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## NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC TASKS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AT THE TURN OF THE SECOND AND THIRD DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

National security is a process of continuous ensuring of opportunities to pursue national interests in conditions of uncertainty, challenges and threats posed by external and internal factors<sup>1</sup>. This can be done by means of the current responding to emerging needs in this area (the operating behaviour) or pre-emptive preparation in advance (the strategic behaviour). The first method is expensive and often unreliable due to the possibility of being surprised by the nature and scale of the needs. Therefore, any prudent state tries to act strategically. This means long-term planning and the organisation of appropriate preparations for the future. The proper identification of priority strategic tasks in the short, medium and long term perspective is of particular importance in the context of such preparations<sup>2</sup>. This publication presents such a catalogue of priorities in relation to the security of the Republic of Poland for the next 5–10 years.

In recent years the security conditions in the immediate vicinity of Poland and in the surrounding of our security supra-systems, that is NATO and the EU, have deteriorated. Behind the eastern border of Poland, NATO and the

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Koziej, S. 2016. System bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski. [Systems of Poland's national security.] In: Pietraś, M., Wojtaszczyk, K.A. eds. *Polska w systemie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego*. [Poland in the international security system.] Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, pp. 269–294.

<sup>2</sup> Koziej, S. 2015. Strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa). [The strategy of national (state) security.] In: Pawłowski, J. ed. *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa współczesnego państwa (podmiotu). Implikacje*. [Bases of security of the contemporary state (entity). Implications.] Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, pp. 493–532.

EU there is an armed conflict. Russia, illegally annexing Crimea, and then supporting directly and indirectly a separatist rebellion in the east of Ukraine, has undermined the international order in Europe. Ukraine itself is struggling with internal problems. Russia is increasing the political and strategic pressure on Eastern European NATO states, including through intensive information war and provoking military incidents in the air and sea space at the junction with NATO. At the same time in the Middle East and North Africa a threat from the so-called Islamic State is expanding and intra-European terrorism is weakening the stability of Europe. The EU is experiencing the largest internal crisis since its inception against the background of the migratory pressure, weakening integration processes, problems with leadership. All this causes specific threats and challenges for security that require both current and long-term efforts to strengthen national security of the Polish Republic.

The most urgent and current task is to complete the process of changes in the Polish security system related to the strategic turn shifting the main effort from foreign missions (expeditionary policy) to tasks related to direct Polish security, including the defence of its own territory. This means that state institutions should carry out a series of mutually coordinated activities aimed at strengthening the national potential and external pillars of Polish security. In this analysis I present ten strategic tasks, the implementation of which should lead to the achievement of this goal.

## 1. THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING CYCLE

*Task: the completion of the strategic planning cycle taking into account the negative changes in the security environment caused by Russia's aggressive policy; verification of its results in the exercise of the COUNTRY type and launching of the next planning and organisation cycle, starting from conducting the second Strategic Review of National Security.*

In recent years the state action in the area of national strategic planning has been put in order. Currently its full cycle is finishing, started with the first Strategic Review of National Security (2010–2012)<sup>3</sup>, then the approval of the new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (November

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<sup>3</sup> Overt results of the review: NSB. 2013. *Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

2014)<sup>4</sup> and the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland issued by the President (July 2015)<sup>5</sup>. Now the main task is to update the operational plans for the operation of all the structures of the state in times of threat and war. This applies to both the central government and local governments, as well as the Armed Forces and other services and guards performing safety tasks. It is connected also with the need to update the Defence Response Plan of the Republic of Poland.

Another task is to complete the preparation and carrying out of the system verification exercise codenamed COUNTRY. The concept of the exercise was approved after the release the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland<sup>6</sup>. During the exercise the person designated to be appointed as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in the event of war should appear in this function for the first time.

In parallel with the operational preparations, the next cycle of development programming of the Armed Forces should be carried out, pursuant to the resolution of the Polish President on ‘Major Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and their Preparation for the Defence of the state for the years 2017–2026’<sup>7</sup>.

In 2016, it is advisable to start a next cycle of national strategic planning, starting from carrying out the second Strategic Review of National Security<sup>8</sup>. The review should have a verification and conceptual nature, giving the basis

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<sup>4</sup> NSB. 2014. *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

<sup>5</sup> The Political and Strategic Defence Directive specifies the tasks for all state structures at the time of threat and war. See NSB. The NSB chief for PAP: *Dyrektiva obronna najważniejszym dokumentem wykonawczym do Strategii Bezpieczeństwa*. [The Defence Directive – the most important executive document of the Security Strategy.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6905,Szef-NSB-dla-PAP-Dyrektiva-obronna-najwazniejszym-dokumentem-wykonawczym-do-Stra.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

<sup>6</sup> The President approved the concept of the exercises at the beginning of August 2015. See: NSB. The NSB chief for PAP *Ws. ćwiczeń systemu obronnego pk. „Kraj”*. [On the defence system exercise codenamed COUNTRY.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6942,Szef-NSB-dla-PAP-ws-cwiczen-systemu-obronnego-pk-quotKraj-quot.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

<sup>7</sup> See NSB. *Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych*. [The President specified the main directions of development of the Armed Forces.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/6941,Prezydent-okreslil-glowne-kierunki-rozwoju-Sil-Zbrojnych.html> [Accessed 5 May 2016].

<sup>8</sup> On the role of the review see: Kamiński, S. 2015. *Przegląd bezpieczeństwa narodowego w planowaniu strategicznym Polski*. [The review of national security in the strategic planning of Poland.] Warszawa: Difin.

for the design of recommendations responding to the changing conditions of international and national security<sup>9</sup>.

The review should formulate a recommendation on the maintenance, revision or preparation of a new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. The result of the Review, in addition to the preparation of the report for the state authorities, should be also the second edition of the White Paper on National Security of the Republic of Poland.

The review can also be an opportunity to undertake work on Poland's first Encyclopaedia of National Security supporting the development of Polish security sciences<sup>10</sup>.

## 2. THE CONSOLIDATION (INTEGRATION) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

*The task: to strengthen the organisational system of national security management – the establishment of the Committee of the Council of Ministers for National Security and strengthening of the Government Security Centre as the staff body of this committee. Conducting a strategic training with the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, verification of the state defence managing positions, ensuring secure communications and the purchase of an aircraft for the transport of the most important people in the country (including mobile control stations).*

Polish security is still managed 'by departments'. There are separate systems of planning and management of defence and crisis response extending from the headquarters, through ministries, provinces, up to local govern-

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<sup>9</sup> Possible options of conducting the second Strategic Review of National Security – see Koziej, S. *Ogólna koncepcja II Strategicznego Przeglądu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*. [The general concept of the second Strategic Review of National Security.] Available at: <http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Opcje-II-SPBN.pdf> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

<sup>10</sup> The plan originated in the National Security Bureau during the preparation of the next strategic review. A reflection of this needs may also be: NSB, *MINISŁOWNIK NSB. Propozycje nowych terminów z dziedziny bezpieczeństwa*. [Minidictionary of NSB. Proposals for new terms in the field of security.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/minislownik-NSB-propozy/6035,MINISLOWNIK-NSB-Propozycje-nowych-terminow-z-dziedziny-bezpieczenstwa.html> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

ments (separate defence, crisis, Civil Defence plans and programmes). There is no integrated and comprehensive approach<sup>11</sup>.

This happens in conditions when more and more areas of security are trans-sectoral (e.g. cyber security, energy security, defence industry issues, coordination of special services, etc.), which requires unified management. At the same time, among others, question of the organisation and functioning of the National Civil Defence should be comprehensively regulated, as it is a structure responsible for the protection of the population in the conditions of external threat to the security of the state and during a war.

Therefore there is a need to consolidate the system of national security at all levels of the state – from the Council of Ministers to the level of local government – according to a model: a decision-maker, a collegiate advisory body, a staff body.

At the central level, it is advisable to establish a Governmental Committee for National Security serviced by the Government National Security Centre, created by the expansion of the current Government Security Centre.

Moreover, key strategic state documents pertaining to security should also be substantively integrated. For example, instead of the current Political and Strategic Defence Directive, which regulates only defence matters, a Political and Strategic National Security Directive should be prepared which would regulate the activities of the state in all areas of security.

The integration of the national security management system also requires the regulation of laws, which can be achieved through the preparation of the law on national security management.

The implementation of such a comprehensive approach in practice requires proper preparation of specialised clerical personnel. For the needs of the national security management system it is advisable to create a university engaged in research and education in the field of integrated, trans-sectoral, cross-sectoral, state-wide national security (educating both students, and – at special courses – executives and civil servants). Such a university might be established during a reform of higher military education.

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<sup>11</sup> All major theoretical studies confirm the conclusions of the Strategic Review of National Security about the need to integrate safety actions. See, e.g. Pawłowski, J. ed., *op. cit.*

### 3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC RESILIENCE OF THE COUNTRY TO AGGRESSION

*The task: the completion of the preparation and implementation of a programme for strengthening the strategic resilience of the country to aggression (the duties of Special Forces in the defence of the country, the reform of the National Reserve Forces, the reserve mobilisation system, Civil Defence, the prevalence of defensive preparations, education for security, support for initiatives and activities of pro-defence associations and other social organisations, including for fostering patriotism).*

The basis for ensuring the external security of the state is a suitable deterrence potential, which can have both an offensive (retaliatory) dimension and a defensive (deterrent) one.

In terms of offensive deterrence we should maximally use the alliance potential (nuclear and conventional ones) and selectively build our own capacities. At the same time Poland should organise its own national system of defensive deterrence (deterrence, repression).

The purpose of this system should be to immunise the state and its territory to various forms of aggression, especially to hybrid aggression, including primarily subthreshold aggression (below the threshold of an open, regular war), so that in strategic calculations of a potential aggressor offensive actions would be too expensive in comparison with the expected political and strategic benefits.

Therefore, the construction of a system of strategic resilience to all kinds of threats must be continued<sup>12</sup>. The idea behind this system is the coordination of the legislative, operational, training, organisational, technical, etc actions in areas such as:

- irregular activities on the territory occupied by the enemy;
- military and non-military support of operating troops in regular activities;
- preparation of mobilisation reserves;
- operational preparation of the territory and protection of critical infrastructure;

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<sup>12</sup> See more on this topic, among others, in: Koziej, S. 2016. Strategiczna odporność kraju i rola w niej podmiotów niepaństwowych. [Strategic resilience of the country and the role of the non-state actors.] *Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem*. Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego, vol. 8, no. 1/2016, pp. 82–92.

- ensuring the safety of citizens and state structures, including widespread civil protection;
- conducting public education for security, including defence preparation of society, among others, by exploiting the potential of non-governmental pro-defence organisations.

These operational tasks require the clarification of tasks of the Special Forces, the reformed National Reserve Forces (NSR) and territorial defence forces built on their basis, non-military security and civil protection formations, or non-governmental pro-defence organisations. These are also tasks connected with the improvement of the system of reserves mobilisation.

Irregular activities on the territory occupied by the enemy should be organised and coordinated by the Special Forces<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, they should be entrusted with a wider scope of country defence tasks; what is necessary is the increase of their number and their training on the territory of the country with other state structures.

A task of territorial defence forces (created especially as a result of the reform and expansion of the National Reserve Forces) should be local support for activities of operational troops and other security forces, as well as participation in irregular activities on the territory overrun by the enemy. Preparation for this task should be based on the reform and expansion of the NRF, leading to the creation of separate formations at military units, operating under the subordination to Provincial Military Chiefs of Staff ('provincial governors' army'). It is important that their members should be primarily reservists, not candidates for professional service.

It is necessary to improve the system of reserve mobilisation, enabling the strategic expansion of the armed forces to the size and structure of the war time and their replenishment in the course of any hostilities. The tasks in this area are the adequate planning of needs, the organisation of the mobilisation of resources and their systematic training.

The safety of state structures, citizens and critical infrastructure in the face of armed threats should be provided by non-military security formations. This is connected with the need to clarify properly tasks of the police, special forces, local government guards, security agencies and object protection formations and to prepare them for these tasks.

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<sup>13</sup> A study about special troops – see Królikowski, H. 2005. *Działania specjalne w strategii wojskowej III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [Special operations in the military strategy of the Third Republic of Poland.] Siedlce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej.

Adequately prepared formations of civil protection should be responsible for the protection of civilians from the effects of military and non-military threats in a time of war<sup>14</sup>. Preparation tasks in this area should involve, among others, the creation of a rescue system involving services such as the National Fire Service, emergency medical services and volunteer fire brigade and the creation of structures of Civil Defence of the Country for a time of war (appropriate transformation of some rescue formations into National Civil Defence formations for this time).

An important role in the system should be played by social pro-defence organisations (associations, uniformed classes, reconstruction groups), realising the task of preparing citizens and local communities for national security and preparing them to act in conditions of threat and war, including the implementation of defence tasks<sup>15</sup>.

#### 4. THE ORGANISATION OF THE NATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE ACCELERATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CYBER SECURITY SYSTEM

*The task: to develop a doctrine of information security and organise operation units in cyberspace in the Ministry of National Defence and other ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation) and public safety protection services, and to create a system of supra-ministry coordination of information activities and in cyberspace.*

Among hybrid threats for the security of Poland the first place is occupied by the politico-military pressure, carried out mainly in the information sphere, also in cyberspace. Therefore, it should be a priority to build an

<sup>14</sup> On challenges in this sphere see, among others: Kossowski, B., Włodarski, A. ed. 2007. *Wyzwania bezpieczeństwa cywilnego XXI wieku – inżynieria działań w obszarze nauki, dydaktyki i praktyki*. [Civil security challenges in the twenty-first century – engineering activities in the field of science, education and practice.] Warszawa: Fundacja Edukacja i Technika Ratownictwa.

<sup>15</sup> Koziej, S. 2016. Marnowanie potencjału organizacji proobronnych nie wchodzi w grę. [Wasting of the potential of pro-defence organization is out of the question.] In: Chęłchowski, W., Czuba, A. *Militarni. Już wojskowi czy jeszcze cywile*. [The military. Already the military or still civilians.] Warszawa: MUZA SA.



effective system of information security with a well-organised cyber security sector<sup>16</sup>.

The beginning of action should be the development and adoption of the information security doctrine as one of the documents implementing the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland<sup>17</sup>. The doctrine should specify strategic objectives and determine the desirable courses of action (operational tasks), and the necessary preparations (preparation tasks) in the field of information security.

According to the outlined guidelines, the individual information security units (including cyber security units) should be created and expanded in the defence and protection (military and non-military) links of the national security system. These should be structures capable of performing both defensive and offensive tasks.

It is particularly important to ensure the sovereign operating and technical control over highly digitalised systems of combat and support, including management systems (disposal of source codes of their software). An important task is supra-ministry coordination of this issue in the context of building an integrated system of national security.

In the context of threats in cyberspace, it is important to:

- develop mechanisms of interaction and cooperation between the public and private sectors;
- ensure a balance between security measures and civil liberties;
- continuously improve civic awareness in the field of cyber security;
- use the potential of citizens within the country's cyber defence and cyber protection in the form of voluntary work for cyber security of the state;
- construct a support system for research and development projects in the field of cyber security, conducted in cooperation with the world of science and commercial enterprises;
- invest in national solutions in the field of cyber security, in particular in the field of cryptology;

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<sup>16</sup> Recently adopted doctrinal findings should be used and implemented. See: NSB. 2015. *Doktryna Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. [The cybersecurity doctrine of the Republic of Poland.] Warszawa.

<sup>17</sup> A draft of such a document has been prepared by the NSB: *Doktryna Bezpieczeństwa Informacyjnego. Projekt*. [The Doctrine of Information Security. A draft.] Available at: [http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Projekt\\_Doktryny\\_Bezpieczenstwa\\_Informacyjnego\\_RP.pdf](http://koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Projekt_Doktryny_Bezpieczenstwa_Informacyjnego_RP.pdf) [Accessed 6 May 2016].

- create a national mechanism for coordination of activities, serving not only the improvement of cooperation within the public administration, but also coordination of cooperation with the private sector.

In addition to the activities within information security, also other areas of non-military security, including energy security and economic security, should be strengthened.

## 5. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF PREPARATION OF RESERVE MOBILISATION AND A REFORM OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE FORCES

*The task: to develop a system of armed forces mobilisation, with a simultaneous reform of the National Reserve Forces and involvement of social pro-defence organisations.*

In the conditions of having a professional army, it is necessary for the state to have appropriately numerous and well-prepared reserves that can be mobilised.

It is assumed that the task of a professional army in a time of peace is primarily to prevent the outbreak of a conflict. In the event of war on a large scale the activities must be carried out by the armed forces expanded by the mobilisation to the size needed for this time. The expansion and prevalence of defence is ensured by the systematically trained reserves, along with weapons and equipment maintained them for the time of the expansion. In the face of the contemporary needs this solution is adequate and reasonable.

The increased activity of all pro-defence non-governmental social organisations should be maximally utilised for the training of military reserves. A good step in this direction is to associate some of these organisation into a national federation of such entities, with the support of the Ministry of National Defence.

An important element of the military reserve system should also be the reformed National Reserve Forces, along with the territorial defence forces created as a result of the reform. Reforming them we should move from single NRF jobs located today in operating troops to establishing separate, territorially subordinated formations (branches) of the NRF, constituting the first, 'elitist' and operational echelon (as opposed to the mobilisation of reserves) of strategic reserves of the Polish Armed Forces.

The main operational tasks of the so reformed the NRF should include local support for operations of operational troops and other services of the

state in ensuring territorial security or participation in irregular activities on the territory overrun by the enemy.

## 6. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 'THIRD WAVE' OF TECHNICAL MODERNISATION OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES – CYBER DEFENCE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS, PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS

*The task: to consistently pursue a long-term programme of technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces in accordance with the adopted priorities and to prepare a programme of the modernisation 'third wave' oriented at extensive computerisation of the army (cyber defence, unmanned systems, precision-guided weapons, including ones based on the use of satellite technology).*

The Armed Forces are a synthesis of three factors: man, weapons and organisation<sup>18</sup>. The personal capital is the most important. The organisational solutions are also important. However, weapon is the essence of the army. Without it, even the largest and best-organised group of people would not be a full-fledged army. Therefore, the development of weapons and military technology and their continuous technical modernisation are factors that largely prejudice the strength and the face of the armed forces, and determine the direction of the transformation of the army<sup>19</sup>.

The rational, planned and long-term development of the Armed Forces in Poland has a nearly fifteen-year history. Its beginning was the establishment in 2001 of the statutory fixed rate of budgetary outlays on the military at the level not lower than 1.95 percent of GDP (and, additionally, in a separate act 0.05 percent of GDP on the multiannual programme to finance the purchase of a multi-purpose aircraft).

As part of the planned modernisation a number of important programmes, which can be described as the 'first wave' of the modernisation of the Polish Army in the twenty-first century, have been implemented in the Armed Forces. It concerns primarily the acquisition of a multi-role aircraft F-16, a wheeled armoured personnel carrier ROSOMAK, or an anti-missile system SPIKE.

<sup>18</sup> See more in: Koziej, S. 2011. *Teoria sztuki wojennej*. [The theory of military art.] Warszawa: Bellona.

<sup>19</sup> See more on this topic, among others, in: Ciastoń, R. et al. 2014. *Sily Zbrojne RP – stan, perspektywy i wyzwania modernizacyjne*. [The Polish Armed Forces – the state, prospects and modernization challenges.] Warszawa: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego.

Currently the 'second wave' of the modernisation is being implemented. It consists of the programmes that are launched in accordance with the priorities laid down in the governmental and presidential Major Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and their Preparations for the Defence of the State for the years 2013–2022:

- air defence, including anti-missile defence<sup>20</sup>;
- information systems (communications, reconnaissance, command);
- the mobility of land forces, especially the helicopter mobility.

As a result of the implementation of these programmes the Polish Armed Forces will belong to the main core of NATO forces. An important support here is raising the fixed rate of budgetary expenditure on defence to 2 percent of GDP.

However, in the near future the Polish Armed Forces await the implementation of priorities within the framework of the 'third wave' of the modernisation, the assumptions of which were outlined in the decision of the President on the Main Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and their Preparations for the Defence of the State for the years 2017–2026<sup>21</sup>.

Similarly to Toffler's theory of development of civilisation, the 'third wave' of the modernisation of the Polish Army in the twenty-first century should be a technological leap in the sphere of information. This means massive equipping of the Polish Armed Forces with the computerised combat and support systems. This process should be completed in the third or fourth decade of the twenty-first century.

As part of the 'third wave' the following three modernisation development programmes of the Polish Armed Forces must be treated as a priority<sup>22</sup>:

- Cyber defence means (broadly – cyber combat, cyber weapons) – combat for supremacy in cyberspace will be even more important for the success

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<sup>20</sup> See, e.g. Ciastoń, R. et al. 2014. „Polska Tarcza” – potrzeby, wyzwania i implikacje dla bezpieczeństwa kraju. [Polish ballistic missile defence – needs, challenges and implications for the security of the country.] Warszawa: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego.

<sup>21</sup> See: NSB. Prezydent określił główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych. [The President specified the main directions of development of the Armed Forces.], op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> These priorities are in line with the latest trends in the development of the armed forces in the most technologically advanced armies of the world. See, e.g. the strategy of the so-called 'third offset' in the US Army: *The third U.S. offset strategy and its implications for partners and allies. As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, Willard Hotel, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2015.* Available at: <http://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=2575&Article=606641>

than, for instance, the struggle for supremacy in the air known in the previous century.

- Unmanned combat and support systems – the information revolution enables and enforces even wider replacing of men by highly computerised, unmanned systems (drones). Just like in the twentieth century cavalry was supplanted by tanks, so in the twenty-first century manned machines will be supplanted by unmanned ones.
- Precision-guided weapons, including the ones using satellite security technologies, i.e. systems making use of space for the need of national security, including the armed forces (just like all other computerised systems of combat and support, systems based on operation in cyberspace cannot operate effectively without the simultaneous use of space). Satellite communication, the use of satellites to identify, monitor, control, command, etc., are a prerequisite for the effective operation of computerised armed forces saturated with ITCs.

## 7. LAUNCHING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS (A FLYWHEEL OF INNOVATIVENESS FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT)

*The task: to launch and implement the National Programme of Unmanned Systems as an engine of innovativeness for safety and economic development, especially the innovativeness of Polish defence industry.*

There is a good chance for Poland to become one of the leading international manufacturers of unmanned systems. This innovative direction also presents a unique opportunity for a generation leap for Polish research and production potential in the sphere of defence.

Unmanned systems are among the most prospective security systems, including defence and protection systems. They are also used in other sectors of the economy, and in many spheres of public and private life. Other arguments in favour of the use of unmanned systems are their effectiveness, efficiency, and economic considerations, and – most importantly – the reduced risk of loss of human life or health<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> See more on this topic, e.g., in: NSB. *Potrzebny narodowy program bezałogowców*. [We need the national programme of unmanned systems.] Available at: <https://www.NSB.gov>.

Therefore, their use and development must be one of modernisation priorities, which is already happening among others in the Polish army. In the future, their use, also by public and non-public services and protective guards will take place on an even larger scale. We can also expect an increase in commercial demand for drones, because a group of users of such systems, as well as the number of their applications is constantly growing.

When using unmanned aerial systems in the area of security a key issue is the information control and management systems, or 'cryptographic control' (own software source codes), without which it is impossible to fully rely on the used equipment. This is one of the most important arguments for the establishment of own, national programme of their development and production.

To fully control unmanned aerial systems at the operational level, they must be of Polish production. Purchases from abroad are in such a situation burdened with too great a risk to base the equipment of Polish forces and structures of national security on them.

Polish science and industry have a promising human and technical potential, creating opportunities for innovativeness to design and produce a full range of unmanned systems of various classes and types in the perspective of a decade.

Using this chance Poland could be in the forefront of European countries-producers of unmanned systems, and also cooperate with international producers, for example, in the framework of the European programme of unmanned systems<sup>24</sup>.

What is necessary to launch the initiative of the National Programme for Unmanned Systems is the interest and cooperation of three groups: users defining the needs (the Polish Armed Forces, the police, services, guards); a scientific potential focused on the development of national solutions (including the National Centre for Research and Development); a production potential implementing specific projects (Polish defence industry entities). The cooperation of the above communities and the achieved synergy are a primary way to implement this complex challenge. It will also create a unique chance for a generation leap of Polish R&D and production poten-

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pl/pl/wydarzenia/5375,Potrzebny-Narodowy-Program-Bezzalogowcow.html and [http://youtu.be/Dxk5Z\\_Fd0NI](http://youtu.be/Dxk5Z_Fd0NI) [Accessed 6 May 2016].

<sup>24</sup> Even today these possibilities are significant. See, e.g. Lentowicz, Z. 2016. Bezzalogowce z Polski poleca walczyc za granica. [Unmanned aerial systems from Poland will fly to fight abroad.] *Rzeczpospolita* 4 May 2016.

tial in the sphere of defence<sup>25</sup>, making unmanned systems a showcase of the national defence potential

## 8. THE ACTIVITIES STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

*The task: to develop on the international forum activities strengthening the mechanisms of NATO collective defence, including the defence potential on the eastern flank of the Alliance, especially by transforming the training, rotational presence of the armed forces of allied countries in the region into the strategic, continuous, permanent presence.*

NATO responded adequately to the outbreak of the conflict in the east increasing the military allied activity and presence in the flank countries, as well as in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea<sup>26</sup>.

However, given the durability of changes in the security environment caused by Russia, the permanent strategic adaptation of the Alliance's policy has become an important issue, especially by strengthening the mechanisms of collective defence.

Important directions of this adaptation – leading to strategic strengthening of the capacity on the eastern flank of NATO – were adopted at the NATO summit in Newport in 2014. The most important of them is the continuous, rotational military presence on the eastern flank in the framework of the increased exercise activity; the creation of the so-called 'Very High Readiness Joint Task Force' for immediate response (VJTF); the creation of advanced command elements with the necessary logistic infrastructure and support; the concretisation of contingency plans with the possible transformation of some of them into permanent defence plans in the future.

At the NATO summit in Warsaw (scheduled for 8–9 July 2016) these tasks should be summarised. At the same time it will be important to design the directions of the further strategic adaptation of the Alliance.

In this regard, it should be the most important to build the capacity to scare away, halt, deter a potential opponent from aggression below the threshold of an open, regular war. The Alliance undoubtedly has the cred-

<sup>25</sup> To see how important it is, see Kleiber, M. 2014. Nauka i technologia na rzecz bezpieczeństwa państwa w polskich realiach. [Science and technology is aid of the security of the state in the Polish reality.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 32, pp. 61–74.

<sup>26</sup> Koziej, S., Pietrzak, P. 2014. Szczyt NATO w Newport. [NATO summit in Newport.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 31, pp. 11–30.

ible deterrence potential, including nuclear deterrence, against large-scale aggression on its territory. On the other hand, the difficulty with responding and obtaining a consensus within NATO may occur in the event of irregular, asymmetric aggression, hybrid low-intensity aggression, and especially aggression below the threshold of an open war<sup>27</sup>.

One of the important ways to deter a potential aggressor from such actions is to ensure a strategic presence of troops from other allied countries on the territory of NATO border states. A potential attacker would then have to take into his strategic account entering into a conflict not only with the country which is the target of aggression, but also the countries whose troops would be deployed on the territory of the attacked state.

It is therefore necessary to strengthen the military presence in the border countries, in particular, to give it a more permanent nature. The concept of 'Very High Readiness Joint Task Force' adopted in Newport and the system of the rotary, exercise presence should be supplemented at the summit in Warsaw with the continuous presence of not even numerous, but clearly visible allied forces and adequate infrastructure in the border zone of NATO.

It is also important that the use the doctrine of the 'Very High Readiness Joint Task Force' for immediate response also assumed their anticipatory expansion in the direction of threats already in the phase of the emerging crisis, and not only in the form of a response to the existing aggression. Moreover, previous deployment of military equipment and weaponry in the border countries ('prepositioning') will also contribute to enhancing of the speed of VJTF operations.

One important challenge is NATO's conceptual response to Russia's nuclear doctrine with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, including the concept of the so-called 'de-escalation nuclear strikes' during a conventional conflict. This requires modification and adaptation of NATO nuclear doctrine concerning especially tactical nuclear weapons to virtually neo-Cold War conditions<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> On certain aspects of this problem – see Fryc, M. 2015. Polska strategia obronności wobec potencjalnego wystąpienia zagrożenia militarnego z elementami „wojny hybrydowej”. [Polish defence strategy against the potential military threat with 'hybrid war' elements.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 33, pp. 61–80.

<sup>28</sup> Koziej, S. 2016. Nuclear deterrence in the new Cold War. *Geopolitical Information Service* 6 May 2016. Available at: <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/article/1462512789466042800> [Accessed 6 May 2016].



It also seems that, given the scale, nature and duration of changes in the security environment<sup>29</sup>, a fundamental reflection within NATO on the amendment to the Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010 will be necessary. It is advisable to start working on it already at the next NATO summit in Warsaw, with the prospect of the adoption of a new concept at the summit in 2018.

## 9. ACTIVITIES LEADING TO STRATEGIC EMPOWERMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE EU (POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO HYBRID THREATS)

*The task: to continue efforts to agree on a new common and viable EU security strategy, taking into account its complementarity with NATO and the development of systemic mechanisms of cooperation between NATO and the EU (the construction of a Euro-Atlantic 'security tandem').*

The European Union is one of the pillars of Poland's security<sup>30</sup>. Despite the fact that NATO remains the main international guarantor of military security, including of Poland and other Central European countries, the reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict showed that the EU has a great deterrent potential implemented by means of economic instruments, such as economic sanctions. The EU can also complement the competences of the Alliance in the field of non-military security, including energy, information, cybernetic, financial and social security.

If, however, the potential of the EU as a security pillar of the Republic of Poland is to be fully utilised, it has to become an essential strategic actor in the field of security and defence. That is why, Poland should seek to strengthen the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), engaging in the development of this initiative and defining its future shape<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> A prognostic study on this topic: Fiszer, J.M., Wódka, J., Olszewski, P., Paszewski, T., Cianciara, A., Orzelska-Stączek, A. 2014. *System euroatlantycki w wielobiegunowym świecie. Próba prognozy. [The Euro-Atlantic system in the multipolar world. A forecast attempt.]* Warszawa: ISP PAN.

<sup>30</sup> Fiszer, J.M. ed. 2015. *Dziesięć lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Próba bilansu i nowe otwarcie. [Ten years of Polish membership in the European Union. An assessment attempt and a new opening.]* Warszawa: ISP PAN.

<sup>31</sup> Koziej, S. 2016. *Przed czerwcowym szczytem UE w sprawie WPBiO – Europa potrzebuje jakościowo nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa. [Before the June EU summit on CSDP –*

The main challenge of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy – which became evident as a result of the Ukrainian crisis<sup>32</sup> – is the lack of a uniform strategy with which all Member States would identify themselves. The European Union needs a strategy to become a more efficient and effective institution. This strategy should relate to military affairs, but also (and perhaps primarily) to non-military aspects of security<sup>33</sup>.

What is needed are actions building the sense of the empowerment of the European Union as a strategic actor of security, especially in the face of the rapidly changing security environment on its eastern flank. A key to strengthening the subjectivity of the EU will be the implementation of the tasks posed by the European Council on 25–26 June 2015 ordering the preparation of the EU global strategy for foreign and security policy by June 2016<sup>34</sup>.

The cooperation on the forum of NATO-EU is of particular importance. It seems that now is the right time to break the long-term deadlock and take action to build a Euro-Atlantic security tandem.

It is important in the face of the contemporary complexity of security threats in Europe<sup>35</sup>, hybridity meaning the simultaneous use of different methods and means of pressure and aggression from political, diplomatic, informational ones, through economic, financial, energy, cyber, to military ones in all possible degrees of severity (including aggression below the threshold of an open, regular war, particularly dangerous for allied/community organisations).

The EU-NATO tandem is an optimal solution in countering hybrid threats. The EU would be particularly effective in the field of non-military security and NATO in political and military security.

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*Europe needs a qualitatively new security strategy.*] Fundacja Pułaskiego. Available at: <http://pulaski.pl/przed-czerwcowym-szczytem-ue-w-sprawie-wpbio-europa-potrzebuj-jakosciowo-nowej-strategii-bezpieczenstwa/> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

<sup>32</sup> Sobczyk, K. 2015. Konflikt na Ukrainie – porażka czy szansa dla Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE? [The conflict in Ukraine – a defeat or a chance for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy?] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 33, pp. 37–60.

<sup>33</sup> Koziej, S., Formusiewicz, R. 2014. O potrzebie nowej strategii bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej. [The need for a new security strategy of the European Union.] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 32, pp. 17–30.

<sup>34</sup> Koziej, S. 2016. The EU needs a security strategy based on common interests. *Geopolitical Information Service* 2 September 2016. Available at: <http://geopolitical-info.com/en/defense-and-security/the-eu-needs-a-security-strategy-based-on-common-interests> [Accessed 6 May 2016].

<sup>35</sup> On the diversity of threats and challenges – see Wojciechowski, S., Potyrała, A. ed. 2014. *Bezpieczeństwo Polski. Współczesne wyzwania.* [Poland's security. Contemporary challenges.] Warszawa: Difin.

## 10. STRENGTHENING OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, ESPECIALLY THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US

*The task: to strive for the permanent stationing of US troops in Poland and in the region (including missile defence systems, air forces, special forces) and to expand Polish-American political-military cooperation adding non-military dimensions. At the same time to strengthen relations with key European allies and the countries of the region lying on the eastern flank of NATO.*

The strategic partnership with the United States is the third – alongside the membership in NATO and the European Union – external pillar of Poland's security. It is in the interest of Poland to strive for the durability and quality of the transatlantic links, based on the foundation of the US military presence in Europe, particularly on the eastern flank of NATO.

Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict the United States has undertaken a number of actions to enhance the security of Central and Eastern Europe, including in the framework of the European Reassurance Initiative announced by US President Barack Obama in Warsaw on the Freedom Day 4 June 2014.

Recently these decisions have been strengthened by an increased budget for the needs of the presence of the US forces in the region; strategic, continuous, rotary in the case of the personnel and constant in the case of heavy equipment and weapons. These activities should acquire a more permanent character, and be complemented by the presence of troops also of other European allies, the presence of NATO's on the eastern flank should have the highest possible multinational character.

Currently a priority for the Polish-American strategic partnership is the planned development of the allied missile defence system, whose key element is the American component within the EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach). A missile defence base located in Redzikowo, the construction of which should begin this year, is to become its part in 2018<sup>36</sup>. The continuation of technical and military cooperation should be also an important element of strengthening this co-operation.

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<sup>36</sup> Fryc, M. 2014. Rozwój amerykańskiego systemu przeciwrakietowego w Europie – czy możliwe jest przyspieszenie budowy „tarczy”? [The development of the American anti-missile system in Europe – is it possible to speed up the construction of Polish ballistic missile defence?] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, no. 31, pp. 31–50.

Apart from the cooperation in the field of 'hard' security, Poland should seek to expand a bilateral strategic security dialogue with the United States adding issues related to supporting democracy in the world, cyber threats, energy security and scientific-technical cooperation. The prospect of cooperation in the field of energy gains special importance.

The strengthening of cooperation with the United States should be accompanied by the development and strengthening of regional and bilateral partnerships of Poland with major European allies (the Weimar Triangle, the United Kingdom), as well as with the countries of the eastern flank (the Visegrad Group, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria), as well as the Scandinavian countries. Investments in the format of the eastern flank countries appear to be particularly promising. They can bring tangible benefits both in terms of bilateral activities, as well as in the framework of NATO and the European Union.

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In conclusion, it is worth noting that the continuity, the continuation of the efforts of the state is particularly important in ensuring national security. Work in fits and starts, from change to change, is not the best procedure. Security requires a strategic approach, and that means being directed by long-term priorities. They cannot be changed ad hoc. Let us hope that a change of political power in Poland – beyond the natural propaganda rhetoric – will not lead to a real break in the priorities of Polish security presented in this publication, and realised, in fact, for years.

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## NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC TASKS OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AT THE TURN OF THE SECOND AND THIRD DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

### Summary

This article presents the main strategic tasks that Poland should take to strengthen their own security in the next 5 to 10 years. The first and particularly important task is to continue the cycle of national strategic planning. It is necessary to complete the development of basic directive and planning documents to ensure the implementation of the adopted in 2014, the new National Security Strategy, and at the same time to start another Strategic Review of National Security, starting a new cycle of planning. Six tasks concern the practical, organisational and technical strengthening Poland's own security capabilities. These include: the consolidation of the system of national security management, building a system of strategic resilience to aggression, organizing national information security system, including the acceleration of the construction of the cyber security system, improving preparation of reserve mobilisation and reform of the National Reserve Forces, implementation of the 'third wave' of technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces – cyber-defence, unmanned systems, precision-guided weapons, launch and implementation of the National Programme for unmanned systems (flywheel of innovation for security and development). The third part of the tasks refers to activities aimed at strengthening the Poland's external security pillars. These are measures to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the strategic actions leading to the empowerment of the European Union and the development of cooperation between NATO and the EU (political and strategic response to hybrid threats) and strengthening strategic partnerships, especially the alliance with the US.



## STRATEGICZNE ZADANIA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA NARODOWEGO RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ NA PRZEŁOMIE II I III DEKADY XXI WIEKU

### Streszczenie

Artykuł przedstawia główne zadania strategiczne, jakie Polska powinna podjąć dla wzmocnienia swojego bezpieczeństwa w najbliższych 5–10 latach. Pierwszym i szczególnie ważnym zadaniem jest kontynuacja cyklu narodowego planowania strategicznego. Należy dokończyć opracowanie podstawowych dokumentów dyrektywnych i planistycznych zapewniających realizację przyjętej w 2014 roku nowej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego i jednocześnie uruchomić kolejny Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, rozpoczynający nowy cykl planistyczny. Sześć zadań dotyczy praktycznego, organizacyjno-technicznego wzmocnienia własnego potencjału bezpieczeństwa. Należą do nich: konsolidacja systemu kierowania bezpieczeństwem narodowym, budowa systemu strategicznej odporności kraju na agresję, organizowanie narodowego systemu bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego – w tym przyspieszenie budowy systemu cyberbezpieczeństwa, doskonalenie systemu przygotowywania rezerw mobilizacyjnych oraz reforma Narodowych Sił Rezerwowych, wdrożenie „trzeciej fali” modernizacji technicznej Sił Zbrojnych RP – cyberobrona, systemy bezzałogowe, broń precyzyjnego rażenia, uruchomienie i realizacja Narodowego Programu Systemów Bezzałogowych (koło zamachowe innowacyjności dla bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju). Trzecia część zadań dotyczy działań na rzecz wzmocnienia zewnętrznych filarów bezpieczeństwa Polski. Są to działania wzmocniające Sojusz Północnoatlantycki, działania prowadzące do strategicznego upodmiotowienia Unii Europejskiej i rozwoju współpracy NATO-UE (polityczno-strategiczna odpowiedź na zagrożenia hybrydowe) oraz umacnianie strategicznych partnerstw, szczególnie sojuszu z USA.

## СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ЗАДАЧИ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ПОЛЬША НА РУБЕЖЕ II I III ДЕКАД XXI ВЕКА

### Резюме

В статье представлены главные стратегические задачи, которые Польше необходимо решить для укрепления своей безопасности в ближайшие 5–10 лет. Первостепенной и важнейшей задачей является продолжение цикла национального стратегического планирования. Необходимо завершить разработку базовых директивных и планистических документов, обеспечивающих реализацию принятой в 2014 году новой Стратегии Национальной Безопасности и одновременно привести в действие очередной Обзор стратегий национальной безопасности, начинающий новый планистический цикл. Шесть задач касаются практического, организационно-технического укрепления собственного потенциала безопасности. К ним относятся: консолидация системы управления национальной безопасностью, формирование системы стратегической устойчивости государства к агрессии, организация национальной системы информационной безопасности, – в частности, ускоренное формирование системы кибербезопасности, совершенствование системы подготовки мобилизационных резервов, а также реформа Национальных резервных сил, реализация «третьей волны» технической модернизации вооруженных сил Польши – киберзащита, беспилотные системы, высокоточное оружие, приведение в действие и реализация Национальной программы систем беспилотных летательных аппаратов, (маховик инноваций для безопасности и развития). Третий цикл задач связан с деятельностью, направленной на укрепление внешних устоев безопасности Польши. Среди них можно назвать действия по укреплению Североатлантического блока, действия, направленные на стратегическое расширение прав и возможностей Европейского Союза и развитие сотрудничества НАТО-ЕС (политическо-стратегическая реакция на угрозы смешанного типа), а также укрепление стратегических партнерств, в первую очередь альянса с США.