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INTEGRATION THROUGH CONTROL: THE MODEL OF POWER HIJACKING AS AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW ON EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION

European integration has created many difficulties for adherents of neo-realism. It is argued (Koukoudakis 2014) that neo-realism is incapable of fully explaining this phenomenon. As such, the EU seems to be vindicating various liberal and neo-liberal approaches to IR, with neo-structuralism as the most important one, capable of creating testable hypotheses that through observations seem to be confirming its main assumptions (Sandholtz, and Stone 2012). With the end of the Cold War neo-realists predicted that integration will collapse or at least come to a halt (Mearsheimer 1990), however this did not happen. Quite the contrary, integration intensified. As a result, the neo-functionalist approaches became dominant. However, neo-realists such as Kenneth N. Waltz (2000) remained sceptical. They consistently maintained that relative gains, control through institutions and complex interdependence are enough to account for integration. With Brexit, the immigration crisis and the euro-crisis as well as the rise of euro-scepticism (Pew Research Center 2016), neo-realists may appear to be making a comeback. It is so because traditional approaches explaining dynamics of integration, like

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a spill-over effect, appear not to account for these phenomena. By showing only positive dynamics of integration they obscure the fact that the process is not deterministic. Advantages offered by integration may be not enough to encourage cooperation, and in fact the spill-over effect may be partially responsible for anti-EU backlash, since increasing interdependency between states does not ease tensions and rivalry between them. On the contrary, it seems that those rivalries are intensified with greater interdependence, especially during the times of crisis – as predicted by neo-realists (Waltz 2000)[1]. If integration is net positive, why would countries try to stall or reverse it? How to account for Brexit? Is there any rational explanation of such behaviours or are we forced to think about them in terms of sudden eruptions of ignorance and bad decision-making, in short: errors of judgement?

The paper will argue that such occurrences may stem from attempts at centralisation of decision making in the EU, which creates both incentives for integration as a tool of control over actors within the EU; and for disintegration – as a way of escaping this effect. In doing so the article will try to reconcile elements of neo-structuralist and neo-realist approaches to integration. Due to the fact that this topic is quite demanding, the paper will concentrate, however, only on one aspect of this problem: general state behaviour as a basic unit of the analysis in the process of integration understood mainly as centralisation of the political process. The paper does not discuss economic or social trade-offs of integration. Whatever advantages or disadvantages may be there is outside of the scope of this inquiry. However, the paper will also indirectly show why looking at integration only through lenses of economic gains (neo-structuralist approach) as well as relative gains (neo-realist approach) may be partially misleading, and that calculation whether to join the EU and stay is more a question of how states perceive their ability of winning in a political game of 'integration hijacking': imposing command over actors via EU institutions. Thus, integration as well as disintegration is a problem of control, not gains.

The main thesis is by no means an authoritative statement about the facts, quite on the contrary, it is a proposal of an alternative way of thinking about integration, a way that merely may be the beginning of more in-depth research. If anything, the paper should be first and foremost understood as

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[1] 'The impulse to protect one's identity – cultural and political as well as economic – from encroachment by others is strong. When it seems that "we will sink or swim together", swimming separately looks attractive to those able to do it'. Waltz, K.N. (2000) 'Structural Realism after the Cold War'. *International Security* 25 (1), 15

a methodological experiment, an attempt to break away from pre-existing methods of looking at the problem.

The reasoning presented in this article is concerned with the description of effects of political interaction as it is, not just intentions. The focus is on the end result rather than on initial motivations. The paper focuses on the outcomes of decisions, the consequences of constraints and real results of human action rather than declaratory statements and ideological motivations that although important, seem not to allow researchers to build framework fully capable of explaining the shaky nature of European integration. In that sense the author accepts to a certain degree the neo-realist perception of international relations. The presented thesis may help to bridge a gap between various perspectives and offer a partial explanation for observed phenomena.

INTEGRATION, CENTRALISATION AND THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The conventional wisdom based on the neo-functionalist theory of the spill-over effect says that economic gains dictate the logic of integration. Benefits of integration in one sphere show that other areas would work more efficiently if integrated too (Małuszyńska 2007). Additionally, integrating one sector of activity reveals that it can function better if those attached to it would be integrated too. Integration in the neo-functionalist approach is an independent, self-propelling occurrence resulting from increasing intra-border transactions, which then create a need for supranational organisations solving problems resulting from such contacts, which in turn creates a better environment for more intra-border transactions. Over time this leads to the creation of supranational institutions dealing with conflict resolution and management of supranational interest groups. The last step is cross-border governance (Sandholtz, and Stone 2012).

Since integration promotes more integration, and it requires political mechanisms that will guide and govern it, we can observe that centralisation will be also encouraged – tighter economic integration requires tighter political integration, and centralisation is the result.

This is a logical conclusion of the neo-functionalist approach. In order for economic integration to occur one has to design a political mechanism that will steer the way in which this is supposed to happen. Without such a mechanism members of a union would not be able to decide on particular

solutions. Any decision requires some agreement on how to proceed, and future cooperation requires settlement of the rules of this cooperation. Thus, economic integration requires a political process: a way through which parties agree on norms binding for all of them. Without an agreement on the rules of cooperation there would not be any integration. All members would still operate under separate set of norms, and would be able to change them irrespective of consequences for others. Thus no true unification would happen, since integrated economy requires uniformity of rules and compliance to them. That is why it is reasonable to expect that integration will necessitate the creation of some kind of a political mechanism that will be servicing it. By definition, the existence of such a mechanism will be a form of centralisation.

Neo-realists view European integration very differently. Before the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War they perceived integration as a response to the existence of superpowers, a logical result of power-play and rebalancing (Waltz 2010). After the end of the Cold War it was argued that the European Union is based on the logic of complex, deep interdependence which allows stronger states to control weaker ones. International institutions that serve as a front for this are in fact rooted in national, not international interest (Milward 2000), can and are used by stronger powers to control weaker ones (Waltz 2000)[2]. The European Union, just like NATO, has outlived its purpose and has been maintained because it has been in the interest of the strongest stake-holders, allowing them to control other countries. As for law, institutions, norms and rules neo-realist maintained, following the work of Stephen D. Krasner who argued that throughout the last four centuries the values and preferences of strong states dictated the shape of international law and institutions, 'applied in a discriminating fashion only to the weak' (Krasner 1994), that European norms are just tools of domination. A similar, but methodologically separate view was expressed by Moravcsik (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1995). Technically speaking his view is detached from

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[2] 'Realists, noticing that as an alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it mainly as a means of maintaining and lengthening America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states. (…) The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests'. Waltz, K.N. (2000) 'Structural Realism after the Cold War'. *International Security* 25 (1), 20; Waltz was making here a remark about NATO, however the example of this institution outliving its purpose was used in the context of EU examination; Waltz was suggesting that the situations are the same.

neo-realism, although it had roots in it and should be more appropriately classified as a version of liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik's approach assumes that convergence of views and preferences about integration happens between group of powerful countries, which later on achieve agreement through the process of bargaining; products of this process are then imposed on reluctant and/or weaker states through side-payments. Thus, his views are to a certain degree consistent with the neo-realist approach (states – basic units; relative gains, powerful actors), but at the same time they are close to the neofunctionalist perception (emergence from within the state – not from its environment; convergence of views/attitudes).

Thus, one can conclude, that although very different and at odds with each other, all approaches – neo-functionalist, neorealist and liberal intergovermentalist – agree about the existence of centralised rule-making through some political, formalised and institutionalised process. What they disagree about is who really makes decisions, what motivates them, and whether the outcome is stable.

The paper proposes an approach that links those similarities through a single mechanism of state behaviour, named 'integration hijacking', whose existence and operation depends on the establishment of a centralised political process.

A political process is the way in which society decides about the rules (laws) binding for it (Merriam-Webster 2017). In a unitary state a single political process encompasses all matters of the state, and thus society. In others, like a federation, local governments have reserved competences, separate from that of central government. Regardless of the way the political process is organised the fact remains that there is a political order from which other orders originate – the political process is the source of laws, and laws decide about the way society functions. As Acemoglu and Robinson in *Why Nations Fail* (2012) argue, the political process is a crucial component in the nation's success or failure. Their theory suggests that most countries have problems with becoming successful and wealthy because of the nature of their political systems that are exploitive and exclusive; they are designed to serve only the socio-economic interests of chosen elites, and that these elites defend their ability to control the political process, because it is the sole basis of their individual success and group stability. In short, the elites create such rules for society that would suit them, not the public good, even if it is detrimental to the country in the long run. In doing so they prohibit proper development and progress, since progress means instability due to creative destruction, and instability means that that system can be opened

to competition; or that those on top of it may be exchanged. Either way, it means risk of losing control, and therefore is not preferred.

Although Acemoglu's and Robinson's book concentrates on national, not international politics, their conclusions sound familiar to the one made by neo-realists about the European Union (control through institutions, rules serving those with more power). Since European nations do integrate, it is not unreasonable to assume that one could use this approach for inter-state politics. Normally states cannot influence one another in the way society influences itself – via a centralised political process; however this is not the case with entities such as the European Union. Power to impose rules can be used by both non-governmental organisations and governments alike. There is no contradiction. Due to that reason Acemoglu's & Robinson's approach is not inconsistent with liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism.

Partial application of Acemoglu/Robinson's theory in conjunction with Moravcsik's view on integration allows us to draw conclusions that powerful stake-holders in the EU should be inclined towards such a design of rules and norms as to support and protect their interest first and foremost, even on the expense of weaker partners. Moreover, since integration – as neo-realists argue – blurs the lines between national and supranational organisations, it is not unlikely that not only states, but also other actors, such as companies, could use the same methods to influence the (now) centralised political process to protect their interest on the expense of public one or that of competition. In fact, as adherents of public choice theory argue, this is precisely what has been already observed (Butler, E., 2012). Thus, in many aspects the EU as a state bloc actually appears to have the dynamic of a government without being a country.

Neorealism meets neofunctionalism: change of priorities, tools and perspectives as a result of the environment change

If the boundaries between methodologies and theories indeed are difficult to see, and some convergence is observed then perhaps such convergence is the result of objective reality, since those approaches try to see and report on the same occurrences. However, because they use different methods of analysis and define goals as well as main actors differently, they tend to be at odds with each other. The paper will propose a partial possible solution to that problem by changing the interpretation of goals of state actors.

Our starting point will be the neorealist framework and the explanation of integration as outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his already mentioned *Structural Realism after the Cold War* (2000). However, once integration starts, although states remain prime actors, the dynamic observed by Moravcsik becomes prevalent. The bargaining process occurs, as a result of convergence of views between main powers. This convergence is the result of increased trans-border transactions, in accordance with mechanism outlined by neo-structuralist theory. Thus, the paper assumes that although the process of integration starts because of neo-realist reasons and initially it is driven by security concerns; soon actors within nations start to influence their own governments towards integration (liberal intergovenrmentlism), leading to the convergence of views on integration and the beginning of spill-over effects (neo-functionalism). However, all this time states are a necessary intermediary between all agents, factors and institutions, as predicted by neo-realists. The state behaviour changes with a change of the environment in which it operates. However, its goals remain the same – they are just being pursued in a different way. States are now constrained by complex interdependency and are entangled in attempts to control one another. The mechanism of this control is 'integration hijacking', described in the next chapter. Therefore, states remain the key agents and actors, linking the process of integration together. They are neither replaced by supranational organisations, nor are they independent from them, instead they are a necessary link between all, forming a feedback loop, where states create rules, that thanks to lobbying, negotiations, side-payments and bargaining go through supranational institutions (the centralised political process), ending in influencing other states (the localised political process). The bargaining and side-payments are elements of this process, while bottom-up pressure created by an increased amount of intra-border transactions is being siphoned through state institutions and therefore becomes a propellant for their actions, which are directed at maintaining control over their environment, integration being a side-effect.

As a result of integration and centralisation, the tools, views and goals of main actors – states – change. They no longer operate in a pure neo-realist environment. Instead, they are now pressured from the bottom by neo-structuralist currents to integrate; but they do so not in order to merely satisfy needs of these currents, but rather to secure a controlling position *vis a vis* other states within a new, liberal intergovernmental environment, where bargaining is a key method of balancing power of other actors. The purpose of this bargaining is not only to gain more power, as neo-realist would argue;

neither an economic gain is that important in itself. But states rather try to use the dynamic of integration against one another to get a higher level of freedom of action for themselves, while restraining others. Restraining can be a relative asymmetric gain, but it can also be control achieved through institutions (neo-realism).

In order to explain this thesis we need to reinterpret the neo-realist credo centred around anarchy, self-help and power.

States tend to accumulate power to gain security, but this security is essentially derived from their degree of freedom of action, which flows from the amount of power at their disposal. A country with a bigger army, for instance, has more freedom of action *vis a vis* other states with smaller ones. It has an option of imposing its will on others thanks to its military might if it so chooses. This additional option increases its range of possibilities and therefore – freedom. The more depends on the pure will of the state with regard to interactions with other state actors, the more secure it is. For example, if a state is weak, it faces constraints in the form of interests of other states. It has to take them into account. However, when it is strong, it can but *doesn't have to* take them into account. Thus, it has a higher level of freedom of action. The very existence of this strength creates constraints on actions of others. They immediately take it into account while planning their responses and moves.

Thus, states pursue power in order to get more freedom of action. Anything that limits this freedom of action is a threat to security. Asymmetrical gains, for instance, have such effects; the increase of power of one state is a relative loss for others, thus it translates into limitations of their freedom of action.

The above re-interpretation of the classical neo-realist approach concentrates on the effects of actions, not merely tools that are used. This re-interpretation is necessary in order to understand how in a different environment states are going to behave similarly to neo-realist predictions, but they will do so in a very different way. This new environment is political centralisation.

Political centralisation of Europe as a result of integration means that states are sacrificing their sovereignty by becoming part of a bigger structure that will be able to impose on them obligations that they would normally not, perhaps, accept. It follows that they will be no longer capable of controlling their fate on their own to the same degree. The Member States of the EU lose part of their sovereignty, at least in the practical sense (formally, according to international law, all states remain sovereign regardless, they merely agree not to use their competences in some areas, however here we will not use the legal definition of sovereignty).

But sovereignty does not mean autarky. Autarky is independence from other states in real terms, self-sufficiency. Sovereignty is merely ability to decide about one's actions. Decisions can be influenced by circumstances, they can be the result of objective constraints – like the existence of stronger states with opposing interest; however the key component is intact: the ability to decide freely on the basis of available information. Freedom in this context means lack of need to think about interest of other actors (states). The only thing that shapes the limits of this freedom is the actor's will and his power (ability to transform his will into action, disregarding will of other actors if necessary). This allows the pursuit of one's interest as one sees fit. This freedom is what neo-realist observe and concentrate on, describing it as self-help, pursuit of one's interest.

In political arrangements such as a federation or a unitary state this freedom no longer exists, since when it comes to relations between participants of it as well as relations with third parties the central government has the authority. Thus, it is the central government that has true sovereignty, not participants (subjects, citizens, members) of the state, regardless of their power. They are bound by law, rules of allowable conduct. Breaking this arrangement is typically not thinkable, due to the way the system is set up (central authority'smonopoly on violence, and/or hostile attitude towards a rule-breaker by other participants of the system). A participant of the state may regain sovereignty by seceding, but until that moment he is constrained by the existing agreement. He may influence the active regime, play by the rules of it, but he is not the regime himself.

In short, states in this context are separate, independent political processes that produce effects exclusive for a given population. As already discussed in this paper a *political process is the way in which society decides about the rules (laws) binding for it*. By becoming part a state association of some sort, such as the EU, states agree to create a new, joined political process that will be in some aspects more important than their own. Its products, that is decisions, will constrain them through the creation of legal obligations, translating into obligations for their citizens.

The form of an agreement forming a government can be varied – the European Union is neither a unitary state nor a federation and arguably it is not a government in a strict sense. However, for the purpose of this paper this is not important, because the fact that the European Union limits to a certain extent freedom of actions of its members through sets of rules and laws produced by designated institutions (centralised political process) is all that matters. It is the fact of centralisation of the political process that is our concern.

Although some areas of sovereignty may be protected from the effects of centralisation due to the way the agreement creating it was set-up, others are not. Therefore, states in the European Union have less freedom than outside of it. From the point of view of the neo-realist perspective interpreted in the way presented in this paper were freedom of action is paramount this means that states will have a tendency to perceive the EU as a sub-optimal solution even if it gives them higher levels of economic output or better military security. Because these gains do not make-up for the lost sovereignty. It is so, because the EU imposes limits on freedom of action, and it is freedom of action – not gains – that states seek. A gain without freedom to use it is useless to them. Therefore, states should not prefer entering the EU even if faced with objective benefits of such a decision. To ignore that would be forfeiting a vital element of security calculation. Yet, we not only observe that this is not the case, but we see constant attempts of deepening integration, many new countries wish to join, others propose enlargement of the Union – all in addition to events such as Brexit. These opposing forces have, however, one common source, and therefore are part of the same phenomenon: the existence of the centralised political process, required for integration. It is both sought as a tool of control of other states and feared as a device of domination and can account for a seemingly contradictory situation in which states still want freedom of action, but are entering the arrangement limiting it. A more traditional neo-realist view of state sovereignty may not be sufficient to explain this phenomenon precisely because integration seemingly offers many aspects of power that states seek; at the same time eliminating a need for it by getting rid of the anarchical environment. However, thanks to the 'translation' of states goals from power to freedom we can retain the neo-realist logic of state behaviour in the new environment such as the European Union.

Figure 1

**Not centralised political processes**

Anarchical international environment – various countries of various power levels (here: size) compete. Circles represent independent political processes.

Source: the author.

Figure 2

Centralised political processes

Creation of a supra-state organisation such as the European Union (blue area). A centralised political process emerges, linking political processes of state actors. Now they can influence each other in a political way. Please note that the centralised political process does not encompass the entirety of competences of its participants (blue area vs. white area inside the circles).

Source: the author.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA: INTEGRATION THROUGH CONTROL?

The idea that an overarching, pan-European political process will be created, with some prerogatives reserved for a central body, encourages states to engage in integration once it starts, but not in order to achieve a stable union. Rather states do so in order to be able to influence decisions of other participants through a centralised regime. The desired outcome is to position oneself in the process of centralisation/integration in such a way so that one will maintain a higher level of freedom of action than other participants. In other words, members of the EU want to retain more sovereignty, while allowing its erosion for other participants. This aspect is consistent with the neo-realist perspective, as well as liberal intergovernmentalism, and does not disregard neo-functionalism. The goal of states in this equation is not merely to become more powerful through increased economic efficiency, but rather to make sure that through the process of centralisation that leads to integration they will retain as much of freedom of action as possible in the emerging legal order, even at the expense of other participants.

In other words, the behaviour of states does not change, they still try to get as much freedom as possible. But since in the European Union this is not possible in a classical way –through the acquisition of more power only; they switch to control the EU political process and therefore its laws. Through

them they try to limit freedom of action of others, while retaining as much of it for themselves. In the end this causes the process of integration to be manipulated, so that it will serve the needs of the manipulating state/states – now and preferably also in the future. This phenomenon can be called hijacking.

Hijacking is a behaviour of a state within a centralisation process. A centralised political system is then used to impose such legal solutions so that state pushing them will gain advantage over other participants of the political process. This advantage – relative gain in the neo-realist terminology – is generally translated into a higher level of freedom of action. This may be achieved in various ways – either by suppressing the ability of other members to influence political process or by creating such rules that would allow faster accumulation of power for the state within the union (but not necessarily outside of it – power within a legal entity is usually based on rules and norms, not force, thus what gives power within the geometry of the EU may be useless as power-enhancer outside of it). What leads to this result is the question of circumstances. Gaining more power allows the state to become more capable of hijacking in the future due to the possession of more resources, influences or things for exchange (for instance: the state may agree to withdraw support for certain policy in order to gain support for another one – this is bargaining and side-payments known from Moravcsik's approach). Hijacking can serve short and long term interests of the state. An example of a short term goal would be the protection of minimum wage laws in the transportation industry on a territory of a given country, demanding that other participants of the common market have to obey them too, even if they operate from areas of a lower minimum wage (Polska Agencja Prasowa 2015). A long term advantage can, for instance, mean more national seats in the EU parliament or a voting system that creates preference for the given state and its allies (Henzel 2014), cementing their freedom of action over other members. Noticeably an attempt at hijacking prompts response from other states. They also engage in similar actions, mimicking moves of the country with the initiative. For instance, in response to the introduction of protection measures of the national law in Germany from the supremacy of the European one (*Re Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft/Solange*, 1986), Poland attempted to make such changes in its constitutional order too as a countermeasure (*Verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland of May 11th*, 2005). Therefore, hijacking is not limited to actions that influence the centralised political process directly, but include anything that can have such a practical effect.

In short, the ability to protect the local political process from influences of central government is good, but to be able to protect it and influence other local processes through the centralised political process of the EU is much better. Thus, although a given Member State may be unwilling to dominate others, in order to protect itself from such a possibility it is forced to act in this way. The danger of allowing others to hijack the process of integration paired with advantages if one is successful in it (the ability to dominate other states, ensuring a privileged position within the union, creation of preferential rules, hindering development of rivals, etc.) creates a situation corresponding to the prisoner's dilemma in game theory. Particularly, it has a striking resemblance to a nuclear arms race.

Although some benefits from non-hijacked integration may be appealing, whereas hijacking may create costs, problems, instability and failure of the project, it is still more rational to follow the hijacking strategy. It is so because the risk of not doing so is too great. In this situation norms, rules and laws are an equivalent of a definite military advantage akin to a nuclear bomb. Achieving such an advantage may be costly, and absolute benefits lesser than in the scenario without additional expenses. But the vision of a rival failing to gain a similar advantage and thus being left unprotected while we engage in advantage acquisition is too attractive. And the same time the danger of being in a situation of lack of build-up, while rivals decide to gain an advantage, prompts states to exercise hijacking as the only rational option. The result is negative for the stability of the European Union: since the only rational choice is to attempt hijacking, all members attempt it, contributing to the instability and failures of integration, as well as its inefficiencies. There is no actor that cares for the European public good, only actors that care for their own. This problem can be presented on the following decision matrix.

Figure 3

Model of integration hijacking

	Country B, Engage in hijacking	Country B, Do not engage
Country A, Engage in hijacking	–1, –1	2, –2
Country A, Do not engage	–2, 2	1, 1

A decision matrix representing the phenomenon of hijacking.

Source: the author.

In the above matrix the Nash equilibrium is -1,-1 for both countries. Noticeably mutual not engaging in hijacking gives positive result of 1,1 for both players (balanced integration, gains for everyone *vis a vis* the rest of the world), but the option of engaging while the other player does not engage brings much higher benefits: 2, and a much better relative position *vis a vis* the other player: 4 points. At the same time both integration building and collapse of the project have the same relative effect (net result for balance of power: zero. When integration is successful both states gain equally, thus no one is stronger. If both engage in hijacking, both loose equally. Nobody gains an advantage).

This explains the lack of stability of the integration process, and why states may perceive integration and centralisation as dangerous, but at the same time they are willing to risk their development (therefore why we see more integration next to Brexit, for instance). No country wishes to be a 'victim' of integration, but all prefer to be in control over centralised laws. The goal is to make one's local political process a vital piece of the central one, while (preferably) not allowing other local processes to have equal access and influence. States simply see central government and unified laws as a tool of domination, a tool of power.

A centralised political process is a promising tool for controlling others. Perhaps even better than traditional tools of international politics. It has lower risks (no danger of military retaliation, sanctions, etc. if played by the rules) and higher rewards (ability to influence other members whether they want it or not with little constant effort). But more importantly, a state that decides to participate, has a possibility – through hijacking – to achieve such gains in power that would translate not only into a better position within the EU, but also outside of it. States have an option of behaving like lobbyists in public choice theory – creating concentrated gains for themselves at the expense of other members. Instead of the ideal of collaborating members that help each other to boost their stance on the international stage; hijacking presents an option of being able to use resources and power of others regardless of their consent. It is just a question of arranging the inner order of the EU in a correct way, being a successful lobbyist in a sense. In this, the results are akin to what Acemoglu's and Robinson's theory of wealth creation predicts. Control of the political process is a key prize for any group/power/actor, allowing it to remain in a dominant position within society/group. The key is to remain on top and to make rules that will benefit those on top. Since the centralised government allows for such an impact, all seek control over it.

The same mechanism is also responsible for reluctance to continue the integration process as well as attempts at escaping it. Once a member fails systematically at hijacking or ceases to see it as a viable, beneficial option, he may simply decide to 'drop out' of the game. Hijacking would be, therefore, responsible for both successes of European integration (understood as spreading and deepening of it, not whether it is stable and beneficial for all in the same way) and its failures (like Brexit).

Moreover, the game represented by the decision matrix in Figure 3 is repeated constantly, and states take this fact into account, calculating their future hijacking decisions. Sometimes they may choose to withdraw or consent to hijacking by other members only so that in the next game they will be able to use that as a bargaining chip so that the previous winner may be more willing to agree to withdraw or to support a proposition that is not good for its interests. Therefore, although hijacking is a win-lose type of game, it can actually encourage cooperation. This appears to be consistent with liberal intergovenrmentalism of Moravcsik's approach, but also presents certain similarities to ideas of public choice theory like logrolling and vote trading (Butler 2017). Therefore, further investigation of the topic may reveal long term strategies and explain choices made by states that normally would seem counter-intuitive.

A process of integration that is propelled by hijacking is most probably not going to produce results satisfying for public good of its members, or aggregated public good of the EU in general. However, despite that the ability to hijack may be compelling enough so that states might still participate in a failing integration process, because of perceived security gains achieved thanks to hijacking.

All of this is, however, to a certain degree separate from the actual, tangible fruits of integration such as increased economic efficiency or interdependency. The hijacking thesis is not designed to explain the entirety of integration dynamic, but rather possible reasons for discrepancy between popular attitudes, state rhetoric, state behaviour and its actual results; while to a certain degree reconciling opposite theoretical approaches that try to explain integration.

The concept of attractiveness of hijacking may help to add another layer of understanding why states decide to integrate, and what partially motivates them to choose counterintuitive options that are not accounted for in other integration and disintegration theories.

Conclusions

The slow-pace of European integration, constant instability, managing of policies from crisis to crisis, secessionist tendencies and lack of success in carving common security – all of those and more are most probably the result of the fact that the EU was at least partially created (and is still propelled) by integration hijacking. The shape of European institutions, the way of functioning of the EU as a whole is a result of this.

Hijacking is the only rational response of a country participating in the integration process, because it allows it to protect its sovereignty, which is required to maintain levels of freedom of actions as high as possible. Freedom of action is a key goal for all states seeking security. At the same time hijacking offers more attractive gains than just those received through balanced good-for-all integration, or a regular power play as envisioned by neo-realists. It can not only boost one's power, but it also can limit costs of achieving it in terms of losing sovereignty. At the same time this phenomenon is responsible for failures of integration. Hijacking is successful only when the other side does not engage in it. If both engage (and if parties are rational – they will) the result may be negative for the stability of the integration process. Every hijacking move can be countered by a similar one, contributing to lesser stability of the union and imperfect promotion of public good. The logical result of iterated hijacking may be counterintuitive in the end – a closer union that nobody profits from, where everyone is at perceived net loss, yet no one is willing to break away. A result in some way similar to the nuclear arms race. All of that is detached from the actual or perceived gains and losses that integration actually creates.

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INTEGRATION THROUGH CONTROL:
THE MODEL OF POWER HIJACKING AS AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
ON EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

Summary

The following paper presents a possible new explanation for the European Union's turbulent integration. By combining elements of game theory, neo-functionalist theory and its neo-realist account as well as devoting special attention to liberal intergovernmentalism it presents a method of thinking about the way in which European states function and calculate their behaviours in relation to integration efforts. Through that it attempts to build an initial framework for an alternative way of thinking about integration and disintegration of the European Union. Countries attempt to control one another through products of a centralised political process, imposing limitations on freedom of action of others: the more control, the less freedom of action and the more integration as a result. The same mechanism can be both responsible for tendencies of integration as well as disintegration, since countries that fail to increase their ability to control others see that as an asymmetrical gain for others, and tend to opt out from integration, or to disassociate themselves from the project altogether.

Key words: integration, European union, game theory

INTEGRACJA PRZEZ KONTROLĘ: MODEL PRZEJMOWANIA WŁADZY JAKO ALTERNATYWNY POGLĄD NA INTEGRACJĘ UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Streszczenie

Niniejsza praca przedstawia możliwe wyjaśnienie powodów burzliwego przebiegu integracji Unii Europejskiej. Poprzez połączenie elementów teorii gier, jak również neo-funkcjonalistycznej teorii integracji, wespół z neo-realistycznym jej ujęciem z szczególnym uwzględnieniem spojrzenia liberalnego intergowermentalizmu, przedstawia sposób, w jaki państwa UE funkcjonują i kalkulują swoje zachowania w relacji do wysiłków integracyjnych. Poprzez to artykuł podejmuje próbę zbudowania wstępnej propozycji ramowej dla alternatywnego spojrzenia zarówno na integrację, jak i dezintegrację Unii Europejskiej. Kraje podejmują próby wzajemnego kontrolowania się poprzez produkty scentralizowanego procesu politycznego, narzucając ograniczenia na swobodę działania innych krajów w myśl zasady, że im więcej kontroli, tym mniej swobody działania dla innych. Jako efekt uboczny powoduje to więcej integracji. Ten sam mechanizm odpowiedzialny jest więc zarówno za integrację, jak i dezintegrację Unii Europejskiej, gdyż kraje, które nie odniosą sukcesu w przejmowaniu kontroli, interpretują to jako asymetryczne korzyści dla innych państw. Powoduje to tendencję do wykluczania się z integracji lub w skrajnych przypadkach opuszczania UE.

Słowa kluczowe: integracja, Unia Europejska, teoria gier

ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ ЧЕРЕЗ КОНТРОЛЬ: МОДЕЛЬ ПЕРЕХОДА ВЛАСТИ В КАЧЕСТВЕ АЛЬТЕРНАТИВНОГО ВЗГЛЯДА НА ИНТЕГРАЦИЮ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА

Резюме

Настоящая работа представляет собой возможное объяснение причин турбулентного курса интеграции Европейского союза. Объединив элементы теории игр, а также нео-функционалистическую теорию интеграции, с ее неореалистическим подходом, с особым акцентом на необходимость учета либерального интергенерализма, автор исследования представляет способ функционирования и поведения стран ЕС в отношении интеграционных уси-

лий. В связи с этим автор статьи пытается создать первоначальное рамочное предложение для альтернативного взгляда как на интеграцию, так и на дезинтеграцию Европейского союза. Государства предпринимают попытку контролировать друг друга посредством продуктов централизованного политического процесса, налагая ограничения свободы действий других стран в соответствии с принципом, что, чем больше контроля, тем меньше свободы действий для других. Это чревато побочным эффектом, который приводит к большей интеграции. Тот же механизм отвечает как за интеграцию, так и за дезинтеграцию Европейского союза, поскольку страны, которые безуспешно пробуют принять на себя функции контроля, трактуют это как асимметричную выгоду для других стран. Это влечет за собой тенденцию к исключению из интеграции или, в крайнем случае, выхода из ЕС.

Ключевые слова: интеграция, Европейский союз, теория игр.