Europe and the world<sup>33</sup>.

Poland with a strong position in the EU, good relations with its neighbours, without seeking unnecessary “rescue” from Russia, whose rhetoric must not be confused with its actual capabilities, will mean more for Washington. In

<sup>32</sup> J. Nowak-Jeziorański, *Rzeczpospolita atlantycka...*, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> R. Kuźniar, *Droga do wolności...*, p. 323. See also: R. Ciborowski (ed.), *Rola Polski w polityce Unii Europejskiej wobec krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Wydział Ekonomii i Zarządzania, Białystok 2007.

this context, the attempts made by Warsaw in 2005–2007 to be involved in a “war on two fronts”, largely determined by the domestic historical policy, were a sign of weak imagination<sup>34</sup>. It is regrettable that Poland returned to this policy after 2015. Since the presidential elections in 2015 and the parliamentary elections in 2016, Poland’s political system has been heading in an increasingly anti-democratic direction. If we stand in the position of classical realism, i.e. we believe that foreign policy is a function of domestic policy, then, since 2015/2016 Poland’s foreign policy has been also moving more and more in a direction contrary to the Polish *raison d’etat*. It has been more and more ideologised and put under pressure of one political party – PiS (Law and Justice). So it is not the state’s policy, but rather a party’s policy, detached from international reality and Polish national interests. It is a short-sighted policy that weakens Poland’s position and role in the international arena. As Olaf Osica writes: “The result is a growing gap between the political narrative about Poland in international politics and our everyday experience of the world. Between a story with no geopolitical ambitions, power, and threats, on the one hand, and the creaking reality of the Polish army, public institutions, or the quality of political debate, on the other. Between faith in the ideas of European integration and Atlantic cooperation and growing economic protectionism or pressure to choose technologies and tax solutions. This clash of theory and practice is not unique in the world. Many countries underwent or are going through a similar process, grappling with their old, “domestic” identities and the new ones that are being shaped in front of their citizens. However, it becomes troublesome. A foreign policy that is put aside real social, political, and economic processes becomes a burden. And this inability to adapt will pave the way for extreme ideas for which the divergence of the dominant narrative with everyday experience will fuel the negation of everything that has been built in the past 30 years”<sup>35</sup>.

In the theoretical aspect, foreign policy should strengthen the state in the international arena, its role, and its authority in international relations. It must always be carried out in the interest of the state and its citizens; it cannot satisfy the ambitions or the politicians’ imaginations that are detached from

<sup>34</sup> A. Niedźwiecki, *Polska polityka europejska w latach 2005–2007. Zarys problemu*, “ATHENAEUM. Political Science”, vol. 19, 2008, pp. 39–53; M. Musiał-Karg, *Polska polityka europejska w latach 2005–2007*, [in:] R. Podgórzńska (ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w warunkach członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009, pp. 200–221.

<sup>35</sup> O. Osica, *Nowa polityka zagraniczna | Res Publica Nowa*, [https://publica.pl/teksty/osica-polska-i-swiat-67468.html?utm\\_sou](https://publica.pl/teksty/osica-polska-i-swiat-67468.html?utm_sou) (6.04.2021).

reality. Foreign policy should not be conducted in the interest of one political party and cannot be subordinated to its ideology, which unfortunately is the case in Poland today. Disregarding the role and will of the nation negatively affects the international image of the state and does not serve its *raison d'état*. In the international environment, a country in which the ruling parties appropriate and politicise foreign policy is losing importance<sup>36</sup>.

In the light of the English School, Poland is seen as a peripheral country, torn between East and West, whose position is beyond the core of the international community<sup>37</sup>. Therefore, in the current situation in Europe and in the world, it should pursue a more active and realistic foreign policy, i.e. should not give in to illusions but keep both feet on the ground<sup>38</sup>. Poland cannot leave NATO or the European Union. On the other hand, Poland should change its foreign policy towards the European Union, which Poland often treats only as a source of easy money or as a “treasury of wisdom” from which Poles should thoughtlessly “import” the rules of the game and values. Neither of these paths will allow us to make the most of the potential of the EU membership. Finally, it is necessary to determine what we want to achieve in the European Union and through the EU, treating it, however, not as a charitable organisation, but as a place where the interests of states and economic entities that are much stronger than Poland and Polish companies clash. Therefore, Poland needs to be more active in the EU today and less reactive, but estimate chances of what can be achieved, and be able to form coalitions. Both spectacular gestures in defence of what is impossible to implement, and the uncritical adaptation to all the ideas of the stronger members of the European Union is a way for Poland to go astray. The European Union is a place where it is possible to achieve political and economic goals together with other members. Acting in defiance of the entire EU will not bring any results<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> J. Nowak, *Czym jest polityka zagraniczna*, [in:] W. Malendowski and Cz. Mojsiewicz (ed.), *Stosunki międzynarodowe*, Atla 2, Wrocław 1998, pp. 75–119; A. Czarnocki, D. Kondrakiewicz, *Uwarunkowania, koncepcje i realizacja polityki zagranicznej Polski*, [in:] M. Pietraś (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2007, pp. 601–659.

<sup>37</sup> R. H. Jackson, *Pluralism in international political theory*, “Review of International Studies”, no. 18(3), 1992, pp. 271–282; M. Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester University Press, Leicester 1977.

<sup>38</sup> D. Woźniak-Szymańska, *Pozycja Polski w społeczności międzynarodowej, czyli jak wraść na peryferiach Europy?*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2021.

<sup>39</sup> M. Tomecki, *Dojrzały związek z UE – co to znaczy?*, Kongres Obywatelski, Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Warszawa 2021, pp. 1–7.

## CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of the USSR was caused by many objective and subjective, internal and international factors. The Soviet system turned out to be unreformable, which was finally confirmed by the perestroika announced by M. Gorbachev, which was not implemented eventually. Moreover, the practice has shown that communism was a utopian ideology and was systematically losing public support. The author believes that the main cause of the collapse of the USSR was its poorly implemented economic policy, which systematically led to the economic catastrophe. Moreover, the USSR was unable to compete with America and its anti-Soviet policy in the long term so the imposed arms race forced Moscow to change the direction in international politics.

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 opened the way to a reorientation of Polish foreign policy and the normalisation of Poland's relations with close and distant neighbours. After that, the "iron curtain" and the division of the world into East and West disappeared, and the Cold War ended. The geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe and throughout Europe has also changed. Thanks to this, Polish national and international interests were reinterpreted. A sovereign Poland could finally decide on its own about its foreign policy, as well as national and international security.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Poland should seek close allies and strive for cooperation in the international arena within the Euro-Atlantic structures and such groupings of states as the Three Seas Initiative, the Visegrad Group, and the Weimar Triangle. As a result, Poland should become one of the key countries in the EU and NATO and be present in their leading bodies, as well as become a leader among the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe region. It should cooperate with all powers, especially France, Germany, the United States, Russia, and China, which are currently playing a major role in the international arena<sup>40</sup>. It should be kept in mind that medium-sized countries,

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<sup>40</sup> R. Zięba, *Poszukiwanie międzynarodowej roli dla Polski – konceptualizacja roli państwa "średniej rangi"*, [in:] S. Bieleń (ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna Polski po wstąpieniu do NATO i do Unii Europejskiej. Problem tożsamości i adaptacji*, Difin, Warszawa 2010; J. Zając, *Role międzynarodowe państwa średniego – aspekty teoretyczne*, "Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe", vol. X, no. 3, 2017; J. M. Fiszer, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w XXI wieku: cele, wyzwania, kierunki, szanse i zagrożenia*, "Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna", no. 2(65), 2019, pp. 141–172; D. Woźniak-Szymańska, *Pozycja Polski w społeczności międzynarodowej, czyli jak wzrastać na peryferiach Europy?*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2021.

including Poland, have limited possibilities to shape their international roles. Firstly, due to their limited potential, they do not have enough effective means of influence, and secondly, their insignificant international position does not make them fit for global or universal roles. A medium-sized country is important for neighbouring countries that are geographically close and those that have developed cooperation in a given field.

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## WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION COLLAPSE? THE REASONS AND EFFECTS FOR POLAND, EUROPE, AND THE WORLD

### Abstract

The paper is aimed at analysing the domestic and international determinants of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the consequences for Europe, the world and Poland, as well as its place in Central and Eastern Europe. It demonstrates geopolitical changes that took place in Europe and the world, as well as their effects on the reorientation of Poland’s foreign policy at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In the article, the author attempts to answer a few questions and verify several theses and hypotheses related to the reasons and effects of the collapse of the USSR. The key thesis is that the fall of the Soviet Union was provoked not only by the internal factors but also to a great extent by the

international situation in Europe and the world, including the Revolutions of 1989 in the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

The analysis shows that the collapse of the Soviet Union has had a positive impact on Europe, the world, Poland, and its foreign policy. It contributed to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam order, and the creation of a new international order. After the fall of the USSR, Poland's foreign policy was consistent with the Polish *raison d'état* and was of great importance for Central and Eastern Europe. It was based on the Euro-Atlantic system and close relations with Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the article, the author refers to classical realism, the theory of foreign policy, and constructivism and applies the following research methods: description and critical analysis of documents and literature on the subject. The source base comprises Polish and foreign published documents, monographs, articles and studies, and press releases.

Key words: Soviet Union, collapse, geopolitics, Poland, foreign policy, Central and Eastern Europe

## DLACZEGO UPADŁ ZWIĄZEK RADZIECKI? PRZYCZYNY I SKUTKI DLA POLSKI, EUROPY I ŚWIATA

### Streszczenie

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza przesłanek wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych upadku Związku Radzieckiego oraz jego skutków dla Polski i jej miejsca w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Ukazuje on zmiany geopolityczne, które dokonały się wówczas w Europie i na świecie oraz ich wpływ na reorientację polityki zagranicznej Polski na przełomie XX i XXI wieku.

W artykule staram się odpowiedzieć na kilka pytań oraz weryfikuję kilka tez i hipotez związanych z upadkiem ZSRR. Główną tezą jest konstatacja, że do upadku Związku Radzieckiego oprócz przyczyn wewnętrznych w dużym stopniu przyczyniła się ówczesna sytuacja międzynarodowa w Europie i na świecie, w tym "jesień ludów 1989" w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej.

Przeprowadzona analiza pokazuje, że upadek Związku Radzieckiego miał pozytywne znaczenie dla Europy, świata i Polski oraz jej polityki zagranicznej. Przyczynił się do zakończenia zimnej wojny, upadku ładu jałtańsko-poczdamskiego i rozpoczęcia budowy nowego porządku międzynarodowego. Polityka

zagraniczna Polski po upadku ZSRR była zgodna z polską racją stanu i miała istotne znaczenie dla Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Została oparta na systemie euroatlantyckim i bliskich relacjach z Niemcami, Francją, Wielką Brytanią, Stanami Zjednoczonymi oraz z państwami Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej.

Przy pisaniu artykułu wykorzystałem teorię realizmu klasycznego, teorię polityki zagranicznej państwa i teorię konstruktywizmu oraz takie metody badawcze jak opis i krytyczną analizę dokumentów i literatury przedmiotu. Bazę źródłową stanowią polsko- i obcojęzyczne dokumenty publikowane, prace zwarte, artykuły i studia oraz informacje z prasy Internetu

Słowa kluczowe: Związek Radziecki, upadek, geopolityka, Polska, polityka zagraniczna, Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia

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THE USE OF INFORMATION  
AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY  
AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS  
AND PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDERS  
IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

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## INTRODUCTION

Quite a few studies and inquiries on the impact of ICT, primarily in the promotion of good local governance in Nigeria, have been prompted by persistent cases of poor and outright lack of accountability and transparency in government affairs and institutions, low citizen participation, outright poor service delivery and provision of public goods, and low participation in governance and decision-making processes (Onimode, 2000; Yagboyaju, 2004; Yagboyaju, 2011). The infrastructural prominence is waning at the local level, and, most crucially, the situation shows signs of infrastructural decadence at the national level.

In addition, the literature (Onuoha, 2005; Kukah, 2012; Akinlo, 2015; Adeyeye, 2016 and Aransi, 2017) has revealed that, despite allocations from the Federal Government and the Internally Generated Revenues (henceforth

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referred to as IGRs) and the economic capacities of several grass roots governments, there has been little to show as an indication of an expected outcome on grass roots development, owing to corruption and bad governance. Furthermore, there are voting irregularities and apathy (lack of involvement) among the local population, lack of accountability and transparency of grass roots political leaders and public office holders, which have rendered good local governance and development aspirations a mirage. The introduction and acceptance of information and communication technology (ICT) in Nigeria's governance and electoral systems has prompted research targeted at reversing bad governance caused by a lack of transparency and openness among state officials and government leaders in local government.

A number of studies have observed the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) as a tool for improving good governance at the national and regional levels of government, as well as its executable roles (Misuraca, Kwami, 2013; Adesola, 2012; Iwasokun, Alese, Thompson & Aranuwa, 2011; 2007; Nasser, Gage & John, 2005; Olowu, 2004; Mundy & Sultan, 2001; Agere, 2000); they have not been able to demonstrate the impact of ICT not just on accountability but also on local administration, service delivery efficacy, the implications of ICT for good governance at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria, as well as the openness of local public and political office-holders.

## GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Profoundly, an appropriate working understanding of what governance represents could be labeled in this study as a multifaceted compound situation of institutions, systems, relationships, structures, processes, procedures, practices, and leadership behaviour in the isometrics of social, political, economic, and managerial or administrative authority in the running of either public or private affairs (K.W. Olawoyin and K. O Lamidi).

Nevertheless, it will be used in conjunction with a definition of "local government," which refers to the application of authority at the local community level. However, we must keep in mind that not all forms of local governance are local governments. As a consequence, it is conceivable to have central or even foreign governance at the local level. The level of the local populace's involvement in the steering (i.e., selecting the direction) in harmony with their local needs, priorities, and issues is the most important and determinant aspect in establishing whether or not governance is local. Governance ceases

to be a substance of government alone; it becomes a position of multiple inter-linkages and relationships in which dissimilar and various actors in the public and private sectors and civil society at local, national, and international levels play different roles, sometimes mutually conflicting, sometimes mutually reinforcing, and complementary, especially with aligned purposes in satisfying the local community's interests. It is possible that "local governments behave more in conformity with the demands and priorities of local populations than would larger authorities", according to Klugman (1994), cited in Kauziya (2000). As a result, higher authorities must prioritise close collaboration with local governments in order to complete their share of the task and effort in harmony with the demands and goals of the local community.

Suffice to ask then "What does locality in local governance truly imply?". Local government and local inhabitants are not the only elements of local governance. Perhaps, this describes a scenario in which any governance actor (an international NGO, a central government entity, a local government agency, or a private-sector enterprise) engages in long term planning, execution, maintenance, assessment, and regulation with a pivotal superintendent responsive to the needs, priorities, preferences, involvement, and well-being of the local population. In other words, the local people's needs, interests, priorities, involvement, control, and well-being are more important than the actor in local government. It is also critical to keep this in mind, or we will continue to be entombed in the structural limits of equating local governance with local government. A number of studies have proved that not all local governments work in the interests of local residents for better analysis. As a result, there is a risk that some local governments will become exploitative and authoritarian to the local population to serve local leaders' interests.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Through the democratic participation paradigm of local government, the study employs a bottom-up development method. The bottom-up approach's synergy is the splicing together of systems to produce more complex systems. Bottom-up information is a derivative of incoming input from the environment in order to construct a perception. In a bottom-up approach, the system's separable base elements are meticulous in great detail; these elements are then integrated to build a more significant subsystem, which is then linked to make a complete top-level system, sometimes in several tiers. Scholars such as Haward (1952), Carl (1950), Gutman (1951), Staughton



(1950), Thompson (1952), and Jesse (1954) are proponents of this theory, but Thompson (1952), who first proposed it in the 1950s, is the main intellectual mentor of this method.

After the strategy and priority selection are tailed in their local region, the bottom-up method means that local actors democratically participate in decision-making. This technique involves local stakeholders such as local institutions, economic and social interest groups, and private organisations, all of whom participate. Capacity building is a precarious element of the bottom-up method, on which ICT can act as a catalyst. According to Enri (2006), the shift from top-down to bottom-up mechanisms began in the 1980s. Concurrently, with the appreciation of the value of indigenous technical know-how. Moreover, with the ability of the poor to contribute to solutions to their problems. Technically and, occasionally, a reflection of over-relating actions to recognise the uniqueness of local experiences, making them sacred.

Willy-nilly, Sharma (2006) recognised that both practice and theory influence the shift. This approach can also manifest as a shift towards an organic, holistic, participatory approach with management and collaboration with local institutions to recognise local development sustainability through ICT instrumentality. Using the African development experience, Olowu (2000) explains several challenges with top-down development planning. “Past centralised efforts, however well-intentioned, failed to benefit the rural poor,” writes Olowu (2000), and supplementarily added to the paradigm shift to favour community participation and local development planning, thus, creating, according to Olawoyin and Lamidi (2020), development, and reduce poverty, as well as empower local people through the bottom-up mechanism and ICT’s aid, from side to side.

According to Erni (2006), the bottom-up approach focuses on strengthening indigenous capacities for development and how local actors synergise and utilise local resources to achieve local goals. According to Robinson (1997), the bottom-up approach views local/rural development as community-based, and individuals should have the ability to participate in their futures, as Behere (2009) puts it. What is more, this demonstrates the importance of careful planning and local-centric consideration, particularly in terms of local groups and demographics and their active participation and involvement enabled by e-governance and ICT instrumentality, in order for developmental multitudes to be broadly successful. However, the bottom-up approach centred on how local people can be involved in the development process in terms of human resources, community capacity, physical innovations

and capabilities within their locality; it focuses on how local people can be convoluted in the development process in terms of physical innovations and capabilities, human resources, and community capability within their locality. Consequently, this strategy represents a paradigmatic shift away from the apathetic political behaviour of the past and towards a more participatory role and involvement of the local population.

## METHODOLOGY

The study utilised primary data collected from key informants and questionnaires administered to local party officials, elected political office holders, Nigerian Union of Local Government Employee (NULGE), and executive members of ICT-oriented non-governmental organizations. It is imperative that to elicit information on the interconnection between information and communications technology and authority at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria 460 copies of the questionnaire were dispersed to the category of respondents, as mentioned earlier. Conversely, 418 questionnaire copies were recovered from the field, accounting for 90.8% of the total number of questionnaires distributed. Additional data was massed through interviews with 18 people, all of whom were ICT officers from non-governmental organisations (Revoder, Tracker, and BudgIT) with a thorough understanding of the topic at hand.

## RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS

This section looks at the impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on political leaders and public officials' accountability in governance processes at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. In order to gather quantifiable data for this specific purpose, respondents were inquired to agree or disagree with several assertions. In this regard, Table 1 indicates the frequency and percentage distribution of respondents on each of the statements used to assess the impact of ICT on political leaders and public office holders' responsibility in grass roots governance processes. Furthermore, the mean value ( $\bar{X}$ ) summarises the strength of the respondents for each of the claims made to reach this goal, using the following decision rule: more respondents agreed where ( $\bar{X} > 2.5$ ), and more respondents disagreed where ( $\bar{X} < 2.5$ ).

Effect of ICT on accountability of political leaders and public office holders in local governance in Southwestern Nigeria

This section contains data analysis and interpretation of the respondents' perspectives on the impact of ICT on political leaders and public office holders' accountability in the governance arena at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. The percentage and frequency distribution of respondents on each of the statements set forth to attain the above-stated purpose are shown in Table 1, and the values/responses are grouped using a Likert scale of measurements. The mean value and standard deviation would also confirm the respondents' level of agreement and disagreement with the established statements.

In response to the first assertion in Table 1, 206 respondents (49.3%) strongly agreed, and 180 respondents (43.1%) agreed that excellent local governance is based on accountability, openness, and involvement. Another 9 (2.2 per cent) disagreed with the assumption, and only 7 (1.7 per cent) strongly disagreed, while 16 (3.8 per cent) said nothing ( $\bar{X} = 3.32$ ,  $SD = 0.907$ ). The components of excellent local governance, to a considerable extent, are reliant on the trinity of transparency, accountability, and involvement at the distinct local levels, according to this distribution.

However, it was questioned if the use of ICT had resulted in effective accountability of public and political office holders through citizen participation. In response to the second allegation, a higher percentage of respondents agreed, with 127 (30.4) strongly agreeing and 221 (52.9%) agreeing. However, just 25% of respondents (or 6% of the total) disagreed with this assumption regularly, with 7% strongly disagreeing ( $\bar{X} = 2.99$ ,  $SD = 1.000$ ). As a result, it can be firmly assumed that the use of ICT will be an effective tool for ensuring proper accountability of public and political office holders at the local level in Nigeria.

In response to the third question, 126 respondents (30.1%) strongly agreed, and 216 respondents (51.7%) agreed that ICT could help local governments become more responsive and accountable to their citizens. In contrast, 28 respondents (6.7 per cent) disagreed, 25 respondents (6% strongly disagreed), and 23 (5.5 per cent) did not react to this allegation ( $\bar{X} = 2.95$ ,  $SD = 1.050$ ). As a result, the use of ICT in various local communities can help achieve governance objectives at the local level.

The statement that ICT in Nigeria has enhanced accountability of public/political office holders in the conduct of local governance in Southwestern Nigeria was strongly agreed by 118 (28.2%) and agreed by 205 (49%) respondents, which is shown in Table 1. In all, 77.2 percent of respondents

agreed with this statement ( $\bar{X} = 2.86$ ,  $SD = 1.088$ ). This suggests that the use of ICT in governmental administration at the local level may be claimed to be a viable technique for promoting accountability in the conduct of local governance in the researched area.

Respondents were requested to agree or disagree on whether accountability is better now (2017) than in 1999, before the advent of ICT and its tools. When it came to the fifth assertion, 118 people (28.2%) strongly agreed, and 182 (43.5%) agreed. On the other hand, 58 (13.9%) disagreed, with 40 (9.6%) strongly disagreeing ( $\bar{X} = 2.81$ ,  $SD = 1.096$ ). The respondents overwhelmingly accepted the importance of ICT technologies on accountability as important for promoting democratic local governance and successful service delivery at the local level, as inferred from this distribution.

Reduced election cheating is a significant threat to Nigeria's governance system at the local level and beyond. However, this stance was asserted to confirm if election rigging (both local and national) may be minimised in Southwestern Nigeria through the widespread deployment and use of ICT tools. One hundred twenty respondents agreed strongly with this sixth assertion, accounting for 28.7% of the total, while 210, i.e. 50.2 per cent, respondents agreed with. In terms of deviation, approximately 39 respondents (9.3%) disagreed, 31 respondents (7.4%) strongly disagreed, and 18 respondents (4.3%) did not answer to this allegation ( $\bar{X} = 2.92$ ,  $SD = 1.030$ ). The simple reading of this data distribution is that using ICT would reasonably reduce election fraud at the local level, encouraging accountability of political and public office holders to the masses, knowing that their vote will always count and that they will be held accountable.

Nigeria's economic development has been hampered by a lack of accountability and, what is more, transparency in local governance, as well as election cheating. In response to the seventh assertion, 162 respondents, or 38.3%, strongly agreed, while 180 respondents, or 43.1 per cent, agreed.

However, this does not imply complete agreement, as almost 14% of respondents disapproved of the claim ( $\bar{X} = 3.07$ ,  $SD = 1.033$ ). Nonetheless, based on an agreement rate of around 81 per cent, economic development at the local level suffers a significant setback due to inadequacies in government openness and accountability in the conduct of governance activities at the local level and the consequences of election rigging.

In response to the eighth argument, a total of 354 respondents (84.7 per cent) agreed that corruption and a lack of accountability had harmed democratic survival and growth in Southwestern Nigeria. ( $\bar{X} = 3.10$ ,  $SD = 1.016$ ). However, this does not have an absolute meaning because

10.5 per cent of respondents disagreed with the statement, while 4.8 per cent did not reply. In consequence, there is compelling substantiation that insufficient accountability can stifle democratic activities and create local content at the grass roots level in Nigeria.

In response to the ninth claim presented in Table 1, respondents in Southwestern Nigeria's local government areas shared their thoughts on accountability in revenue production and expenditure. Lack of accountability in local revenue generation processes and expenditure by public office holders will engender corruption on the part of public and political office holders in local governance in Southwestern Nigeria, according to 151 (36.1%) of respondents who strongly agreed and 210 (50.2%) of respondents who agreed. Meanwhile, 26 (6.2 per cent) of respondents disagreed, with 15 (3.6 per cent) strongly disagreeing ( $\bar{X} = 3.11$ ,  $SD = 0.949$ ). This indicates that a sizable proportion of respondents acknowledged the lack of accountability in municipal revenue generation processes and spending procurement systems.

Respondents were also asked to categorically agree or disagree on whether accountability is one of the factors of bad local governance in Southwestern Nigeria. In response to the last allegation in Table 1, 185 (44.3 per cent) of respondents strongly agreed, while 164 (39.2%) agreed. In all, 83.5 percent of respondents agreed, compared to 12.2% who disagreed, and roughly 4.3 per cent of respondents did not answer to this assertion ( $\bar{\chi} = 3.15$ ,  $SD = 1.027$ ). As a result, it is practical to assume that accountability impacts governance procedures in the researched region. As a result, the claim was put to a hypothesis test utilising correlation co-efficient analysis following the objective statement.

In addition to all of this, respondents agreed with the quantitative analysis results in an interview session. Almost all respondents agreed that ICT positively impacts political leaders and public office holders' accountability in local government in Southwestern Nigeria. However, a few respondents expressed reservations about ICT's ability to instil accountability in politicians and public office holders in local government. According to this group, the politicisation of ICT use in local government allows for politicians' non-accountability to the public. Furthermore, the state government's employment of a committee system to operate local governments exempts legislators from public responsibility because their positions are not determined by popular vote but by the state government's appointment, resulting in little or no accountability to the people.

In contrast, more respondents agreed that ICT encourages politicians and public office holders to be more accountable. The opinions of the few who opposed the opinion that ICT improved local accountability cannot

be disputed. It is critical to examine some factors that contribute to ICT's inability to promote accountability at the local level. According to a NULGE official in one of the selected states in Southwestern Nigeria, some of the issues leading to the failure of ICT in fostering accountability of political officers and public office holders include:

Despite using ICT tools, our political leaders in Ogun State, particularly in the Abeokuta local government, are not accountable to the people. I mean the ones selected by the state governor. They are held to a higher average by their superior, the governor who selected them. Accountability in local government is uncommon among political leaders and public office holders, except for career officials. This invariably has an impact on local governance<sup>1</sup>.

The preceding argument demonstrates that, despite using ICT at the local level, governor-appointed politicians and public officials are not accountable to the people. Similarly, the Chairman of one of the most influential political parties in one of the study's selected states declares:

ICT is only effective on career public officials, not on state governors' nominated political leaders. How many of our leaders are answerable to the people? It is even worse when the state government appoints these political leaders. Political leaders are answerable to the governor who appointed them at the municipal level, not to the people. As a result, there is a show of poor governance at the local level<sup>2</sup>.

Contrary to popular belief, most respondents believe that ICT encourages political leaders and public officials to be more accountable at the local level. One of the respondents' replies was quite thought-provoking. In one of the selected states in the study area, a Director of Admin and Supplies, in a Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs stated:

Using appropriate ICT tools, we, the public and government employees, can now hold our leaders responsible and accountable to the people. With the establishment of IPPIS, BVN, whistleblowing policy, and TSA, our political leaders and public office holders have been more accountable on multiple occasions. They have often expressed worry and anxiety about being embarrassed by these ICT tools, and the majority of them now have a positive attitude and demonstrate honesty. Buhari's dread is, in reality, the beginning of wisdom. The majority of ICT technologies are now quite proactive and effective. This invariably instills fear in them and forces them to take responsibility<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Egbewole G. O NULGE Official Akure South L.G.A. Ondo State.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Olofin D. O A.P.C. Secretariat, Owo L.G.A., Ondo State.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Mrs. Roseline Jacob, Director of Admin and Supplies, Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, Oba's complex Oke Mosan Abeokuta Ogun state.

All of the comments above and the viewpoints of respondents are supported by empirical evidence. Specifically, data from Capron (2000), Odalonu (2015), Frey (2008), Mouffe (2007), Yanina and Anita (2016), and Groshek (2009) suggest that ICT has had a considerable positive effect on the accountability of political leaders and public office holders at the local level. This finding was backed up by quantitative analysis, which revealed that 83 per cent of respondents believe ICT has dramatically aided the proper accountability of public and political office holders through citizen involvement.

**Table 1**

**Effect of I.C.T. on accountability of political leaders and public office holders  
in local governance in Southwestern Nigeria**

S/N	Assertions	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly disagree	Disagree	No response	Descriptive statistics	
		f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	Mean value	Standard deviation
i.	Accountability, transparency, and involvement are the cornerstones of good local governance.	206 (49.3)	180 (43.1)	9 (2.2)	7 (1.7)	16 (3.8)	3.32	0.907
ii.	The use of ICT has significantly led to proper accountability of public and political office holders through citizen engagement.	127 (30.4)	221 (52.9)	25 (6.0)	28 (6.7)	17 (4.1)	2.99	1.000
iii.	ICT can help local governments become more responsive and accountable to their citizens.	126 (30.1)	216 (51.7)	28 (6.7)	25 (6.0)	23 (5.5)	2.95	1.050
iv.	ICT in Nigeria has promoted accountability of public/political office holders in local governance in Southwestern Nigeria.	118 (28.2)	205 (49.0)	32 (7.7)	43 (10.3)	20 (4.8)	2.86	1.088
v.	Good and democratic local governance via accountability of political office holders is better now (2017) than in 1999 before the proliferation of ICT and its tool.	118 (28.2)	182 (43.5)	58 (13.9)	40 (9.6)	20 (4.8)	2.81	1.096

Table 1 (cont.)

S/N	Assertions	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly disagree	Disagree	No response	Descriptive statistics	
		f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	f (%)	Mean value	Standard deviation
vi.	Elections rigging (both local and national) can be reduced by deploying and exploiting ICT tools in Southwestern Nigeria.	120 (28.7)	210 (50.2)	39 (9.3)	31 (7.4)	18 (4.3)	2.92	1.030
vii.	Lack of openness and accountability in the conduct of local governance and election rigging has affected economic development in Nigeria.	162 (38.8)	180 (43.1)	38 (9.1)	19 (4.5)	19 (4.5)	3.07	1.033
viii.	ICT can help local governments become more responsive and accountable to their citizens.	163 (39.0)	191 (45.7)	28 (6.7)	16 (3.8)	20 (4.8)	3.10	1.016
ix.	Corruption on the side of the public and political office holders in local administration in Southwestern Nigeria will be engendered by a lack of accountability in local income collection procedures and expenditure by public office holders.	151 (36.1)	210 (50.2)	26 (6.2)	15 (3.6)	16 (3.8)	3.11	0.949
x.	In Southwestern Nigeria, poor local government is exacerbated by a lack of accountability.	185 (44.3)	164 (39.2)	34 (8.1)	17 (4.1)	18 (4.3)	3.15	1.027

Source: Field Survey, 2018.

## TEST OF HYPOTHESIS

This section looks at how the study's hypothesis was analysed and interpreted. The Spearman's correlation coefficient is the statistical instrument utilised in the data analysis. The analysis was conducted at a 5% level of significance (i.e. 0.05).



Table 2

**Correlation analysis between effect of ICT on accountability of political leaders and public office holders at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria**

Hypothesis				
In Southwestern Nigeria, ICT has had no substantial impact on the accountability of political leaders and public office holders at the local level.	Correlation coefficient (r)	Df	p-value	N
	+0.576	1	0.000	418

Source: Field Survey, 2018.

Table 2 shows a correlation analysis of the impact of I.C.T. on political leaders’ and public office holders’ accountability in selected local government areas in Southwestern Nigeria. The Spearman’s correlation coefficient was positive (+0.576), which is significant at p 0.05, according to Table 2. The positive coefficient suggested that ICT and accountability have a 57 per cent positive influence at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. Because the probability value (0.000) is less than the alpha level (0.05), the null hypothesis was rejected, and the study indicated that ICT has a substantial impact on political leaders and public office holders’ accountability at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria ( $r = 0.576, p 0.05$ ). As a result of the Spearman’s co-efficient, half of the changes in public accountability at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria are linked to the influential roles of ICT platforms.

The positive link also demonstrates that the more significant the impact of ICT tools on public accountability in local government in Southwestern Nigeria, the better. This is in line with the findings of empirical studies such as Nassar (2005) and Odalonu (2005). Furthermore, practically all respondents agreed that ICT has always positively impacted political leaders and public office holders’ responsibility at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria.

**DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

The findings of the study are discussed in further depth in this section. It synchronises and triangulates quantitative and qualitative data with comparable empirical findings from other research on the study’s topic. It did, however, point out a point of disagreement between the conclusions of this study and previous empirical results. Data acquired from the field in the questionnaire and in-depth interviews with essential respondents were used

to assess the study's objectives and assumptions, which were described in the introduction section. We must discuss our findings further after we have tested and accepted the hypothesis.

There is an agreement between quantitative and qualitative evaluations on the impact of ICT on political leaders and public office holders' accountability in governance processes at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. According to the findings of the interview session, all respondents believe that ICT, when properly applied and executed, has a substantial impact on political leaders and public office holders' accountability in government practices at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria<sup>4</sup>. Although a few respondents disagreed, most respondents agreed that information and communication technology (ICT) had had a considerable positive impact on political leaders' and public office holders' accountability in governance procedures at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. This result was largely unswerving in view of the findings of quantitative analysis, which revealed that governance processes such as revenue generation (81 per cent), political leader recruitment and transparency (66 per cent), corruption-free (70 per cent), and financial leakage prevention (79 per cent) are all important (See items ii–ix of Table 1). Odalonu (2015), Frey (2008), Mouffe (2007). As a result of data acquired through interviews and questionnaires, the second aim was met, and this corresponds to the second research hypothesis that ICT has a substantial impact on transparency in governance processes at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. Given the correlation between the objective and the hypothesis that ICT has affected favourably in making political leaders and public office holders accountable in local governance in Southwestern Nigeria, the hypothesis is valid and credible. This is correct, reliable, and widely regarded.

These findings demonstrated that information and communication technology (ICT) had aided in promoting accountability among political leaders and public officials at the local level. Mkandawaire (2010) finds that ICT tools such as the mobile phone, BVN, IPPIS, e-payment, e-pension, and e-governance help to close financial loopholes and improve financial integrity at the local level.

In a similar line, Adesola (2012) finds that ICT increases government honesty, openness, and legitimacy at the local level. On the issue of reduced corruption and prompt and direct payment of civil servants' salaries with the

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<sup>4</sup> Interview with Mr Sanusi Modupe Kehinde, Senior Adm. Officer, Abeokuta North L.G.A Osun State.

introduction of e-payment, e-tax collection, and IPPIS (Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System), all respondents agreed that the use of ICT at the local level reduces corruption and improves prompt and direct payment of workers' salaries. The quantitative test confirmed this conclusion, with seventy per cent of respondents believing that adopting ICT at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria improved corrupt behaviours, timely and speedy payment of civil officials' salaries.

These findings were in line with Fukuyama's (2013) empirical investigation, which finds that the purpose of ICT is to reduce corruption and expedite the payment of workers' salaries in government offices. Issues such as the usage of ICT platforms such as the newly established IPPIS, TSA, BVN, FOI, whistleblower policy, and government e-payments systems to limit leakages of local public funds were also raised during the interview session as respondents gave insight into the usefulness of ICT. ICT platforms such as IPPIS, TSA, BVN, and others, according to 77% of respondents, have considerably aided in the prevention of financial leakages of local public monies.

A response from the Chairman of a Community Development Association in one of the researched area's selected states corroborates this viewpoint:

IPPIS tools/platforms like TSA. and BVN have considerably aided in the blocking and bridging of local public funds leakages in public offices, particularly at the local government level. IPPIS, TSA, and BVN, in particular, are all helping the government save money. Direct payment of employees' salaries when due generates a strong sense of connection among government employees. ICT is a tool for advancing and developing an organisation<sup>5</sup>.

According to the findings, information and communication technology (ICT) has aided in preventing money leakages in government agencies, particularly local governments. It increases local government performance in terms of timely service delivery and accountability. More importantly, ICT fosters a sense of community among workers who use the technology. By inference, it can be concluded that the usage of ICT has had a bigger impact on political leaders and public office holders' accountability at the grass roots level.

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Alabelewe H., A Community Leader, Community Development Association in Ife Central L.G.A. Osun State.

## CONCLUSIONS

So far, our investigation of the role and impact of ICT on local governance in Southwestern Nigeria has been reasonably instructive. The degree of ICT's benefits and effects on strong grass roots governance, which is based on practical and unfettered public participation, openness, accountability, and effective local service delivery, is a big revelation. The results of the data analysis for this study, which was evaluated and analysed with the use of Spearman's correlation coefficient to look for a significant link between the factor and the outcome variables at 0.05 levels of significance, further validated this position. The independent variable (ICT) is substantially connected to the outcome variable when the P-value is less than or equal to 0.05. (good local governance predicated on accountability of political and public office holders). Also, the propositions that were investigated were validated.

As a result, Spearman's correlation coefficient was positive (+0.576), statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$ . The positive coefficient suggested that ICT and accountability have a 57 per cent positive influence at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria. Because the probability value (0.000) is less than the alpha level (0.05), the null hypothesis was rejected, and the study indicated that ICT has a substantial impact on political leaders and public office holders' accountability at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria ( $r = 0.576$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). As a result of Spearman co-efficient, half of the changes in public accountability at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria are linked to the influential roles of ICT platforms.

The positive link also demonstrates that the more significant the impact of ICT tools on public accountability in local government in Southwestern Nigeria, the better. This is in track with the findings of empirical studies such as Nassar (2005) and Odalonu (2005, 2015). Furthermore, practically all respondents agreed that ICT has always positively impacted political leaders and public office holders' responsibility at the local level in Southwestern Nigeria.

The results of the respondents' comments during the interview session, on the other hand, verified it. In the selected local governments' area, Alabi and Alebelewe's responses caught the fact that there is a link between the use of ICT and governance transparency. Furthermore, data from Nassar (2005), Adesola (2012), and Fukuyama (2013) all corroborated the quantitative and qualitative test results. For example, Adesola (2012) states that ICT enhances openness in local governance, whereas Nassar (2005) discovers

that ICT facilitates democratic governance by allowing citizens to participate in governance in large numbers utilising any of the ICT tools available. As a result of all of these evaluations, it can be argued that ICT is substantially associated or related to transparency in municipal governance.

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THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY  
AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS  
AND PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDERS IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between ICT use and political leaders and public office holders' accountability in the local government in Southwestern Nigeria. In Southwestern Nigeria, there significantly appears to be little or no attempt to investigate the role of ICT usage and its impact on political leaders and public office holders' accountability. At the same time, in considering this as the starting point for this topic, the study utilised primary data collected through a mixed approach method of surveying local council ICT officers, registered voters, local community and youth leaders, and key interviews with officers of ICT non-governmental organisations. In the quantitative design, 418 respondents were administered the questionnaire, and 18 key informants were purposefully interviewed. The data were analysed via SPSS; tables were utilised for correlation co-efficient analysis, and content analysis was used to present the interview responses. The results revealed a positive correlation of +0.576 between ICT use and political leaders and public office holders' accountability in local governance. The study finds that using appropriate ICT tools in rural communities will improve local governance.

Key words: ICT, local governance, accountability, e-governance and Southwestern Nigeria

ZASTOSOWANIE TECHNOLOGII TELEINFORMATYCZNYCH  
ORAZ KWESTIA ODPOWIEDZIALNOŚCI SPOŁECZNEJ  
PRZYWÓDCÓW POLITYCZNYCH I URZĘDNIKÓW PUBLICZNYCH  
W SAMORZĄDACH LOKALNYCH W NIGERII

Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia analizę związku zastosowania technologii teleinformatycznych (ICT) z odpowiedzialnością społeczną przywódców politycznych oraz urzędników publicznych w samorządach lokalnych w Południowo-Zachodniej Nigerii. W Południowo-Zachodniej Nigerii wyraźnie widać, że



istnieje niewiele lub brak jest prób zbadania roli zastosowania technologii teleinformatycznych oraz ich wpływu na odpowiedzialność społeczną przywódców politycznych i urzędników publicznych. Jednocześnie, uwzględniając to jako punkt wyjścia dla tego zagadnienia, do analizy wykorzystano dane pierwotne zgromadzone z zastosowaniem metody podejścia mieszanego w badaniu obejmującym teleinformatyków w samorządach lokalnych, wyborców, przywódców społeczności lokalnych i młodzieżowych oraz teleinformatyków w organizacjach pozarządowych. Zgodnie z ilościowym założeniem, ankiety skierowano do 418 respondentów, a z 18 informatorami celowo przeprowadzono wywiady. Dane zostały poddane analizie z zastosowaniem oprogramowania SPSS, zestawienia wykorzystano do analizy współczynnika korelacji, a analiza zawartości posłużyła do prezentacji odpowiedzi udzielonych w wywiadach. Wyniki pokazały dodatnią korelację +0,576 między zastosowaniem technologii teleinformatycznych a odpowiedzialnością społeczną przywódców politycznych i urzędników publicznych w samorządach lokalnych. Z badania wynika, że prawidłowe zastosowanie narzędzi teleinformatycznych w społecznościach wiejskich podniesie jakość zarządzania lokalnego.

Słowa kluczowe: ICT (technologie teleinformatyczne), samorzady lokalne, odpowiedzialność społeczna, e-zarządzanie, Południowo-Zachodnia Nigeria

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## SOCIAL CAPITAL OF AN INNOVATIVE RESEARCH ORGANISATION (CASE STUDY)

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### INTRODUCTION

The role of innovation in the development of the modern world is not questioned at all. Innovations, especially technological innovations, are the engine of change, significantly influencing the mechanisms of the functioning of many economic sectors and the enterprises operating in them. What is more, the experience of the last several months (SARS-CoV2 epidemic) clearly shows that the functioning of many important areas of social and economic life is possible almost exclusively thanks to the constant technological progress that has taken place over the years in many different areas, especially in electronics and telecommunications.

Technological progress in many industries has for years been closely linked to the potential for its commercial exploitation. Hence, the growing role of scientific studies related to the area of commercialisation of science and technology, which arouses wide interest among theorists of several different

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disciplines of social sciences (including management and quality sciences, economics and finance, sociology and law) because of its considerable interdisciplinarity and basically unlimited potential for industry applications. What lies at the root of almost every innovation is an important managerial decision regarding the further development of a given technology. This clearly involves a great deal of analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, with varying degrees of formalisation, to support the process of making such a decision.

Despite significant progress in the identification of tools and techniques to support the innovation decision-making process, there are still many research gaps in this area that require further exploration. One of them is the role of social capital in the innovation decision-making process. Despite the fact that the concept of social capital is well recognised in the literature, highlighting its importance in the innovation decision-making process is much less explored from the theoretical perspective. On the other hand, the practical aspect of the issue is almost absent in the literature.

The aim of the article is to present the role of social capital in the creation of innovation on the basis of the case study of one of the Polish research institutes. The case study method was implemented as exemplification and confirmation of theoretical research results conducted in favour of this study.

With the above in mind, the main purpose of the article is to indicate the importance and role of social capital in the process of innovation decision-making based on the results of research and analysis devoted to the issue of information users' behaviour in the innovation process. The article has a review-practical character; it is, on the one hand, a kind of summary of many years of work and theoretical research conducted by its authors<sup>1</sup>, as well as an indication of the importance of the practical aspects of the addressed issues exemplified by the commercialisation processes of one of the most technologically advanced Polish research institutes, which is known, inter alia, for its achievements related to graphene technologies of the Warsaw Institute of Technology of Electronic Materials (ITME)<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, the research thesis of the article, directly related to the indicated practical example, is to show that social capital is one of the key factors determining the effectiveness of commercialisation activities exemplified by the analysed research institute.

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<sup>1</sup> A. Żolnierski, *Informacja w dobrym towarzystwie – internalizacja informacji a kapitał społeczny*, INE PAN, Warszawa 2021.

<sup>2</sup> ITME became part of the Łukasiewicz Research Network (ŁUKASIEWICZ-ITME) in 1 April 2019, in 1 October 2020 the Institute merged with another unit to form Łukasiewicz – Institute of Microelectronics and Photonics (Ł-IMIF).

Taking into account the structure and scope of the article, the basic research tool used is a critical analysis of the literature on the subject, including materials in the form of books and articles in Polish and English. It should be noted that due to the wide interdisciplinary nature of the issues discussed in the article, including considerations of, *inter alia*, management science, economics, sociology and law, as well as the limited volume of the article, the authors of the study had to set relatively strict limits in the selection of literature subject to further analysis (which is always a subjective decision). An additional research tool used is a decision-making case study, based on the authors' experience of cooperation in innovation decision-making in the above-mentioned unit<sup>3</sup>.

## SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION

Taking effective commercialisation actions requires the right decisions, and these decisions must be based on adequate information. Maintaining a transactional perspective in analysing the impact of information on a business organisation, social capital provides a kind of information *vehicle* – an environment in which the spread of information and the acquisition of information at the right time and place becomes more effective.

The issues of social capital are increasingly emerging in the context of economics and are increasingly being incorporated into micro-level analyses as well. The concept of social capital, first used by Hanifan more than a century ago to describe the importance of neighbourhood cooperation and shared commitment to schools in rural areas<sup>4</sup>, has been interpreted and given a wealth of meaning. The most influential authors who shaped the concept of social capital include Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam, Fukuyama and Gary Becker. From the point of view of further considerations, it is important to emphasise that social capital plays an active role in the knowledge management process, and the extent of influence on this process depends on the type of social capital. While bridging capital allows more efficient

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<sup>3</sup> Two authors were/are employees of the Commercialisation Department of ITME/ŁUKASIEWICZ-ITME (one of them employed since the beginning of the establishment of such a unit in the structure of the Institute), while the third one was the Director of ITME/ŁUKASIEWICZ-ITME.

<sup>4</sup> L. J. Hanifan, *The Rural School Community Center*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 67, 1916.

distribution and acquisition of information, binding capital limits the flow of knowledge to one's own group<sup>5</sup>.

The personal, friendly and collegial nature of these relationships indicates greater importance of social capital of innovators, thus making greater use of informal relationships. From the innovation process management point of view, it is also important that social capital also influences the self-organisation of research teams<sup>6</sup>.

Nowadays, innovation research goes far beyond the area defined at the microeconomics/management level and reflects the whole range of issues of capacity building and development for innovation creation. Already Pavit defines innovation as the core of the process related to the renewal of what the organisation offers, which results from conscious, manageable organised activities<sup>7</sup>. Other definitions are also used in the literature. For example, Freeman's definition states that innovation is the first commercial introduction (application) of a new product, process, system or device<sup>8</sup>. Kotler, on the other hand, emphasises that the term refers to virtually any service, goods or idea that is perceived as new by the recipient<sup>9</sup>. Freeman highlights the fact that innovation in industry not only includes the "technical" design, manufacture or management, but also the marketing activities of the new (or improved) product<sup>10</sup>.

The analysis of the importance of social capital for innovation is primarily situated in the context of the innovation process, in the context of the organisation's ability to acquire the information necessary for this process. Factors influencing the creation of innovation are often related to the nature and quality and the way of establishing and maintaining contacts with the environment and the ability to acquire information and create knowledge in the organisation. The process of innovation management, multilateral

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<sup>5</sup> J. Hui, C. Yijia, *The Research on How Social Capital Facilitates Knowledge Sharing between Individuals*, [in:] L. Jiang (Ed.), *Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Informatics, Cybernetics, and Computer Engineering (ICCE2011)*, November 19–20, 2011, Melbourne, Australia.

<sup>6</sup> A. F. De Toni, G. Biotto, C. Battistella, *Organizational Design Drivers to Enable Emergent Creativity in Web-Based Communities*, *Learning Organization*, 2012, v19 n4, pp. 337–351.

<sup>7</sup> J. Tidd, J. Bessant, K. Pavit, *Managing Innovation. Integrating technological, Market and Organizational Change*, John Willey & Sons, Chichester, 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Ch. Freeman, *The Economics of Industrial Innovation*, Frances Pinter, London 1982, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Ph. Kotler, *Marketing – analiza, planowanie, wdrażanie i kontrola*, Gebethner i S-ka, Warszawa 1994, p. 322

<sup>10</sup> Ch. Freeman, op cit., p. 24.

interactions between the company, customers, suppliers and the R&D sphere, as well as between enterprises themselves, can have a significant impact on both the formation of the innovative potential of the economic entity and its practical ability to create innovations. The pace of change, both in building new knowledge in the scientific sector and in the innovations introduced, is increasing. Innovation itself, or the innovation process, has ceased to be the domain of a single scientific discipline, and research on innovation is increasingly becoming an element of interdisciplinary research projects. Problems related to innovation, in fact, concern a wide range of issues in the field of social, economic or technical issues<sup>11</sup>. Thus, innovation is not only a “technical” project, which is the production or management, but also activities in the field of marketing of a new (or improved) product; creativity, forward thinking and forms of communication between the sender and the recipient of the innovation message. The search for new solutions for the creation of innovations includes a search in the close and wider environment and within the company; and turning to the environment in the process of innovation creation makes the physical boundaries of the company blur, and its area of activity approaches asymptotically to all potential and new sources of information (know-how), both in terms of R&D necessary for the creation of innovations and methods of distribution of innovative products and services. In general, it is important to emphasise the fact that the impact of social capital on innovation is significant, which is confirmed by both organisational and macroeconomic studies<sup>12</sup>.

## INNOVATION PROCESSES – THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS

The information needs of an enterprise are a set of contents necessary for decision-making in fulfilling the mission and achieving the goals of the enterprise in an effective way. Information needs arise as a result of changes occurring both in the organisation’s environment and within it. They depend directly on many personal characteristics of managers and employees who use information. Complex information needs are only partially routine ones in nature and are often based on vague, poorly structured questions. This is often clearly identifiable in the innovation process when complex information

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<sup>11</sup> J. Fagerberg, *Innovation: A Guide to the Literature*, University of Oslo, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Y. Suseno, C. Standing, R. Kiani-Mavi, P. Jackson, *National innovation performance: the role of human capital and social capital*, *The European Journal of Social Sciences*. Sep2020, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 296–310.

from many different sources is required. Information needs are based on a variety of procedures and data<sup>13</sup>. There is an increased demand for soft information too, due to the fact that complex needs cannot be accurately estimated in advance and are difficult to plan and evaluate<sup>14</sup>.

Knowledge management is essential as the first stage of innovation creation; hence information itself becomes one of the most important determinants of innovation decisions. Knowledge possessed by individuals has a social dimension. The creation of knowledge is never disconnected from the environment/society in which it is created, if only in the context of education or even access to physical resources used by the individual during the process of education and socialisation<sup>15</sup>. An example of the importance of socialisation for individuals making decisions on the basis of knowledge provided by information systems can be seen in the change introduced in the United States Air Force in 2000, when, in addition to formal information management systems, scientific and technical expert panels (S&T Summits) were introduced that included individuals from the highest command. The purpose of the meetings was to improve the flow of information and to inform operational-level leadership about future S&T opportunities. Raising the level of knowledge among mid-level commanders also became an important goal<sup>16</sup>.

Landry and his team, based on survey data from nearly half a thousand manufacturing companies, determined the importance of social capital in the innovation process. They found that it takes the form of a two-stage decision-making process: the decision to introduce an innovation (stage I) and its scope (stage II). Already in the case of the first stage it was proved that different forms of social capital influence the decision itself, even the increase in the value of social capital is the most significant variable increasing the probability of innovation. In the second stage, social capital becomes – next to the technology used in the company – the variable of decisive importance

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<sup>13</sup> G. Rejikumar, A. Aswathy Asokan, V. Raja Sreedharan, *Impact of data-driven decision-making in Lean Six Sigma: an empirical analysis*, Total Quality Management & Business Excellence, 31:3–4, 2020, 279–296.

<sup>14</sup> R. Skyrius, V. Bujauskas, *A Study on Complex information needs and business activities*, Informing Science: the International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline, Vol. 13, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> G. Carchedi, *On the Production of Knowledge*, [in:] Paul Zarembka (ed.), *The Capitalist State and its Economy; Democracy in Socialism*, Research in Political Economy, volume 22, Elsevier Ltd., Amsterdam – Boston – Heidelberg 2005, pp. 273–274.

<sup>16</sup> Air Force Science and Technology Board, *Effectiveness of Air Force, Science and Technology Program Changes*, Air Force Science and Technology Board, National Academy of Sciences, Washington 2003, p. 36.

for the decision on the degree of innovation<sup>17</sup>. On the other hand, it is known that an innovator is usually a person with above-average social capital, able to effectively use informal contacts and effectively manage the information necessary in the innovation process through them<sup>18</sup>.

Social capital influences decisions not only in the organisation, but also in personal<sup>19</sup>, or household decision-making<sup>20</sup>. Another important factor, interdependent on social capital and important for decision-making in the innovation process, is organisational culture. It determines the processes of information management, acquisition and flow, and therefore the decision-making process for the creation and diffusion of innovations. Technical innovations themselves make highly technology-oriented markets less price elastic, and price ceases to be the main determinant of the decision-making process<sup>21</sup>.

A company introducing innovations usually has an advantage over other entities that offer their products or services on the market. The durability of the advantage, due to the introduced innovation, usually results from the introduced breakthrough technological change; the essence of this advantage is the potential possibility of other market participants gaining. The economic practice allows for the description of the sources of innovation (by identifying the sources of information as determinants of innovation decisions) from the perspective of the enterprise itself and the active role of the staff. In Poland, microenterprises are dominated by determinants that often result from the personal preferences of company managers – their knowledge, experience, and ability to correctly assess the potential for absorption of created solutions. In Juchiewicz and Grzybowska's research, about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the respondents indicated that the owners are the main initiators of innovations. As innovations in the smallest companies are rather incremental, many ideas have their sources in the solutions of competitors. Owners and managers of the smallest companies do not see the potential of using institutional sources of innovation, including the scientific environment of enterprises. The

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<sup>17</sup> R. Landry, N. Amara, M. Lamari, *Does social capital determine innovation? To what extent?*, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 69, Issue 7, pp. 681–701.

<sup>18</sup> A. Żolnierski, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

<sup>19</sup> A. Cirman, S. Mandič, J. Zorić, *Decisions to Renovate: Identifying Key Determinants in Central and Eastern European Post-socialist Countries*, Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.). Dec2013, Vol. 50, Issue 16, pp. 3378–3393.

<sup>20</sup> D. Yi, Y. Huang, G.-Z. Fan, *Social Capital and Housing Affordability: Evidence from China*, Emerging Markets Finance & Trade. 2016, Vol. 52, Issue 8, pp. 1728–1743.

<sup>21</sup> L. Leydesdorff, *The triple helix: an evolutionary model of innovations*, Research Policy 29/2000, pp. 243–255.



deficit of social capital and resulting reluctance (sometimes even inability) to cooperate is clearly visible<sup>22</sup>. In medium-sized and large enterprises, in the process of making decisions on the introduction of innovations, the role of direct relations between managers is on the decrease, and the importance of the application of the results of the R&D work conducted is increasing. The application of research results has an increasing impact on the development of entire sectors.

## DETERMINANTS OF INNOVATION DECISIONS – SOCIAL CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE

Developing creative solutions requires social capital and sensitivity to the environment. Decisions related to the process of solving complex design problems require the collaboration of many people with complementary skills. Systems that facilitate collaboration must be designed to facilitate creativity and encourage collaboration, exchange of views, information and ideas. The potential benefits of facilitating decision-making, including the selection of an effective path forward that maximises creativity, are difficult to overestimate. The most important ones include e.g. effective division of labour, supporting development of competences (both individual and team) and generation of new ideas. A proper understanding of the problem to be solved and a sense of common interest are extremely important. Creating conditions for the development of social capital based on new information and communication technologies requires keeping abreast of trends in technology, social changes in terms of social trends and fashions, changes in fundamentals and anticipating the dynamics of political and economic changes. The development of information technology makes us witness the formation of information capitalism<sup>23</sup>. Social capital not only determines how information is acquired, but also the quality of the information itself. The social system itself determines the information system. Optimising the information system must incorporate complex social processes in the organisation that are adaptive in nature and involve social behaviour<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> M. Juchniewicz, B. Grzybowska, *Innowacyjność mikroprzedsiębiorstw w Polsce*, PARP, Warszawa 2010, pp. 200–201.

<sup>23</sup> M. Castells, *The Information Age*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2010, p. 377.

<sup>24</sup> M. Sitarska, *Charakterystyka systemów informowania kierownictwa*, Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu. Informatyka ekonomiczna, Akademia Ekonomiczna we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2007, pp. 69–70.

This perspective is also important for issues at the interface between social issues and technology. New technology and especially new media create conditions for individualised approaches to cooperation<sup>25</sup>. Cooperation and trust are important for innovation for yet another reason; innovation and creativity are associated with risk, and in a situation of trust deficit such as in Poland, concerns arise as to whether costs associated with the introduction of innovations are appropriately allocated to all participants in the process. Hence, social capital is not only related to the issue of reducing transaction costs, but also to a sense of fair risk sharing<sup>26</sup>.

An important issue related to social capital in the context of economic processes, including innovation ones, is the institutional and legal environment. It is the public institutions, including primarily the legislative, but also ministries, generally the central administration, that are a key element of the regulator of innovation processes. Currently, to a large extent, these regulations result from the accepted norms and principles, resulting from the documents of the European Union, but specific provisions, both within legal acts and e.g. adopted development strategies, remain in the hands of the Polish administration. In this way, solutions that can both support the development of social capital and innovativeness, as well as hamper it or even contribute to its destruction, are in the hands of the national administration.

Social capital is a key factor that makes the organisational culture and the management style dominant in the organisation, as well as the ability to cooperate and strengthen the effectiveness of innovation decisions. On the one hand, social capital is a kind of catalyst making it possible for innovators (representatives of both the enterprise and science sectors) to effectively acquire information for the innovation process. On the other hand – as the acquisition and processing of information is a process and can be managed from this point of view – it also becomes possible to shape such resources of social capital that allow for more effective use of relations with the environment – primarily in the context of information management.

The turbulent environment makes information a new kind of challenge in doing business. This is due to the fact that information is becoming a factor that guarantees competitive advantage. Nowadays we can talk about the

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<sup>25</sup> G. Fischer, E. Scharff, Y. Ye, *Fostering Social Creativity by Increasing Social Capital*, [in:] Marleen Huysman, Volker Wulf (ed.), *Social Capital and Information Technology*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2004, pp. 393–394.

<sup>26</sup> R. Drozdowski, A. Zakrzewska, K. Puchalska, M. Morchat, D. Mroczkowska, *Wspieranie postaw proinnowacyjnych przez wzmacnianie kreatywności jednostki*, PARP, Warszawa 2010, p. 119.

information era, when an almost unlimited flow of information is noticeable. Technology is increasingly becoming a factor of change<sup>27</sup>. The advantage of many companies is determined, among other things, by what information they have and whether they can use it sufficiently. This is because information with the right structure and content, and prepared “on time”, provides management with the ability to make the right strategic and operational decisions.

Decisions in the innovation process are indirectly influenced by participation in social networks, which allows their participants to benefit in various ways; to reach consensus and to make joint, sometimes difficult, decisions. Problem solving becomes easier and runs more smoothly. The effectiveness of the use of social networks in the selection of factors affecting the decision-making process in innovation management is primarily due to the diverse nature of the information provided within each network. The great dissimilarity of information provided by market participants and by specialised institutions is also reflected in the social networks in which individuals and managers participate. This dissimilarity is not only due to the different nature of the information received, but also to the manner and cost of its acquisition and its usefulness. Market participants very often do not provide ready information, but only raw data that need to be processed and analysed in order to become valuable information useful in the decision-making process. On the other hand, 75% of useful information for a company comes from informal sources<sup>28</sup>.

## CASE DESCRIPTION

The activity of the commercialisation unit of the Warsaw Institute of Electronic Materials Technology can be an example of the impact of social capital as a determinant of the decision-making process. The origins of ITME go back to the 1970s, when, in the conditions of real socialism at that time, an idea was put forward to create an institution supporting state enterprises of the electronics industry located in Warsaw and its surroundings. The unit was conceived of as a place that was to be one of only a few centres of support

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<sup>27</sup> H. A. Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2008, pp. 55–60.

<sup>28</sup> B. Martinet, Y. M. Marti, *Wywiad gospodarczy. Pozyskiwanie i ochrona informacji*, PWE, Warszawa 1999, p. 41.

for the industry of the Comecon countries. This resulted, inter alia, in the creation of a Polish copy of the Intel processor at ITME in the early 1980s.

The Institute initially functioned as a research and development unit, from 2010 as a research institute, and finally in 2019 it became one of the institutes of the Łukasiewicz Research Network. For years, the key task of ITME has been to conduct development work and industrial research towards supporting the innovation of Polish enterprises through implementation. It is ITME that for years has been known for conducting the most prestigious scientific projects in Polish conditions, including the European Commission's Graphene Flagship programme with a long-term perspective and a budget of 1 billion euros and the Ensemble3 Centre of Excellence project under Horizon 2020. The Institute is located in Warsaw's Bielany district and employs over 200 people. The scope of conducted research includes optical fibres, optoelectronics, composite and ceramic materials, graphene and materials for electronics (epitaxial structures). A relatively large dispersion of conducted research makes it necessary to develop mechanisms to optimise their management strategies<sup>29</sup>.

Currently the Institute is headed by a Director appointed by the President of the Łukasiewicz Centre; formerly, before its inclusion in the Łukasiewicz Research Network, by the supervising Minister of Economy. ITME faces key problems, which drain its social capital and affects its innovation potential. Reducing the value of social capital also has a negative impact on innovation decision-making potential.

The key problems include the high average age of the Institute's staff, which is aggravated by the retirement of scientists. This results not only in the loss of competences useful in electronic industries, which currently in Poland are in a residual form or no longer exist at all, but most of all it lowers social capital. Inflation of the value of social capital affects both the ability to use stable internal and external relations and the trust necessary for efficient implementation of research projects. If this phenomenon persists, the likely rebuilding of effective relationships in the future will be in question.

The specific nature of scientific research (especially as specialised as that conducted at the Institute) means that it is essential for its continuation and development to maintain the master-student relationship. In a situation where salaries offered in Polish science are far lower than those offered by

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<sup>29</sup> Z. Matyjas, *Strategie zarządzania instytutami badawczymi na przykładzie Instytutu Technologii Materiałów Elektronicznych w Warszawie*, Prace naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, 2018, no. 538, pp. 225–233.

industry, especially foreign industry, the generation gap is a growing problem, additionally breaking the bonds of trust and relations forming social capital. Although new concepts are emerging (such as the changes introduced by the Łukasiewicz Research Network Act and its implementing regulations), it is currently difficult to judge whether they will prove to be an effective remedy for the aforementioned problems, which are characteristic of the entire science sector of the former Eastern bloc.

Another problem is the phenomenon of the so-called «brain drain» encompassing young employees caused by higher salaries offered by foreign entities in very narrow scientific specialisations, in which ITME employees operate. This may be a negative side effect of the high level of social capital, as employees having an extensive network of contacts with the scientific community face the temptation to take advantage of the jobs offered to them. The availability of unique, highly specialised, world-class research equipment, which facilitates establishing contacts with researchers from all over the world and the implementation of joint scientific projects, is certainly a positive result of the state's policy towards scientific entities.

The impact of the decreasing value of social capital and the consequences in terms of commercialisation decisions are particularly visible in the case of activities related to the commercialisation of the Institute's solutions. The above-mentioned and described problems influence – through the formation of social capital – the availability and sustainability of the Institute's competences, as well as the manner and scope of commercialisation decisions. This is done by directly influencing the functioning of a specialised unit, whose tasks are primarily focused on introducing the created solutions to the market and bringing the Institute's activity closer to the real economy.

Scientific units analogous to ITME were supposed to stimulate growth of innovativeness of the national economy through the practical implementation of results of basic research conducted, as well as participation in the development and implementation works of economic entities. For this purpose, they established units dedicated to commercialisation, whose tasks included: marketing activities, IP management, reporting (to central and internal bodies), assistance in legal services (NDA, cooperation agreements) and the selection of external partners. Building social capital, understood as holding innumerable meetings during conferences/fairs that gather together representatives of the field, is a fundamental basis for the activity of such units. The information provided about the resources of the unit that have a chance to be commercialised must meet the rigours of scientific accuracy with the simultaneous attractiveness of the choice of the form of communication,

consistent with contemporary marketing practices. Trust understood to be the highest level of knowledge of things and the ability to fulfil commitments, is an essential element that decides about the commencement of talks on the implementation of joint activities between research units and entrepreneurs.

Therefore, an effective commercialisation unit must simultaneously meet two key tasks requiring unique competencies and social capital. Its role is to constantly acquire internal information about the current research work, ongoing projects and detailed knowledge of staff competencies and applied technologies - this is an internal task. On the other hand, its external role is to establish external relations with diverse external stakeholders: other research units and scientists (e.g. for scientific cooperation), potential technology recipients (direct commercialisation role), obtaining market information (such as demand for new research, scientific and research work), as well as cooperation with governmental and local authorities. This role requires not only an excellent understanding of the details of the functioning of the research unit, but also knowledge of a wide range of interdisciplinary issues (in addition to the developed technology also e.g. legal, managerial, economic, social nature).

## DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

The situation of the functioning of the scientific unit as a whole (in this situation ITME) significantly affects the scope and capabilities of the commercialisation unit. In particular, these problems limit the potential for internal collaboration with scientists who are willing to make the effort to create solutions for specific business needs. For example, the degradation of trust negatively affects the ability to prepare new research and development projects, including primarily those based on cooperation with the environment.

There is no doubt that also problems with obtaining and processing information have a negative impact on the potential to build lasting relationships with potential partners from the environment. This, too, is a result of declining social capital. It is worth mentioning here that in the case of any organisation, informal information is important<sup>30</sup>, which often determines how decisions are made to a greater extent than the formal message. In practice, also attempts to establish cooperation with foreign

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<sup>30</sup> A. Żołnierski, *Znaczenie nieformalnych źródeł informacji w procesach innowacyjnych*, [in:] T. Baczko (ed.), *Raport o innowacyjności gospodarki Polski w 2012 roku*, INE PAN, Warszawa 2013.

investment funds require first of all personal contact, without which it is impossible to discuss commercialisation. Social capital is of considerable importance here also in the context of investor relations in a broad sense<sup>31</sup>.

Scientific institutions with low levels of social capital, with sporadic and difficult interactions with external partners, cease to understand the needs of the market and may misdirect scientific development, therefore making poor decisions related to the management of other components of their capital resources. Social capital influences how resources are acquired and the social relationships that allow control of decision-making in the organisational context<sup>32</sup>.

Social capital begins to be seen as a key determinant of decisions in the innovation process, influencing the way information is acquired and managed in the process. Social capital itself – its role and importance – is particularly evident in the context of the nature of the information sought, its typology, where informal information happens to be the one that is of considerable importance in creating innovation. The quality of relationships that managers establish affects the ability to analyse information from both formal and informal sources. This occurs through consultation with entities or individuals that support the innovators' interpretive abilities. This is even more important because a frequently indicated barrier to information flow is its ambiguity. Barriers to the flow of informal information raise concerns about the possibility that subsequent intermediaries in the information diffusion process may distort the message. The credibility of information sources is determined primarily by the knowledge of the subject and the reliability and intentions shown by the information source. Innovative enterprises, but also research institutes (ITME type), make advanced use of all types of information sources regardless of the type of innovations they introduce.

## CONCLUSIONS

One of the most important factors affecting the quality of social capital in the organisation's environment, and therefore its ability to effectively implement the decision-making process, is to build and maintain trust as

<sup>31</sup> H.-L. Chen, M. H.-C. Ho, W.-T. Hsu, *Does board social capital influence chief executive officers' investment decisions in research and development?*, R&D Management, Sep2013, Vol. 43, Issue 4, pp. 381–393.

<sup>32</sup> Z. Wang, R. McNally, H. Lenihan, *The role of social capital and culture on social decision-making constraints: A multilevel investigation*, European Management Journal, Apr2019, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 222–232.

a characteristic of the population. In the context of the Institute of Electronic Materials Technology, this is also influenced by the personnel situation, including natural processes related to retirement, rejuvenation of the staff and breaking the existing contacts with the environment. On the other hand, the macro perspective in this respect indicates the importance of trust not only in the direct context of taking innovative decisions, but in the sense of directly touching the economic processes in which the organisation participates. It is primarily about issues of lowering transaction costs and building beneficial relationships in business, where entrepreneurs can make decisions based on less relativised premises. In this sense, trust, or more specifically social capital, is a kind of “ether” allowing for more efficient information acquisition. This is particularly important from the point of view of innovation. Trust, which is a central element of social capital, is not determined by culture, and culture is not uniform and identical in different economies. Therefore, it is also possible to speak of a state of equilibrium in the absence of trust, when the economy may be in equilibrium in a deficit of social capital. Hence, the conclusion is that individuals can function effectively (from an economic point of view) both in an environment where there is a lack of generalised trust and in one where social capital reaches high values<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> P. Francois, *Social Capital and Economic Development*, Routledge, London 2002, pp. 79–80.



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## SOCIAL CAPITAL OF AN INNOVATIVE RESEARCH ORGANISATION (CASE STUDY)

### Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyse the importance of social capital as a key factor in transforming information resources into knowledge and the process of commercialization. The study is based on the case study method used to present the Institute of Electronic Materials Technology.

The authors analyse the role of social capital in creating innovation in the organization's environment. Social capital plays a significant role in the context of the necessary information resources, its typology, where informal information turns out to be important in creating innovation.

The credibility of information sources is determined primarily by the knowledge of the subject and the reliability and intentions shown by the information source. Innovative enterprises, but also research institutes (ITME type), make advanced use of all types of information sources regardless of the type of innovations they introduce. Scientific institutions with low levels of social capital, with sporadic and difficult interactions with external partners, cease to understand the needs of the market and may misdirect scientific development, therefore making poor decisions related to the management of other components of their capital resources.

Key words: social capital, innovation, information management, ITME

## KAPITAŁ SPOŁECZNY W INNOWACYJNEJ ORGANIZACJI BADAWCZEJ (STUDIUM PRZYPADKU)

### Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie znaczenia kapitału społecznego jako czynnika mającego kluczowe znaczenie w przekształcaniu własnych zasobów informacyjnych w wiedzę w procesie komercjalizacji. Artykuł opiera się na metodzie studium przypadku, za pomocą której przedstawiamy Instytut Technologii Materiałów Elektronicznych.

Analizujemy rolę kapitału społecznego w tworzeniu innowacji w otoczeniu organizacji. Sam kapitał społeczny – jego rola i znaczenie – jest szczególnie widoczny w kontekście charakteru poszukiwanych informacji, jego typologii, gdzie istotna w kreowaniu innowacji okazuje się informacja nieformalna.

Wiarygodność źródeł informacji determinowana jest przede wszystkim znajomością tematu oraz rzetelnością i intencjami, jakie wykazuje źródło informacji. Innowacyjne przedsiębiorstwa, ale także instytuty badawcze (typu ITME) w zaawansowanym stopniu wykorzystują wszelkiego rodzaju źródła informacji, niezależnie od rodzaju wprowadzanych innowacji. Instytucje naukowe o niskim poziomie kapitału społecznego, o sporadycznych

i trudnych kontaktach z partnerami zewnętrznymi przestają rozumieć potrzeby rynku i mogą źle kierować rozwojem nauki, podejmując przez to złe decyzje związane z zarządzaniem innymi składnikami swoich zasobów kapitałowych.

Słowa kluczowe: kapitał społeczny, innowacje, zarządzanie informacją, ITME

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# WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM NEOCLASSICAL AND KEYNESIAN VIEWS ON HOW THE MACRO-ECONOMY FUNCTIONS AT THE TIME OF THE CURRENT CRISIS?

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## INTRODUCTION

Macroeconomic stability is one of the basic objectives of economic policy. Macroeconomic stability may be defined as the stability of prices, full employment, a positive long-term growth and sound public finances. Most economists agree that maintaining macroeconomic stability, e.g. by maintaining a stable level of aggregate demand is desirable to keep the process of economic development smooth. There are, however, some differences among economists when it comes to the means of achieving this goal. Proponents of the neoclassical theory believe that the best way to maintain a stable growth of aggregate demand is to adopt a constant growth rate of money supply. Due to the price rigidity in the short term, the change of money supply can affect real GDP in the short term. In the longer term, however, the effects of their impact on real GDP fade away. The expansionary macroeconomic policies result in growing inflation. The supporters of this concept show deep reluctance to accept the active role of the government in the economy. This is due to their belief in the high effectiveness of the market mechanism and the belief that the economy is stable in the long run. They argue that there is

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no need to stabilise the economy, and even if there was such a need, it should not be done because the instruments used could increase this instability even more. The arguments presented by the supporters of the state interventionism proposed by John Maynard Keynes are opposite to the neoclassical ones. They argue that the private sector is highly volatile, and therefore the economy is exposed to disturbances, which are leading to imbalances. According to Keynes, the government should intervene on the market by conducting an active fiscal policy and stimulate the effective demand that will lead to GDP growth and a decrease in unemployment. Apart from the active fiscal policy, there are the so-called automatic economic stabilisers (income tax, taxes on consumption, unemployment benefits) – a passive policy that supports the process of market stabilisation.

## PROBLEM STATEMENT

The aim of the article is to answer the question: What lessons can we learn from neoclassical and Keynesian views on how the macro-economy functions at the time of the current crisis? The article will briefly discuss the implications for macroeconomic policy in the current situation in Poland.

## METHODOLOGY AND DELIMITATIONS

The answer to the question will be based on the theoretical indications presented in the IS-LM model, which will be defined mathematically and illustrated on a graph. The IS-LM model is normally used to present the short-term equilibrium economy with a given assumption concerning the rigidity of prices. To present the differences among two basic economy schools, the author decided to differentiate the outcomes of the model by changing this assumption. The macroeconomic policy consists of fiscal policy and monetary policy. The author will not analyse the structural policy (e.g. microeconomic, labour policy). Using the model, the author will determine the parameters of the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in achieving the basic goals, distinguishing neoclassical and Keynesian arguments. The author will also comment on the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in Poland within the last months during the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

## DEFINITION OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY (FISCAL POLICY AND MONETARY POLICY), GOALS AND FUNCTIONS

Fiscal policy is responsible for shaping the amount and proportion of public revenues and expenditures. The government collects revenues (budget) in order to further distribute them, defining the goals of public expenditure. The basic instrument of fiscal policy is the state budget. The main goal of fiscal policy is to stabilise production and employment by regulating aggregate demand and supply. Thus, fiscal policy is to use the appropriate fiscal instruments in order to smooth the fluctuations of the economic cycle, ensuring long-term growth of the economy. In other words, the goal of fiscal policy is to stimulate economic activity in the period of slowdown and to inhibit expansion of the economy in a period of excessive growth. This type of policy is known as anti-cyclical policy. The aim of such a policy is to maintain a stable level of total demand.

The main goal of monetary policy is to keep prices stable. The definition of prices stability is given in the regulations by defining the level of proper inflation (2.5% +/- 1% in Poland, “less than 2% close to 2%” in the euro area). Monetary policy is led by the central bank, which with the use of its instruments may influence the size of money supply. The main instruments are: open market operations, interest rates and levels of reserves – monetary base.

## FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES – THEORETICAL APPROACH

Fiscal and monetary policies are present in macroeconomic interdependencies. Endogenous variables are: income –  $Y$ , consumption –  $C$ , investment –  $I$ , interest rate –  $r$ , savings –  $S$ . Exogenous variables are: variables dependent on economic policy: government spending –  $G$ , tax –  $T$ , money supply –  $M$ ,  $t$  – tax rate. Basic identities and functions are presented below:

$$Y \equiv C + S - T \quad \text{income identity} \quad (1)$$

$$D \equiv C + I + G + X \quad \text{expenditure identity} \quad (2)$$

$$Y = D \quad \text{equilibrium condition on goods market (ex post)} \quad (3)$$

Thus, the components of GDP are given by identities (1) and (2) to the form:

$C = a + b(1 - t)Y$	function of consumption	(4)
$I = e - d r$	function of investments	(5)
$X = g - mY - n r$	function of net export	(6)
$L = (kY - h r) P$	function of money demand	(7)
$M = L$	equilibrium on the money market	(8)

The algebraic approach to equilibrium in the goods and services market expresses the equation of income (1) and expenses (2). On the spending side, we have government spending, consumption, investment and net exports. Using the functions of consumption, investment and net export (4–6) for further considerations, we obtain the following form Y:

$$\text{IS: } Y = a + e + g + [b(1 - t) - m]Y - (d + n)r + G$$

$$\text{IS: } r = (a + e + g)/(d + n) - [1 - b(1 - t) + m]/(d + n) Y + 1/(d + n) G$$

The above notation determines the IS curve. The course of the curve shows all the combinations of  $r$  and  $Y$  that satisfy the identity of income and the equations of consumption, investment, and net exports – that is, the combinations of  $r$  and  $Y$  that provide equilibrium in the product market. An increase in the government spending increases the interest rate for a given income level. Graphically, an increase in expenditure ( $G$ ) leads to a shift in the IS curve to the right. We obtain an algebraic representation of the LM curve from the money demand function (7). The LM curve shows all combinations of  $r$  and  $Y$  for which the money market is in equilibrium, i.e. which ensures equilibrium in the money market with a given money supply  $M$  and a fixed price level  $P$ . Based on (7) and (8) we get:

$$M = (kY - h r)P.$$

Solving the equation for the interest rate. LM curve:  $r = (k/h) Y - (1/h)(M/P)$ , where  $M/P$  is the real money supply. The change in the money supply  $M$  causes the LM curve to shift at constant prices<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> A change in the price level causes the real supply of  $M/P$  to change at a constant amount of money  $M$ .



## THE MECHANISM OF PRICE CHANGES: NEOCLASSICAL ASSUMPTION VS. KEYNESIAN ASSUMPTION


The effective stabilisation requires the recognition of macroeconomic relationships between the instruments of macroeconomic policy. The IS-LM model shows the main relationships under the following assumptions: the economy has free production capacity (demand creates supply; in other words, production adjusts to demand) and prices are fixed. These assumptions fit into the concept of the Keynesian theory, which by the way is the result of definition of the consumption function (above).

The results of the IS-LM model are observed for different assumptions concerning the price behaviour. The fixed price corresponds to Keynesian assumptions, the variable price - to neoclassical economics. We obtain two types of reaction of the model to the impulse coming from the expansionary fiscal policy.

**With rigid prices** => adjustment in the model by gradually changing production (Y) and slow shifts of the IS curve. The IS curve shifts right to the IS position '. The result justifies an active economic policy by the government. An increase in expenditure leads to an increase in economic activity leading to an increase in income. It is worth noting that the concept includes arguments for stickiness of prices: (a) the cost of the «menu», (b) the relationship with customers, (c) contracts.

**With flexible prices** => adjustment in the model through changes in prices (P), which causes changes in the real quantity of money (M) and immediately shifts the LM curve. After shifting the IS curve to the right to the IS position ', the LM curve shifts to the left to the LM position ' (real M / P money supply decreases due to the increase in P) This leads to the so-called concept of neutrality of money, which means that changes in the quantity of money has no influence on the level of production (and employment). Changes in the size of money, in turn, are a factor that leads to instability. The government's reluctance to play an active role in the economy is highly justified. There is no need to stabilise the economy, and even if there was such a need, it should not be done, because stabilisation policy measures could further increase this instability.

Graph 1



Source: own calculations.

Apart from the adjustment mechanism, attention should be paid to the parameters determining the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. The effectiveness of an expansionary fiscal policy depends on the impact of fiscal spending on interest rates and the response of investment and net exports to interest rates changes. Based on the IS-LM model defined above, it should be noted that effectiveness of fiscal policy is determined by interest elasticity of investments (I) and net export (X), and interest elasticity of money. The influence of fiscal policy on income (Y) is high when the rate of interest rates increase is low and the interest rates reaction to investments and net export is low. In other words, the sensitivity of money demand to interest rate is high, which means that the increase in money demand does not cause a large increase in interest rates and low increase of interest rates does not cause the crowding out effect on the side of investments. Sensitivity of investment demand to interest rates is low.

Additionally, the effectiveness of additional fiscal expenditure is related to the expenditure multiplier effect<sup>2</sup>. The higher multiplier is, the higher the influence of fiscal policy on income.

In conclusion, increased fiscal spending will have a limited impact on aggregate demand if there is a significant rise in interest rates, which


<sup>2</sup> Expenditure multiplier =  $1 / [1 - [b(1 - t) - m]]$  – shows how the consumption changes as an effect of income change by one unit.

will further translate into a strong crowding out effect – displacement of investment from the market and a deterioration in net exports. On the contrary, an expansionary fiscal policy will have a greater impact on aggregate demand if the increase in interest rates is low and /or it has no significant impact on investment and net exports.

The increase in government spending in the economy causes GDP growth with the expenditure multiplier in place, but also increases the demand for money, which is related to the growing transaction demands. A growing demand for money with a fixed supply leads to an increase in the price – the interest rate – in the money market<sup>3</sup>. In the graphic illustration, it translates into a greater slope of the IS curve and a smaller slope of the LM curve. The steeper the IS curve and the flatter the LM curve, the higher the effectiveness of the fiscal policy.

Graph 2

Effectiveness of fiscal policy



Source: own calculations.

The graph on the left side shows the shift of the IS curve to the right (increase in government spending) for both cases. The one which corresponds to the steeper IS curve is the second to the flat IS curve. The impact on the demand is greater – the equilibrium point reached with the higher Y – in case of the steep IS curve. The graph on the right side compares two outcomes of the IS-LM model for different slopes of the LM curves. The better point in terms of the Y is reached with the flatter LM curve.

<sup>3</sup> An increase in the money supply may stop an increase in the interest rate. In this sense, the use of an expansionary monetary policy in conjunction with government spending reduces the crowding-out effect (mixed policy).


A similar analysis should be carried out to define the conditions for the effectiveness of monetary policy. In the IS-LM model, the effectiveness of an expansionary monetary policy (in the short term) will depend on how the model will respond to the increase of money supply in terms of interest rate change and further on how this change will translate into the increase in investment and net exports.

It can be assumed that monetary policy (an increase in the money supply) is effective when the multiplier effect is high and there is high interest rates elasticity of investments (I) and net export (X). Elasticity of money demand is low, which means that an increase in  $M$  causes a significant reduction in interest rates.

Based on the graph, the effectiveness of monetary policy is higher with the steeper LM curve and the flatter IS curve. Both situations are presented in the graph. The starting point is the shift of the LM curve to the right as a result of an increase in the money supply  $M$  (we maintain the assumption of fixed prices, and therefore  $p = \text{const.}$ ). The size of increase in money supply defines the scope of expansionary monetary policy. The shift of the LM curve on the graph is indicated by an arrow.

Graph 3

## Effectiveness of monetary policy



Source: own calculations.

The left graph illustrates the outcome of the model for different elasticity of the LM curve. The LM curve is steeper when the sensitivity of the money demand to changes in interest rates is lower. The equilibrium point (after the LM shifts) corresponds to higher income ( $Y$ ) with a steep LM curve. The

right graph shows the result of the model with different slopes of the IS curve. The flat IS curve corresponds to the higher sensitivity of investment demand and net exports (I and X) to changes in interest rates. For achieving the highest possible income (Y) by expansionary monetary policy, the IS curve should be flat.

The following conclusions for macroeconomic policy can be drawn from the theoretical analysis presented above. The main task of the central bank is to maintain price stability in the long term. Monetary policy decisions should be dedicated to achieve the so-called superior goal. The effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating economic growth in the IS-LM model is justified only under the assumption of fixed prices. It is assumed that such a situation is possible only in the short term. Economic politicians are tempted to use monetary policy to stimulate employment and growth by increasing the money supply and lowering interest rates (discretionary policy). Even if it is possible to accelerate growth and reduce unemployment in the short term, an overly expansionary monetary policy leads to higher inflation, lower investment and growth in the longer term, which is in line with the model reaction under the assumption of flexible prices. Long-term costs can by far outweigh short-term benefits. Therefore, monetary policy decisions should be taken by persons and institutions independent of political influence, and independent of temporary political choices. Only independence may guarantee the impartiality and substantive nature of monetary policy decisions.

Fiscal policy should be conducted in a way that stabilises production and employment by regulating aggregate demand and supply. This is achieved by the so-called active fiscal policy, as well as passive policy. The passive policy is based on the system of the so-called automatic stabilisers. They are designated to offset the fluctuations of economic activity without additional decisions. Other important functions of fiscal policy include the provision of public goods through resource allocation, “fair” distribution of income.

The effectiveness of fiscal policy in the short term is limited by the crowding out effect (sensitivity of investments to interest rates and the sensitivity of the demand for money to an increase in interest rates) and the size of the multiplier effect. It should also be noted that fiscal interventions require the budgetary deficit increase. The limited power of fiscal policy to stabilise the economy comes from the public debt. Deficit increases public debt (open or hidden), which must be kept at a manageable level (under control) so as not to fall into the over-indebtedness trap.

It is worth adding that the fiscal expansion related to the course of the business cycle (offsetting the economy fluctuation) is not the only reason for increasing the deficit. Another crucial reason is the so-called asymmetry of fiscal policy, the pure time preference that encourages borrowing in order to increase the present consumption.

## MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN POLAND – CONCLUSIONS

Actions taken by macroeconomic policy in recent months have been determined by the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. We observed an expansionary macroeconomic policy aimed at maintaining the demand and liquidity on the market.

Firstly, the monetary policy reaction was very quick. The central bank (National Bank of Poland – NBP) reacted by lowering interest rates. However, the room for interest rate cuts was low, as before the outbreak of the pandemic the economy operated in an environment of low interest rates, which was a consequence of the monetary policy conducted in the period of the economic downturn following the 2007–2009 crisis. Monetary policy was also active in the bond market, purchasing securities and supplying the money to the market. The expansionary monetary policy has limited the crowding out effect of the expansionary fiscal policy (increased the real interest rate). There was 25 per cent increase in M3 supply between July 2021 and January 2020<sup>4</sup>. It is worth noting that the change accounted for 32% and 12% respectively in the periods DEC21 / DEC20 and DEC20 / DEC19 for M1 aggregate and respectively 8.9% and 16% for M3 aggregate in annual terms. Data illustrating the money supply are presented in the table below.

**Table 1**

### Money supply in period SEP19 – DEC21

<b>Time</b>	<b>M1</b>	<b>M2</b>	<b>M3</b>
SEP19	1 082 384.4	1 495 863.8	1 506 173.4
OCT19	1 089 792.1	1 511 907.4	1 523 945.2
NOV19	1 109 059.4	1 530 381.4	1 542 584.1
DEC19	1 154 871.6	1 552 647.9	1 565 574.7

<sup>4</sup> Narodowy Bank Polski – Internetowy Serwis Informacyjny (nbp.pl).

Table 1 (cont.)

Time	M1	M2	M3
JAN20	1 127 701.0	1 546 994.5	1 557 781.6
FEB20	1 152 635.4	1 569 329.1	1 579 368.8
MAR20	1 224 779.8	1 617 386.3	1 628 423.3
APR20	1 275 591.9	1 666 812.3	1 673 139.1
MAY20	1 338 261.2	1 712 512.4	1 717 907.0
JUN20	1 395 848.4	1 739 330.1	1 746 224.8
JUL20	1 410 037.4	1 733 221.1	1 740 828.3
AUG20	1 429 109.1	1 736 424.2	1 744 100.9
SEP20	1 454 114.7	1 754 841.0	1 762 175.6
OCT20	1 481 052.2	1 775 038.7	1 782 616.5
NOV20	1 502 540.3	1 783 814.6	1 790 685.6
DEC20	1 531 713.7	1 814 748.9	1 822 727.7
JAN21	1 539 598.8	1 812 420.6	1 820 192.0
FEB21	1 570 540.8	1 829 434.6	1 836 597.0
MAR21	1 603 108.4	1 856 144.7	1 862 406.7
APR21	1 606 983.3	1 854 364.1	1 859 964.6
MAY21	1 622 872.8	1 866 430.2	1 871 972.6
JUN21	1 634 719.5	1 869 644.5	1 876 000.6
JUL21	1 651 441.9	1 887 486.2	1 894 515.0
AUG21	1 663 567.8	1 895 077.4	1 902 568.2
SEP21	1 678 181.9	1 907 960.2	1 914 199.2
OCT21	1 696 549.5	1 930 050.9	1 935 690.7
NOV21	1 726 455.3	1 963 239.9	1 971 943.1
DEC21	1 724 928.5	1 974 640.1	1 985 020.6

Source: National Bank of Poland.

Interest rates: The Lombard rate was kept at 0.5% (as of May 2020). Deposit rate accounted for 0%. The interest rates were increased for the first time by 50 bp to 1pp in October 2021.

Secondly, fiscal policy played a much greater role than in the previous crisis. Expansionary fiscal policy was carried out with high awareness of the limitations on the side of monetary policy (low interest rates). The fiscal policy activities were directly aimed at the real economy, e.g. by protecting income and jobs, supporting companies directly to avoid bankruptcy. Despite a significant increase in debt, interest rates remained at low levels. This was related to the parallel expansionary monetary policy that accompanied increased government spending (policy mix). It is worth noting that the expenditure under the fiscal policy is not fully visible in the budget deficit levels (7.1% of GDP in 2020 and 4% in 2021)<sup>5</sup>.

Table 2 below gathers data on budget deficit levels calculated with the use of uniform methodology according to Eurostat. All the countries are presented for the purpose of comparison. The effect of increased spending related to the fiscal policy response to the shock caused by the pandemic is shown in 2020 data. Poland recorded a deficit of over 7% GDP. All countries applied an active fiscal expenditure policy, which is reflected in the presented data, although the scale differs, depending on the country. Thirteen countries exceeded the deficit level of 7% GDP. In this sense, Poland should be included in the group of countries where fiscal instruments have been widely used. It is also worth noting that some countries recorded a budget surplus in the years preceding the pandemic crisis. These were years of positive economic growth. The budget surplus is recorded for two well-explained reasons. Firstly, the fiscal policy is counter-cyclical, which allows macroeconomic stabilisation; secondly, the budget surplus creates space for expansionary fiscal policy in the period of slowdown or stronger shock/crisis, as it was the case in 2020.

Table 2

## Budget deficit in EU countries in selected years

Time	2018	2019	2020
European Union – 27 countries (from 2020)	-0.4	-0.5	-6.9
Belgium	-0.8	-1.9	-9.1
Bulgaria	1.7	2.1	-4.0
Czechia	0.9	0.3	-5.6
Denmark	0.8	4.1	-0.2
Germany	1.9	1.5	-4.3

<sup>5</sup> Główny Urząd Statystyczny.



Table 2 (cont.)

<b>Time</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>
Estonia	-0.6	0.1	-5.6
Ireland	0.1	0.5	-4.9
Greece	0.9	1.1	-10.1
Spain	-2.5	-2.9	-11.0
France	-2.3	-3.1	-9.1
Croatia	0.2	0.3	-7.4
Italy	-2.2	-1.5	-9.6
Cyprus	-3.5	1.3	-5.7
Latvia	-0.8	-0.6	-4.5
Lithuania	0.5	0.5	-7.2
Luxembourg	3.0	2.3	-3.5
Hungary	-2.1	-2.1	-8.0
Malta	1.9	0.5	-9.7
Netherlands	1.4	1.7	-4.2
Austria	0.2	0.6	-8.3
Poland	-0.2	-0.7	-7.1
Portugal	-0.3	0.1	-5.8
Romania	-2.9	-4.4	-9.4
Slovenia	0.7	0.4	-7.7
Slovakia	-1.0	-1.3	-5.5
Finland	-0.9	-0.9	-5.5
Sweden	0.8	0.6	-2.8


Source: Eurostat.

Due to the extra spending, the public debt increased from 45.6% of GDP to 57.4% of GDP. Additionally, the majority of spending was conducted by the state-owned institutions, which include Polish Investment Fund (PFR) and the development bank BGK. PFR and BGK are financial institutions fully controlled by the State with 100 % share of the state treasury.

In the short term, the macroeconomic policy limited the decline in employment (increase in unemployment). In the longer term, the main consequence is the inflation itself and the risk of growing inflation that forces the future decisions to address the inflation and keep it under control.

Graph 4

Inflation (CPI index) in Poland



Source: Central Bank of Poland.

One of the direct consequences of rising inflation is the change of the nature of the monetary policy from neutral or expansionary to restrictive. In order to protect the stability of money, the central bank is pushed to tighten monetary policy. Firstly, the quantitative easing is reduced or stopped. The bank reduces the asset purchases. Secondly, there is a sharp rise in interest rates. The main cost resulting from a delayed reaction of the monetary policy to the risk of inflation, like it was in Poland, is a significant increase in interest rates and higher than it would have been if the central bank had taken appropriate action in the right time. In other words, overdue reaction of monetary policy will result in much higher final levels of interest rates. At the time of writing the article, the central bank made a couple of decisions resulting in interest rates increases, in line with the data below.

Table 3

## Central Bank Interest rates in Poland


In force since	Reference rate	Lombard rate	Deposit rate	Promissory note rediscount rate	Promissory note discount rate
2020-03-18	1.00	1.50	0.50	1.05	1.10
2020-04-09	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.55	0.60
2020-05-29	0.10	0.50	0.00	0.11	0.12
<b>2021</b>					
2021-10-07	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.51	0.52
2021-11-04	1.25	1.75	0.75	1.30	1.35
2021-12-09	1.75	2.25	1.25	1.80	1.85
<b>2022</b>					
2022-01-05	2.25	2.75	1.75	2.30	2.35

Source: Central Bank of Poland.

The statements of the central bank representatives suggest that the process of raising interest rates has just started. The National Bank of Poland decided to conduct a restrictive monetary policy. What is even more, there is an announcement indicating the strong determination of the monetary authorities to extinguish inflation to the level of the statutory inflation target. These actions will have influence on the demand on the market, leading to squeezing the economic growth. Fiscal policy also faces an important challenge. Continuation of expansionary fiscal policy is problematic for the following reasons. Firstly, the space for expenditure policy is diminishing. It is related to the deterioration in public finances – growing indebtedness and high deficits. Secondly, an expansionary fiscal policy will give a pro-inflationary impulse to the economy, which means that it will trigger even stricter central bank reactions.

The IS-LM model can be used to present the consequences of the macroeconomic policies decisions. It is illustrated in the graph below.

Graph 5



Source: own calculations.

Firstly, the LM curve shifts to the left. LM moves to LM'. The new equilibrium point will be the intersection of the LM' curve with the IS curve. This point is described by a higher interest rate and lower income (Y). If there is a restrictive fiscal policy (that supports monetary policy in bringing back the price stability), then the IS curve shifts to the position of IS'. The point of intersection of IS' and LM' gives the equilibrium described by an interest rate lower than previously (but higher than at the initial point of equilibrium) and a lower level of income.

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## WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM NEOCLASSICAL AND KEYNESIAN VIEWS ON HOW THE MACRO-ECONOMY FUNCTIONS AT THE TIME OF THE CURRENT CRISIS?

### Abstract

Macroeconomic stability should be defined as price stability, full employment, positive long-term growth over the long term and sound public finances. Maintaining macroeconomic stability is necessary for the smooth process of economic development. For years, there has been discussion in mainstream economics about the best ways to achieve this goal. The article presents the main theoretical assumptions on which the discussion is based and tries to verify the assumptions of the models with the economic reality.

Key words: macroeconomic stability, fiscal policy, monetary policy

## JAKIE WNIOSKI MOŻNA WYCIĄGNĄĆ Z NEOKLASYCZNYCH I KEYNESOWSKICH POGLĄDÓW NA TEMAT FUNKCJONOWANIA MAKROEKONOMII W CZASIE OBECNEGO KRYZYSU?

### Streszczenie

Stabilność makroekonomiczną należy definiować jako stabilność cen, pełne zatrudnienie, pozytywny długoterminowy wzrost w długim okresie oraz zdrowe finanse publiczne. Utrzymanie stabilności makroekonomicznej jest konieczne, aby proces rozwoju gospodarczego przebiegał płynnie. Od lat w głównym nurcie ekonomii prowadzona jest dyskusja na temat najlepszych sposobów osiągnięcia tego celu. Artykuł przedstawia główne założenia teoretyczne, na których oparta jest dyskusja oraz próbuje zweryfikować założenia modeli z rzeczywistością gospodarczą.

Słowa kluczowe: stabilność makroekonomiczna, polityka fiskalna, polityka monetarna

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# ZASTOSOWANIE ANALIZY EKONOMICZNEJ W PROCESACH DECYZYJNYCH W OBSZARZE ZARZĄDZANIA INNOWACJAMI

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## WPROWADZENIE

Analiza aspektów ekonomicznych w zarządzaniu to powszechnie akceptowany, lecz w rzeczywistości rzadko wdrażany element procesów decyzyjnych w przedsiębiorstwach. Można zaryzykować twierdzenie, że wiele przedsiębiorstw nie dokonuje kompleksowych i szczegółowych analiz inwestycyjnych w sferze innowacyjności. Mnogie bariery w realizacji tego typu analiz powodują, że sfera innowacji może wymywać się spod kontroli zarządczej, a tym samym przynosić skutki odmienne od oczekiwanych.

„Dla uniknięcia strat i umożliwienia skutecznej realizacji celów strategicznych przedsiębiorstwa konieczne jest wprowadzenie metod selekcji i doskonalenia propozycji inwestycyjnych. Wprowadzenie tych metod powinno mieć miejsce na etapie planowania inwestycji, tak aby uruchomienie i realizacja poszczególnych projektów przebiegały sprawniej i przy mniejszym obciążeniu kosztowym przedsiębiorstwa”<sup>1</sup>. Rolę, o której mowa, odgrywa zbiór metod nazwanych analizą wpływu inwestycji na ekonomikę przedsiębiorstwa.

Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest wskazanie możliwości zastosowania uznanych i szeroko stosowanych narzędzi analizy ekonomicznej dla wszystkich, w tym określanych jako trudno mierzalne, aspektów inwestowania w innowację. W ramach artykułu zaproponowana zostanie również struktura realizacji tego typu analiz oceny inwestycji.

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<sup>1</sup> G. P. Pisano, *Potrzebujesz strategii innowacyjności*, „Harvard Business Review” 2015, nr 7–8.

Zastosowana zostanie metoda analizy i konstrukcji logicznej, a rozważania oprą się na kluczowych składowych inwestowania w innowacje w obszarze systemów informatycznych.

## 1. ANALIZY EKONOMICZNE W ZARZĄDZANIU INNOWACJAMI

### 1.1. Struktura analizy ekonomicznej

Badanie wartości biznesowej inwestycji powinno być oparte o badanie całkowitego wpływu tej inwestycji na ekonomikę przedsiębiorstwa, tzw. TEI<sup>2</sup>. Chronologię prowadzenia oceny ekonomicznej projektów planowanych w obszarze technologii przedstawiono na poniższej grafice.

Rysunek 1

#### Uniwersalna procedura analizy ROI – Trójkąt ROI



Źródło: Materiały szkoleniowe IT Investment Consulting – warsztat „Metody pomiaru ROI/TCO w praktyce inwestycji informatycznych”.

#### Etap 1. Analiza efektów ekonomicznych

Analizy z tego etapu zmierzają do ustalenia, jaki poziom szczegółowych parametrów ekonomicznych przyjmują wybrane obszary przedsiębiorstwa,

<sup>2</sup> OECD, *The Economic Impact of ICT Measurement, Evidence and Implications*, OECD, 2004.



które ulegają zmianom dzięki innowacji. Obszary, które powinno się poddać szczegółowej analizie, należy klasyfikować do takich sfer, jak:

- sfera całkowitych kosztów posiadania (TCO<sup>3</sup>),
- sfera satysfakcji klienta,
- sfera zarządzania zasobami materialnymi,
- sfera zarządzania usługami świadczonymi na czyjaś rzecz,
- sfera oczekiwanej wartości informacji w decyzjach taktycznych i strategicznych (EVI),
- sfera zarządzania produktywnością zasobów pracy (produktywność zasobów pracy = ilość zadań w czasie / budżet roboczogodzin),
- sfera zjawisk rzadkich (katastrofy, przestoje).

## **Etap 2. Analiza scenariuszy ekonomicznych**

Ten etap to porównanie scenariusza bieżącego, obrazującego funkcjonalnie przedsiębiorstwa w przypadku zaniechania realizacji analizowanej inwestycji, oraz scenariusza przyszłego (docelowego), opisującego sytuację przedsiębiorstwa w trakcie i po realizacji inwestycji. Analiza scenariuszowa ma na celu porównanie ekonomiczne dwóch wariantów funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa, a określenie obszarów, w których mają miejsce różnice i ich kwantyfikacja, pozwala na realizację kroku trzeciego analizy.

## **Etap 3. Analiza NPV**

Polega on na opracowaniu modelu przepływów pieniężnych netto i analizie wskaźników finansowych służących jako kryterium podejmowania decyzji inwestycyjnych oraz mających na celu zobrazowanie wartości biznesowej przedsięwzięcia inwestycyjnego.

$$NPV = CF_0^{(-)} + \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{NCF_i}{(1+r)^i}$$

gdzie:

$NPV$  – Net Present Value, wartość bieżąca netto;

$CF_0^{(-)}$  – ujemny przepływ pieniężny w „zerowym” okresie inwestycji – wydatek inwestycyjny i elementy tworzące wydatek inwestycyjny;

$NCF_i$  – Net Cash-Flow, dodatni lub ujemny przepływ pieniężny netto w okresie;

$r$  – stopa dyskontowa projektu – stopa kosztu kapitału użytego do sfinansowania inwestycji

<sup>3</sup> R. L. Weil, M. W. Maher, *Handbook of Cost Management*, John Wiley & Sons, New Jersey 2005.

Założenie o trzyetapowym podejściu do oceny inwestycji ma na celu zapewnienie kompletności procesu, który obejmuje pełne spektrum zjawisk zachodzących w procesie analizy inwestycyjnej.

## 1.2. Analiza efektów ekonomicznych

Analiza efektów ekonomicznych jest najbardziej rozległym obszarem analizy w całym procesie badania opłacalności. „Analiza ta obejmuje swoim zasięgiem wszystkie potencjalne obszary funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa, w którym można się spodziewać wystąpienia efektu realizacji, bądź braku realizacji danego projektu”<sup>4</sup>.

Obszary potencjalnego wpływu zaklasyfikowano następująco<sup>5</sup>.

### **Sfera całkowitych kosztów posiadania**

1. Bezpośrednie koszty:
  - a) urządzenia,
  - b) oprogramowanie,
  - c) personel.
2. Bezpośrednie koszty biznesowe:
  - a) zarządzanie wiedzą,
  - b) dostępność,
  - c) wydajność,
  - d) zarządzanie plikami,
  - e) odzyskiwanie danych i dostępności.

### **Sfera satysfakcji klienta/partnera**

1. Poziom sprzedaży (ilościowo, wartościowo, w segmentach klientów, w grupach produktowych etc.):
  - a) ryzyka redukcji sprzedaży,
  - b) szanse wzrostu sprzedaży,
  - c) cykl życia produktów/usług,
  - d) jakość produktów i usług w relacji z satysfakcją klienta.

<sup>4</sup> E. Syska, „Metody analizy ROI/TCO w praktyce inwestycji informatycznych – Skrypt warsztatowy”, IT Investment Consulting, 2012.

<sup>5</sup> M. Bobruk, A. Kwasek, M. Marczak, *Methods for the assessment of investment projects in new it technologies*, Challenges in enterprise management of today, Łódź 2009, s. 128–141.

### **Sfera zarządzania usługami świadczonymi na czyjąś rzecz**

1. Poziomy kosztów usług.
2. Zmienność kosztów usług w zależności od eksploatacji.

### **Sfera zarządzania zasobami materialnymi**

1. Zarządzanie majątkiem trwałym.
2. Zarządzanie majątkiem obrotowym:
  - a) zapasy,
  - b) należności,
  - c) gotówka,
  - d) zobowiązania krótkoterminowe.
3. Zarządzanie zobowiązaniami długoterminowymi.
4. Zarządzanie materialnymi kosztami operacyjnymi (zmiennymi).
5. Zarządzanie ryzykiem operacyjnym związanym z zasobami materialnymi.

### **Sfera zarządzania produktywnością zasobów pracy**

1. Ilość zadań/procesów wykonywanych przez pracowników.
2. Zarządzanie czasochłonnością wykonywanych procesów.
3. Zarządzanie poziomem błędów i nieprawidłowości w wykonywanych procesach.
4. Zarządzanie wynagrodzeniami.
5. Zarządzanie zasobami ludzkimi.

### **Sfera zjawisk rzadkich i ryzyk operacyjnych**

1. Ryzyka wystąpienia zjawisk rzadkich w poszczególnych operacyjnych sferach:
  - a) zasoby materialne i koszty operacyjne,
  - b) produktywność zasobów pracy,
  - c) satysfakcja klienta,
  - d) całkowity koszt posiadania rozwiązań IT (TCO).

### **Sfera zarządzania wartością informacji (EVI)**

1. Analiza wartości informacji w taktycznym i strategicznym zarządzaniu:
  - a) zasobami materialnymi,
  - b) produktywnością,
  - c) satysfakcją klienta,
  - d) całkowitym kosztem posiadania rozwiązań IT (TCO),
  - e) wartością opcji strategicznych,
  - f) zjawiskami rzadkimi i ryzykami.

### 1.3. Analiza scenariuszy ekonomicznych

Koncepcja analizy scenariuszowej zakłada modelowanie przyszłego stanu przedsiębiorstwa w różnych wariantach: realizacji bądź braku realizacji analizowanego projektu. Fundamentalną zasadą tworzenia scenariuszy ekonomicznych jest doprowadzanie wszystkich analizowanych parametrów ekonomicznych do poziomów przepływów pieniężnych uzyskiwanych w poszczególnych projekcjach finansowych.

## 2. MATEMATYKA FINANSOWA

### 2.1. Analiza NPV

Zgodnie z teorią finansów<sup>6</sup> analiza wartości inwestycji winna być prowadzona w oparciu o wskaźniki:

- **Net Present Value (NPV)** – wartość bieżąca inwestycji, czyli wartość netto korzyści osiągniętych dzięki rozwiązaniu, kryterium *NPV* jest decydujące: im jego wartość jest wyższa tym inwestycja jest atrakcyjniejsza.
- **Internal Rate of Return (IRR)** – wewnętrzna stopa zwrotu mówiąca o rzeczywistej, uśrednionej stopie zwrotu z inwestycji.
- Zdyskontowany okres zwrotu informujący, jak szybko korzyści z eksploatowanego systemu przekroczą poniesione nakłady.
- **CFROI – Cash Flow Return on Investment** – średnia roczna stopa zwrotu z zainwestowanego kapitału, klasyczny wskaźnik informujący o przeciętnym zwrocie z inwestycji w relacji Cash-Flow/wydatek inwestycyjny.
- **Prawdopodobieństwo sukcesu projektu** – wielkość prawdopodobieństwa, dla którego NPV wyliczone dla wszystkich zmierzonych elementów zjawiska wykazuje wartość dodatnią. Analogicznie – prawdopodobieństwo porażki projektu jest wielkością prawdopodobieństwa, przy którym *NPV* charakteryzuje się wielkościami ujemnymi.

### 2.2. Wartość pieniądza w czasie

Z uwagi na zachodzące makroocenieniu przedsiębiorstwa zjawiska, takie jak fazy inflacji, które mają bezpośredni wpływ na wartość pieniądza, czyli

<sup>6</sup> R. Brealey, *Podstawy finansów przedsiębiorstw*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1999, s. 9.

jego realną siłę nabywczą, wartość pieniądza w czasie jest zmienna. Wraz z upływem czasu na skutek wydarzeń i działań praw ekonomii wartość posiadanych pieniędzy może być znacznie większa lub znacznie mniejsza od wartości aktualnej.

*FV* – *future value* – wartość kapitału w przyszłości;

*PV* – *present value* – aktualna wartość zainwestowanego kapitału.

$$KV = K(1 + d)^N$$

$$PV = \frac{K(1 + d)^N}{(1 + r)^N} = \frac{FV}{(1 + r)^N}$$

gdzie:

*K* – kapitał początkowy;

*N* – liczba okresów naliczania odsetek;

*d* – stopa oprocentowania projektu inwestycyjnego;

*r* – stopa alternatywnego oprocentowania kapitału przy tym samym ryzyku inwestycyjnym.

Wprowadzając pojęcie *NPV* – wartości aktualnej netto, należy stosować wzór:

$$NPV = -K + PV_2 = CF_0^{(-)} + \text{zaktualizowana wartość przyszłych przepływów pieniężnych}$$

### 3. INWESTYCJE KAPITAŁOWE I INWESTYCJE RZECZOWE

W przypadku inwestycji kapitałowych, a więc takich, w których kapitał wraca do właściciela po pewnym czasie, źródłem korzyści jest przewaga stopy *d* nad stopą *r*. W przypadku inwestycji w aktywa trwałe przedsiębiorstwa kapitał jest konwertowany w dobra materialne i dobra niematerialne. Brak zatem możliwości łatwego odzyskania go – trudno bowiem sprzedać zakupione dobro, a w przypadku dóbr niematerialnych (takich jak zakup usługi wdrożenia systemu informatycznego) często jest to niewykonalne.

W związku z tym pierwszą istotną kwestią, jaką należy wskazać w inwestowaniu w aktywa trwałe, są trudności w odzyskaniu kapitału. „Zamrożony” kapitał traci płynność. Występują ponadto inne czynniki oddziałujące na wartość środków trwałych (zużycie fizyczne, zużycie moralne itp.), które

powodują, że kapitał ten traci systematycznie wartość. W rachunkowości zjawisko to nazwano amortyzacją środków trwałych, a więc deprecjacją ich wartości w czasie. W praktyce księgowej przyjmuje się również przybliżone stawki amortyzacji poszczególnych dóbr trwałych w zależności od tempa ich zużywania się.

Warunek konieczny powstawania dodatniego NPV jest jednak ten sam – kapitał w postaci maszyn i wiedzy musi być alokowany tak, aby stopa zwrotu z tego kapitału była istotnie wyższa od stopy kosztu jego uzyskania i tempa jego zużywania się. Innymi słowy: aby osiągnąć dodatnie NPV, suma zaktualizowanych korzyści powstających w trakcie eksploatacji inwestycji powinna przekroczyć wartość kapitału początkowego i kosztów jego utrzymania w analizowanym okresie.

### 3.1. Formuła NPV dla inwestycji rzeczowych

W inwestycjach rzeczowych należy uwzględnić nadwyżkę wartości uzyskanych przepływów pieniężnych względem kapitału początkowego w dowolnej postaci.

$$NPV = CF_0^{(-)} + \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{NCF_i}{(1+r)^i}$$

gdzie:

$NPV$  – wartość bieżąca netto (FNPV, ENPV);

$CF_0^{(-)}$  – ujemny przepływ pieniężny w „zerowym” okresie inwestycji – wydatek na dowolne dobro lub usługę;

$NCF_i$  – dodatni lub ujemny przepływ pieniężny netto w okresie  $i$ ;

$r$  – stopa dyskontowa projektu – stopa kosztu kapitału użytego do sfinansowania inwestycji.

Inne ujęcie tego samego wzoru, oddające analogię do wzoru kwestii wartości pieniądza w czasie, jest następujące:

$$NPV = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N NCF_i (1+d)^{N-i}}{(1+r)^N} - CF_0^{(-)} = PV - K$$

gdzie:

$N$  – liczba okresów;

$d$  – stopa reinwestycji odnoszonych korzyści.

W przypadku inwestycji rzeczowych nie jest możliwe każdorazowe reinwestowanie całości kapitału. Reinwestujemy zatem tylko uzyskane korzyści netto, stąd w potęgze stojącej przy  $(1 + d)$  stosowany jest zapis „ $N - i$ ”.

### 3.2. Obliczanie stopy dyskontowej projektu

Stopa dyskontowa projektu to koszt kapitału tego projektu. Projekt może być finansowany przez przedsiębiorstwo z kapitału własnego oraz zewnętrznego – obcego. Z reguły koszt kapitału obcego (kredytów, kapitału pochodzącego z obligacji) da się łatwo obliczyć. Problemy pojawiają się w przypadku szacowania kosztu kapitału własnego.

Formuła prowadząca do obliczenia kosztu kapitału projektu inwestycyjnego to WACC – *weighted average cost of capital*, czyli średni ważony koszt kapitału.

$$r = WACC = u_1 K_{ko} * (1 - T) + u_2 K_{kw}$$

gdzie:

- $u_i$  – udział pewnego kapitału w ogólnej sumie kapitałów;
- $T$  – stopa podatkowa obowiązująca w danym okresie;
- $K_{ko}$  – koszt kapitału obcego;
- $K_{kw}$  – koszt kapitałów własnych;
- $r$  – stopa dyskontowa używana przy obliczaniu NPV danego projektu.

### 3.3. Koszt kapitału obcego

Kapitał obcy przedsiębiorstwo pozyskuje po cenach rynkowych, negocjowanych w zależności od jego ilości i okresu używania. Instytucje finansowe posługują się nominalnym kosztem kapitału, zniekształcając rzeczywisty jego koszt. Aby obliczyć rzeczywisty koszt kapitału obcego (efektywną stopę oprocentowania), konieczne jest przeprowadzenie symulacji kredytowej prowadzącej do uzyskania projekcji Net Cash-Flow (NCF) wynikającej z obsługi danego sposobu finansowania, np. kredytu. Projekcja NCF umożliwi obliczenie stopy IRR, która jest dobrym oszacowaniem poszukiwanej efektywnej stopy kapitału obcego.

### 3.4. Koszt kapitału własnego

Inwestorzy lub właściciele każdego przedsiębiorstwa oczekują określonej minimalnej stopy zwrotu, która odpowiada przeciętnemu poziomowi ryzyka związanego z tą firmą i tym samym jest adekwatną wielkością zysków netto. „Koszt kapitałów własnych jest zatem wymaganą, minimalną stopą zwrotu netto, którą właściciele chcieliby uzyskiwać. Alternatywą dla tego uzysku byłaby sprzedaż swoich udziałów w danej firmie po to, aby zainwestować ten kapitał w innej firmie o podobnych parametrach ryzyka, lecz o wyższej stopie zwrotu”<sup>7</sup>. Inwestor nie jest skłonny do ponoszenia wysokiego ryzyka bez oczekiwania wyższej stopy zwrotu. I odwrotnie – wysoka stopa zwrotu przy niskim ryzyku jest zjawiskiem wysoce pożądanym.

### 3.5. Reguły dla stopy reinwestycji i stopy dyskontowej

Stopa reinwestycji jest oprocentowaniem, po którym ponownie inwestowane są środki uzyskane w procesie eksploatacji inwestycji. Przyjmuje się, że każda zarobiona na środku trwałym złotówka wraca do przedsiębiorstwa i pozwala na nowo kreować dochód z określoną stopą, nazywaną stopą reinwestycji.

Stopa dyskontowa, czyli średni ważony koszt kapitału projektu, wyraża wielkość kosztu kapitału, zwykle używanego w inwestycjach przedsiębiorstwa. „Stopa reinwestycji mówi z kolei, z jaką stopą przedsiębiorstwo osiąga korzyści netto, czyli jaka jest jego stopa korzyści ze wszystkich zaangażowanych kapitałów”<sup>8</sup>.

W praktyce uznaje się że stopa reinwestycji oraz stopa dyskontowa dążą do siebie w dłuższym okresie. Zjawisko to uzasadnia powszechne zastosowanie wzoru NPV, który nie uwzględnia w swojej konstrukcji stopy reinwestycji. Na potrzeby niniejszej pracy przyjęto założenie równości obu stóp.

W przedsiębiorstwie może się zdarzać, że stopa reinwestycji będzie znacznie niższa niż stopa dyskontowa. Będzie tak, gdy korzyści osiągane z eksploatacji nowego środka trwałego w firmie będą źle reinwestowane. Zerowa lub niska stopa reinwestycji występuje zaś, kiedy przedsiębiorstwo nie zna w danym okresie efektywnych dziedzin inwestowania i wkłada swoje oszczęd-

<sup>7</sup> R. Machała, *Praktyczne zarządzanie finansami firmy*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2001.

<sup>8</sup> K. Marcinek, *Ryzyko projektów inwestycyjnych*, Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Ekonomicznej im. Karola Adamieckiego w Katowicach, Katowice 2000, s. 76.



ności w lokaty bankowe lub bony skarbowe. W takim przypadku NPV inwestycji będzie wskazywać na wyższą wartość, podczas gdy NPV uwzględniające stopę reinwestycji okaże się niższe.

Odwrotna, bardzo pożądana sytuacja to osiągnięcie wyższej stopy reinwestycji od stopy dyskontowej – może tak być, gdy inwestycja jest finansowana w dużym stopniu z kapitałów obcych. Korzyści z inwestycji wracają wówczas do firmy i są oprocentowane stopą kapitału własnego przedsiębiorstwa, która jest wyższa niż koszt kapitału obcego.

### 3.6. Wewnętrzna stopa zwrotu – IRR i MIRR

Chcąc oszacować, ile wynosi teoretyczna, uśredniona stopa zwrotu projektu, która równoważy nakłady inwestycyjne z korzyściami netto, należy zastosować jeden z dwóch algorytmów prowadzących do obliczenia IRR (*internal rate of return*) lub MIRR (*modified internal rate of return*).

Stopy te porównuje się z rzeczywistą stopą dyskontową projektu w celu sprawdzenia, czy są od niej wyższe. Jeżeli projekt jest typowy lub odwrotny od typowego i obliczenie IRR jest możliwe w sensie matematycznym, to sytuacja, w której  $IRR > r$ , sugeruje pozytywną rekomendację projektu i dalszą jego analizę. Odwrotna sytuacja:  $IRR < r$ , wywoła przeciwną reakcję oceniających. Obliczenie MIRR jest możliwe dla projektów każdego typu i skutkuje podobną interpretacją ekonomiczną.

IRR zakłada, że osiągnięte korzyści reinwestowane są z tą samą stopą, czyli  $IRR = d$ . MIRR nie zakłada tej równości, jest przez to dokładniejszą miarą.

$$0 = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{NCF_i}{(1 + IRR)^i} - CF_0$$

$$IRR^* (MIRR) = \sqrt[N]{\frac{\sum_{i=0}^N NCF_i^{(+)} \cdot (1 + d)^{N-i}}{\sum_{i=0}^N \frac{NCF_i^{(-)}}{(1 + r)^i}} - 1}$$

#### 3.6.1. Return on Investment – ROI i CFROI

Miara ROI zyskała sobie szczególną popularność w powszechnej świadomości inwestorów w obszarze informatyki. Wynikać to może z prostoty konstrukcji tego wskaźnika i jego jasnej interpretacji. „ROI jest sumaryczną stopą

zwrotu obliczoną bez uwzględnienia wartości pieniądza w czasie. Wskaźnik ROI mówi jedynie, ile procent średnio zarobiliśmy w stosunku do nakładów poniesionych na początku procesu inwestowania”<sup>9</sup>.

$$ROI = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \text{Zysk netto}_i}{CF_0} \cdot 100\%$$

gdzie:

$\text{Zysk netto}_i$  – zmiana księgowego zysku netto dla okresu  $i$ ,

$CF_0$  – wartość inwestycji.

Wskaźnik ROI całkowicie pomija koszt kapitału, stopę reinwestycji osiągniętych korzyści oraz rzeczywisty przepływ pieniężny, jaki miał miejsce w danym czasie. Jest to zatem wysoce nieprecyzyjny miernik, przydatny tylko w ogólnych analizach na okresy nie dłuższe niż rok. Pewną korektą jest wprowadzenie *net cash-flow* zamiast zysku netto. Dzięki tej operacji powstaje Cash Flow Return on Investment – CF ROI:

$$CFROI = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N NCF_i}{CF_0} \cdot 100\%$$

Niestety zmiana ta nie podwyższa w sposób decydujący wiarygodności tego wskaźnika. W związku z tym ROI oraz CF ROI nie znajdują zastosowania w poważnych analizach rentowności inwestycji. ROI i CF ROI, będąc w istocie przybliżeniami stóp IRR/MIRR, mogą w pewnych warunkach znacznie się od nich odchyłać i wprowadzać w błąd. Główną zaletą tych miar jest ich prostota, szybkość obliczeń i stosunkowo niewielka ilość danych wejściowych.

### 3.7. Zdyskontowany okres zwrotu

W praktyce analiz inwestycyjnych znaczącą rolę odgrywa informacja o okresie, w którym badana inwestycja zaczyna generować dodatnią wartość. Moment ten z reguły jest przybliżany zwykłym okresem zwrotu, a więc takim, który nie uwzględnia wartości pieniądza w czasie.

<sup>9</sup> T. Copeland, T. Koller, J. Murrin, *Valuation. Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies*, J. Wiley, New York 2000, s. 184, tłum. własne (jeśli nie zaznaczono inaczej, wszystkie tłumaczenia z języka angielskiego to tłumaczenie własne).

Zdyskontowany okres zwrotu obliczany jest dla szeregu zdyskontowanych przepływów pieniężnych (DCF – *discounted net cash-flow*) generowanych przez daną inwestycję. Przepływy netto (NCF) dyskontowane są stopą  $r$  i doprowadzają tym samym do szeregu DCF. Kumulacja poszczególnych przepływów DCF i porównanie ich z nakładem początkowym  $CF_0$  daje pełny obraz analizowanego projektu. W sytuacji, gdy skumulowane DCF przewyższą nakład  $CF_0$  – inwestycja zaczyna wykazywać dodatnie NPV, czyli przynosić zyski ekonomiczne.

#### 4. PODSTAWOWE RACHUNKI EKONOMICZNE ORAZ ANALIZA EKONOMICZNA

W poprzedniej części przedstawiono funkcje celu, których wartości wynikowe przedsiębiorstwo powinno maksymalizować. Wskazano, że inwestycja jest tym bardziej rentowna, im wyższe są NPV i IRR. Należy podkreślić, że oszacowania wskaźników ekonomicznych to kompromis pomiędzy ilością informacji o zjawisku a kosztem ich nabycia. Każdy pomiar jest oparty na rozkładach prawdopodobieństw, które mogą się różnić precyzją w sensie odchylenia standardowego i innych parametrów.

Ekonomia to zjawisko społeczne wywodzące się z zachowań dużej ilości konsumentów, decyzji zachodzących w gospodarstwach domowych. W skali mikro społeczno-polityczna geneza zjawisk ekonomicznych pozostaje ta sama, a nieco niższy punkt obserwacji pozwala na większą dokładność modelowania zjawisk. Należy podkreślić, iż modelowanie zjawisk ekonomicznych jest „tylko” modelowaniem – procesem mającym na celu maksymalnie wiarygodne odzwierciedlenie rzeczywistości. Modele mogą być konstruowane nieprawidłowo i tym samym świadomie lub nieświadomie manipulować uzyskiwanymi wynikami. Tracą one wówczas wiarygodność i przestają być przydatne.

##### 4.1. Typy projektów inwestycyjnych

„W zakresie modelowania projektów inwestycyjnych identyfikuje się ich typy, pozwalające dobrać odpowiednią metodę pomiaru. Kryterium klasycznym jest podział ze względu na typowość przepływów pieniężnych”<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> D. Remenyi, *The Effective Measurement of IT Costs and Benefits*, Butterworth Heinemann, Amsterdam 2000, s. 298, tłum. własne.

## 4.2. Kryterium typowości przepływów pieniężnych

Kryterium to ma charakter głównie matematyczny i powinno pokazywać ograniczenia metod pomiaru efektywności inwestycji (głównie ograniczone zastosowanie wskaźnika IRR). Kierując się tym kryterium, wyróżniamy:

- projekty typowe,
- projekty odwrotne do typowych,
- projekty nietypowe.

Projekty typowe charakteryzują się dużym ujemnym przepływem na początku projekcji finansowej, by w kolejnych okresach wykazywać serię przepływów dodatnich. Do klasy projektów typowych zaliczamy większość rzeczowych inwestycji.

Projekty odwrotne od typowych to w pierwszym okresie duży dodatni przepływ finansowy, a w kolejnych seria przepływów ujemnych. Tego rodzaju przepływy można obserwować przy projektach deweloperskich i w emisji papierów wartościowych (obligacji, akcji).

Projekty nietypowe charakteryzują się brakiem przejrzystej zależności pomiędzy przepływami dodatnimi i ujemnymi. Przepływy ujemne poprzedzają przepływy dodatnie i na odwrót. Jedyną w pełni wydajną miarą finansową stosowaną w tego rodzaju projektach jest NPV (ewentualnie Extended NPV). Sytuacja tego typu występuje w przypadku inwestycji rzeczowych z finansowaniem rozłożonym na kilka rat.

## 4.3. Kryterium ekonomiczne

Kolejnym kryterium jest charakter ekonomiczny inwestycji. Rozumieć przez to należy przewagę pewnej grupy efektów ekonomicznych – kosztowych lub przychodowych. W związku z tym wyróżniać można inwestycje w redukcję kosztów lub inwestycje we wzrost przychodów<sup>11</sup>.

Inwestycja w redukcję kosztów będzie dotyczyć takich działań w zakresie projektów, w konsekwencji których przedsiębiorstwo odczuje istotny spadek kosztów (zarówno w sferze TCO, jak i poza nią). Inwestycja we wzrost przychodów polega na takim wyborze i wdrożeniu systemów informatycznych, aby

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<sup>11</sup> L. A. Orozcoa, J. A. Sanabria, J. C. Sosa, J. Aristizabal, J. López, *How do IT investments interact with other resources to improve innovation?*, „Journal of Business Research” 2022, t. 144, nr 5, s. 358–365.

były one nośnikiem zmian w obszarze poziomów sprzedaży. Inwestycja we wzrost przychodów może wynikać także z poprawy jakości produktów/usług.

Rzeczywiste inwestycje mają najczęściej charakter mieszany. Świadomość podanej klasyfikacji jest przydatna w praktycznych analizach.

#### 4.4. Czynniki determinujące efektywność ekonomiczną projektu

Rachunek NPV obejmuje kluczowe elementy składowe inwestycji, co pozwala w szerokim ujęciu analizować opłacalność projektu.

W procesie modelowania inwestycji należy zwrócić szczególną uwagę na pięć obszarów:

- nakłady inwestycyjne,
- korzyści wynikające ze zmiany,
- koszty wynikające ze zmiany,
- okres efektywnej eksploatacji,
- ryzyko inwestycyjne.

#### 4.5. Nakłady inwestycyjne

Nakład inwestycyjny to suma kosztów i wydatków ponoszonych przed rozpoczęciem eksploataowania inwestycji.

W informatyce np. w zakres nakładów wchodzi następujące koszty:

- wydatki na sprzęt,
- wydatki na licencje,
- koszt pracy wdrożeniowców i konsultantów,
- obniżenia wydajności funkcjonowania wywołane procesem wdrożenia,
- koszt szkoleń użytkowników i administratorów, rozumiany jako koszt bezpośredni oraz jako utrata potencjalnych korzyści ze zwykłych czynności pracowników,
- inne koszty związane z projektem, ponoszone przed rozpoczęciem eksploatacji systemu (obsługa prawna itd.).

Nakład inwestycyjny nie podlega z reguły dyskontowaniu (chyba że okres wdrożenia jest dłuższy niż 6 miesięcy) i ujmowany jest jako pojedyncza suma ze znakiem ujemnym w postaci symbolu  $CF_0^{(-)}$ . Nakłady inwestycyjne są ujmowane w klasyfikacji Total Cost of Ownership w scenariuszu zmiany. W scenariuszu bazowym nakłady inwestycyjne (poniesione wcześniej) są amortyzowane stawką od 0 do 100% (w zależności od typu aktywu).

#### 4.6. Korzyści i koszty

Modelowane w toku analizy przepływy pieniężne mogą mieć charakter ujemny oraz dodatni. Przepływy ujemne to te generujące pomniejszenie środków pieniężnych przedsiębiorstwa, czyli kosztów, zarówno bezpośrednio, jak i pośrednio związane z realizacją badanego projektu.

„W obszarze korzyści zidentyfikować można zarówno korzyści mające charakter dodatnich przepływów pieniężnych, np. nowe przychody uzyskane przez firmę dzięki realizacji danego projektu, oraz korzyści związane z uniknięciem kosztów”<sup>12</sup>. Realizacja analizy w podejściu scenariuszowym umożliwia wycenę tego typu korzyści poprzez umieszczenie kosztu w scenariuszu bazowym oraz jego redukcję lub całkowite wyeliminowanie w scenariuszu docelowym. Delta tych scenariuszy w tym obszarze osiągnie wartość dodatnią.

#### 4.7. Okres efektywnej eksploatacji

Rachunek NPV jest wrażliwy na wydłużanie i skracanie okresu eksploataowania inwestycji, a więc okresu, w którym inwestycja ma przynosić obserwowalne przepływy pieniężne netto. Nie można dowolnie wydłużać i skraćć okresu eksploatacji. Nie można też *a priori* stwierdzić, że będzie on wykorzystywany dokładnie tak długo jak jego ustawowy okres amortyzacji (24 miesiące na oprogramowanie, 40 miesięcy na urządzenia).

Aby rozwiązać ten problem, wprowadzono pojęcie efektywnego okresu eksploatacji (EOE) w celu podkreślenia w projekcjach pewnego istotnego momentu, w którym zachodzi decyzja o zaniechaniu użytkowania systemu, sprzedaniu go lub pozostawieniu funkcjonującego systemu przynoszącego korzyści na zasadzie rent wieczystych.

Renta wieczysta to NCF stałej wielkości uzyskiwany od pewnego momentu w nieskończoność lub przez długi, kilkudziesięcioletni okres. Renta wieczysta określona jest następującym wzorem:

$$\text{wartość renty wieczystej} = \frac{\text{ostatni NCF w efektywnym okresie eksploatacji}}{\text{stopa dyskontowa projektu}}$$

Efektywny okres eksploatacji jest zdeterminowany przez zachowanie branży, w której funkcjonuje dane przedsiębiorstwo. Aby oszacować ten okres,

<sup>12</sup> W. Flakiewicz, J. Oleński, *Cybernetyka ekonomiczna*, PWE, Warszawa 1989, s. 315.

należy precyzyjnie określić kluczowe obszary wpływu projektu na przedsiębiorstwo:

- wpływ na wyższą konkurencyjność w stosunku do średniej w branży,
- stopień unikalności mechanizmów leżących u podstaw zwiększenia konkurencyjności oraz czas, jaki zajmie konkurencji ich skopiowanie,
- zagrożenie w bliskim okresie odkryciem nowych mechanizmów zwiększających konkurencyjność, znacznie silniejszych od uzyskanych w procesie inwestowania metod podnoszenia efektywności przedsiębiorstwa.

Wartość bieżąca netto jest miernikiem wzrostu konkurencyjności przedsiębiorstwa (oraz miernikiem wartości unikania utraty konkurencyjności). Przedsiębiorstwo zawsze ma alternatywne miejsca inwestowania kapitału o określonej stopie zwrotu. Dodatkowo NPV pojawia się zawsze wtedy, gdy stopa zwrotu z inwestycji (np. stopa typu IRR) jest wyższa od stopy alternatywnej alokacji kapitału, czyli gdy wartość uzyskanych korzyści netto przewyższa nakłady inwestycyjne.

W związku z powyższym przedsiębiorstwo musi inwestować w taki sposób, aby osiągnąć istotny wzrost sprzedaży lub istotną redukcję kosztów. Konieczne jest obserwowanie branży i domniemanie, kiedy branża będzie w stanie dogonić (lub wyprzedzić) przedsiębiorstwo. W momencie, kiedy branża zbliża się do stanu efektywności przedsiębiorstwa, pojawia się punkt, w którym kończy się efektywny okres eksploatacji danego projektu. Zakończenie efektywnego okresu eksploatacji nie musi oznaczać wyłączenia (lub sprzedaży) systemu informatycznego. Zmienia się natomiast charakter przynoszonych przez ten system korzyści. Często systemy używane po okresie EOE stają się swego rodzaju standardem w branży, bez których nie byłoby możliwe dalsze funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstwa. Inwestycja w taki system po okresie EOE nie może zatem przyczynić się do wzrostu konkurencyjności, będąc tylko obowiązkowym kosztem, koniecznym do poniesienia dla przedsiębiorstw pragnących wejść na dany rynek. Systemy używane po okresie EOE przynoszą zatem standardową korzyść, czyli rentę wieczystą o wartości zdefiniowanej we wzorze.

## PODSUMOWANIE

Dokonana analiza pozwala na sformułowanie następujących wniosków:

1. Badanie zwrotu z inwestycji jest w istocie projektem badawczym o zmiennym poziomie zaawansowania. O złożoności oraz kosztach badania decyduje sam inwestor, akceptując lub odrzucając poziom niepewności pozostający po kolejnej iteracji analizy.

2. Zachowanie odpowiedniej relacji pomiędzy ogólnością modelu a szczegółowością to warunek szybkiej realizacji pomiaru. Modelując przepływy pieniężne, należy zadbać, by nie wszystkie ważne elementy projekcji zostały w procesie badawczym ujęte. Model zawierający wszystkie istotne efekty pozwala wstępnie ocenić rentowność projektu i rozważyć kolejną iterację badania.
3. Szybkie identyfikowanie efektów może sprawiać badaczowi trudność, zaś uzyskanie tego typu kompetencji przez badacza, a w konsekwencji przez przedsiębiorstwo, może stanowić zasób strategiczny o dużej wartości.
4. W celu zapewnienia satysfakcjonującego poziomu precyzji badania zwrotu z inwestycji, proces badawczy powinien spełniać następujące kryteria:
  - a) krótki czas wykonania badania (kilka dni do kilku tygodni),
  - b) wyważona relacja pomiędzy ogólnością a szczegółowością analizy,
  - c) minimalne angażowanie zasobów do przeprowadzenia badania i optymalne wykorzystanie istniejących źródeł informacji,
  - d) konsekwentne stosowanie metod analizy statystycznej wraz z odpowiednim oprogramowaniem.
5. Stosowanie metod analizy statystycznej pozwala zobiektywizować proces badawczy i oprzeć go na wypracowanych przez naukę metodach modelowania, a także ustrukturyzować proces pozyskiwania i analizowania danych.
6. Wszystkie zidentyfikowane zjawiska i obszary funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa dotknięte analizowaną inwestycją muszą znajdować odzwierciedlenie w rachunku NPV, co w wymiarze ekonometrycznym jest możliwe, niemniej do uzyskania prawidłowych założeń konieczne jest uzyskanie dostępu do wiedzy eksperckiej, raportów branżowych, analiz strategicznych i danych stanowiących benchmark.

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## ZASTOSOWANIE ANALIZY EKONOMICZNEJ W PROCESACH DECYZYJNYCH W OBSZARZE ZARZĄDZANIA INNOWACJAMI

### Streszczenie

Wdrożenie analizy ekonomicznej jako elementu zarządzania innowacjami może być trudne do wykonania. Ta trudność oznacza, że innowacja przyniesie rezultaty odmienne od oczekiwanych. Głównym celem artykułu jest pokazanie możliwości zastosowania uznanych i szeroko stosowanych narzędzi analizy ekonomicznej we wszystkich aspektach inwestycji w innowacje. W niniejszym artykule proponowana jest również struktura wdrażania tego typu analizy oceny inwestycji. Proponowana jest metoda analizy i konstrukcji procesu, a rozważania oparte będą na kluczowych komponentach inwestycji w innowacje w obszarze systemów informatycznych.

Słowa kluczowe: innowacja, analiza ekonomiczna, całkowity koszt posiadania, ocena rentowności, badania i rozwój, zarządzanie projektami, modelowanie finansowe, biznes plan

## APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE FIELD OF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT

### Abstract

The implementation of economic analysis into innovation management can be difficult to execute. This difficulty means that innovation will result in results different from those expected. The main purpose of this article is to show the applicability of recognized and widely used economic analysis tools for all aspects of investment in innovation. This article will also suggest a structure for implementing this type of investment evaluation analysis. The method of analysis and logical construction will be applied, and the considerations will be based on the key components of investment in innovation in the area of information systems.

Key words: innovation, financial modeling, forecast analysis, model financial, manufacturing costs, forecasting, financial model, business plan projections, investment analysis, ROI assessment, tco, total cost of ownership

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## BRITISH CLIMATE POLICY UNDER THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT<sup>1</sup>

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### INTRODUCTION

Climate change may lead to socio-economic consequences that are difficult to predict in the long term. Therefore, in recent years, countering climate change has become of interest to an increasing number of countries, which is reflected in, inter alia, the conclusion of the Paris Agreement – an international treaty on climate change<sup>2</sup>. It is also noteworthy that several countries have adopted internal legal acts for this purpose. In this context, the example of the United Kingdom<sup>3</sup> seems particularly interesting, although it has not yet been analysed in detail in Polish literature in relation to this subject.

The Climate Change Act<sup>4</sup> (CCA or Act), passed into law on 26 November 2008, is “a major step forward in the UK’s effort to address climate change and

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<sup>1</sup> The article does not present the official position of the institution where the author works, but his personal views only. The translation of the quoted Polish sources into English is the author’s own.

<sup>2</sup> The Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21 in Paris on 12 December 2015, and entered into force on 4 November 2016. Text available at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english\\_paris\\_agreement.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>3</sup> The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is the official name of the country. For practical reasons, the commonly known name – the United Kingdom (UK) – will be used in this article.

<sup>4</sup> The Climate Change Act 2008, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents/enacted>, accessed 15.03.2022.

represents the world's first long-term legally binding framework for reducing emissions"<sup>5</sup>. Climate policy in the UK thus ceased to function on the basis of acts of political will, and began to be subject to binding legal regulations<sup>6</sup>.

The CCA, which remains the main piece of legislation in the area of British climate policy, initially set a target of at least 80% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 compared to the 1990 baseline<sup>7</sup>. However, in May 2019, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC)<sup>8</sup>, guided by, inter alia, the latest scientific evidence<sup>9</sup> and the aspiration to define the appropriate<sup>10</sup> role of the UK in global efforts to stop global warming, recommended<sup>11</sup> that the UK government raise this target to at least 100%. The amendment to the Act, introduced a month later, made the UK the first G7 and G20 country to commit to achieving climate neutrality<sup>12</sup> by 2050 at the national level.

The CCA is also significant because "good climate laws are essential for the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and its goal of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Such

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<sup>5</sup> *Making a Climate commitment: Analysis of the first Report (2008) of the UK Committee on Climate Change*, The Tyndall Centre, University of Manchester, 2009, p. 4, <https://documents.manchester.ac.uk/display.aspx?DocID=42722>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>6</sup> K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, *Polityka klimatyczna państwa. Norweska droga do zrównoważonego rozwoju*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2018, p. 140.

<sup>7</sup> This article concerns the area of climate change mitigation. Other issues, such as adaptation to climate change, are outside the scope of this text.

<sup>8</sup> More information on the Committee on Climate Change can be found later in this article.

<sup>9</sup> Including, among others, the IPCC's *Global warming of 1.5°C* report, [https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15\\_Full\\_Report\\_High\\_Res.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>10</sup> However, the question of what UK contribution would be appropriate remains under discussion: D. Campbell, *How UK Climate Change Policy Has Been Made Sustainable*, "Social & Legal Studies" 2015, vol. 24, issue 3, p. 399–418; and K. Anderson, J. Broderick, I. Stoddard, *A factor of two: how the mitigation plans of 'climate progressive' nations fall far short of Paris-compliant pathways*, "Climate Policy" 2020, vol. 20, issue 10, pp. 1290–1304, who suggest the need for even greater emissions reductions.

<sup>11</sup> *Net Zero: The UK's contribution to stopping global warming*, Committee on Climate Change 2019, <https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/net-zero-the-uks-contribution-to-stopping-global-warming/>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>12</sup> The CCA specifies that it is a net reduction target. Adopting a gross target would implicate the need to completely eliminate all greenhouse gas emissions, which in practice does not seem to be realistic at the present stage of technological development. The net target, on the other hand, means that the UK will continue to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gas in 2050, but this will be offset by absorbing an equivalent amount of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.

laws are essential because they ‘lock in’ policy commitments and help achieve national climate goals”<sup>13</sup>. This issue is of particular importance for the UK, whose ambition is to play a leading role in international efforts to combat climate change. This is most clearly expressed<sup>14</sup> in the latest GHG emissions reduction targets announced by the UK government: 68% to 2030 as part of the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)<sup>15</sup> to the Paris Agreement and 78% by 2035 under the CCA<sup>16</sup>, both very ambitious targets compared to other countries<sup>17</sup>.

Even before the adoption of the climate neutrality goal, the CCA was described in the literature on the subject as pioneering legislation, and one of the most ambitious and advanced legal acts in the world in the field of climate change<sup>18</sup>. In this context, the CCA deserves attention due to establishment, for the first time in the world, of medium and long-term GHG emissions reduction targets in the legal system of a given country. Equally important was the creation of an institutional and legal regime aimed at forcing successive UK governments to pursue these goals and weakening the so-called credible commitment problem. In the following years, the CCA served as a source of inspiration and a point of reference, for, among others, Austria (2011), Iceland (2012), Denmark (2014), Finland and Ireland (both 2015), and

<sup>13</sup> M. Socorro Manguiat, A. Raine, *Strengthening National Legal Frameworks to Implement the Paris Agreement*, “Carbon & Climate Law Review” 2018, vol. 12, issue 1, p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> Such ambitions are also visible in the strategic documents published by the UK government, in particular see: HM Government, *Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener*, October 2021, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/1033990/net-zero-strategy-beis.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1033990/net-zero-strategy-beis.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>15</sup> A national target for combating climate change set over five years. Each subsequent NDC should be more ambitious. The British NDC does not account for international aviation and shipping emissions – in line with the internationally accepted standards.

<sup>16</sup> Including international aviation and shipping emissions: UK Government, *UK enshrines new target in law to slash emissions by 78% by 2035*, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-enshrines-new-target-in-law-to-slash-emissions-by-78-by-2035>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>17</sup> For example, the European Union has set the 2030 target of 55% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in relation to the 1990 base year. See also: UNFCCC NDC Registry, <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>18</sup> For example: S. Fankhauser, D. Kennedy, J. Skea, *The UK’s carbon targets for 2020 and the role of the Committee on Climate Change*, [in:] *Building a low-carbon future: The politics of climate change*, ed. A. Giddens, S. Latham, R. Liddle, Policy Network, London 2009, p. 99; I. Lorenzoni, D. Benson, *Radical institutional change in environmental governance: Explaining the origins of the UK Climate Change Act 2008 through discursive and streams perspectives*, “Global Environmental Change” 2014, vol. 29, p. 10.

Norway and Sweden (both 2017), which introduced, albeit to a different extent, similar laws to their legal systems<sup>19</sup>.

The aim of this article is to present the main elements of the British model of climate policy and to outline future challenges for its credibility in the context of the CCA's foregoing implementation process and the abovementioned emissions reduction targets that were announced at the end of 2020 and in the first half of 2021, respectively. In this article, I will focus primarily on the assessment of the Act and its implementation in terms of the abovementioned credible commitment problem.

The article is divided into five parts. The first one presents a general nature of the CCA as well as some theoretical foundations of the credible commitment problem. The next part describes the most pertinent elements of the Act that form the basis of the British climate policy model. The third part touches upon the current state of implementation of the Act, as well as presenting the latest British emissions reduction targets resulting from the Act itself and the Paris Agreement. In the fourth part, selected<sup>20</sup> problems are outlined in the context of maintaining the long-term credibility and stability of the model created by the Act. In the conclusion (fifth part), the Act is assessed in the abovementioned context and the consequences of the CCA's potential failure to help global efforts combat climate change are signalled.

## THE NATURE OF THE CCA AND THE CREDIBLE COMMITMENT PROBLEM

Due to its nature, the CCA is sometimes referred to as the flagship law in the area of climate policy<sup>21</sup>. The nature of such laws was in the last

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<sup>19</sup> S. Nash, R. Steurer, *Taking stock of Climate Change Acts in Europe: living policy processes or symbolic gestures*, "Climate Policy" 2019, vol. 19, issue 8, p. 1053.

<sup>20</sup> E.g. due to the scope of this article and the fact that the CCA adopted the concept of calculating greenhouse gas emissions on the territorial basis, the issue of the level of British emissions including consumption (which is important from the point of view of the nature of the climate change problem) was omitted. The consumption-based method also takes into account emissions embedded in products and services imported to the UK – see the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs' study which suggests that UK emissions calculated on the consumption basis would be almost 50% higher than in the case of the territorial criterion, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uks-carbon-footprint>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>21</sup> For example: S. Fankhauser, C. Gennaioli, M. Collins, *The political economy of passing climate change legislation: evidence from a survey*, "Global Environmental Change"

few years the subject of growing interest among researchers<sup>22</sup>. This article uses Thomas L. Muinzer's definition of CCA-type acts: a "broad national legislative framework that has been set in place by a state legislature as an Act of Parliament (or equivalent) for the purpose of redressing specific problems posed by climate change in an overarching or otherwise broadly strategic manner within that particular country"<sup>23</sup>. It is particularly noteworthy that, in this case, it is a legal act that deals with the issue of climate change in a superior manner, i.e. it does not introduce into the legal system provisions creating specific initiatives to reduce GHG emissions in a given sector of the economy. Acts of this type create an institutional and legal order (and often set specific emissions reduction targets), under which sectoral initiatives are subsequently designed and implemented. Nash and Steurer indicate that the creation of such acts was a response to the ineffectiveness of creating climate policy by means of strictly political documents (e.g. in the form of government strategies), which were not legally binding and were not able to systematically limit GHG emissions<sup>24</sup>.

The adoption of such laws by individual countries is not the only way to operationalize the transition to a low-carbon economy. It seems that the real needs and local conditions, such as political traditions or the political system, are decisive in this context. The need to adopt the CCA in the UK resulted from negative experiences related to the occurrence of the credible commitment problem<sup>25</sup>. In fact, it is the problem of time inconsistency, which was first described in 1977 by Kydland and Prescott<sup>26</sup> in relation to monetary policy. The essence of the problem is that "while many governments want to commit to climate policies, there may also be incentives for them or future governments to weaken or abandon those policies if and when short-term policy costs are perceived to create the risk of electoral unpopularity"<sup>27</sup>.

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2015, vol. 35, p. 52; or T. Townshend, S. Fankhauser, R. Aybar, M. Collins, T. Landesman, M. Nachmany, C. Pavese, *How national legislation can help to solve climate change*, "Nature Climate Change" 2013, vol. 3, p. 430.

<sup>22</sup> For example: T. Muinzer, *What are national 'climate change acts'?*, "Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law", vol. 39, issue 4, pp. 419–438; S. Nash, R. Steurer, *Taking stock...*, pp. 1052–1065.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 429–430.

<sup>24</sup> S. Nash, R. Steurer, *op. cit.*, p. 1053.

<sup>25</sup> M. Lockwood, *Routes to credible climate commitment: the UK and Denmark compared*, "Climate Policy", vol. 21, issue 9, p. 1236.

<sup>26</sup> F. Kydland, E. Prescott, *Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans*, "Journal of Political Economy", vol. 85, issue 3, pp. 473–491.

<sup>27</sup> M. Lockwood, *op. cit.*, p. 1235.

In other words, the motivation to implement the assumed commitments varies with time due to the current political situation, so the actions declared by the government may not be perceived as credible. This is significant, *inter alia*, in the planning and decision-making process of enterprises<sup>28</sup>.

As a response to this threat, Kydland and Prescott advocate introducing “institutional arrangements which make it a difficult and time-consuming process to change the policy rules in all but emergency situations”<sup>29</sup>. Dośpiał-Borysiak describes this method as “tying hands” and specifies that “it would consist in defining norms that would be sanctioned in the form of statutes or even constitutional provisions, which would require significant expenditure and political capital to change them”<sup>30</sup>. In British conditions, this postulate took the form of the CCA, as “what distinguishes the UK constitutional system from other modern countries is the lack of a constitution in a formal sense, that is, a specific codified legal act passed under a specific extraordinary procedure”<sup>31</sup>.

## THE MOST PERTINENT ELEMENTS OF THE BRITISH MODEL OF CLIMATE POLICY SET OUT IN THE CCA

The CCA can therefore be seen as a device that increases the credibility of the commitment to achieving the established direction of the climate policy. It is worth emphasizing in this context that it is a construction in line with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty – the central principle of the British constitution, which is an example of a constitution in the material sense. According to it, the UK Parliament has unlimited legislative power. It is not bound by the will of the previous parliament and it cannot bind the future

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<sup>28</sup> For more on this subject, see e.g. A. McHarg, *Climate Change Constitutionalism? Lessons from the United Kingdom*, “Climate Law” 2011, vol. 2, issue 4, pp. 469–484; P. McGregor, K. Swales, M. Winning, *A review of the role and remit of the committee on climate change*, “Energy Policy” 2012, vol. 41, pp. 466–473; D. Frame, J. von Stein, *Automaticity and delegation in climate targets*, “Environmental Research Letters” 2021, vol. 16, issue 4; G. Nemet, M. Jakob, J. Steckel, O. Edenhofer, *Addressing policy credibility problems for low-carbon investment*, “Global Environmental Change” 2017, vol. 42, pp. 47–57.

<sup>29</sup> F. Kydland, E. Prescott, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

<sup>30</sup> K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>31</sup> M. Moulin-Stożek, *Status prawny sędziego w Zjednoczonym Królestwie Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej*, [in:] *Status prawny sędziego. Państwa europejskie. Tom I*, ed. B. Przywora, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, Warszawa 2019, p. 536.



parliament with its will<sup>32</sup>. As Brunner, Flachslund, and Marschinski point out, “every subsequent legislature will have the authority to change laws and subsequent governments will be able to change the degree of enforcement. Legislation, however, raises the discursive hurdle for policy change. Targets can no longer be silently dropped when they become inconvenient. Changing laws entails a visible (and perhaps politically costly) process if constituents are not convinced of the action’s legitimacy”<sup>33</sup>.

The UK model of climate policy has been additionally strengthened by delegating some of the rights and obligations to an external institution – the aforementioned CCC – which is supposed to perform the entrusted tasks in a manner based on scientific knowledge, free from the current political situation<sup>34</sup>. The CCC is an independent<sup>35</sup> expert body. One of its functions is the preparation of an annual report for the parliament (progress report), in which actions taken by the UK government are analyzed from the point of view of the CCA’s goals. Furthermore, the impact of those actions is shown in the progress in achieving intermediate targets expressed in the so-called carbon budgets. Progress reports are an increasingly important tool of influence, especially in the context of growing public interest in the subject of climate change. Under these conditions, the CCC progress reports are increasingly discussed in the mainstream media, which thus creates an additional layer of political pressure.

The abovementioned concept of carbon budgets is a key element of the Act. They set the maximum allowable level of GHG emissions in the UK for a given five-year period, compared to the 1990 baseline. Carbon budgets assume a phased emissions reduction and are set at least 12 years in advance by means of secondary (delegated) legislation issued by the competent Secretary of State, after obtaining and considering the CCC

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<sup>32</sup> S. Kubas, *Parlament Szkoeki: dewolucja – wyzwanie dla Zjednoczonego Królestwa*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 2004, pp. 34–36.

<sup>33</sup> S. Brunner, C. Flachslund, M. Marschinski, *Credible commitment in carbon policy*, “Climate Policy” 2012, vol. 12, issue 2, p. 263.

<sup>34</sup> The inspiration for the creation of the CCC seems to be the model of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, whose task is, inter alia, to independently set interest rates so as to achieve the inflation targets set by the government – see P. McGregor, K. Swales, M. Winning, *op. cit.*, p. 466; and D. Helm, C. Hepburn, R. Mash, *Credible carbon policy*, “Oxford Review of Economic Policy” 2003, vol. 19, issue 3, pp. 438–450.

<sup>35</sup> In an organizational sense, i.e. it is not part of any of the government departments (non-departmental public body). However, the CCC does not have financial independence.

recommendations, as well as opinions of devolved administrations<sup>36</sup>. Such a legal act is passed in the affirmative procedure, which requires the approval of both Houses of Parliament<sup>37</sup>.

Table 1

Carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act

Nazwa	Years	Emissions limit	Legal basis	Status
1st carbon budget	2008–2012	3018 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Budget Order 2009	Met with a headroom of 1%
2nd carbon budget	2013–2017	2782 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Budget Order 2009	Met with a headroom of 14%
3rd carbon budget	2018–2022	2544 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e 2632 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e*	Carbon Budget Order 2009	Ongoing
4th carbon budget	2023–2027	1950 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Budget Order 2011	Adopted, not yet started
5th carbon budget	2028–2032	1725 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Budget Order 2016	Adopted, not yet started
6th carbon budget	2033–2037	965 MtCO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Budget Order 2021	Adopted, not yet started

\* The emissions limit has been increased by transferring 88 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e of the surplus achieved under the 2<sup>nd</sup> budget – see remarks later in this article.

Source: own study based on legal acts indicated in the table.

Carbon budgets are another layer of building the credibility, stability, and predictability of British climate policy. They not only set intermediate goals, in theory stimulating the government to take ambitious actions also in the short term, but above all, they are supposed to send a positive signal to investors interested in transformation projects in individual sectors of the economy. Moreover, they indicate a reduction trajectory allowing for the actual achievement of the long-term goal, i.e. climate neutrality by 2050.

<sup>36</sup> Section 9 of the CCA. In addition, Section 10 identifies other issues that the Secretary of State has to consider when determining the level of a carbon budget, including the state of scientific knowledge on climate change or the impact on the country's economy.

<sup>37</sup> Section 91.1 of the CCA. See also: UK Parliament, *Affirmative procedure*, <https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/affirmative-procedure>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

As Church notes, “it is fundamental to the effectiveness of the Act that these carbon budgets do indeed chart an appropriate – gradual and cost-effective – course which keeps its sight on the 2050 target”<sup>38</sup>.

The CCA formalized the political consensus<sup>39</sup> on the need to take urgent action to combat climate change. However, while the Act sets goals and the organizational and institutional framework of the British climate policy, it does not specify how these goals are to be achieved. Development of specific initiatives and their implementation remains the domain of the government<sup>40</sup>.

## STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CARBON BUDGETS AND SETTING NEW EMISSIONS REDUCTION TARGETS

The periods covering the first and second carbon budgets have now ended. As indicated in Table 1, both budgets were met with a surplus<sup>41</sup>. This is especially true for the second carbon budget, during which emissions were 384 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e below the maximum level. However, in this context, attention should be paid to the way UK carbon budgets are structured and accounted for.

For the settlement of carbon budgets, the CCA adopted the concept of the net carbon account<sup>42</sup>. According to the Act, a given carbon budget is deemed to be met if the net carbon account does not exceed the set level of the carbon budget at the end of the budgetary period. This concept includes considering the results of trading between participants in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The UK net carbon account for a given year is calculated by adjusting the net emissions (i.e. UK<sup>43</sup> real emissions from all sources minus

<sup>38</sup> J. Church, *Enforcing the Climate Change Act*, “UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence” 2015, issue 1, p. 110.

<sup>39</sup> Only three MPs voted against the CCA.

<sup>40</sup> And also, to some extent, devolved governments.

<sup>41</sup> *Final Statement for the First Carbon Budget Period*, Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2014, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/310648/final\\_statement\\_first\\_carbon\\_budget\\_period.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310648/final_statement_first_carbon_budget_period.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022; and *Final Statement for the Second Carbon Budget*, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2019, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/803404/Final\\_Statement\\_for\\_2n\\_Carbon\\_Budget.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/803404/Final_Statement_for_2n_Carbon_Budget.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>42</sup> Section 27 of the CCA.

<sup>43</sup> That is, emissions that were created within the borders of the UK, but excluding overseas territories and dependencies.

the estimated absorption of emissions, e.g. by forests and land use) by adding or subtracting an appropriate amount of EU ETS credits. Buying allowances abroad means a reduction in net carbon account; selling them, in turn, means an increase as the emissions will take place outside the UK<sup>44</sup>.

The first five carbon budgets were adopted when the UK was still a member of the European Union and participated in the EU ETS. Thus, the level of the budgets passed at that time consisted of two parts: emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS (e.g. energy sector) and others (e.g. agriculture or transport). In practice, this means that the budget in the part concerning the EU ETS depended not on the actual emissions but on the share of British installations in the overall system limit. For example, when establishing the recommended level of the fifth carbon budget – which will be discussed later – the CCC assumed that 140 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e should be added to the part concerning the EU ETS in order to balance the expected sales of allowances by British installations<sup>45</sup>.

The period of the second carbon budget coincided with the beginning of the third phase of the EU ETS (2013–2020). As indicated in the final report on the implementation of the second budget, “in this phase Member States do not receive a fixed cap at the national level as was the case during the first carbon budget; the ETS instead operates at installation level”<sup>46</sup>. When the appropriate emissions limit was being worked out for the second carbon budget, the exact number of allowances for British installations was not known. Therefore, it was necessary to adopt a notional cap which was set at 1078 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e. Later, however, the UK cap was set at 782 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e, which is as much as 296 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e less than assumed.

The difference has thus created an additional “empty” space for emissions in sectors not covered by the EU ETS. As indicated by the authors of the Cambridge Econometrics report prepared for the CCC, due to the fact that the assumptions of the second carbon budget were not revised in connection with

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<sup>44</sup> In 2018, the UK’s net carbon account was 476.2 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e, including 24.7 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e (approx. 5% of the total) as a result of functioning in the EU ETS; see: *2018 UK greenhouse gas emissions: final figures – data tables*, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2020, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/875508/final-greenhouse-gas-emissions-tables-2018.xlsx](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/875508/final-greenhouse-gas-emissions-tables-2018.xlsx), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>45</sup> *The Fifth Carbon Budget. The next step towards a low-carbon economy*, Committee on Climate Change, 2015, p. 115, <https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Committee-on-Climate-Change-Fifth-Carbon-Budget-Report.pdf>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>46</sup> Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

a smaller than expected allocation of allowances for British installations under the EU ETS, “the second carbon budget was easily met, purely as a result of changes in accounting and not measures to lower carbon emissions”<sup>47</sup>. The report further states that, in addition to considering external factors beyond the control of the government, e.g. economic slowdown caused by the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the UK would not have an excess emissions reduction, but a deficit resulting from the mismatch between emissions reduction targets envisaged and the measures implemented to meet these targets (policy gap).

This problem was also repeatedly highlighted by the CCC. The analysis of the annual progress reports mentioned earlier in this article indicates that the policy gap issue has been raised annually since 2014<sup>48</sup>. The scale of the problem is estimated by reviewing and assessing government plans and actions to achieve emissions reductions, and then comparing them with the recommended emissions reduction path developed by the CCC, leading to the achievement of the emissions level assumed in the carbon budgets.

Against this background, the latest British emissions reduction targets were announced, i.e. the NDC and the sixth carbon budget. The British NDC from 2020<sup>49</sup> includes a commitment to a 68% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to the 1990 baseline<sup>50</sup>, while the sixth carbon budget assumes a GHG emissions limit of 965 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e, i.e. 78% reduction by 2035 relative to the same baseline.

Considering the level of ambition expressed in the latest emissions reduction goals, it is clear that meeting them will require the adoption of an extensive package of measures, which are postulated in successive CCC annual reports. The structure and accounting methods for carbon budgets, in combination with external factors, have so far allowed for the formal fulfilment of the assumed goals, as well as for the duration of the described

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<sup>47</sup> *A report for the Committee on Climate Change. How the UK met its carbon budgets. Covering carbon budgets 1 and 2*, Cambridge Econometrics, Cambridge 2019, p. 7, <https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/How-the-UK-met-its-carbon-budgets.pdf>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>48</sup> See CCC, *Progress Reports*, <https://www.theccc.org.uk/publicationtype/0-report/02-progress-reports/>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>49</sup> As a member of the European Union, in 2015 the UK was part of the joint EU NDC. In 2020, after leaving the EU, the UK presented its own updated NDC. See: UK Government, 2020, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/943618/uk-2030-ndc.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/943618/uk-2030-ndc.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>50</sup> As previously mentioned, this target – unlike the sixth carbon budget – does not include international aviation and shipping emissions.

situation of discrepancy between the goals and the actions actually taken to achieve them (policy gap), without serious political consequences. In the abovementioned article by Brunner, Flachsland, and Marschinski of 2012, the authors emphasize that the fact of establishing an independent entity to which certain rights and obligations are delegated is not in itself sufficient to increase the credibility of the commitment. They also state that “time will show whether the political clout of the UK CCA suffices to effectively check political opportunism”<sup>51</sup>. In retrospect, it seems that the political importance of the CCC in this respect was not strong enough to influence government climate actions in real terms, as Averchenkova, Fankhauser, and Finnegan note: “While the CCC has been a successful knowledge broker, there are limits to its influence on policy outcomes. The CCC’s statutory advice on carbon budgets has generally been followed. However, its repeated warnings that policy was off track, and the recommended remedies, have largely gone unheeded by Government”<sup>52</sup>.

#### CHALLENGES IN THE CONTEXT OF MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE BRITISH CLIMATE POLICY MODEL

The issues outlined above will be important for the credibility of the Act and the model it has created in the coming years. Official estimates of the ongoing third carbon budget indicate<sup>53</sup> that it will also be achieved with a surplus, in part for the reasons already described above. Although the scale of the surplus is not yet known, the CCC indicated that it may be “extremely large”<sup>54</sup>. This does not change the fact that the policy gap problem has remained and will have an impact on the prospects of meeting the growing emissions reduction targets set for the 2020s and 2030s. One

<sup>51</sup> S. Brunner, C. Flachsland, M. Marschinski, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

<sup>52</sup> A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, J. Finnegan, *The influence of climate change advisory bodies in climate governance: The UK’s Committee on Climate Change*, “Climate Policy”, vol. 21, issue 9, p. 1231.

<sup>53</sup> *Updated energy and emissions projections 2019*, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2020, p. 12, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/931323/updated-energy-and-emissions-projections-2019.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/931323/updated-energy-and-emissions-projections-2019.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>54</sup> Much will depend on the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic will ultimately affect emissions. See: *The Sixth Carbon Budget. The UK’s path to Net Zero*, Committee on Climate Change, 2020, p. 435, <https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Sixth-Carbon-Budget-The-UKs-path-to-Net-Zero.pdf>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

solution in this context is the possibility of transferring the surpluses achieved in the previous budget to the next budgetary period<sup>55</sup>, in whole or in part. As a result, the level of the carbon budget for the next period is increased by the amount transferred. The decision made by the competent Secretary of State in this matter is subject to few formal conditions, i.e. it requires consultation with devolved administrations and obtaining the CCC's recommendation. In addition, the decision is time-limited – it must be made no later than 31 May in the second year after the end of the earlier of the two budgetary periods affected.

In *The Clean Growth Strategy* published in 2017, the UK government signalled<sup>56</sup> its readiness to use the surplus transfer mechanism. Ultimately, it happened in 2019. Despite the negative CCC recommendation<sup>57</sup>, the government decided<sup>58</sup> to carry over approximately 23% (88 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e out of 384 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e) of the surplus achieved in the second carbon budget, increasing the permissible emissions limit in the third carbon budget from 2544 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e to 2632 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e.

The CCC consistently<sup>59</sup> takes the position that surpluses generated in carbon budgets should not be used in this way. It should be noted that this mechanism is a form of providing a measure of flexibility in the Act, which was largely designed to “block” commitments. As Cambridge Econometrics analysts note in the previously cited study, “this is a useful design feature and is based on climate science and the political context at the time of setting carbon budgets. From a scientific perspective, it is the accumulation of long-lived greenhouse gases in the atmosphere over time that matters (the stock

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<sup>55</sup> Section 17 of the CCA.

<sup>56</sup> *The Clean Growth Strategy. Leading the way to a low carbon future*, HM Government, 2017, p. 40, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/700496/clean-growth-strategy-correction-april-2018.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700496/clean-growth-strategy-correction-april-2018.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>57</sup> *An independent assessment of the UK's Clean Growth Strategy. From ambition to action*, Committee on Climate Change, 2018, pp. 11–12, <https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CCC-Independent-Assessment-of-UKs-Clean-Growth-Strategy-2018.pdf>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>58</sup> Minister Chris Skidmore's letter to CCC Chairman Lord Deben, [http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2019-0626/Chris\\_Skidmore\\_to\\_Lord\\_Deben.pdf](http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2019-0626/Chris_Skidmore_to_Lord_Deben.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022. However, as the decision to carry forward was taken as a contingency, it remains to be seen whether the government will eventually use the over-performance to meet the third carbon budget.

<sup>59</sup> This position was once again expressed in the recommendation of the sixth carbon budget; see: Committee on Climate Change, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

of emissions) and so if the UK's domestic emissions are within the combined budgets it is largely (but not entirely) irrelevant whether they were emitted, for instance, in 2015 or 2020. From a political context, if the UK's emissions are within the combined budgets then the government could consider the transition a success and that the UK has met its international and legal obligations"<sup>60</sup>.

Possible action of this type to meet the fourth carbon budget (and also subsequent ones), in a situation where the surplus from the third carbon budget would not result mainly from political initiatives, seems very risky for the credibility of the entire model of British climate policy. As already mentioned, carbon budgets set the desired, cost-effective reduction trajectory allowing for the achievement of climate neutrality. Meeting them by means of an accounting mechanism significantly increases the risk of excessive deviation from the designed trajectory, resulting in reduced chances of achieving all assumed emissions reduction targets.

In this context, it should also be emphasized that the desired trajectory has changed following, *inter alia*, the June 2019 Act's amendment whereby the UK has adopted the goal of climate neutrality by 2050. In other words, the new commitment means at least 100% reduction in the UK's net carbon account by 2050 compared to 80% before the amendment. In connection with that increase, the CCC developed a new, more demanding emissions reduction trajectory (Balanced Net Zero Pathway)<sup>61</sup>, optimal and in line with the climate neutrality goal. It was on this basis that the CCC developed the government-approved level of the British NDC for 2030 and the sixth carbon budget.

Both targets are the only ones that were established after the CCA amendment entry came into force. The previously adopted but not yet started carbon budgets therefore do not fit the new trajectory. This applies in particular to the fifth carbon budget (2028–2032). As the CCC points out, this budget is too loose (between 140 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e and 335 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e) in relation to the new path<sup>62</sup>.

The CCA provides for the possibility of modifying the already-adopted budget under several conditions – *i.e.* only if it appears to the Secretary of State that, since the budget was originally set (or previously altered), there have been significant changes affecting the basis on which the previous decision was made<sup>63</sup>.

<sup>60</sup> Cambridge Econometrics, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>61</sup> This trajectory also considers, *inter alia*, anticipated changes in the emission inventory method.

<sup>62</sup> Depending on whether emissions from international aviation and shipping are considered.

<sup>63</sup> Section 21.2 of the CCA.



Such an amendment requires the acceptance in the previously described affirmative procedure, and thus the active approval of both Houses of Parliament. Considering the aforementioned CCA amendment of 2019, it seems that this most important premise has been met. However, when deciding on the sixth carbon budget level, the UK government at the same time resolved<sup>64</sup> that the already-adopted, but not yet started, carbon budgets would remain at the current level, despite the fact that both the Scottish and the Welsh governments were of the opposite opinion<sup>65</sup>.

The UK government's decision is consistent with the CCC's position. Although the Committee noted that in an ideal scenario all existing carbon budgets would be adjusted to the new trajectory, at the same time it stated that the modification is not necessarily required<sup>66</sup>. In this context, the CCC expects that the government's adoption of the sixth carbon budget and the NDC at the recommended level will make the new GHG reduction trajectory (i.e. aforementioned Balanced Net Zero Pathway) de facto binding for the government now. This is due to the statutory obligation to set out proposals and policies to meet the net zero target and all already-adopted carbon budgets<sup>67</sup>.

In this situation, the UK will have two formally binding and mismatched GHG reduction targets in 2030, i.e. NDC and the one resulting from the level of the fifth carbon budget. Such a situation may potentially lead to increased political tensions, especially since the CCC announced<sup>68</sup> that progress towards achieving the fifth carbon budget will now be assessed according to the new reduction trajectory, not the one in force at the time of adoption of that budget. In practice, this means that instead of the permissible average of 345 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e per year over the period of this budget, the CCC will accept the permissible average annual emissions of 317 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e.

Considering the state of the ongoing mismatch between the actual measures and the assumed goals, it seems optimistic that the mere establishment of the sixth carbon budget at the level recommended by the CCC will force the adoption of an appropriate package of initiatives in the years 2028–2032. This pose, in particular, a potential threat to the prospects of meeting more ambitious, international goal resulting from the NDC.

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<sup>64</sup> *Impact Assessment for the sixth carbon budget*, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2021, p. 16, [https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2021/18/pdfs/ukia\\_20210018\\_en.pdf](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2021/18/pdfs/ukia_20210018_en.pdf), accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 76.

<sup>66</sup> Committee on Climate Change, *The Sixth...*, p. 433.

<sup>67</sup> Section 13 and 14 of the CCA.

<sup>68</sup> Committee on Climate Change, *The Sixth...*, p. 433.

The CCA's provisions do not provide for any legal sanctions for failure to achieve the long-term goal and carbon budgets, thus suggesting more political than legal liability<sup>69</sup>. It is indicated that “judges might (...) be reluctant to read the Act as imposing absolute duties to meet targets and budgets at all. Since the government cannot in practice guarantee that its policies will produce the required emission reductions, it might rather be interpreted as simply creating a duty to use best endeavours”<sup>70</sup>. In this context, the commitment under the Paris Agreement appears to be additionally slightly weaker than the one under the CCA. Rajamani and Brunneé point out that the Parties to the Paris Agreement “do not have binding obligations of result in relation to their NDCs”. They further state that “in practical terms (...) a party could fall short of its NDC without the consequences that attach to breaches of a legal obligation under the law of state responsibility”<sup>71</sup>.

On the margins of these considerations, it should also be noted that the presumptive fulfilment of the NDC goal would in this case likely involve a significant surplus in the fifth carbon budget, which, in accordance with the previously described possibility of transferring it to the next accounting period, may be theoretically used for the purposes of the sixth carbon budget. In this way, the credibility risk would be transferred from the international to the national level.

## SUMMARY

The CCA has undoubtedly had a great influence on the development of the British climate policy. As Fankhauser points out, the CCA “has transformed the tone of the climate change debate in Britain. There is still

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<sup>69</sup> A similarly sceptical position regarding the enforcement of the CCA's provisions in court was expressed by many scholars, e.g. P. McMaster, *Climate Change – Statutory Duty or Pious Hope?*, “Journal of Environmental Law” 2008, vol. 20, issue 1, pp. 115–119; S. Brunner, C. Flachsland, M. Marschinski, *Credible commitment...*, p. 263; D. Feldman, *Legislation Which Bears No Law*, “Statue Law Review” 2016, vol. 37, issue 3, p. 222. However, for a dissenting opinion, see: J. Church, *op. cit.*, who argues that under certain conditions the CCA provisions may be enforced in court.

<sup>70</sup> A. McHarg, *op. cit.*, p. 478.

<sup>71</sup> L. Rajamani, J. Brunneé, *The Legality of Downgrading Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US Disengagement*, “Journal of Environmental Law” 2017, vol. 29, issue 3, p. 542. See also: D. Helm, *Net Zero. How We Stop Causing Climate Change*, William Collins, London 2020, pp. 54–55.

climate scepticism at the feral end of public opinion, but the constructive debate is no longer about the targets, but instead about how to meet them”<sup>72</sup>. It is also worth emphasizing that the CCA has left its mark on the policies adopted by other countries in this regard. The UK act not only inspired other countries to introduce legislation in an unregulated area but also constituted a kind of testing ground, which was used at the stage of designing solutions adapted to the realities of individual countries<sup>73</sup>.

The experience of over a decade of the CCA’s use offers insight into the positive and negative aspects of building a functional and credible model of climate policy, adapted to the long-term nature of the climate change problem. Considering that national climate policy is often a derivative of conditions existing at the international level, it should be noted that during this period, the CCA regulations have not been weakened. On the contrary, as indicated above, the long-term emissions reduction target was raised to a level of at least 100% by 2050. However, it would apparently be justifiable to look at the functioning of the CCC with a degree of disappointment, as its political position has so far not allowed it to realistically affect the improvement of the situation in relation to the policy gap problem.

Against this background, it may be necessary to further modify the CCA by introducing new tools that could strengthen the existing model<sup>74</sup>. As Lockwood points out, while solutions based on building cross-party agreements may be successful in the countries of continental Europe, they do not have good prospects in the UK due to the electoral system in force. In this situation, perhaps the solution would be to implement a mechanism ensuring a greater role for local governments or even greater social participation in the creation and implementation of climate policy<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> S. Fankhauser, *Do Climate targets work?*, “Carbon Management” 2011, vol. 2, issue 5, p. 495.

<sup>73</sup> P. Taylor, K. Scanlen, *The UK Climate Change Act. An act to follow?*, “Policy Quarterly” 2018, vol. 14, issue 3, pp. 66–73, <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/pq/article/view/5106/4544>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>74</sup> Such proposals began to be put forward in parliament – see e.g. Climate and Ecology Bill presented by Caroline Lucas MP, <https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/2772>, accessed: 18.10.2022.

<sup>75</sup> This is especially important in the context of shifting the gravity of the British economy transformation from energy sector to more politically sensitive sectors of the economy, such as housing or transport – see: M. Lockwood, *Routes to...*, p. 1243. It should also be noted that such provisions are included in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 – see section 91, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2009/12>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

There is some hope in the increasing British public interest in the issue of climate change<sup>76</sup>: “In the UK general election of 12 December 2019 the environment and climate change gained much greater prominence compared to previous elections, yet ultimately they were of marginal importance during the campaign and exerted limited impact on voting behaviour”<sup>77</sup>. It is worth remembering, however, that the last general election was dominated by the topic of the UK leaving the European Union. Since the UK’s return to the EU is no longer an issue, it is likely that climate change issues and political parties’ proposals in this area will determine preferences in the next general election to a much greater extent.

The emissions gap is defined as the difference between the projected global GHG emissions with full implementation of the declared NDCs, and the emissions allowed under the reduction trajectories consistent with the Paris Agreement objective to limit the increase in the average global temperature to a level significantly lower than 2°C above the pre-industrial level and making efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level. This gap is still significant and reaches a dozen or so GtCO<sub>2</sub>e worldwide, depending on the adopted scenario<sup>78</sup>. Thus, it is evident that meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement requires the states to be even more ambitious in terms of NDCs and, above all, make real efforts to implement them.

A possible failure to achieve the emissions reduction targets set in the UK or loss of credibility of the UK climate policy model will most probably have a negative impact on climate policy internationally. While the UK is currently responsible for only about 1% of global GHG emissions<sup>79</sup>, it is at

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<sup>76</sup> This is evidenced by, inter alia, the increase in social movements such as Extinction Rebellion or the growing number of councils that have declared a climate emergency – see: <https://www.climateemergency.uk/blog/list-of-councils>, accessed: 15.03.2022. See also the results of quarterly public opinion polls conducted by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy: BEIS Public Attitudes Tracker, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-attitudes-tracking-survey>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>77</sup> N. Carter, M. Pearson, *A ‘climate election’? The environment and the Greens in the 2019 UK general election*, “Environmental Politics” 2020, vol. 29, issue 4, p. 746.

<sup>78</sup> *Emissions Gap Report 2021*, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi 2021, pp. 29–37, <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/36990/EGR21.pdf>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>79</sup> P. Bolton, *UK and global emissions and temperature trends*, “House of Commons Library”, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-and-global-emissions-and-temperature-trends/>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

the forefront of the list of countries in terms of its historical contribution to global warming<sup>80</sup>. To a large extent, its importance and responsibility lies in the global system of climate negotiations<sup>81</sup>. The failure or even a high probability of failure of the British climate policy may therefore be a strong political signal and strong argument against raising goals or implementing climate projects in countries deemed less ambitious in terms of climate policy. Of particular importance in this context is the fact that – as the British government itself admits – the British reduction target resulting from the sixth carbon budget, although very ambitious on a global scale, is less ambitious than if global efforts were shared with historical contributions to emissions taken into account.<sup>82</sup>

Three decades after the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the problem of global warming remains one of the greatest challenges for the entire international community. Despite political efforts and successive initiatives adopted as part of the Conference of Parties (COP) meetings<sup>83</sup>, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has been rising steadily for many years<sup>84</sup>, and the problem of climate change is becoming an increasingly important part of the political agenda. It is difficult to consider the Convention's results to date as satisfactory. The Paris Agreement is currently the main tool at the global level for changing this state of affairs. It is therefore particularly important for individual states to place emphasis on the implementation of their obligations and to develop credible frameworks and transformation programmes in line with the Paris Agreement's objectives. Otherwise, the Paris Agreement's spirit and the global climate policy will most likely be undermined. The risk of wasting even more years will then increase immeasurably.

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<sup>80</sup> D. Matthews, T. Graham, S. Keeverian, C. Lamontagne, D. Seto, T. Smith, *National contributions to observed global warming*, "Environmental Research Letters" 2014, vol. 9, issue 1, p. 5.

<sup>81</sup> The UK's responsibility in the global fight against climate change in the context of the country's historic emissions was also mentioned by Prime Minister Boris Johnson – see: *PM speech at COP26 launch: 4 February 2020*, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-cop-26-launch-4-february-2020>, accessed: 15.03.2022.

<sup>82</sup> Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, *Impact Assessment...*, p. 10.

<sup>83</sup> The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the Convention.

<sup>84</sup> As of February 2022, concentration of carbon dioxide reached 418 ppm (parts per million).

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## BRITISH CLIMATE POLICY UNDER THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT

### Abstract

The British Climate Change Act created the world's first long-term institutional and legal system aimed at reducing domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Following its 2019 amendment, the UK also became the first G7 and G20 country to commit to climate neutrality. The Act, described as one of the most advanced legal acts in the field of climate policy, is still a reference point and source of inspiration for many countries around the world. The model established by it, however, struggles with the credible commitment problem, and the structural problems arising, inter alia, from the aforementioned amendment and the departure of the UK from the European Union may in the future additionally weaken its credibility and have a negative impact not only on British but also on global climate action. The aim of this article is to present the main elements of the British model of climate policy and to signal future challenges to its credibility against the background of the previous experience with the implementation of the Act and the latest emissions reduction targets announced at the end of 2020 and in the first half of 2021.

Key words: Climate Change Act, carbon budget, climate policy, climate change, United Kingdom

## BRYTYJSKA POLITYKA KLIMATYCZNA W ŚWIETLE USTAWY CLIMATE CHANGE ACT

### Streszczenie

Brytyjska ustawa Climate Change Act stworzyła pierwszy na świecie długoterminowy system instytucjonalno-prawny mający umożliwić redukcję krajowych emisji gazów cieplarnianych. Po jej nowelizacji z 2019 r. Wielka Brytania stała się także pierwszym krajem grupy G7 i G20, który zobowiązał się do osiągnięcia neutralności klimatycznej. Ustawa, określana jako jeden z najbardziej zaawansowanych aktów prawnych w obszarze polityki klimatycznej, do dzisiaj stanowi punkt odniesienia i inspirację dla wielu krajów na świecie. Ustanowiony nią model zмага się jednak z problemem

wiarygodności zobowiązań, zaś problemy strukturalne wynikające m.in. ze wspomnianej nowelizacji oraz wyjścia Wielkiej Brytanii z Unii Europejskiej, mogą w przyszłości dodatkowo osłabić jego wiarygodność oraz negatywnie wpłynąć nie tylko na brytyjską, ale również światową politykę klimatyczną. Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie głównych założeń brytyjskiego modelu polityki klimatycznej oraz zasygnalizowanie przyszłych wyzwań dla jego wiarygodności na tle dotychczasowych doświadczeń implementacji ustawy oraz najnowszych celów redukcji emisji ogłoszonych w końcu 2020 r. oraz pierwszej połowie 2021 r.

Słowa kluczowe: Climate Change Act, budżet węglowy, polityka klimatyczna, zmiany klimatu, Wielka Brytania

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**R E C E N Z J E   I   S P R A W O Z D A N I A**

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**R E V I E W S   A N D   R E P O R T S**

**Zbysław Ziemacki\***

NOREENA HERTZ,  
*STULECIE SAMOTNYCH. JAK ODZYSKAĆ UTRACONE WIĘZI,*  
WYDAWNICTWO SŁOWNE, WARSZAWA 2022

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Noreena Hertz, brytyjska ekonomistka, autorka wielu publikacji i doradczyni biznesowa, profesor University College London, w swojej najnowszej książce pt. *The Lonely Century: Coming Together in a World That's Pulling Apart* zgłębia podstawy kryzysu samotności w XXI wieku w kontekście ekonomicznym, politycznym i społecznym. Książka w oryginale ukazała się w 2020 roku, a w 2022 doczekała się polskiej edycji. Polskie tłumaczenie tytułu nie jest jednak wierne oryginałowi i nie oddaje tak dobrze istoty tej publikacji jak tytuł angielski.

Hertz spogląda na zagadnienia szeroko, a prowadzone przez nią badania nacechowane są dużą wrażliwością społeczną i interdyscyplinarnością, czego często brakuje w publikacjach ekonomicznych skoncentrowanych na twardych modelach ekonometrycznych i statystykach.

Autorka została nazwana przez „The Observer” „jedną z ważniejszych światowych myślicielek”, a magazyn „Vogue” określił ją jako jedną z najbardziej inspirujących kobiet świata. Po lekturze książki trudno się z tym stwierdzeniem nie zgodzić.

O ile problem samotności nie jest niczym nowym, zarówno w realnym życiu, jak i w naukowej literaturze, o tyle chyba jeszcze nikomu do tej pory nie udało się tak trafnie naświetlić ekonomicznych i społecznych skutków tego zjawiska. Tłem powstania książki była sytuacja spowodowana pandemią COVID-19, jednak zjawisko samotności jest w niej opisywane w szerszym kontekście: jako długofalowy proces nasilający się od dziesięcioleci. Autorka

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podejmuje próbę wskazania głównych winowajców kryzysu oraz identyfikuje potencjalne długofalowe koszty samotności, którą określa światową epidemią.

Zgłębiając temat, Hertz wymienia wiele dobitnych przykładów ukazujących skalę problemu. Jeszcze długo przed wybuchem pandemii trzech na pięciu Amerykanów czuło się samotnych. Autorka wymienia też Japonię, w której starsze osoby celowo popełniają drobne wykroczenia, aby trafić do więzienia, licząc na to, że tam uciekną przed samotnością. Innym ciekawym przykładem jest rosnąca popularność portali oferujących możliwość wynajęcia osoby do towarzystwa, z którą można się wybrać na wystawę czy na kolację. Najbardziej znany globalny portal Rentafriend.com ma w bazie ponad 600 tys. potencjalnych „przyjaciół” na całym świecie. W Polsce również sprawnie działają takie portale, np. PrzyjacielDowynajecia.pl, oferujące „przyjaciół” na wiele różnych okazji, jak wyjście na wesele, siłownię, kolację, do kina czy teatru<sup>1</sup>.

Potwierdzenie skali zjawiska samotności znajdziemy też m.in. w badaniach firmy medycznej Cigna realizowanych cyklicznie wspólnie z renomowanym uniwersytetem UCLA. Autorzy badania przeprowadzonego wśród dorosłych Amerykanów wskazują, że problem samotności zarówno w czasie pandemii, jak i przed dotykał ok. 60% populacji. Wśród głównych czynników wpływających na poczucie samotności wskazano wiek – wbrew pozorom znacznie częściej dotyka ono ludzi młodych, pomiędzy 18. a 35. rokiem życia, niż osób mających więcej niż 55 lat. Kolejnym głównym czynnikiem jest wielkość dochodu. Według badaczy samotność znacznie częściej spotyka ludzi o niższych dochodach<sup>2</sup>. To stwierdzenie raczej nikogo nie dziwi, znajdziemy tego dowody w książkach wybitnych ekonomistów zgłębiających kwestie nierówności społecznych, m.in. Thomasa Piketty’ego czy Johna K. Galbraitha. Galbraith w swoim programie troski o ludzkość pisał: „Trzeba przyznać, że nic tak całkowicie nie pozbawia swobód jednostki, jak zupełny brak pieniędzy – ani nie ogranicza ich tak, jak niedostatek pieniędzy”<sup>3</sup>. Rangę problemu samotności potwierdza też fakt, że kraje takie jak Wielka Brytania czy Japonia stworzyły ministerstwa do spraw samotności.

Jedna z ważniejszych tez stawianych przez autorkę wymienia jako główną przyczynę nasilającej się samotności system, a konkretnie twardy kapitalizm

<sup>1</sup> <http://przyjacielDowynajecia.pl/pl/o-serwisie/>

<sup>2</sup> *The Loneliness Epidemic Persists: A Post-Pandemic Look at the State of Loneliness among U.S. Adults*, <https://newsroom.cigna.com/loneliness-epidemic-persists-post-pandemic-look>, dostęp: 1.06.2022.

<sup>3</sup> J. K. Galbraith, *Godne społeczeństwo. Program troski o ludzkość*, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 2012, s. 17.

i neoliberalizm (s. 24). Według niej ludzie, skoncentrowani na rywalizacji zamiast współpracy, stali się głównie biorcami zamiast dawcami, konsumentami zamiast obywatelami. Społeczeństwem, którego głównym celem i źródłem sukcesu stało się pomnażanie kapitału i intensywna konsumpcja.

Ciekawie obrazują ten stan rzeczy teksty piosenek. Autorka pokazuje, jak w popowych hitach podmiot mówiący zmienia się z „my” w „ja”. Przykładowo w 1977 David Bowie śpiewał *We could be heroes*, Freddie Mercury i Queen *We are the champions*, tymczasem współcześnie Kanye West wykonuje utwór *I am a god* (2013)<sup>4</sup>.

Konsekwencją są pogłębiające się nierówności społeczne i ekonomiczne. Współcześni amerykańscy dyrektorzy generalni zarabiają średnio 58 razy więcej niż przeciętny pracownik, a w 2018 roku luka ta wzrosła prawie pięciokrotnie. Duża część ludzi czuje się pozostawiona w tyle, system w zasadzie zniszczył ich zdolność do utrzymania rodzin lub zachowania statusu społecznego.

*Stulecie samotnych* dotyczy głównych obszarów i podłoża samotności. Podzielone zostało na 11 rozdziałów, których tytuły mówią same za siebie:

1. To jest stulecie samotnych (This is the Lonely Century)
2. Samotność zabija (Loneliness Kills)
3. Samotna mysz (The Lonely Mouse)
4. Osamotnione miasto (The Solitary City)
5. Epoka bezkontaktowa (The Contactless Age)
6. Nasze ekrany, nasze osobowości (Our Screens, Our Selves)
7. Sam w biurze (Alone at the Office)
8. Cyfrowy bicz (The Digital Whip)
9. Seks, miłość i roboty (Sex, Love and Robots)
10. Ekonomia samotności (The Loneliness Economy)
11. Jak trzymać się razem w rozpadającym się świecie (Coming Together in a World that's Pulling Apart)

Pierwszy rozdział to próba zdefiniowania zjawiska samotności. Autorka zrywa z tradycyjnym podejściem do źródeł samotności takich jak brak towarzystwa, miłości, przyjaźni, traktując je jak tylko jedną stronę medalu. Przyczyn samotności upatruje w czynnikach takich jak sytuacja materialna czy poglądy polityczne. Samotność, której doświadczamy, nie polega tylko na tym, że czujemy się niesłyszani lub niewidoczni dla przyjaciół lub rodziny, ale także na poczuciu braku wsparcia ze strony pracodawców, społeczności czy rządu.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, s. 27.

Hertz definiuje samotność jako złożone zjawisko: „zarówno stan wewnętrzny, jak i egzystencjalny – osobisty, społeczny, ekonomiczny i polityczny” (s. 11). Ta definicja, jak argumentuje, jest zgodna z poglądami takich myślicieli jak m.in. Marks, Durkheim, Arendt i Huxley (s. 11).

W tym miejscu warto zwrócić uwagę na przykład Szwecji, kraju, w którym choć 40% społeczeństwa żyje w samodzielnych gospodarstwach domowych, samotność wydaje się nie stanowić większego problemu, ponieważ znaczna część ludzi jest samotna z wyboru. Wynika to oczywiście w dużej mierze z cech charakterologicznych Szwedów, jednak bardzo ważna jest też bogata oferta socjalna państwa, w tym różnego rodzaju aktywności kulturalno-oświatowe (szerzej ewenement pozytywnego nastawienia Szwedów do samotności zgłębia polska autorka Katarzyna Tubylewicz w książce *Samotny jak Szwed? O ludziach z Północy, którzy lubią bywać samotni*).

Hertz również zwraca uwagę na problem polityki społecznej oraz zanikanie oferty kulturalno-oświatowej i odpowiedniej infrastruktury sprzyjającej włączeniu społecznemu, w szczególności ludzi starszych oraz biedniejszych. W rozwijających się dynamicznie metropoliach coraz mniej miejsca zostawia się na wspólne przestrzenie, w których ludzie ze wszystkich warstw mogą się spotykać, wchodzić w interakcje i tworzyć więzi społeczne. Proces ten rozpoczął się w wielu miejscach przed kryzysem finansowym w 2008 roku, a znacznie się nasilił po tym okresie – w ramach walki z kryzysem i cięć na całym świecie zlikwidowano wiele bibliotek, domów kultury, klubów sportowych, parków publicznych. Autorka wskazuje przykład Wielkiej Brytanii, gdzie jedną trzecią klubów młodzieżowych i prawie 800 bibliotek publicznych zamknięto w latach 2008–2018, podczas gdy w USA poziom finansowania bibliotek federalnych spadł o ponad 40% w latach 2008–2019.

W drugim rozdziale autorka porusza kwestie zdrowotne będące skutkiem samotności. Opierając się na badaniach naukowych, przedstawia ciemne oblicze samotności: jest gorsza dla zdrowia niż brak ruchu, tak samo szkodliwa jak alkoholizm i dwa razy bardziej szkodliwa od otyłości. Statystycznie samotność to odpowiednik palenia 15 papierosów dziennie. Wyzwała ona w organizmie utrzymującą się reakcję stresową, osłabiającą układ odpornościowy, zwiększając ryzyko chorób serca, udaru mózgu i demencji, co finalnie prowadzi do skrócenia życia o ok. 30%. Osoby samotne są o 32% bardziej narażone na udar mózgu, o 29% bardziej prawdopodobnie jest, że będą cierpieć na choroby serca, są też o 64% bardziej podatne na rozwój demencji klinicznej. Co więcej, kryzys samotności żyłuje również globalną gospodarkę.

Jako przykład wpływu braku samotności na zdrowie autorka przedstawia członków ultraortodoksyjnego odłamu judaizmu – charedim. Zła dieta, niskie



dochody, mało aktywny tryb życia teoretycznie powinny przełożyć się na ich problemy zdrowotne i większą śmiertelność. Jednak wspólnota jest zdecydowanym zaprzeczeniem tej reguły. 73,6% jej członków określa swój stan zdrowia jako bardzo dobry, w porównaniu z 50% wśród innych grup społecznych. Deklaracje te znajdują potwierdzenie w ich rzeczywistej długości życia. Według Hertz wyjaśnieniem tego ewenementu jest przynależność do grupy. Charedim znacznie więcej czasu niż inne społeczności poświęcają na wspólną modlitwę i zabawę. Doskonale oddaje to cytat z Dova Chernichovsky'ego, profesora izraelskiego Uniwersytetu Ben Guriona, prowadzącego wieloletnie badania wśród tej społeczności: „Samotność skraca życie, a przyjaźń redukuje napięcia”<sup>5</sup>.

W kolejnych rozdziałach autorka opisuje wpływ samotności na politykę. Pokazuje korelację między samotnością a skłonnością do ulegania populistycznej narracji. Odnosi się do badań Hannah Arendt nad związkiem między samotnością a wzrostem prawicowego populizmu. Arendt, jedna z najważniejszych teoretyczek politycznych XX wieku, uciekła przed antysemickimi prześladowaniami z hitlerowskich Niemiec i wyemigrowała do Stanów Zjednoczonych. W 1951 roku opublikowała przełomowy tekst *Początki totalitaryzmu*. Dowodzi w nim, że totalitaryzm przyciąga samotne jednostki, oferując im możliwość odzyskania szacunku do siebie i poczucia celu w życiu.

Hertz omawia przykład amerykańskiego inżyniera lokomotyw, który na skutek wprowadzenia w czasie kadencji Baracka Obamy ustawy o czystym węglu stracił pracę, został porzucony, osamotniony i pozbawiony poczucia sensu życia. W konsekwencji stał się aktywnym zwolennikiem Donalda Trumpa. Jest to typowa sekwencja zdarzeń: skrajnie prawicowi politycy budują poparcie, aktywnie słuchając ludzi wykluczonych i oferując im poczucie przynależności do wspólnoty, a następnie podsycając ich gniew wobec „obcych”.

Ponadto samotność wywołuje frustrację i agresję. Rozdział *Samotna mysz* na przykładzie eksperymentów na myszach pokazuje, że samotność, której nie będziemy odpowiednio wcześniej zapobiegać, będzie się stopniowo nasilać, a podświadoma chęć alienacji będzie nas skutecznie zniechęcać do kontaktów z innymi. Jak mysz odizolowana w klatce na dłuższy czas, która brutalnie atakuje wpuszczonego do niej po tym okresie współtowarzysza. Im więcej czasu spędzamy w odosobnieniu, tym bardziej antagonistycznie i agresywnie nastawiamy się do innych.

Hertz w swojej książce za dynamiczny rozwój samotności obwinia również nowe technologie.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, s. 37.

Pandemia spowodowała, że wiele czynności, które wcześniej wykonywaliśmy razem, przeszło do świata wirtualnego, jak zajęcia jogi przez aplikację; powszechnie korzystamy też z chatbotów, kas samoobsługowych czy całych bezobsługowych sklepów, takich jak Amazon GO czy Żabka na polskim rynku. Trend ten obserwowany był już wcześniej, w pandemii tylko się nasilił, a znaczne oszczędności, jakie generują takie modele biznesowe, najprawdopodobniej przyczynią się do jego kontynuacji.

Smartfony to również sprzymierzeńcy samotności. Średnio 221 razy dziennie sprawdzamy nasze telefony. Cyfrowe uzależnienie powoduje, że w Sydney, Tel Awiwie czy Seulu, miastach, w których ludzie praktycznie nie odrywają wzroku od smartfonów, urbaniści podjęli drastyczne kroki w celu poprawy bezpieczeństwa. Na chodnikach zainstalowano światła Stop/Go, aby piesi mogli zobaczyć, czy przejście jest bezpieczne, bez konieczności odrywania wzroku od ekranu. W Seulu umieszczono nawet lasery na skrzyżowaniach, które uruchamiają powiadomienie na smartfonie pieszego „zombie”, ostrzegając go, że niedługo wejdzie na ruchliwą ulicę.

Smartfony powodują uciekanie w wirtualną rzeczywistość: skrolując media społecznościowe, oglądając filmy, czytając tweety, komentując zdjęcia, nie jesteśmy obecni, odcinamy się od otaczających nas ludzi, pozbawiamy się wielu codziennych interakcji społecznych, które sprawiają, że czujemy się częścią szerszego społeczeństwa.

Hertz pokazuje również, że samo posiadanie przy sobie smartfona zmienia nasze zachowanie i sposób, w jaki wchodzimy w dialog z otaczającym nas światem. Przytaczając badania, wedle których nieznanymi uśmiechają się do siebie znacznie mniej, gdy mają przy sobie smartfony. Ponadto walka o akceptację w świecie wirtualnym, kolejne polubienia i kolejnych obserwatorów naszych profili powoduje, że prezentujemy w internecie wyidealizowaną, mało autentyczną wersję samych siebie. Życie, które dzielimy online, to wyselekcjonowana seria najważniejszych wydarzeń i szczęśliwych chwil, imprez i uroczystości, piaszczystych białych plaż, zebrana na podkreślonych cyfrowo zdjęciach. Autorka przedstawia statystyki, z których wynika, że coraz więcej młodych ludzi zwraca się do chirurgów plastycznych ze swoimi przetworzonymi w Photoshopie zdjęciami z prośbą o odtworzenie ich w rzeczywistości. W 2017 roku z takim zjawiskiem spotkało się 55% amerykańskich chirurgów plastycznych, co stanowiło wzrost o 13% w porównaniu z rokiem poprzednim.

Media społecznościowe powodują, że nie tylko czujemy się mniej popularni niż ludzie wokół nas, ale także mamy poczucie, że nasze prawdziwe ja jest mniej atrakcyjne niż to wirtualne, udoskonalone cyfrowo. To sprawia, że jesteśmy coraz bardziej osamotnieni.

Pomimo tej ponurej wizji – XXI wieku jako okresu alienacji jednostek oraz wzmagającej się polaryzacji w większości społeczności na świecie – książka niesie pozytywne przesłanie. Hertz bierze pod lupę czynniki sprzyjające samotności, dając jednocześnie wskazówki, jak ograniczać to zjawisko i mitygować ryzyka z tym związane. Kluczowe pozostaje jednak pytanie, czy znajdują się decydenci na tyle mądrzy i odpowiedzialni, by zrobić dobry użytek z tej kopalni wiedzy na temat ekonomicznych, społecznych i politycznych konsekwencji samotności. Stawka jest wysoka – jeżeli lekcja nie zostanie właściwie odrobiona, a problem zostanie zignorowany, wkrótce możemy się obudzić w totalitarnym świecie, nękanym potężnymi kryzysami gospodarczymi i społecznymi.

**Cytuj jako:**

Ziemacki Z., recenzja książki: Noreena Hertz, *Stulecie samotnych. Jak odzyskać utracone więzi*, Wydawnictwo Słowne, Warszawa 2022, „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” 2022, nr 1(72), s. 141–147. DOI: 10.26399/meip.1(72).2022.07/z.ziemacki

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ZASADY ETYCZNE OBOWIĄZUJĄCE W ODNIESIENIU  
DO PUBLIKACJI ZAMIESZCZANYCH W KWARTALNIKU  
„MYŚL EKONOMICZNA I POLITYCZNA”

Redakcja „Myśli Ekonomicznej i Politycznej” dba o utrzymanie wysokich standardów etycznych czasopisma i przestrzega stosownych zasad. Zasady te zostały oparte na COPE’s Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors. Są to:

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Redaktor naczelny stosuje się do aktualnego stanu prawnego w zakresie zniesławienia, naruszenia praw autorskich i plagiatu oraz ponosi odpowiedzialność za decyzje, które ze złożonych w Redakcji artykułów powinny zostać opublikowane.

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Żadnemu członkowi zespołu redakcyjnego nie wolno ujawniać informacji na temat złożonej pracy komukolwiek, kto nie jest upoważniony procedurą wydawniczą do ich otrzymania.

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Nieopublikowane artykuły lub ich fragmenty nie mogą być wykorzystane w badaniach własnych członków zespołu redakcyjnego bądź recenzentów bez wyraźnej pisemnej zgody autora.

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Autorstwo powinno być ograniczone do osób, które znacząco przyczyniły się do pomysłu, projektu, wykonania lub interpretacji pracy. Jako współautorzy powinny być wymienione wszystkie osoby, które miały udział w powstaniu pracy.

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'Economic and Political Thought' Editorial Board strives to ensure high ethical standards. Articles submitted for publication in 'Economic and Political Thought' are assessed for their integrity, compliance with ethical standards and contribution to the development of scholarship.

The principles listed below are based on the COPE's Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors.

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Authorship should reflect individuals' contribution to the work concept, project, implementation or interpretation. All co-authors who contributed to the publication should be listed. Persons who are not authors but made substantial contributions to the article, should be listed in the acknowledgements section. The author should make sure that all co-authors have been listed, are familiar with and have accepted the final version of the article, and have given their consent for submitting the article

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Authors should disclose all sources of their projects funding, contribution of research institutions, societies and other entities as well as all other conflicts of interests that might affect the findings and their interpretation.

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Ghost authorship is when someone makes a substantial contribution to a work but he/she is not listed as an author or his/her role in the publication is not acknowledged. Guest authorship takes place when someone's contribution is very small or in-existent but his/her name is listed as an author.

Ghost and guest authorship are manifestations of a lack of scientific integrity and all such cases will be disclosed, involving a notification of component entities (institutions employing the authors, scientific societies, associations of editors etc.). The Editorial Board will document every instance of scientific dishonesty, especially the violation of the ethical principles binding in science.

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All reviewed works should be treated as confidential documents. They cannot be shown to or discussed with third parties who are not authorised members of the Editorial Board.

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All reviews are made anonymously; neither does the Editor reveal information on authors to reviewers.

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Reviews should be objective. Derogatory personal remarks are inappropriate. Reviewers should clearly express their opinions and provide adequate arguments. All doubts as well as critical and polemical comments should be included in the review.

### **Conflict of interests and its disclosure**

Confidential information and ideas arising as a result of a review must be kept secret and cannot be used for personal benefits. Reviewers should not review works of authors if there is a conflict of interests resulting from their close relationship.

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1. Czasopismo przyjmuje oryginalne, niepublikowane prace naukowe dotyczące szeroko rozumianej problematyki ekonomicznej i politycznej. Nadsyłane materiały powinny zawierać istotne przyczynki teoretyczne lub ciekawe zastosowanie empiryczne. Publikowane są także recenzje oraz sprawozdania z życia naukowego szkół wyższych. Artykuły są przedmiotem recenzji, a warunkiem opublikowania jest pozytywna opinia recenzenta.
2. Materiał do Redakcji należy przekazać w jednym egzemplarzu znormalizowanego maszynopisu (30 wierszy na stronie, po 60 znaków w wierszu, ok. 1800 znaków na stronie) wraz z tekstem zapisanym na nośniku elektronicznym lub przesłanym pod adresem: [wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl](mailto:wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl)
3. Przypisy należy umieszczać na dole strony, podając najpierw inicjały imienia, nazwisko autora, tytuł pracy, nazwę wydawnictwa, miejsce i rok wydania, numer strony. W przypadku prac zbiorowych należy podać imię i nazwisko redaktora naukowego. Szczegółowe wskazówki dla autorów opublikowane są na stronie internetowej Oficyny Wydawniczej Uczelni Łazarskiego pod adresem <https://www.lazarski.pl/pl/badania-i-rozwoj/oficyna-wydawnicza-uczelni-lazarskiego/dla-autorow/>.
4. Zdjęcia i rysunki mogą być dostarczone w postaci oryginalnej (do skanowania) lub zapisane w formatach TIFF, GIF, BMP.
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6. Artykuł powinien mieć objętość od 18 do 25 stron znormalizowanego maszynopisu (nie licząc bibliografii), natomiast recenzja, komunikat naukowy i informacja – 12 stron.
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PROCEDURA RECENZOWANIA PUBLIKACJI W KWARTALNIKU  
„MYŚL EKONOMICZNA I POLITYCZNA”

Rada Programowa i Kolegium Redakcyjne kwartalnika „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” na posiedzeniu 30 czerwca 2011 r. jednogłośnie przyjęły następujące zasady obowiązujące przy recenzowaniu publikacji w kwartalniku „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”.

1. Do oceny każdej publikacji Kolegium Redakcyjne powołuje co najmniej dwóch recenzentów zewnętrznych, czyli specjalistów wywodzących się spoza Uczelni Łazarskiego.
2. Jeden z wyżej wymienionych dwóch recenzentów musi pochodzić z zagranicznych ośrodków naukowo-badawczych.
3. W postępowaniu recenzyjnym obowiązuje tzw. *double-blind peer review process*, czyli zasada, że autor publikacji i jej recenzenci nie znają swoich tożsamości.
4. Recenzenci składają pisemne oświadczenia o niewystępowaniu konfliktu interesów, jeśli chodzi o ich relacje z autorami recenzowanych tekstów.
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Powyższe procedury i zasady recenzowania są zgodne z wytycznymi Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego.

Redaktor Naczelny  
dr Adrian Chojan

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS SUBMITTING ARTICLES  
TO *ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THOUGHT*

1. The quarterly accepts original unpublished scientific articles devoted to issues within a broad field of economics and political studies as well as management. Submitted manuscripts should provide substantial theoretical generalisations. The journal also publishes reviews and reports on academic life. The submission of an article means the author approves of and follows commonly accepted rules of publication ethics and publication malpractice. Articles are subject to evaluation by two reviewers and their positive opinion is a condition for their publication.
2. Manuscripts should be submitted in one copy of a standard typescript (30 lines of 60 characters each, i.e. ca. 1,800 characters per page) together with a digital version saved on a data storage device and emailed to [wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl](mailto:wydawnictwo@lazarski.edu.pl).
3. Footnotes should be placed at the bottom of a page providing the initials of the author's given name and surname, the year of publication, the title, the name of a journal or a publisher, the place of publication (in case of books) and a page number.  
In case of books with multiple authors, give the first name and surname of their editors. Online material is to be described in the same way as articles in print journals or books followed by a URL and the date of access. It is also necessary to add a bibliography after the article text. Detailed information for authors is published on the Lazarski University Publishing House website: <https://www.lazarski.pl/pl/badania-i-rozwoj/oficyna-wydawnicza-uczelni-lazarskiego/dla-auto-row/> (We encourage you to read the English version).
4. Photographs and drawings can be submitted in the original version (for scanning) or saved in TIFF, GIF and BMP formats.
5. An article should be accompanied by references, key words, and abstract informing about its aim, methodology, work outcomes and conclusions. An abstract should not exceed 20 lines of typescript.
6. An article should be in the range between 18 and 25 pages of a standard typescript (not including references) and a review, scientific news or information 12 pages.
7. The editor reserves the right to introduce changes in the manuscript submitted for publication, e.g. shorten it, change the title and subheadings as well as correct the style.
8. A manuscript shall contain the author's full given name and surname, their residence address with the telephone/fax number, their email address, the scientific degree or title and the name of the scientific institution the author works for.

*ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL THOUGHT*  
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1. The Editorial Board appoints at least two independent reviewers, i.e. specialists who are not Łazarski University employees, to evaluate each publication.
2. One of the two reviewers shall be an employee of a foreign research centre.
3. The reviewing procedure is a so-called double-blind peer review process, i.e. follows a rule that an author and reviewers do not know their identity.
4. Reviewers submit written declarations of non-existence of a conflict of interests in their relations with the authors of articles being reviewed.
5. A review must be developed in writing and provide an unambiguous recommendation to accept a manuscript for publication or decline it.
6. The above procedure and rules of reviewing are published on the *Economic and Political Thought* website.
7. The names of reviewers of particular publications are not revealed. However, the name of the reviewer of each quarterly issue is publicised. The above procedures and reviewing principles conform to the directives of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Editor-in-chief  
dr Adrian Chojan

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Uczelnia Łazarskiego rozpoczęła działalność 1 października 1993 r. Dziś jest to jedna z najbardziej prestiżowych niepublicznych uczelni w Polsce. Prowadzi studia na siedmiu kierunkach: prawo, administracja, stosunki międzynarodowe, ekonomia, finanse i rachunkowość, zarządzanie oraz kierunek lekarski.

W 2006 r. Uczelnia uzyskała uprawnienia do nadawania stopnia naukowego doktora nauk prawnych, w 2016 uprawnienia do nadawania stopnia doktora habilitowanego nauk prawnych, a obecnie czyni starania o uzyskanie uprawnień do nadawania stopnia naukowego doktora nauk ekonomicznych i w dziedzinie nauk społecznych w zakresie nauk o polityce. Od 2012 roku na kierunku stosunków międzynarodowych działa Centrum Naukowe Uczelni Łazarskiego i Instytutu Studiów Politycznych PAN. Kierunek ten w 2016 roku uzyskał ocenę wyróżniającą Polskiej Komisji Akredytacyjnej.

Uczelnię Łazarskiego wyróżnia wysoki stopień umiędzynarodowienia; prowadzi w języku angielskim studia I i II stopnia w trybie stacjonarnym na trzech kierunkach: ekonomia, stosunki międzynarodowe i zarządzanie. Cztery programy studiów otrzymały akredytację Coventry University z Wielkiej Brytanii – ich absolwenci otrzymują dwa dyplomy: polski i angielski. Uczelnia prowadzi też współpracę z prestiżowymi uniwersytetami amerykańskimi: Georgetown University w Waszyngtonie, University of Kentucky w Lexington i University of Wisconsin w La Crosse.

Nasza Uczelnia zajmuje trzecie miejsce w rankingach uczelni niepublicznych, a Wydział Prawa i Administracji od wielu lat jest liderem w rankingach wydziałów prawa uczelni niepublicznych. Realizowane u nas programy nauczania są współtworzone z wybitnymi praktykami i odpowiadają oczekiwaniom pracodawców. Dzięki temu 96% naszych absolwentów znajduje pracę w trakcie lub zaraz po studiach.

W ramach Uczelni działa również Centrum Kształcenia Podyplomowego, oferujące wysokiej jakości usługi z zakresu kształcenia podyplomowego, szkoleń i doradztwa dla firm, instytucji oraz jednostek administracji państwowej i samorządowej. Absolwentom studiów prawniczych oferujemy anglojęzyczne studia LLM (odpowiednik MBA), umożliwiające zdobycie międzynarodowego dyplomu prawniczego.

Wykładowcy Uczelni to znani w kraju i za granicą dydaktycy, którzy łączą pracę naukową z doświadczeniem zdobytym w renomowanych i cenionych na rynku firmach i instytucjach. To również znakomici profesorowie z Wielkiej Brytanii, Niemiec i Stanów Zjednoczonych.

Uczelnia Łazarskiego posiada certyfikaty „Wiarygodna Szkoła”, „Uczelnia walcząca z plagiatami”, „Dobra Uczelnia, Dobra Praca” oraz „Uczelnia Liderów”.