

Mikołaj Kukowski*

DEVELOPMENT AND SHIFT OF US OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN (1945–1951) IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

DOI: 10.26399/meip.3(62).2018.40/m.kukowski

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to present the shift in American occupation policy in Japan – its reasons and consequences. I would like to describe the development of US position referring to Japan, changes in Americans' thinking about this country and its future role in the world.

1. BEFORE THE OCCUPATION

1.1. American attitudes towards Japan at the end of the Second World War

On 22–26 November 1943 the Cairo Conference took place. The Cairo talks, which were preliminary to the Teheran Conference, concerned especially the question of the Far East.

American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

They declared that Japan should be stripped off of all the islands in the Pacific which she had seized or occupied since the beginning of the First

* Mikołaj Kukowski – Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of International and Regional Cooperation in Wołomin, mikolaj_kukowski@yahoo.com

World War in 1914. Japan should be expelled also from Chinese territories – Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores, which she had stolen and all other territories taken by violence and greed. Korea should become free and independent.

The three Allies agreed also to continue operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan (Maki 1961: 119–120).

As far as the Pacific Islands were concerned, it referred to islands north of the equator such as: the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas. They were former German colonies, entrusted to Japan under the mandate of the League of Nations after the First World War.

Its claims to these islands had been supported before by Britain at the Versailles Peace Conference. Britain had done it in return for Japan's support for her pretensions to the Pacific islands south of the equator.

Japan violated its mandate upon these islands and started to fortify them. Because of their good location, during the Second World War they served as stepping stones in the conquest of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.

In Versailles the US opposed the Japanese Trusteeship on these territories. In Cairo the US insisted on taking back these Pacific islands from Japan and on locating American bases there.

According to the Cairo agreements, Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores should be returned to China. In the case of these two islands, there were no obstacles to fulfill the agreements after the war.

But as far as Manchuria was concerned, there were some problems. Americans considered also the possibility of giving Russians control over Manchurian railways and a warm water outlet at Port Arthur (Fleischer 1945: 69). Independence of Korea and its full freedom from Japanese control were agreed upon.

It should be stressed that by inviting Chiang Kai – shek, Roosevelt wanted to enhance China's role (Kimball 1984: part II, 608). China was the only East Asian nation then which was not conquered by the Japanese. Thanks to Chinese resistance the Japanese army of over a million men had to deal with regular troops and guerrillas. These men could not be used in other places and it was very helpful to the US army. The American president concluded that China would play an important role in Asia. Churchill's opposition to the decolonisation of India assured him in his opinion. Roosevelt thought about a common Sino-American sphere of influence in East Asia and the Pacific (Kimball 1984: part II, 609). This plan only enlarged Allies' concern about the unconditional surrender of Japan and taking back of territories plundered by Japan.

Apart from the Cairo talks, the Tehran Conference took place from 28 November to 1 December 1943. Joseph Stalin promised to join the fight against Japan, after Germany's defeat. But for Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt the front in France and the situation in general was a bigger problem.

Roosevelt's intention to strengthen China remained the same. The reflection of it was the American stand during the Cairo Conference. The best way to implement it was to weaken Japan. According to the document of 4 May 1944 prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, the US had two basic aims concerning Japan:

- 1) to prevent future Japanese threat for the US and Pacific countries,
- 2) to establish a Japanese government which will respect rights of other countries and its international obligations.

These aims were intended to be achieved in three phases:

- 1) implementation of surrender conditions and submission of Japan to hard occupying discipline as unavoidable retribution for military aggression,
- 2) Japan should stay under strict supervision which would be weakened when it shows readiness and ability to live in peace with other nations,
- 3) the ultimate aim of the US is the correct fulfillment by Japan of its duties in a family of peaceful nations.

This document also contained practical measures, such as: full disarmament, elimination of extreme organizations, introduction of democratic values (GPO 1945: 591–592). Thus, this document reflected the will to proceed with hard policy towards Japan. Supporters of the so called 'hard peace' approach were satisfied. American president F.D. Roosevelt was one of them.

The Yalta agreement was drawn up in the same spirit. On 4–11 February 1945 the second wartime summit of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill was held in Yalta on the Crimean coast. They agreed to Soviet entry into war with Japan in two or three months after Germany's defeat.

The conditions were as follows (among others):

- 1) return of the southern part of Sakhalin, occupied by Japan, to the Soviet Union,
- 2) handing the Kuril islands over to Russia,
- 3) preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic),
- 4) China will retain sovereignty in Manchuria, but the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad will be jointly operated by the established joint Soviet – Chinese Company,
- 5) the commercial port of Dairen (Dalian) will be internationalised. Port Arthur will be leased as a naval base of the USSR.

The Yalta agreement contained also Soviet readiness to conclude a pact of friendship with China and establish cooperation between them for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke (Maki 1961: 120–121). Americans realised that the Soviet Union's entry into war against Japan would shorten the conflict and save lives of many American soldiers.

At the end of the war and after Roosevelt's death (12 April 1945) the another approach towards Japan became prevalent – the so called 'soft peace' approach. Supporters of it agreed upon the idea of weakening Japan and destruction of Japanese imperialism.

However, they wanted to preserve some traditional internal Japanese institutions – one of them was the institution of the Emperor. One of the 'soft peace' supporters was Joseph Grew, a former ambassador to Japan.

On 2 July on the basis of the material prepared by Grew, Secretary of Defence Henry L. Stimson gave a memorandum to Truman. It concerned the prolonged Japanese capitulation and contained the assurance that the US did not exclude leaving the constitutional monarchy system with the current dynasty.

The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945 did not comprise this assurance, which was considered to be controversial.

Thus, it said about:

- 1) an opportunity that should be given to Japan to end the war,
- 2) the authority and militaristic advisers that caused suffering of Japanese people. It suggested that those who had misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest should be replaced,
- 3) it announced that the Cairo Declaration would be carried out and the Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and minor islands,
- 4) disarmament of Japanese forces and permission for them to return to their homes,
- 5) punishment to all war criminals,
- 6) establishment of democratic tendencies – freedom of speech, of religion and respect for fundamental human rights,
- 7) promise to withdraw forces which would occupy Japan if these objectives were accomplished.
- 8) calling upon the Japanese government to proclaim an unconditional surrender of all Japanese forces. The alternative of it was only utter destruction (Maki: 121–123).

Thus, the Potsdam Declaration did not show any greater deviation from the 'hard policy' track on the American side. However, the discussion which

was carried on in the US about future policy toward Japan showed diversity of opinions there. One may call the text of the Potsdam Declaration a little bit 'softer' in that sense that it did not talk only about Japanese losses of territories and spheres of influence, but it also indicated rights it would have in the future.

1.2. Developments at the end of the war

In July 1945 Japanese military strength amounted to: 2 million men on home islands; under 2 million in Korea, Manchuria, China and Formosa; over 200,000 in French Indo-China, Thailand and Burma; over 500,000 in the East Indies area; over 100,000 in the by-passed Pacific Islands. So in sum, there were 5 million Japanese soldiers (Stimson, Bundy 1947: 618).

Americans realised that these soldiers would fight to the end and their surrender might save many American casualties. Therefore, this was one of the reasons of their decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 (Truman 1965: 463)¹. On 8 August Soviets went to war with Japan.

These two factors caused the change of the position of the Japanese government. Before that they had been against the Potsdam Declaration (at least officially). On 9 August three members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War – Premier Kantaro Suzuki, Minister of Foreign Affairs – Shigenori Togo and Minister of Navy – Mitsumasa Yonai were in favour of the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. Their only reservation was retaining of monarchy. The War Minister, General Korechika Anami, and two Chiefs of Staff, Yoshijiro Umezu and Soemu Toyoda, expressed three more reservations:

- 1) Japan would not be occupied,
- 2) the Japanese should be allowed to disarm and demobilise their own forces,
- 3) war criminals would be tried by Japanese courts.

The members of the Council could not reach an agreement.

¹ According to Harry S. Truman (1965: part I, 463) the list of Japanese cities which might be targets was prepared by a staff headed by Henry Stimson – American Secretary of War. Those were: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. Kyoto – a center of military activity was excluded from that list because of Stimson's reservations. He stressed cultural, national and religious meaning of Kyoto to the Japanese.

On 9 August the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki (Truman 1965: part I, 470)². At the conference which took place a day later the Emperor proposed to accept the Potsdam Proclamation only with reservations concerning upholding of the monarchy system. The Emperor's proposal was accepted unanimously.

Japan offered to surrender through Swiss way (Truman 1965: 471)³. On 11 August Henry Stimson answered that since the surrender the power of the Emperor and the government would be subjected to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (Stimson, Bundy 1947: 627)⁴.

On 13 August Tokyo was raided by Allied planes. Next day (14 August) the Supreme Council of Japan and the cabinet met in the presence of the Emperor. They agreed on surrender. That day the Emperor recorded his rescript ending the war. It was broadcast the following day.

General Douglas MacArthur was selected for the post of the Supreme Commander for the Allied forces. American allies – the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China accepted this proposal. MacArthur was given the 'supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Powers concerned' (Truman 1965: 383–384).

General Order No. 1 was prepared – the directive to the Japanese forces in the field which had to surrender. It was announced officially on 2 September 1945. Thus in China, Formosa and in Indo-China north of the 16th parallel they were to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek. A Russian commander would

² Harry Truman (1965: 470) reports that at first a target for the second bomb was Kokura, but because of the weather it was given up. Niigata was too distant. Thus, Nagasaki was chosen.

³ (Truman 1965: 471) In the Japanese government statement there was the following sentence: 'The Japanese government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on 26 July 1945 by the Heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain and China and later subscribed to by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler'.

⁴ President Harry Truman asked Stimson (1947: 627) for advice and he answered that Americans 'have to continue the Emperor ourselves under our command and supervision in order to get into surrender the many scattered armies of the Japanese who would own no other authority and that something like this use of the Emperor must be made in order to save as from the score of bloody Iwo Jimas and Okinawas all over China and the Netherlands. He was the only source of authority of Japan under the Japanese theory of the state'.

take their surrender in Manchuria, Korea north of the 38th parallel and on Karafuto (Sakhalin). In Southeast Asia south of the 16th parallel and from Burma to the Solomons the Allied representatives were Lord Mountbatten and the Australian commander with the exact demarcation line between them. Finally, in Japan, the Philippines and Korea south of the 38th parallel the surrender would be accepted by General MacArthur (elsewhere in the Pacific – Admiral Chester Nimitz) (Truman 1965: 484).

But Generalissimo Joseph Stalin announced reservations to General Order No. 1. He proposed in his message dated 16 August 1945 to include the northern part of the Island of Hokkaido in the region of surrender of Japanese forces to Soviet troops. According to him the demarcation line on the Hokkaido island should be drawn from the city of Kushiro in the east to the city of Rumoi in the west. He explained his proposition as a compensation for the Japanese occupation of Soviet Far East in the years 1919–21. President Truman in his request of 18 August rejected this plan (Truman 1965: 486). In the meantime General MacArthur radioed his first message to Japan. He ordered the Japanese to send their representatives to him to Manila in order to discuss the formal surrender ceremony and the arrival of occupation troops. On 2 September the ceremony of surrender took place aboard the American battleship ‘Missouri’ in the Tokyo Bay. This began the formal occupation of Japan.

2. OCCUPATION – THE FIRST PHASE

2.1. First months after surrender

Two days after the surrender ceremony the Emperor addressed his people personally in the Diet for the first time in history. He ordered them to submit to the terms of surrender. This submission was necessary ‘to re-establish in the future Japan’s position of trust and respect in the world’ (MacArthur 1964: 280). On 6 September President Truman approved a document on ‘Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’, which was written on 29 August. It was distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and to US departments and agencies for their guidance.

The ultimate objectives of the US toward Japan were:

- 1) assurance that Japan would not become ‘a menace to the US or to the peace and security of the world’,
- 2) establishment of a peaceful government which ‘will respect the rights of other states’ and ‘will support the objectives of the US’.

These objectives would be achieved by the following means:

- 1) limitation of Japan's sovereignty to the home islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku,
- 2) complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan. Militarists were to be totally eliminated from political, economic and social life,
- 3) the Japanese people would be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and human rights such as freedom of religion, assembly, speech and press,
- 4) the Japanese would be given an opportunity to develop an economy for themselves' (United States 1968: 628).

Military occupation of Japanese home islands was a means to carry into effect the surrender terms and to achieve objectives stated 'the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan'. The nations that had taken part in the war with Japan were welcomed in the occupation forces, but they were to be under the command of SCAP designated by the US. In the case of any differences of opinion among the Allied powers, the policies of the US would prevail.

As far as economic objectives were concerned, the document mentioned the destruction of the existing basis of Japanese military strength by enforcing a programme aimed at 'the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment or use of any military force'. Moreover, industries or branches of production which had prepared Japan to war were to be eliminated. The document envisaged the organizations of labour, industry and agriculture on a democratic basis. A wider distribution of income and ownership would be favoured.

The policy of the Supreme Commander should be:

- a) to prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of people who had been involved in war activity,
- b) to support a programme for the dissolution of large industrial and banking combinations.

The memorandum stated that the Allies 'will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage' of the economic plight of Japan. 'It will be necessary for them [the Japanese] to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities'. The Allies would not prevent the accomplishment of these tasks. Japanese authorities' control over economic activities would be subjected to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

There would be reparations for Japanese aggression. Referring to international trade in this document, it was written that Japan would be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods

for peaceful purposes and to export goods. Control over it would be exercised by SCAP. Japanese authorities were barred from giving to any Japanese business preferential opportunities to the enterprise of any foreign country (United States 1968: 628).

On the same day that 'the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' was approved by President Harry Truman (6 September), he drafted with Admiral William Leahy and General George Marshall a statement for General MacArthur. It contained the exposition of his authority as SCAP. According to it, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government was subordinated to him. The control of Japan was to be exercised through the Japanese government, but he would be able to act directly if it was required. The full effect would be given to the statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration.

On 1 November the document 'Basic Initial Post-Surrender Policy' was prepared. It confirmed and repeated the objectives of the military occupation of Japan, which had been drawn up in 'the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' of 6 September. It specified more concretely the aims and means to achieve them (US 1968: 633–652).

On 27 December in Moscow two bodies were established. One of them was the Far Eastern Commission. It consisted of representatives of the USSR, the UK, the US, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth. Their functions included the right to formulate policies and 'review any directive issued by SCAP with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished'. However, the Commission was able to take action with majority of all the representatives, including the concurrence of four powers: the US, the UK, the USSR and China. The Allied Council for Japan had also limited rights and supervisory power (US 1968: 628)⁵. Therefore, the US and SCAP could practically carry out their own policy without obstacles.

In the first period of the occupation the US proceeded with some reforms in Japan important for its future. These included: the Constitution, the land reform, the dissolution of combines, the political and economic purge.

⁵ (US 1968: 628) Provision no. 6 stated that in the case of disagreement between a member of the Council and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP 'will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission'.

2.2. Major reforms

2.2.1. Civil Liberties

Before the new constitution was created on 4 October 1945 the occupation authorities had proclaimed directives which were called after the bill of rights. Their aim was the removal of restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties. The Japanese government had to abrogate laws which maintained restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of expressing opinions on the Emperor and the Imperial Japanese government (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 1949: 463). It demanded also:

- 1) the release of political prisoners,
- 2) abolition of all organizations and agencies created to carry out laws which restricted civil liberties,
- 3) removal of people who directed these organizations (SCAP 1949: 464).

The Bill of Rights was preceded by memorandums referring to the annulment of press censorship of 10, 24, and 27 September 1945.

On 15 December 1945 the SCAP directive discontinued the dissemination of Shinto as a state religion. Shinto-national Japanese religion, which had been used by nationalists and militarists as an explanation and excuse for military expansion, was excluded from state's 'sponsorship, support, perpetuation and control' (SCAP 1949: 460–462). The Bill of Rights and directives connected with it constituted a background for a new constitution and democratization of the Japanese state and society.

2.2.2. The Constitution

A new Constitution was probably the most important achievement of the occupying forces in Japan. First talks about a change of the constitution took place between General MacArthur and Prince Fumimaro Konoe a few months after the beginning of the occupation. Konoe, however, was then classified as a war criminal. Therefore, Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara appointed a special committee to deal this matter under the chairmanship of Dr Joji Matsumoto (The Constitutional Problem Investigating Committee). They were working for three months.

The first draft of the new constitution was submitted in January 1946 (MacArthur 1964: 300). But it did not satisfy MacArthur. He regarded it as nothing more than rewording of the old Meiji constitution. Thus, he ordered key officers in his government section to draft a new constitution for Japan. General Courtney Whitney, a former Manila lawyer, became a chief of this team.

The Supreme commander stressed three points which he wanted to see in the new Japanese constitution:

- 1) Japan was to renounce war forever, abolish her armed forces and pledge never to revive them,
- 2) while sovereignty was to be vested in the people, the emperor was to be described as a symbol of the state,
- 3) the peerage was to be abolished, and the property of the Imperial Household was to be reverted to the state (Gayn 1973: 20).

In February 1946 General Whitney met with the Japanese. He told them that General MacArthur was not satisfied with their constitutional draft and regarded it as totally unacceptable. Therefore, he brought a document approved by the Supreme Commander. After that he left, giving them time to read it. When he returned the Japanese argued that this draft was ‘totally un-Japanese’ in its spirit and tradition. Whitney threatened that if they did not agree to it, MacArthur would place it before the Japanese people, over the heads of the government. The Japanese government tried to detain the draft but finally they capitulated.

The Supreme Commander allowed only one main government modification referring to the re-establishment of the Upper House of the Diet – the House of Councillors (in the American draft there was uni-cameral legislature).

The constitution was approved by the Lower House in August 1946. The following month the Upper House did the same. It was proclaimed by the Emperor the law of the land on 3 November and it came into effect in May 1947.

According to the constitution the House of Representatives – the Lower House of the Diet became the ‘highest organ of the state power’. The cabinet could summon sessions, but a vote of at least one-fourth of the total membership of either house was required. The Lower House could override an Upper House veto:

- a) on money bills and treaties – by a simple majority vote.
- b) on other matters – by two-thirds of the votes.

The cabinet was collectively responsible to the Diet. Two houses had to appoint the prime minister, but in the case of disagreement the decision of the Lower House prevailed. The cabinet with no-confidence vote in the Diet was obliged either to resign or to dissolve the House of Representatives within ten days and hold a new election (MacArthur 1964: 302)⁶.

⁶ According to General MacArthur (1964: 302): ‘The form of government is a combination of the American executive system and the British parliamentary one’.

Either house could conduct investigations of the government, demand the presence and testimony of witnesses and access to official records. The new Election Law lowered the voting age from twenty-five to twenty and enfranchised women (MacArthur 1964: 304)⁷. In the constitution there was also a provision for amendment by national referendum. The change came into effect if two-thirds of the Japanese electors had decided something.

Article 9 of the constitution (the so called no-war clause) was very important. It provided that the Japanese people forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation. Therefore, the right of belligerency of the state would not be recognised, and land, sea, air forces would never be maintained⁸.

Another significant change concerned the role of the Emperor. The constitution sanctioned the retention of the Emperor as ‘the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people’. His authority was limited to the ceremonial functions of a constitutional monarch. The national treasury took over his wealth and estates. He became dependent on appropriations voted annually by the Diet. The Imperial Household Ministry – formerly independent – was converted into the Imperial House Office under the jurisdiction of the prime minister.

In the US there was great resentment towards the retention of the Emperor (MacArthur 1964: 280). They saw him as a hindrance to a wholly democratic system. As it turned out, he had been a participant in decisions which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor (Bisson 1993: 26–27). But even opponents of the Emperor confirmed that his abdication would increase instability in the Japanese government. General MacArthur realised that abdication of Emperor Hirohito might cause real difficulties with the implementation of occupation policy in Japan. Many people regarded the Emperor as a divine being, even after his renunciation of divinity on 1 January 1946. He was a symbol for the people and his humiliation might not have helped the Allies and their policy toward Japan (Bisson 1993: 27). Contrary to his retention⁹.

⁷ (MacArthur 1964: 304): More than 13 million women registered their votes for the first time.

⁸ (MacArthur 1964: 303): The no-war clause was proposed to General MacArthur by Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara. When MacArthur agreed, Shidehara said: ‘The world will laugh and mock us as impracticable visionaries, but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets’.

⁹ MacArthur (1964: 288) wrote about the Emperor: ‘He played a major role in spiritual regeneration of Japan, and his loyal co-operation and influence had much to do with the success of occupation’. Truman (1965: 570) mentions Dr Karl T. Compton, the

Other important provisions were contained in a number of articles which one may call the Japanese ‘Bill of Rights’. The word ‘Jinken’ (‘human rights’) was used for the first time in Japanese. Before they had known only duties. ‘Jinken’ comprised freedom of thought, the right to maintain the minimum standard of living, equal rights of husband and wife.

The new Japanese constitution was a ‘product of American brains’ but ‘broadly acceptable to the people of Japan’ (Storry 1960: 253). It connected modern liberal tendencies (human rights, no-war clause) and conservative ones (retention of the Upper House, the Emperor – though without power and only with ceremonial functions, strong government)¹⁰.

2.2.3. The Zaibatsu Dissolution and Economic Purge (1945–48)

‘Zaibatsu’ (‘financial clique’) played the greatest role in the Japanese economy. They were family trusts which controlled the finance and economy, in general. One may see their beginning in the early years of Meiji Restorations (1868). Then, when state owned enterprises proved unprofitable, they were sold at bargain-based prices to Zaibatsu. In the 20s of the twentieth century Zaibatsu and bureaucracy reorganised the economy on the basis of cartels. During the Second World War Zaibatsu were interested in colonial expansion and contributed money for militarist purposes. They became strong especially as a result of the development of Japan’s heavy industry.

One could include Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Yasuda to the main Zaibatsu enterprises. Mitsui – the largest one – employed 2.8 million people before the occupation (1.8 in Japan) (Bisson 1954: 25). Zaibatsu controlled 90 percent of the Japanese industry (MacArthur 1964: 80). These organizations were combinations of a modern holding company with feudal loyalty. Officers were fully subordinated to the controlling families (Hadley 1973: 86–87).

Americans came to the conclusion that one of the main initiatives in occupied Japan should be the Zaibatsu dissolution and economic purge. The concept of it was based on the provision taken from ‘the United States

president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who had spent some time in Japan and wrote in his memorandum that one of the factors of ‘the apparent eagerness of practically all the Japanese...to help us...’ was ‘the fact that the emperor had ordered their cooperation and hence they could give it without feeling of disgrace or disloyalty’.

¹⁰ MacArthur (1964: 301) wrote: ‘The new Japanese constitution is really an amendment to the older Meiji one. I felt that by using this particular device we could insure a continuity, and continuity is important in Japan’.

Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' dated 29 August 1945. In part IV concerning the economy it was stated that destruction of the economic basis of Japanese military strength should take place. This aim was to be achieved by implementing SCAP policy which should:

- 1) prohibit the retention of people connected formerly with the war machine in the economic field,
- 2) favour a programme of the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations (SCAP 1949: 425).

Knowing American intentions Zaibatsu leaders prepared a plan for their own dismemberment called the Yasuda Plan (name derived from the Yasuda Zaibatsu). It was submitted by the Japanese government to SCAP on 4 November 1945. According to this plan the firms of Mitsui Honsha, Yasuda Hozen-sha, Sumitomo Honshu and Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Honsha agreed on the voluntary dissolution. The plan provided for a transfer of all securities of any firm and corporation owned by the holding companies to a Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC). This commission was to be established by the Japanese government. Its functions were to proceed with the liquidation of all property transferred to it.

The holding companies would also cease to exercise direction or control of all enterprises whose securities they owned. The directors and auditors of these companies would resign from all offices held by them. Moreover, all members of the Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo and Iwasaki families would resign from all offices held by them in enterprises. Preference in purchase of the securities transferred to the HCLC and offered for sale would be given to employees of the company involved. If these were corporate shares, democratization of membership would be ensured (by the limitation of shares that may be purchased by a single purchaser). The transferred property title of ownership (offered by HCLC) would not be purchased by holding companies and members of Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo and Iwasaki families.

On 6 November the proposal was accepted by MacArthur. In his directive he stressed that his intention was to ensure a wider distribution of income and ownership in Japan and to encourage democratic forces (Bisson 1954: 81–82). The Yasuda Plan followed it.

However, this plan was criticised in US as too 'soft'. Some American businessmen proposed much further going steps. On the other hand, the Japanese government obstructed the implementation of the Yasuda Plan¹¹.

¹¹ (Campbell 1948: 150) Japanese leaders Yoshida or Shidehara descended from the same social class as zaibatsu.

Finally, in April 1946 Imperial Ordinance 233 made the dissolution plan legally binding, but it did not comprise the offer of the family members to 'resign from all offices'. In July 1946 SCAP instructed the Japanese government to include this. In December the government amended Imperial Ordinance 233 according to that order.

On 4 July 1947 the economic purge was promulgated. It referred to persons who had held key positions in the economy since 1937 (the outbreak of the war in China). The key officers in 245 companies lost their positions. In practice, they could shift to one of thousands of companies which had not been listed among these 245 companies (Hadley 1973: 91). By November 1947 67 holding companies were resolved or were in the process of dissolution. The Commission took control of over 4,260 of their subsidiaries. Over 7 thousand executives were fired from these companies (Campbell 1948: 150).

In early 1947 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) proposed a law dissolving Zaibatsu permanently into small competing companies ('FEC 230'). It provided divestment of creditors, managers, stockholders and other individuals who had 'exercised controlling power of all corporate security holdings, liquid assets and business properties'. They were to be forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings and 'acquiring positions of business or governmental responsibility at any time during the next ten years' (Newsweek 1973: 112). The directive also stated that assets should be transferred to cooperatives of small entrepreneurs and trade unions.

This directive resulted in two laws: 'Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and the Methods of Preserving Fair Trade' and 'Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power Law'. The first prohibited the creation of private monopolies. The latter was a deconcentration law which implemented the main 'FEC230' decisions. These two laws were passed by the Japanese Diet in late 1947. They met with a bad reception in the US and Japan, especially of businessmen. They saw it, particularly the Deconcentration Law as a means that could destroy the country's economy and benefit only Communists (Campbell 1948: 151). The policy outlined in 'FEC230' went too far according to many important American politicians (Livingstone 1973: 113–115).

In March 1948 the Drapper-Johnston mission was sent to Japan. A report from that mission contributed largely to the shift in the American attitude towards Japan. Early 1948, when this mission took place, is treated as the end of first period of the American occupation and the beginning of the second phase.

2.2.4. Political Purge

In the Potsdam Declaration dated 26 July 1945 it was written: ‘There must be eliminated the authority and influence of those who had deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking into war conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world’ (Gordon 1993: 413). In the political part of ‘the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ it was specified more precisely. High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, General Staff and leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations would be purged.

Directives concerning the purge were issued to the Japanese government on 4 January 1946. It ordered it to establish a programme of removal of officials of the national government and to bar the following categories of people from the election to the Diet and from reappointment:

- 1) category A – War Criminals,
- 2) B – Career and Special Service Military Personnel; Special Police Officials; Officials of War Ministers.
- 3) C – Influential Members of Ultrationalistic, Terrorist or Secret Patriotic Societies.
- 4) D – Persons Influential in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Imperial Rule Assistance Society, etc.
- 5) E – Officers of Financial and Business concerns involved in Japanese Expansion.
- 6) F – Governors of Occupied territories.
- 7) G – Other militarists and ultrationalists.

A supplemental directive was added to the purge directive which demanded the dissolution of the existing ultrationalist and secret patriotic societies.

By 4 January the Government screened 8,899 persons. 1,067 people were barred or removed from government service (SCAP 1949: 29). However, a small scale of the purge was criticised in Japan and the US. Under this pressure the purge was extended. On 4 January 1947 the Japanese government promulgated the extension of the purge to the local level. 717,415 people were screened and 201,815 of them were purged. In this extended purge 7 categories were specified (SCAP 1949: 553):

- 1) War Criminal Suspects,
- 2) Career Military Personnel,
- 3) Ultrationalist Societies,

- 4) IRAA (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) and Affiliates,
- 5) Expansionist Organizations,
- 6) Governors of Occupied Areas,
- 7) Additional Militarist and Ultrationalist
 - economic
 - Public Information Media
 - Ex-Servicemen's Associations
 - Miscellaneous others (including Special Higher Police, Butokukai, etc.)

In early 1948 the 'reverse course' of the occupation stopped the purge process. Gradually they returned to public life.

The purge was strictly connected with the process of prosecution of war criminals. On 19 January 1946 the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo was established. It judged main criminals and was equivalent to this in Nuremberg. In May that year it began the trials of accused people, among them were three former prime ministers (Tojo, Keiso and Hirota). On 12 November 1948 the Tribunal sentenced 7 persons to death (including Tojo and Hirota); 16 got life imprisonment; two ministers of Foreign Affairs, Togo and Shigemitsu, received 20 years and 7 years in prison respectively, two accused men died during the trial and one was acknowledged as mentally ill.

2.2.5. Land Reform

Japan had experienced rural poverty until the early years of the occupation. Two main reasons of such a state of affairs were surplus population and inequalities in land distribution. Therefore, on 9 December 1945 General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to conduct a rural land reform in order to 'destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmers for centuries of feudal oppression' (Calder 1988: 251). In his memorandum he pointed out the ills of the contemporary agrarian structure of land. These were:

- 1) 'intense overcrowding of land' – almost half of the farm household in Japan tilled less than one and half acres each,
- 2) 'widespread tenancy under conditions highly unfavourable to tenants' – three-fourths of Japanese farmers paid rentals amounting to half or more of their annual crops as tenants,
- 3) 'a heavy burden of farm indebtedness combined with high rates of interest on farm loans' – because of indebtedness fewer than half of farm households were able to support themselves on their agriculture income,

- 4) 'government fiscal policies which discriminated agriculture in favour of industry and trade' – much higher interest rates and taxes on agriculture than those in commerce and industry,
- 5) 'authoritative government control over farmers and farm organizations without regard for farmer interests' – arbitrary crop quotas restricted the farmer in the cultivation of crops for his own needs or economic advancement.

The programme of the rural land reform should contain:

- 1) 'transfer of land ownership from absentee land owners to land operators',
- 2) 'provisions of purchase of farm lands from non-operating owners at equitable rates',
- 3) 'provisions for tenant purchase of land at annual instalments commensurate with tenant income',
- 4) 'provisions for reasonable protection of former tenants against reversion to tenancy status'. (SCAP 1949: 575)

After MacArthur's directive the government presented to the Diet a bill to amend the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law. It was called the first land reform. It allowed landlords to keep up to five hectares of their property. By some estimates it would have affected less than one-third of tenanted land. However, conservative politicians of the Diet perceived it as a threat to the traditional leadership in villages (Calder 1988: 250).

MacArthur dissatisfied with the government proposal pressed for more radical measures. They should lead to the main objective which was to transform the cultivators of 80 percent of tenanted farmland into independent farmers (Campbell 1948: 149). In October 1946 the Diet passed a law which was the second land reform. According to this law all leased-out land of village owners in excess of one hectare was to be purchased by the state and resold to tenants. Owners, who farmed the land were allowed to keep 3 hectares (Hall 1979: 291). Paying rents in kind became forbidden, only cash payment was permitted. In a short time 2 million hectares changed their owners (Fukatake 1973: 188).

Before the war only 30 percent of farmers were owner-cultivators. After the reform the number of owner-cultivators grew by 1.7 million households and the number of tenant households decreased (Calder 1988: 251). By February 1948 3,489 million acres assigned for redistribution were purchased by a proper commissions. 0,536 million acres were resold to tenants (Campbell 1948: 149).

The execution of this law met many problems. The implementation of the reform on the local level was the responsibility of the elected Land

Committees. Many of them were dominated by landlords. Moreover, landlords wanted to evict tenants in order to get more land for themselves. In practice this law did not forbid completely the return of land to land lords (Livingstone 1973: 192).

Another step which was taken was the abolition of the conservative agricultural associations – ‘nokai’ in December 1947. Through them local elites had influenced the countryside since the mid-Meiji period. Instead of these, politically independent agricultural cooperatives – ‘nokyō’ came into being. It followed the passage of the Agricultural Cooperatives Law of 1947. American occupation authorities insisted on government’s lack of intervention in their affairs. They should be organised and run autonomously to strengthen democracy and pluralism in the countryside (Calder 1988: 251–252).

Meanwhile on 4 February 1948 SCAP submitted to the Japanese government a memorandum calling for the acceleration of the land reform (SCAP 1949: 575). MacArthur remarked there that efforts had been made by ‘certain adversely affected interests’ to obstruct the land reform programme. Therefore, he directed the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to instruct land commissions to purchase all land subject to the Land Reform Law without delay. Also, he suggested the Japanese government to take action against persons who obstructed the implementation of the land reform measures (SCAP 1949: 577). It induced the government to further action in the reform implementation.

2.2.6. Educational System

The reform of the educational system in Japan was one of the most important objectives of American occupation authorities. In ‘the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ of 29 August 1945 there was a provision that militarism and ultra-nationalism should be eliminated from the educational system. Moreover, former military and naval officers and other exponents of these doctrines should be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions (US 1968: 630).

On the other hand, the Japanese should be allowed to get to know the history, culture, and institutions of the US and other democratic countries. It was repeated in the directive ‘Basic Initial Post-Surrender Policy’ of 1 November 1945, which also contained a clause saying that excluded teachers should be replaced by ‘acceptable and qualified successors’. Also, military and paramilitary training in Japanese schools was to be forbidden (US 1968: 641). Americans realised the ‘importance of winning over the children’.

Therefore, after the beginning of the occupation some preliminary steps were undertaken, such as the introduction of a ban on spreading ‘militarist and ultra-nationalist thought’, a purge of teachers, revisions of textbooks and suspension of some courses (especially the course of morals – ‘shushin’)¹².

But the most important step in the educational field was its decentralisation. It had been suggested earlier by the United States Education Mission, which had stayed in Japan since March 1946. According to it, the educational functions should be exercised by prefectural and local administrative agencies. The Ministry of Education should only be an advisory institution for them in professional and technical matters. It should no longer hold control over local schools.

These recommendations were approved by the Japanese Educational Reform Council created in August 1946. Therefore, on 15 July 1948 the Board of Education Law was adopted. In general, it followed the suggestions of the US Education Mission. It exempted education from direct control of the Ministry of Education. The Boards of Education were established, which were put in charge of all schools except private schools and higher education institutions. Their control included: the curriculum, the selection of textbooks and the hiring and dismissing of personnel. The members of the board were elected locally for terms of four years. The boards had a power to participate in the compilation of budget. The Ministry of Education became an advisory body (Livingstone 1973: 51). Moreover, in prefectures new universities were established¹³.

This whole reform contributed largely to the appeasement of authoritarian atmosphere in Japanese schools. It eliminated nationalism from it and encouraged democratic tendencies in society.

3. OCCUPATION – THE SECOND PHASE

3.1. Reversed course – reasons.

The second period of the American occupation in Japan began in early 1948 (for some analyst late 1947). The dominant policy of this phase was reconstruction. Therefore, the US abandoned the idea of complete Zaibatsu dissolution. Americans allowed Japan to possess some military forces (police) and to rebuild its economic strength. Many politicians and businessmen

¹² (MacArthur 1964: 312) Over 25 million new textbooks were distributed then.

¹³ Following the American pattern, where each state of the union has its university.

previously 'purged' reappeared in public life. Reparations which Japan had had to pay to its victims were reduced, and in the end terminated. The end of the second phase and the end of the American occupation in general took place on 28 April 1952. Then the Treaty of the San Francisco Conference came into force. At that conference the Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and other countries (8 September 1951).

There were two main reasons for the reversed course in American policy toward Japan in the second phase of the occupation. The changing international situation was the first reason, the other cause was economic. Both were connected with each other, although the political cause seems to be of major importance.

Americans stopped to supply the Japanese economy on such a scale as they had done before, but on the other hand they spent considerable sums of money on their military facilities and bases in Japan. The change of American policy in the field of economy was on account of the fact that their new economic policy in Japan helped them to achieve a political aim, which was to make that country democratic and stable. Besides, new policy in Japanese economy reduced the US expenditures on the continuing occupation.

The shift of American policy toward the occupied country resulted mainly from political reasons.

3.1.1. International context

American had realised a potential threat of Soviet domination before the Cold War period started. Therefore, they opposed so strongly and successfully the Soviet share of the occupation of Japan (MacArthur 1964: 285)¹⁴. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had a strong anti-Communist attitude and perceived the soviet rule as a 'godless concept of atheistic totalitarian enslavement' (MacArthur 1964: 293).

On 30 August 1946 the 'Baltimore Sun' published an article by Russel Brines. He wrote that thought the military phase of the occupation was completed, the American army might have to stay there to hold 'the eastern anchor of a worldwide American line against the Soviet Union and communism' (Livingstone 1973: 234).

In Japan MacArthur presented openly his support for the conservative wing in Japanese politics. He called Japan 'the westernmost outpost of

¹⁴ Harry Truman (1965: 455) wrote: 'the experience of Potsdam now made me determined that I would not allow the Russians any part in the control of Japan'.

our defences' and 'Switzerland of the East' (Livingstone 1973: 235–236). International developments assured MacArthur and other American officials in their opinions. General Marshall's Mission in China failed on 29 January 1947. Moreover, Chinese Communists were systematically overcoming Kuomintang (Guomindang) forces. On 1 October 1949 the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed. China became a projected US enemy in Asia.

As far as the situation in Europe was concerned, American president Harry Truman gave a speech to the US Congress on 12 March 1947. He pledged American support for 'free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures' (Alan Palmer 1990: 397). Its intention was to prevent Soviet domination and the spread of communism.

Soviets supported communist guerrillas in other countries, whose operations aimed at introducing a Communist type of government there. The Truman doctrine referred mainly to Greece (and Turkey), which were a vivid example of such a case. The Marshall Plan, proposed for the first time on 5 June 1947, had the same aim. It was a plan for European (mostly Western-European) economic recovery in order to strengthen these countries and exclude them from Russian political influence. After the communist revolution in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade from summer 1948 till spring 1949 the bi-polar division of Europe and the world became a reality.

Because of these events Japan started to be perceived by the US as a potential part of its security system. Therefore, an American objective should be (as George Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department, wrote in early 1948): 'to devise a policy toward Japan which would assure the security of that country from communist penetration and domination as well as from the military attack by the Soviet Union and would permit Japan's economic potential to become once again an important force in the affairs of the area, conducive to peace and stability' (Kennan 1950: 381).

In October 1949 58 million dollars were appropriated by the American Congress for military constructions on the Okinawa island as a response to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The presence of American military forces there contributed to the prevention of Chinese invasion of Taiwan (Livingstone 1973: 237). The outbreak of the Korean War (1950) only confirmed the American sense of adequacy of their policy toward Japan¹⁵.

¹⁵ In his memorandum presented to British Premier Attlee on 4 December 1950 President Truman (1965: volume II, 456) suggested 'steps which might be taken to strengthen

3.1.2. Economic reasons

Japanese economy had been in a bad condition by the end of the war. Most of public money had been given to support the war machine. There were problems with tax collection at that time and just after the surrender (MacArthur 1964: 307). Americans appropriated large sums for aid from the beginning of the military occupation of Japan. For instance in the year 1947 Japan experienced a new economic crisis. The US gave Japan 1,652,296 tons of food in the first nine months of 1947 (Campbell 1948: 156–157). According to the budget of the Department of the Army for 1949, 410 million dollars were assigned to be spent on supplies and food for Japan.

Such a situation could not last longer. That annual ‘dole’ was too expensive. Therefore, the US government concluded that Japan could not be still such a burden for American taxpayers. As early as 21 January 1948 General Frank McCoy, an American member of the Far Eastern Commission, announced that the US would not subsidise the Japanese economy. The international situation only encouraged the US to reorient its economic policy toward Japan. They understood that they needed democratic Japan with a stable economy.

3.2. Japanese economy in the second phase

3.2.1. Deconcentration

As I have mentioned in chapter 2, in March 1948 the Drapper-Johnston economic mission took place. After that the Johnston Committee prepared a report. It contributed largely to a reversal of the course toward Japan. They concluded that Japan’s first economic need is increased production.

The Committee pointed out three main deficiencies in physical means available to Japan:

- 1) lack of essential raw materials,
- 2) the bad condition of many existing factories,
- 3) the poor state of transport.

non-communist Asia’. These were: ‘restoration of considerable self-government to Japan, the acceleration of efforts to obtain a Japanese peace settlement, the strengthening of Japanese capacity for self-defence, the greater utilisation of productive capacity to strengthen the capabilities of the free world, and the prompt admission of Japan into international organizations’.

It was also said that the threat of reparations cramped much of Japan industry, especially heavy industry. Referring to the programme of the Zaibatsu dissolution (though not directly) they wrote that ‘the possible disturbing effect should be alleged by care not to hurt production, and by limiting reorganisation to the minimum necessary to insure reasonable competition’ (Livingstone 1973: 120).

As far as further developments within FEC 230 are concerned, the US withdrew its support for it on 12 March 1948. Moreover, the number of 325 companies designed under the Deconcentration Law to dissolution was reduced to 100 in July 1948. The Deconcentration Review Board released further companies from the dissolution process. Thus, only 19 remained for deconcentration. In practice, when 9 corporations had been dissolved, the Board announced the end of the deconcentration process (Kawai 1960: 147). The final outcome of the Deconcentration Law was a victory of the Pentagon and conservative powers in the US (Livingstone 1973: 132).

George Kennan referring to the idea of deconcentration wrote that ‘the measures themselves could only have been eminently agreeable to anyone interested in the future communisation of Japan’ (Kennan 1950: 388).

3.2.2. Dodge Plan

Joseph Dodge went to Japan in February 1949. He was a conservative banker from Detroit, who had been asked by Drapper to take over the Japanese economy. Dodge began his plan of budget cutting and deflation. The intention of this programme was to establish a capitalist, self-supporting economy in Japan by 1953. In a short time it led to mass unemployment. Joseph Dodge argued that ‘an increase in unemployment will in turn lead to increased efficiency of labour and a greater production’ (Livingstone 1973: 135).

In December 1949 SCAP allowed the ‘dumping’ practices by the removal of the price floors on export. The Japanese should lower the prices and therefore their products would be more competitive. Following the Dodge Programme the government increased the price of essential services (commuter trains and staple foods) and controlled wages. The Plan succeeded in achieving a balanced budget and a single exchange rate for imports and exports by June 1949. But the next year the reform showed its full impact on the Japanese economy. The output fell to one-third of the 1931 level, investment to one-half of the 1949 level (Livingstone 1973: 137–138). People lost their jobs.

This tragic situation was changed by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Japanese economy got the boost by US procurement purchases.

Japanese factories manufactured many supplies useful for American and UN troops in Korea. The economic indicators grew up. By the end of 1951 the Japanese industrial production reached its level from the 30s (Storry: 1960: 255). The household saving rate during the 1950–52 period amounted to 10–15 percent (Gordon 1993: 284). Thus, the Korean War brought a recovery to the Japanese economy¹⁶.

3.2.3. War Reparations

The reversal of the American stand was quite evident in the issue of war reparations. In ‘the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan’ of 6 September 1945 there was a provision that reparations for Japanese aggression should be made. For this purpose Japanese property and goods:

- a) located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan,
- b) located in 4 main islands, if such ‘goods or existing capital equipment and facilities ... are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces’ would be transferred.

On the other hand, ‘no form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the programme for Japan’s demilitarisation’ (US 1968: 632).

In November 1945 the Edwin Pauley mission in Japan took place. In his letter to General Douglas MacArthur and President Truman dated 6 December Pauley concluded that ‘Japan retains more industrial capacity than she needs or has ever used for their civilian economy’. Therefore ‘the removal of the surplus, especially to neighbouring Asiatic countries, will help to raise their industrial standards and all living standards without depressing the standards of Japan’ (Livingstone 1973: 83). Pauley proposed that following plants and equipment should be included into programme of reparations:

- 1) half of the capacity for the manufacture of machine tools,
- 2) tools and equipment:
 - a) in army and navy arsenals,
 - b) in the entire aircraft industry of Japan,
 - c) in all plants manufacturing ball and roller bearings,
 - d) in all plants manufacturing aircraft engines,
- 3) all equipment accessories in twenty shipyards,
- 4) all steelmaking capacity in excess of 2.5 million tons per year,

¹⁶ By 1957 the economic recovery was complete (Wall 1964: 42).

- 5) all facilities for the production of magnesium, for the preparation of aluminium and reduction of aluminium,
- 6) half of thermal (coal) electric generating plants of Japan,
- 7) all contact process sulphuric acid plants, except those necessary to recover the waste gases of zinc, lead, copper and other heavy metal smelters,
- 8) the most modern large Solvay process soda-ash plant in Japan,
- 9) twenty of the most modern large plants for the production of caustic soda and chlorine (Livingstone 1973: 84–85).

Pauley's report (which was the summary quoted from his letter) was delivered to the Far Eastern Commission. The Commission partly agreed with Pauley's arguments. But recognising the period of 1930–34 as 'a yardstick for determining Japan's proper standard of living' the commission allowed Japan to retain a higher level of pig iron, steel, shipping (Campbell 1948: 153).

Because of a disagreement concerning the implementation of the suggestions of the Far Eastern Commission from 1946, in April 1947 the United States government ordered the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to distribute 30 percent of the initially available reparation pool to four principal war-devastated countries as follows (US 1968: 1017):

- 1) China – 15 percent.
- 2) Philippines – 5 percent.
- 3) United Kingdom (for Malaya Burma) – 5 percent.
- 4) Netherlands (for Netherlands East Indies) – 5 percent.

On 19 June 1947 in 'the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan' it was stated that reparations should pursue policies set forth by the Far Eastern Commission. However, they should not 'prejudice the defraying of the cost of the occupation and the maintenance of the minimum civilian standard of living' (US 1968: 658).

In the spring of 1948 the Drapper-Johnston mission to Japan took place. As I mentioned earlier it claimed that 'the threat of removal for reparations hang over much of Japan's industry'. The report showed that the Japanese economy was operating with large deficit, despite living standards remaining at the minimum level. Therefore, it suggested a 45 percent reduction of the dismantling plan proposed by Pauley.

On 12 May 1949 Frank McCoy, an American representative of the Far Eastern Commission, presenting the Japanese reparation problem stated that:

- 1) 'The deficit Japanese economy shows little prospect of being balanced in the near future and to achieve eventual balance will require all resources at its disposal'.

- 2) 'The burden of removing further reparations from Japan could detract seriously from the occupation objective of stabilising the Japanese economy and permitting it to move toward self-support'.
- 3) 'There is little or no prospect of the FEC agreement on a reparations initiative by the US over the past three years to assist the FEC in reaching such an agreement. Without agreement on a share schedule, the existing FEC policy decisions regarding reparations are incapable of implementation'.
- 4) 'Japan has already paid substantial reparations through expropriation of its former overseas assets and, in smaller degree, under the Advance Transfer Programme' (US 1968: 1023–1024).

Thus, McCoy concluded that the US would not act to seek possible additional reparations from Japan. Indeed, no further reparations were delivered until the end of the American occupation (1952). However, the problem of reparations remained present and it returned during the talks concerning the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951.

3.3. Purge

The problem of the political purge in the second phase of the American occupation of Japan reflects perfectly the change of US policy toward this country. The purge process which took place in the first period of the occupation caused mixed feelings also among American officials¹⁷.

Thus, on 3 March 1947 a Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board was formed to re-screen those who considered themselves unjustly purged. But occupation authorities annulled about 150 purge charges out of more than 1,000 cases (Yoshida 1961: 161). The Board finished its activity. Simultaneously after 4 January 1947 the purge was extended. As I mentioned earlier 201,815 people were purged as a result of it.

In January 1949 Japanese prime minister Shigeru Yoshida was granted General MacArthur's permission to set up the second Appeal Board. The chairman of the Board Tadaichiro Tanimura met the Chief of the Government Section – General Courtney Whitney. Whitney told him that the Board should only consider cases where an error of judgment of the purge ordinances

¹⁷ George F. Kennan (1967: 389) concluded that 'the indiscriminate purging of whole categories of individuals, sickeningly similar to totalitarian practices, was in conflict with the civil rights provisions of the new constitution that we ourselves had imposed upon the Japanese'.

had occurred. Also those cases which had involved unfairness should be considered.

At the beginning of the Board's activity 10,000 persons were de-purged out of 32,000 re-examined cases. In October 1950 33,250 young officers were also exonerated. The outbreak of the Korean War accelerated that process (Yoshida 1961: 162).

On the fourth anniversary of the Japanese constitution General Ridgeway (who had replaced MacArthur as SCAP in April 1951) allowed the government in his memorandum to 'review existing ordinances issued in implementation of directives from this headquarters, for the purpose of evolving through established procedures such modifications as past experience and the present situation render necessary and desirable' (Livingstone 1973: 92).

Ridgeway's memorandum was used by the Japanese as a legal base for further steps to reverse the purge. In June 1951 the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee replaced the Board. 177 thousand persons were released from the purges. The Appeal Committee created in November added 9,000 people to this amount (Yoshida 1961: 164). By 28 April 1952 (the date of coming into effect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty) only 8,710 persons were still purged (Livingstone 1973: 37). And finally, the San Francisco treaty abolished all laws and ordinances relating to the purges (Yoshida 1961: 164).

Also the so called 'red-purge' process was bound with the process of purge rehabilitation. It was a massive removal of Communists and fellow travellers from jobs in the government, media and private industry in the years 1949–51. American occupation authorities perceived them as a major threat and obstacle to economic and political stabilisation of Japan.

On 3 May 1950 General MacArthur attacked in his Constitution Day speech the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). He described it as an alien destructive power which through weapon of strikes and riots wanted to wreck the whole economy. MacArthur also suggested outlawing the JCP¹⁸. On 30 May 1950 in Tokyo Communists organised 'a rally for the rising of the people' in which several officers of US forces were injured. In retaliation for it MacArthur purged from public life leaders of the Communist party in June 1950. In the same month the JCP organ 'Akahata' ('Red Flag') was

¹⁸ (Yoshida 1961: 235) General MacArthur proposed it for the first time in his Fourth of July message in 1949. He said that Communists used freedoms 'to destroy those freedoms'.

suspended¹⁹. By the end of 1950 11,000 people connected with Communists were fired from their work in private companies. Additionally 1,200 lost their jobs in governmental services (Livingstone 1973: 75).

In summary, in the period of 1949–51 20,997 Communists and fellow travellers were fired from work in the government, media and private industry (Livingstone 1973: 37).

3.4. US-Japan Security Treaty and Peace Treaty

On 17 March 1947 General MacArthur said at the press conference in Tokyo that time had come to finish the occupation and draw up a peace treaty with Japan. He added that Japan fulfilled the requirements of the Potsdam Proclamation and its provisions (Kawai 1960: 31). In July 1947 the US suggested to other nations from the Far Eastern Commission holding a conference to discuss the problem of peace with Japan. But the Soviet Union rejected this offer. Instead of it Soviets insisted on a Foreign Ministers' Conference between the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. The US did not agree to that and it reached a deadlock (Yoshida 1961: 245).

On the other hand, that situation was fortunate for the US. Thanks to it Americans got time to reverse their policy toward Japan and implement it²⁰. International developments such as: the Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Berlin's blockade and the situation in China encouraged such steps. By the end of 1949 it was evident that the US did not plan the withdrawal of its military forces from Japan.

Referring to the future peace treaty with Japan George Kennan said that: 'while the treaty would not itself provide for the retention of American bases in Japan, it would be accompanied by a separate agreement with the Japanese government sanctioning such an agreement; and that if all this was not agreeable to the Russians, as it obviously would not be, we would not hesitate to conclude both treaty and agreement without them' (Livingstone 1973: 236–237).

¹⁹ (Yoshida 1961: 239) It was a punishment for the publication on its front page of a large photo of Kim IL Sung, the Prime Minister of North Korea, immediately after North Korean forces attacked the Republic of Korea.

²⁰ As G.F. Kennan (1967: 376–377) wrote: 'the resulting deadlock now gave us opportunity to review the situation and to have a new look at our thinking and our policies generally with relations to Japan'.

Meanwhile at the turn of 1949 the Peace Study Group on Peace Settlement for Japan was established. It consisted of 60 persons, among them many Tokyo University professors. On 15 January 1950 they released a statement, whose summary conclusions were as follows:

- 1) 'If we Japanese are to express any wish at all on the question of the peace settlement for Japan, there could be no other alternative but the complete overall peace'.
- 2) 'The condition of economic self-support for Japan cannot be attained through a separate peace'.
- 3) 'As for Japan's security after the peace settlement, we favour the status of inviolable neutrality and also would like to be admitted to the United Nations'.
- 4) 'We stand opposed to giving military bases to any country under any pretext'. (Livingstone 1973: 253).

Although these suggestions were not likely to change the Japanese government's and American stand on that issue, Yoshida did not agree primarily to Japan's rearmament and US bases at his meeting with American negotiator John F. Dulles in June 1950. But the outbreak of the Korean War a week later changed the situation drastically. During his second visit to Japan in January 1951 Dulles proposed a mutual security pact between the US and Japan, as well as a peace treaty. At that time it was met with a good reception of Premier Yoshida (Yoshida 1961: 266). Yoshida in return for his permission for American bases in Japanese territories asked for increasing of Japanese land and sea forces. The American envoy agreed to that (Yoshida 1961: 267–268).

On 9 February 1951 a document was signed which specified the stage reached in the peace negotiations. On 18 April another Dulles-Yoshida meeting took place. Dulles informed the Prime Minister about the demands for reparations and limitations of the Japanese rearmament which had been raised by the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, he had managed to persuade these countries to accept the American policy. On 14 June a complete agreement was reached between the US and Great Britain on the draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty (Yoshida 1961: 252).

The main provisions of this draft had not been altered and it was finally signed at the San Francisco Conference on 8 September 1951. The draft stated that Japan would recognise the independence of Korea and would renounce all right, claim and title to:

- 1) Korea including the Qualpart Island and other islands adjacent to Korea,
- 2) Formosa and the Pescadores,

- 3) The Kurile Island and southern Sakhalin,
- 4) The Pacific Islands formerly mandated to Japan by the League of Nations. Japan would also accept UN Security Council decisions concerning these,
- 5) The Spartly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (Keesing's 1952: 11681).

Japan was also to agree to US administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the Bonin Island, the Volcano Islands, the Ryukyu Islands (south of the 29 degree North latitude) and the Marcus Islands. As far as security was concerned Japan would accept the following obligations of the UN Charter:

- a) to settle her international disputes by peaceful means,
- b) to give to the UN assistance in action taken in accordance with the Charter and not to give such assistance to a state against which the UN takes such action.

The Allied Powers recognised Japan as a sovereign nation possessing 'the inherent right of collective and individual self-defence'.

Referring to the occupation forces in Japan it was provided that all of them would be withdrawn not later than 90 days after the coming into force of the peace treaty (Keesing's 1952: 11681).

The third major question in the peace treaty draft – the problem of reparations – aroused many objections. Many countries opposed to such 'soft' treatment of the Japanese in that matter. Because of the pressure from countries such as France, the Netherlands, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines article 14 a of section 'Claims and property clauses' was reworded on 13 August. In the following provision there were three significant corrections: 'It is recognised that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for damage and suffering caused by her during the war. Nevertheless, it is also recognised that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if she is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time to meet her other obligations'.

In the first sentence which originally said '...should in principle pay reparations' the words 'in principle' were deleted. The phrase 'adequate reparation' was substituted by harder 'complete reparation'. The third change was the phrase 'not presently sufficient' instead of original 'lacks of capacity' (Keesing's 1952: 11683). Thus, the final text was made a little bit more punitive for Japan but not enough to satisfy all the countries admitted to the Conference (Latourette 1957: 278).

As far as China is concerned, the US successfully opposed inviting the People's Republic of China to the Conference. The American position became especially uncompromising since China had entered the Korean

War (27 November 1950). During British-American talks (April–June 1951) the British government suggested consultations with the government in Communist China in Peking about the Japanese peace treaty. This proposal was rejected by the US. A spokesman of the US State Department Michael MacDermont announced that the US government ‘recognised the Nationalist government of China and does not contemplate discussions with the Peking regime on the Japanese peace treaty’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11500).

On 8 June John Dulles arrived in London. He had to deal with a difficult diplomatic task. The British government, which recognised the Peking regime as a legitimate government of China wanted to invite it to the San Francisco Conference. But Dulles reached a compromise settlement. In the end it was negotiated that neither Communist nor nationalist China would be admitted. Furthermore, Japan could sign a separate treaty with whichever government of China it chose to recognise. Both Chinese governments, Communist and Nationalist, denounced the Japanese draft treaty and the fact of not being invited to the conference. Peking’s propaganda showed the draft treaty as a ‘violation of international agreements’ which was ‘basically unacceptable’ to the Chinese people. It described the document as ‘a war treaty made to utilise Japan’s military potential for the invasion of Asia’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11683). Also Taipei (Taibei) government was disappointed. It demanded its rights to take part in the San Francisco Conference. Taiwan warned that the US stand ‘seriously damaged the traditional friendship between the Chinese and Americans’. The Japanese Peace treaty without Nationalist China would be ‘lacking in moral force and legal justification, and would leave the indelible blot on the history of Allied cooperation in resisting aggression’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11684)²¹.

On 5 September 1951 during the San Francisco Conference Andriey Gromyko, the Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, tried to introduce a resolution calling for the participation of Communist China. That attempt was ruled out of order by president of the conference Dean Acheson. His ruling was supported by 45 votes to 3.

On the other hand, many Japanese officials wanted to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China at that time. However, the Japanese premier Shigeru Yoshida did not do it because of the threat that the US Congress could refuse to ratify the peace treaty (Livingstone 1973: 243).

On 24 December 1951 Yoshida wrote a letter to John Foster Dulles to demonstrate Americans his aversion to Communist China. He concluded in

²¹ Japan signed a treaty of peace with nationalist China in April 1952.

his letter that: 'there are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist party in its programme of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the present government of Japan'. Therefore, as Yoshida wrote 'the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist government of China'. The Japanese prime minister also added that his government 'is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the national government of China, if that government so desires, a treaty which will re-establish normal relations between the two governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace' (Livingstone 1973: 249–250).

The question of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the San Francisco Peace Conference was strongly backed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, it had its own objectives toward the Japanese Peace Treaty.

On 7 May 1951 the Soviet government submitted to the US Ambassador in Moscow a note rejecting the proposed American draft. It proposed that the draft of the Peace Treaty should be drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers comprising of representatives of the United States, the Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Other countries which had taken part in the war with Japan should assist in drafting the treaty. According to Russians the peace treaty draft should safeguard interests of China and contain assurance that Japan 'would not enter into any coalitions against any of the States that participated in the war against Japan'. Soviets demanded also that 'no foreign state should have troops or military bases in Japan after that period of time' (Keesing's 1952: 11499).

The USA rejected the Soviet proposals (including the most important one concerning the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers) in its note of 20 May. The US declared that the draft treaty reflected real interest of China, particularly articles under which Japan would renounce all her former special rights and interests in that country.

Responding to Soviet complaints about possible remilitarisation of Japan and the retention of occupation troops, Americans wrote that 'the US government is satisfied that Japan's war making power is destroyed'. Furthermore, 'the United States has completely disarmed the Japanese military forces under its control and has assured that they now lead peaceful and productive lives'.

As far as Japanese entrance into a coalition against any of its former war enemies was concerned, the US answered that in the draft there was such a general provision. According to it, Japan refrained from the threat or use

of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (following the UN Charter). Referring to the presence of foreign troops in Japan Americans stated that they ‘would not be willing to deny to Japan what the UN Charter refers to as the inherent right of collective self-defence’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11499–11500).

On 10 June the Soviet Union presented the next note to the US government. It repeated its demand of drafting the Japanese peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Soviets wrote that because of the absence of Communist China and the Soviet Union in drawing up the treaty, the treaty was ‘primarily directed against these states, and is of an aggressive nature’. Russia called the future US-Japan defence agreement a ‘camouflage’ for the continued American military occupation of that country after the conclusion of the peace agreement.

Soviets claimed that the peace treaty should be ‘omnipartite and not separate, for which purpose no single country which took part in the war against Japan must be excluded from the preparation and signing of the treaty’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11685). In their reply Americans reiterated the arguments from the note of 20 May. Finally, on 12 August 1951 the Soviet Union accepted the invitation to the San Francisco Conference although its objectives to the draft remained.

At the conference the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andriey Gromyko said in his speech that the treaty ‘made no provisions for the withdrawal of occupation forces’, it ‘cleared a path for Japanese participation in aggressive blocs under the aegis of the United States’ and that its ‘real purpose’ was to ‘tie Japan hand and foot to the military alliance headed by the United States and directed against the Soviet Union and China’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11722). Finally, the USSR refused to sign the treaty.

On the same day when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed (8 September 1951) US secretary of state Dean Acheson and Japanese Premier Shigeru Yoshida signed the US-Japan bilateral Defence Pact. Under its provisions Japan agreed to the indefinite retention of US forces ‘in and about Japan’ in order to prevent any aggression against it. The preamble of it contained (as it had been promised to Yoshida) the assurance that ‘Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression...’ (Keesing’s 1952: 11724)²².

²² (Livingstone 1973: 242) According to many analyst, it violated the no-war provision (article 9) of the Japanese constitution.

The provisions of the Defence Pact stated also that Japan would not grant any third power any bases without US consent, and conditions of American forces disposition would be agreed between the two governments (Keesing's 1952: 11724). The operative part of the Pact was the Administrative Agreement which was signed on 28 February 1952.

It finally came into effect on 28 April 1952, the same day and hour as the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Pact. On that day the American occupation of Japan was formally finished.

CONCLUSIONS

Americans appeared in Japanese history for the first time in a significant way in 1853 when American commodore Matthew Perry arrived with battleships to the seaport of Uraga and demanded opening of Japanese harbours for international commerce.

Because of it and the general pressure of Western countries which wanted to open the Japanese market for their products, the Japanese carried out a reform (the so called 'Meiji reform') to strengthen their economy and make it able to compete with other countries. After that Japan became a strong imperialist state.

The occupation of Japan in 1945–51 by the US was its second mark on Japanese history. In the first phase of it (1945–48) Americans introduced major reforms which made Japan politically more similar to Western democracies (the Constitution, educational system) and changed partially its social structure (land reform).

However, the US did not succeed fully as far as this latter aim was concerned. In the second phase they abandoned the programme of the Zaibatsu dissolution, also the purge of war criminals was not carried out to the end (the purge of communists was initiated instead). Furthermore, Americans healed the Japanese economy, they included that country into world's political system and made it a political and military ally.

The draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty was the result of negotiations and a compromise between a 'softer' approach of the US and more punitive one of the Great Britain. Afterwards, the text of the San Francisco peace treaty was the outcome of the next compromise between the liberal stand of the US and Great Britain and claiming positions of other countries (particularly Burma, Indonesia and Philippines). However, the US defended successfully its new ally from being too much hurt by the provisions of the treaty. In

exchange Japan had to agree to American military bases on its territory and being in the US sphere of influence.

As I have mentioned before, the most important reasons for the change of American policy in Japan were international developments connected with the Cold War such as: the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the blockade of Berlin in the years 1948–1949, the Greek Civil War in 1946–49. Finally, the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 caused the remilitarisation of Japan and its political and military bonds with the US. As G.F. Kennan wrote: 'The Korean War demolished whatever slight possibility might ever have existed for a Russian-American understanding in relation to the problems of that region, based on the neutralisation and demilitarisation of Japan. What was later to occur in China made it doubly unfortunate that such an understanding ever existed' (Kennan 1967: 296).

One should stress that many American officials had appreciated Japan's importance before. G.F. Kennan thought that 'if at any time in the post-war period the Soviet leader had been confronted with a choice between control over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitatingly have chosen the latter'. Therefore, Americans 'could feel fairly secure in the presence of a truly friendly Japan and a nominally hostile China – nothing very bad could happen to us from this combination; but the dangers to our security of a nominally friendly China and a truly hostile Japan had already been demonstrated in the Pacific war' (Kennan 1967: 374–375).

The personal attitude of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, toward the Japanese was also an important factor. He thought that 'the Japanese are a proud, sensitive and industrious race' and respected them (MacArthur 1964: 309). MacArthur also advocated a peace treaty with Japan already in the early years of the occupation.

In April 1951 he was substituted by General Matthew Ridgeway. At that time the international situation was clear. The division of the world into two opposite political blocks – capitalist (led by the US) and communist (led by the USSR) was a reality. Thus, General Ridgeway continued implementing in Japan American occupation policy, whose aim was evident – making Japan a political and military ally of the US.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anon. (1991) *Japan-US Relationship: Bilateral and Global Contexts*. Budapest.
- Bisson, T.A. (1954) *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Calder, K.E. (1988) *Crisis and Compensation. Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949–1986*. USA: Princeton University Press.
- Campbell, J.C. (1948) *The United States in World Affairs 1947–1948*. New York and London: Harper and Brothers.
- Fleisher, W. (1945) *What to do with Japan?* New York.
- Gordon, A. (ed.) (1993) *Postwar Japan as History*. USA: University of California Press.
- GPO (1945) *Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation 1939–1945*. Washington.
- Hadley, E.H. (1973) ‘Combine Dissolution: Severing Personal Ties’. in *Postwar Japan. 1945 to the Present*. ed. by Livingstone, J. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Hall, J.W. (1979) *Japonia. [Japan.]* Warszawa: PWN.
- Hollermann, L. (ed.) (1980) *Japan and the United States: Economic and Political Adversaries*. USA: Westview Press.
- Kawai, K. (1960) *Japan’s American Interlude*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Keesing’s (1950–52) *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*. vol. VIII. Bristol: Keesing’s Publications Limited.
- Kennan G.F. (1967) *Memoirs 1925–1950*. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press Book.
- Kimball, W.F. (1987) *Churchill and Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence*. New Jersey: Princeton.
- Kolko, J., and Kolko, G. (1973) ‘The Dodge Plan’. in *Postwar Japan. 1945 to the Present*. ed. by Livingstone, J. New York: Pantheon Books .
- Latourette, K.S. (1957) *The History of Japan*. New York: The MacMillan Company.
- Livingstone, J. (1973) *Postwar Japan. 1945 to the Present*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- MacArtur, D. (1964) *Reminiscences*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Maki J.M. (1961) *Conflict and Tension in the Far East. Key Documents 1894–1960*. Seattle.
- Newsweek (1973) ‘A Lawyer Report on Japan Attacks Plan to Run Occupation’. *Postwar Japan. 1945 to the Present*. ed. by Livingstone, J. New York: Pantheon Books.

- Palmer, A. (1990) *Dictionary of the Twentieth Century History 1900–1989*. Great Britain: Penguin Books LTD.
- Stimson, H., and MacGeorge, B. (1947) *On Active Service in Peace and War*. New York.
- Storry, R. (1960) *A History of Modern Japan*. Middlesex: Harmondsworth.
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (1949) *Political Reorientation of Japan. September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers*. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
- Tadashi, F. (1973) 'Land Reform Laws'. in *Postwar Japan. 1945 to the Present*. ed. by Livingstone, J. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Truman, H. (1965) *Memoirs by...* New York: The New American Library.
- United States (1968) *A Decade of American Foreign Policy – Basic Documents, 1941–49*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Wall, R.F. (1964) *Japan's Century. An Interpretation of Japanese History Since the Eighteen-Fifties*. London: The Historical Association.
- Watts, W., Packard, G.R., Clough, R.N., and Oxnam, R.B. (1979) *Japan, Korea and China*. D.C. Toronto: Heath and Company.
- Yoshida, S. (1961) *The Yoshida Memoirs. The Story of Japan in Crisis*. Great Britain: William Heinemann LTD.

DEVELOPMENT AND SHIFT OF US OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN (1945–1951) IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Summary

This article presents shifts of US occupation policy in Japan in years 1945–1951. America's changing position towards that country at the end of the Second World War, as well as in the first and second phases of the occupation is discussed. The international context of this process is presented and described.

Key words: American occupation in Japan, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), US – Japan Defence Pact, Second World War, Japan remilitarisation, Drapper – Johnston mission to Japan, (Red) purge in Japan, zaibatsu dissolution, 'Jinken' – human rights, Dodge plan

ROZWÓJ I ZMIANA AMERYKAŃSKIEJ POLITYKI OKUPACYJNEJ W JAPONII (1945–1951) W KONTEKŚCIE MIĘDZYNARODOWYM

Streszczenie

Artykuł ten opisuje zmiany polityki okupacyjnej USA w Japonii w latach 1945–1951. Omówiona jest tu zmieniająca się postawa Ameryki wobec tego państwa pod koniec II wojny światowej, a także w pierwszej i drugiej fazie okupacji. Przedstawiony oraz opisany jest także kontekst międzynarodowy tego procesu.

Słowa kluczowe: Amerykańska okupacja w Japonii, naczelny dowódca wojsk sprzymierzonych (SCAP), pakt obronny USA-Japonia, druga wojna światowa, remilitaryzacja Japonii, misja Drapper'a-Johnston'a w Japonii, (czerwona) czystka w Japonii, rozwiązanie zaibatsu, 'Jinken' – prawa człowieka, plan Dodge'a

РАЗВИТИЕ И ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ОККУПАЦИОННОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ В ЯПОНИИ (1945–1951) В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ КОНТЕКСТЕ

Резюме

В статье описываются изменения в политике оккупации США в Японии в 1945–1951 годах. Рассматривается претерпевающее изменения отношение Америки к этой стране в конце Второй мировой войны, а также на первом и втором этапах оккупации.

Кроме того, представлен и описан международный контекст этого процесса.

Ключевые слова: Американская оккупация в Японии, главнокомандующий союзными войсками (SCAP), Договор о взаимном сотрудничестве и гарантиях безопасности между США и Японией, вторая мировая война, ремилитаризация Японии, миссия Дрейпера-Джонстона в Японии, «чистка красных» в Японии, решение *дайбацу*, 'Jinken' – права человека, План Доджа

Cite as:

Kukowski, M. (2018) 'Development and Shift of US Occupation Policy in Japan (1945–1951) in the International Context'. *Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna* 3(62), 258–297. DOI: 10.26399/meip.3(62).2018.40/m.kukowski

Cytuj jako:

Kukowski M., *Development and Shift of US Occupation Policy in Japan (1945–1951) in the International Context [Rozwój i zmiana amerykańskiej polityki okupacyjnej w Japonii (1945–1951) w kontekście międzynarodowym]*, „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna” 2018 nr 3(62), s. 258–297. DOI: 10.26399/meip.3(62).2018.40/m.kukowski