

FRANCE, RUSSIA, USA: ON HEGEMONY, REVOLUTIONS AND WARS

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1. REVOLUTIONS AND WARS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS

It is widely accepted that revolutions, i.e. sudden and violent regime changes occurring beyond the established legal framework and supported by a significant portion of the society can increase the likelihood of becoming involved in an interstate conflict¹. Two critical bodies of research on post-revolutionary conflicts are Maoz's *Domestic Sources of Global Change* (1996: 71–124) and Stephen M. Walt's *Revolution and War* (1996: 18–46). Both authors observe an increased likelihood of an interstate conflict following a revolution². They also describe the struggle between established status-quo powers and new revolutionary regimes which seek to disturb the 'balance of threat' (Walt 1996: 19) in their vicinity. Current research, however, does not examine the relationship between a revolution and instigating a war versus becoming a target.

The main research question is, thus, why do some revolutions lead to becoming a target of military operations and others to their initiation? One hypothesis states that a previously lost war increases the chance of instigating a post-revolutionary rematch. Whereas the democratic or liberal peace

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¹ The period of the increased probability is variously defined but this article will assume that it is about 20 years following the revolution (i.e. the time of political activity of the first generation of revolutionary leaders).

² This is also a prediction made by S. Huntington (1982).

proposition (Danilovic, and Clare: 2007) would suggest that revolutions which embrace more liberal political concepts create less belligerent states. Nevertheless, I theorise that neither a possible return to an old conflict nor the ideology by itself are the decisive factors. Assuming a slightly more neorealist position, I claim that the type of war that follows a revolution is contingent on the regional balance of power and ideology plays a certain role only in the context of that balance. Irrespective of the time, place and ideology, revolutions of weaker states (peripheral revolutions) tend to lead to targeting whereas hegemonic revolutions (i.e. revolutions within states which possess greater military potential than any single one of their neighbours) to aggressive wars of revolutionary spreading. Moreover, most post-revolutionary wars exceed in their magnitude the conflicts that immediately preceded them. Relatively powerful revolutionary states such as France after 1789, Russia after 1919 and Germany after 1933 instigated conflicts in order to spread their ideology and completely remodel the international system. The objective of these conflicts was to establish a vast sphere of influence that would provide the revolutionary state with a guarantee that both domestically and internationally no actors would seek to challenge their claim to power. Conversely, revolutions in smaller states tend to make them targets. The stronger neighbours or the former colonial masters of revolutionary states frequently view such a dramatic political change as a threat to their own legitimacy and foreign policies. The USA, for instance, in the dawn of its history was a weaker state targeted by the British Empire both in the revolutionary period (1775–1783) and then again in 1812. However, by the mid-twentieth century the USA became a status quo power and as such found itself in a position to target smaller revolutionary states, e.g. Cuba.

An additional impact of a revolutionary change is that a wrenching political transition effectively erases previous diplomatic agreements. This creates an opportunity for a hegemonic state to subjugate or incorporate a post-revolutionary state under the pretext of restoring order. It is also worth noting that revolutionary states become increasingly risk acceptant thanks to a new ideological bend that enables the leadership to view itself as the *avant-garde* of new local and global movements. Therefore, the leadership, especially that of a local hegemon, starts viewing its international environment according to the ‘us or them’ logic and views even very risky and expansionistic endeavours as crucial for its survival.

This prediction also draws on power transition theory (Kim, and Morrow 1992). Power-shift theories typically claim that one of the main factors leading to a dyadic war is the dissatisfaction with the regional or global status quo. It

would also seem that in many cases revolutions increase this dissatisfaction. The political messages of restoring lost prestige and power have been applied by numerous revolutionary movements to mobilise a dissatisfied population. This corresponds with Tilly's (1975: 439) concept of a revolution as a victory of one of the competing visions of the state, its economic system, and political structure. Furthermore, Lipset's (1959) observation that every polity requires a robust ideological legitimisation suggests that revolutionary states which succeed in establishing their new vision of society and remain major players in the interstate system create something that can be defined as an ideological spillover.

This phenomenon occurs mainly because revolutions are political developments that often cause the states to undergo substantive changes at the domestic level and toss aside political and social institutions that were previously commonplace in the international environment. In other words, post-revolutionary states need to prove that they were right in decisively breaking the established norms of the pre-revolutionary polity and the neighbouring states. To achieve this end, revolutionary powers possessing a sizable coercive capacity assert themselves by changing their own politics, the politics in their region and – ideally – the whole globe.

Weaker revolutionary governments also have high revolutionary ambitions in the long run but more often than not they find themselves on the defensive. I, however, assume that irrespective of the actual intensions of weaker revolutionary states, the dominant regional powers will assume that they are a potential source of contagion that threatens their interests. Moreover, a revolution can result in creating a hostile neighbour that the existing powers would have to deal with. This is one of the reasons why the Hungarian uprising of 1848 was quenched by the Russian empire (Evans 2000: 181), even though Russia at the time had no direct territorial interests in Habsburgian Hungary and clearly acted as a *gendarme* of the whole Europe. More recently this reasoning provides some explanation for Iran's support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the Teheran's general reluctance to embrace any Sunni led revolution in its vicinity. Similarly, the rise of the Kurdish Autonomy and the activities of Kurdish People's Party in northern Iraq led to Turkey's incursion into the territory of Iraq in 2008 (Tavernise, and Asru 2008). The event intimated that following a revolution in Iraqi Kurdistan and winning full autonomy for the region a larger Turkish invasion can be expected.

2. CASE STUDIES

2.1. Selection and Discussion of Cases

In order to further corroborate the hypothesis this article examines three case studies from different time periods and different parts of the world. The first deals with the French Revolution of 1789 as a trigger for numerous post-revolutionary wars. The French Revolution is an archetypical hegemonic revolution (a revolution within a major regional power) in which one of the preeminent continental powers undergoes a revolution and immediately starts waging wars to spread the new ideology and institutions. Of course, the historical description of the events of the French revolution is well-known, however, the aim of the case study is to examine their conformity with the general theories from the field of modern political science. The other two case studies come from the more recent period and provide analyses of military targeting of smaller revolutionary states following a clearly peripheral revolution. The second case study will deal with Russian military interventions in the Caucasus and the war in Eastern Ukraine, all from the period of 1990–2015. The Cuban revolution of 1959 and the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) will constitute the third case study.

All research of revolutions encounter similar methodological problems. There are few reliable databases that examine such events. Moreover hegemonic revolutions (of major regional powers, defined as states capable of military overcoming each of their neighbours) are so rare that they can be only examined on a case-study basis. Nevertheless, with the help of the database compiled by Jeff Colgan (2012), with a colleague of mine I am currently in the process of creating a research design that will use quantitative methods in a study of a larger number of relatively minor revolutionary events. At this point I am, however, inclined to present a comparative study of three selected cases, including, one typical hegemonic revolution and two analyses of peripheral revolutions.

In my comparative work I rely on Mill's method of agreement (1843: 455). The presented case studies come from different periods and different parts of the world, all of them however display certain similar a pattern. Moreover, to avoid being accused of an ideological bias I present cases that pertain to revolutionary changes with some very different ideological goals, and status quo powers with some very different political and cultural inclinations (the USA and Russia). It is also worth mentioning that the USA and Russia in their history were both revolutionary powers and status quo

powers at different periods. Russia, however, unlike the USA, has never been considered a weaker revolutionary state. Its status in 1917 was, however, more ambiguous than France's in 1789. To put it briefly, in a very short period between 1917–1919 Soviet Russia went from being a target to being a revolutionary hegemon.

2.2. France and Europe the Archetype of a Hegemonic Revolution

Revolutionary France while motivated by the lofty, progressive goals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, ended as a failed imperial project. At the outbreak of the French revolutionary wars, France had a good chance of victory, as well as an opportunity to emerge as a hegemonic force in Europe. This is so because at that time France was Europe's most populous nation and had access to raw materials which could be applied to outfitting a sizable military force. Moreover, France possessed a long history of military innovation and experience in training and equipping well-disciplined infantrymen (Bell 2008: 29–42). In short, it not only had a very modern army, but it was also one the first European states to devise one. As John Childs puts it, 'after 1648 France was the dominant political, military and cultural force in Europe' (2005: 20–30).

Prior to the revolutionary unrest at home, French elites were supporting revolutionary movements in the Americas, the Netherlands, and Hungary (Doyle 1989: 159). These choices were not an intentional attempt at sabotaging the existing monarchist status quo. They were viewed as a rather opportunistic foreign policy decisions intended to undermine the competing powers of the United Kingdom and Austria. While a great revolt had been anticipated in Europe as early as the 1680s, the multi-ethnic and ill-governed Austria was considered the most likely candidate. Tocqueville's (2008: 173) insight stating that revolutions follow rapid technological and economic development rather than periods of economic malaise was still a foreign concept.

Despite the social and political unrest in Europe prior to the French Revolution of 1789, the suddenness and violence of the revolt was a shock for all the neighbouring states. The publication of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution of France* (Burke 1987) soon turned public sentiment in Europe against the French Revolution. The work argued that the revolutionary movement would inevitably collapse due to its inherently weak and abstract ideological foundations centred on pure rationality. Burke claimed that the revolutionary concepts simply ignored the wider complexities of human nature. By 1791 this point of view had become widespread throughout the

continent. Rulers from Scandinavia and Russia to Italy started to actively censor reports on the latest developments in France, mobilise their armies, and spread anti-revolutionary propaganda. The whole of Europe feared what would happen when the leading military power of the continent turns its back on the current international and political norms.

Rather than assuaging old grievances the French Revolution exacerbated the perceived threat posed by Austria and the potential threat that it could pose to France. These fears encouraged the National Assembly to attempt to drag Louis XVI into a pre-emptive conflict and attack Austria before it could fully mobilise for war. Despite the history of Austro-French antagonism throughout the eighteenth century this rivalry became coloured with a new ideological tinge. In 1791 the National Assembly instructed Louis XVI to contact the electors of Trier and Mainz and deliver a novel ultimatum. Louis XVI was told to:

Say to them...that if German princes continue to favour preparations directed against the French. We shall carry to them, not fire and the sword, but freedom. It is for them to estimate what would follow from the awakening of nations (Doyle 1989: 177).

In addition to a newly found desire to export France's revolutionary ideology, the National Assembly realised that the neighbouring states were hesitant to engage in a full-scale war with France. Despite the turmoil of the revolt, France remained a formidable military power, hence, the National Assembly's decision, and ability, to declare war against Austria and its allies on 20 April 1792 (Bell 2008: 123). Following victories over the Prussian and Austrian armies, the National Assembly reiterated its new foreign policy goal of continuing the French Revolution abroad stating that it would 'grant fraternity and aid to all peoples, who wish to recover their liberty' (Bell 2008: 123). This declaration is, indeed, a declaration of war against non-revolutionary Europe for the sake of expanding the 'revolutionary cause'. Of course the military results of this endeavour were initially mixed, in July 1792 Prussia was, for instance, able to march into Champagne. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that being confident in its own strength revolutionary France willingly started the war period on its own in April 1792 by attacking Austria. The attack could be seen a pre-emptive strike following Austria's mobilisation of troops but was an attack nevertheless. Moreover, one buttressed by an extremely expansionistic ideology.

In order to raise the sizable army required for tackling the new challenges, the French government released what Townsend refers to as a 'volcanic natural

force of patriotic citizenship' (2005: 6). Rather than conscripting feudal tenants revolutionary France was able to enlist free men, who were fighting to prevent returning to the state of subjugation, and who sought to liberate neighbouring nations from the same form of feudal subjugation. By doing so Revolutionary France became a more formidable foe than its predecessor. This increased ability to mobilise force conforms with Goldstone's (1982: 187–207) expectation that revolutionary states are frequently more capable of altering the political status quo than their predecessors.

Even though later Napoleon named himself Emperor, his empire was a new political entity which had little to do with the status quo monarchies of Europe which continued to rely on feudal hierarchy and patrimonialism. The desire to fight for the 'cause' and alter the international system in a way favouring the new revolutionary hegemon was something Napoleon clearly pursued. 'I must make all the peoples of Europe one people and Paris the capital of the world', declared the emperor (Bell 2008: 243).

Even after Waterloo and Versailles the old states of Europe never really managed to contain the forces that the revolution had put into motion. Of course, they tried to return to business as usual, reduce the size of the armies and again maintain the upper-class-only officer corps. For some time, between 1815 and 1848 such policy worked, but the Jinn was already out of the bottle. The modern army and modern nation-state formation was well on its way (French 2005: 55–94). One might thus conclude that although France ultimately lost; the revolution won, and it did so largely thanks to being fed with the prodigious military and economic potential of the *Ancien Régime*.

Before Napoleon's ultimate defeat, like any major power which has undergone a hegemonic revolutionary change, France had become increasingly risk acceptant and expansionistic. It strove to create a favourable international environment for the new state and turn popular sentiments away from a possible counter-revolution (Druckman 2008, Russet 1990, Kim, and Morrow 2008). Daniel Bell (2008: 186–223) rightly observed that Napoleon took huge risks on a nearly daily basis. The non-revolutionary state system was initially wary of challenging France, but once the revolution began to forcibly expand from the historic boundaries of France the non-revolutionary regimes started to act to contain and defeat both the French state and its new ideology. Today the wars following the French revolution remain one of the most well document cases of a hegemonic revolution and ensuing expansionistic conflicts.

2.3. Russia, the Caucasus and Ukraine

Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and some of its former European satellite-states (East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) proceeded down divergent developmental paths. Russia did not build closer ties with the West and never experienced a complete democratisation. The former leaders of the Soviet Union were succeeded by their younger protégés, many of whom were tied to the special services of the former regime. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, many former Soviet satellites embarked on a path leading towards democratisation and closer ties with the West. The Russian Federation was not able to forcefully prevent the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc due to its internal instability. There is, however, substantial evidence that hardliners were making such attempts, their faction, however, lost following the unsuccessful Janaev putsch (Andrusiewicz 2016: 302–328).

Nevertheless, after the loss of most of the Eastern European states and the collapse of the Soviet system, Moscow became determined to maintain some form of political influence in Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. It therefore started acting as a typical status quo power in relation to the states from those regions.

In *Competitive Authoritarianism* Levitsky and Way (2010) propose a model explaining why certain post-Soviet states democratised and others either failed to do so, or experienced a volatile and uncertain transition. In addition to variables such as: the power of the government, the structure of the government's resources, the organisational power of the opposition; the researchers focus on Western linkage and leverage as key variables. According to their analysis when strong levels of linkage and leverage with the West are present they create an effect so strong that it can overcome domestic factors. They note that 'In states with extensive ties to the West, post-Cold war international influences were so intense that they contributed to democratisation even where domestic traditions were unfavourable' (Levitsky, and Way 2010: 38). Linkage is operationalised as four distinct forms including: economic linkage, intergovernmental linkage, technocratic linkage and social linkage. Leverage is essentially a measure of the strength of the linkage when utilised by the West to exert pressure for democratic change.

In addition to explaining why certain states have been more likely to democratise, Levitsky and Way also suggest that powerful states or coalitions have an interest in encouraging smaller states to adopt a friendly ideology and suppress unwarranted revolutionary movements. As for the move opposite

to the democratisation efforts, Levitsky and Way describe it using the term: ‘black knight effect’. The description of this effect implies that some states support and promote authoritarian systems in neighbouring states and as a result try to counter the democratising peripheral revolutions (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990: 96–111).

Russia is a typical ‘black knight’ for the former-Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The idea of ‘near abroad’, encompassing these regions, is a concept deeply embedded in the Russian thought and foreign policy. In the past, when high levels of Western linkage and leverage and its democratising effects on Eastern Europe proved too strong for Russia to counteract, it effectively gave up on some of its foreign policy interests. However, in the Caucasus and Ukraine where ties to the West were relatively weak, Russia actively asserted its interests in an attempt to undermine all revolutionary and separatist attempts. Although, one needs to note a slightly different nature of the Chechen conflict, since Chechnya was, according to all accounts, less inclined to follow the Western-liberal model and more willing to create an Islamic or semi-Islamic republic. Nevertheless, with some important caveats, the Chechen wars can also be classified as a conflict that followed a peripheral revolution.

In the early 1990’s Chechnya was a semi-autonomous republic of the Russian Federation. As Kristin M. Bakke notes:

the immediate backdrop to the first Chechen war in 1994 was the Chechen Revolution of 1990–91, which brought the nationalists to power. Initially, the nationalist movement... sought to revive Chechen culture and traditions, but its demands quickly came to encompass political sovereignty (2011: 534).

After the collapse of negotiations in December 1994, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, opted for a military solution to the diplomatic stalemate. Following two succeeding years of conflict, Russian troops withdrew and Chechnya gained *de facto* independence. The First Chechen War broke out when a powerful secessionist movement gained prominence. The movement supported drastic changes in the government and Chechen society with respect to cultural and religious self-identification. What followed these drastic changes, and the efforts to destroy the regional status quo, is a clear case of a major power opting to intervene in a weaker state in order to suppress a potentially contagious revolutionary ideology and re-establish the status quo.

The *casus belli* for the second war between Russia and Chechnya arrived after Aslan Maskhadov defeated a pro-Russian politician in the presidential

race in 1997. Soon it became clear that Maskhadov was unable to demilitarise the Islamist militias that were active in the region. As these groups began to carry out attacks in neighbouring Dagestan (Schaefer 2011: 47–49) effectively trying to spread the idea of an independent Caucasian Emirate, Russia again intervened militarily in 1999 hoping to destroy the movement (Ware 2005: 79–117). This conflict reached its conclusion in 2004 when the authoritarian pro-Russian government was established.

The events that led to a war with Georgia are an even a clearer case of a major non-revolutionary power opting to suppress revolutionary changes in a small neighbouring state. Georgia had often fallen under either Russia's direct rule or existed in its sphere of influence. Given Russia's historical role in the region it comes as little surprise that Georgian independence followed by clear attempts to align with the West was viewed by Moscow as an unwelcomed development.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Georgian leaders who favoured distancing themselves from Moscow had supported other separatist movements within the Russian Federation. Zviad Gamsakhurdi, the first democratically elected President of Georgia was the first head of state to recognise Chechnya as an independent state in 1991. Thomas de Waal goes as far as to call Gamsakhurdi's rise to power (and his attempt to disrupt the historical status quo found in the Caucasus) a 'revolution' (2010: 131).

Following the removal of Gamsakhurdi, Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet Minister of External Relations, emerged as the new President of Georgia. Needless to say, Shevardnadze was an advocate of a return to the pre-revolutionary status quo. As an additional precaution the Russian army also began to militarily support the independence of two break-away regions of Georgia: Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Initially this was of course denied by Boris Yeltsin and his successors. Nevertheless, information confirming disruptive activities consistently emerged in the reports of Western journalists (Almond and Stone 2011: 65–103).

Encouraging these separatist tendencies in the regions created a constant justification for war, which could break out if Georgia again chose to adopt policies that would challenge the status quo in the Caucasus. Following the ousting of Eduard Shevardnadze during the Rose Revolution of 2003, and the rise of pro-Western president Mikheil Saakashvili, Russian fears of losing control over Georgia increased. Russia's main concern was that a dramatic political shift in the Caucasus could later undermine Russian influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. In an attempt to halt Saakashvili's efforts Russia utilised its influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the

words of Ronald Asmus: ‘They [South Ossetia and Abkhazia] became the flash point that would spark this war’ (2010: 54).

Russia’s tactics in the Caucasus clearly underline its status as a major status-quo power within its nearest neighbourhood. The Kremlin seems to be determined to counter any radical power-shift that occurs close to its borders. The developments in Ukraine provides the latest example of this tactic. The ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004 did not incite an intervention only because it was unsuccessful and did not end in a radical political change (Willson 2007). In 2006 the leaders of the ‘revolution’ were forced to accept the post-soviet leader of the pro-Russian status-quo block – Victor Yanukovich as the prime minister. And in 2010 Yanukovich became the president effectively ending the ‘Orange revolution’ and marking its failure. The Russian Federation decided to intervene only when a new revolutionary outburst – the Maidan Revolution forcibly ousted Yanukovich. Following this Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and started to actively support counterrevolutionary movement in Eastern Ukraine (Foxall, and Cichowlas 2014). In spite of a number of incidents Russia up till now has not ventured to conduct an open, fully fledged invasion on Ukraine’s heartland. Nevertheless, at this point the two countries remain in a *de facto* state of war that clearly follows a revolution.

2.4. Cuba and the Bay of Pigs Invasion

In line with the democratic and liberal peace propositions the initial USA’s policy towards revolutionary Cuba was marked by conflict avoidance. The USA, for instance, imposed an embargo on weapon trade with the Batista government during the revolution of 1959 (Leonard 1999: 19) and after Castro’s victory Washington promptly recognised the new government. Still, the available sources (Kornbluh 1998: 5–43) make it clear that the USA fairly early on saw Fidel Castro as a grave danger to its interests in Southern and Central America and a potential source of revolutionary contagion. This article argues that eventually, in spite of the USA’s administration initial reluctance to enter into an armed conflict, the fears of revolutionary contagion proved too great to avoid attempting a military intervention. It would seem that the urge to quench a peripheral revolution can overcome even the democratic and liberal peacefulness.

Looking at the issue from Washington’s point of view Robert Snyder claims that the conflict was triggered by Fidel Castro’s attempts to ‘externalise’ (1999) internal tensions. Snyder’s position is that Castro provoked the conflict with the USA in spite of President Eisenhower’s administration attempts at

normalising the USA – Cuban relations and that he did so in order to be able to rally the revenant political forces around his leadership and fight the growing opposition. As Snyder puts it, even ‘before the U.S. responded to Cuba’s hostility, Castro had used American provocation to remove political rivals’ (Snyder 1999: 276). He also adds that the provoked onset of tension with the USA preceded Castro’s communist ‘coming out’ and his alliance with the Soviet block or any inkling of such an alignment. In short, according to Snyder, nothing intimated a possible conflict before May 1959 and the land reform that led to the confiscation of U.S. citizen’s property. This paper will, however, provide some criticism of Snyder’s approach. Moreover, a ‘provocation’ is a very subjective category. Be it as it may, the USA ultimately was the first one to engage in military actions, thus corroborating the general pattern of anti-revolutionary interventions.

Furthermore, what Snyder fails to acknowledge is that the USA’s intelligence and policy makers were extremely wary of Castro’s regime very early on and saw it as a clear threat to U.S. interests in Latin America. Already during Castro’s visit to the USA in April 1959 Vice President Nixon on meeting him wrote a 12 page confidential memorandum for the Department of State and the CIA. He clearly states in the document that the new leader of Cuba is ‘either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline’ (Johnson 1964: 25) and urged the CIA and the Department of State to act on this suspicions. Moreover, Peter Wyden in his books confirms that, although Castro did not immediately disclose his communist sympathies, it was clear that many of the communist-leaning anti-Batista fighters found their way into his government. On the basis of these facts as early as in December 1959 the CIA chief of Western hemisphere division, colonel J.C. King predicted a ‘real problem in Cuba’ (Wyden 1979: 19). Another famous CIA executive and the main planner of the Bay of Pigs Invasion Jacob Esterline later, during an interview, reflected on his early fears of revolutionary contagion that threatened the USA geopolitical interests using the following words: ‘It seemed to me that something like a chain reaction was occurring all over Latin America after Castro came to power. I saw – hell, anybody with eyes could see – that a new and powerful force was at work in the hemisphere. It had to be dealt with’ (Kornbluh 1998: 7).

We still do not have full access to Cuban archives that would confirm Castro’s policy plans. Indeed, however, we can assume the land reforms and signals of alignment with Moscow were the events that ultimately prompted president Eisenhower to authorise the CIA to ‘train and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to overthrow Castro’ (Johnson 1964: 28).

Members of Brigade 2506 were trained on Useppa Island and in government facilities in South Florida. The training of aircrews was carried out by the Air National Guard in Alabama (Fernandez 2001: 103–112). The CIA also recruited a group of American civilians to fly some of the B-26 bombers that the expeditionary forces were equipped with (Fineman, and Mascarenas 1998). The final briefing and the go order was given by President Kennedy on 12 April 1961 (Wyden 1979: 169), the invasion started on 17 April.

Although in accordance with President Kennedy's wishes there was no open-field involvement of the United States military forces, in the face of the later revealed documents, the Bay of Pigs invasion was clearly an act of a governmental military intervention. The USA not only equipped and financed the expedition but also sent its own citizens to combat. In fact, four American airmen were killed and two CIA operatives were later imprisoned and executed (Wyden 1979: 288–300). The operation failed mainly because the popular support Castro enjoyed precluded a mass insurrection or defection of army units (Schlesinger and Meir 2002: 264). Moreover, the Cuban army was prepared. The officers were well aware of the possibility of the invasion and the Soviet intelligence, in fact, seemed to have been able to provide Castro with the exact date of the landing almost a week before it took place (Loeb 2000). As Wyden notes, based on records of conversations that took place in the oval office, president Kennedy had many doubts concerning the outcome of the operation, he, however, chose not to cancel the operation since this would be tantamount to 'admission that Castro ruled with popular support' and 'it would guarantee that Castro would long be around to harass all of Latin America' (Wyden 1979: 308).

Stephen M. Walt describes the Bay of Pigs intervention as 'a brief, inclusive clash' (Walt 1996: 55) and points out that this conflict resulted from the unwinding of a spiral of fear. According to him, in general, in post-revolutionary conflicts, on the one hand, the dominant powers exaggerate the possible contagion and, on the other hand, revolutionary regimes exaggerate every hostile signal because of their insecurity and history of previous grievances. At the same time Walt downplays the actual scope and effects of contagion. This seems to be a partly erroneous account. History of revolutions suggests that although, not necessarily long-lived, indeed, they are all fairly contagious and costly from the point of view of regional power holders (Weyland 2009, 2012). Thus, in spite of the difficulties, the domestic public opinion costs and low chances of success, the temptation (Wyden 1979: 289–313) to try to suppress a peripheral revolution often proves too great to resist for hegemonic policy-makers, even those of established democracies such as the USA.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The major case studies as well as the preliminary analysis of the available data show some support for the hypothesis that peripheral revolutions usually lead to targeting by major regional status quo-powers. There are, however, certain rare cases when a regional power itself undergoes a revolution and as a result it strives to quickly expand its new ideology and institutions using the military and economic force it inherited from the previous regime. For the sake of brevity, this study examines one case study of a hegemonic revolution, the French revolution. However, both the Russian revolution (especially after 1919) and the rise of National Socialism in Germany can be classified as hegemonic revolutions. The conclusions suggest that all revolutions can potentially lead to major military conflicts, of course those followed by hegemonic revolutions are significantly greater in scope and magnitude.

Revolutions, especially those of the hegemonic type cannot be easily examined using quantitative methods. That is why this article proposes a comparative case-study-based approach. The article is a part of a larger research project that will also include qualitative research of peripheral revolutions. As far as the methodology is concerned, this study uses the word 'revolution' as an ideologically neutral term that pertains to any violent regime change occurring beyond the established legal framework and with a considerable support of the population. It does not assume a more ideologically loaded notion of a revolution that is typically used in structuralism, i.e. a revolution as class emancipation.

Regarding more practical political conclusions, the research suggests that political leaders of states that have recently undergone a revolutionary change are always in an extremely precarious international situation. Their risk acceptance, which is enhanced by a revolutionary success and strong ideological allegiance, can often lead them to making misguided decisions. Even those who inherit considerable military powers from the former states, like revolutionary France and later Napoleonic France, often venture to embark on military projects far beyond their real capacities. The states that have undergone a peripheral revolution, like the present-day Ukraine, Georgia or Cuba, are in an even greater danger. Even their victories, as the Cuban case shows, can lead to political isolation and underdevelopment in the long run. In conclusion, the political leadership of all revolutionary states needs to exercise extreme caution in its foreign policies. Moreover, the case studies suggest that while ideology plays a role and that role is contingent on

the regional balance of power. No revolutionary ideology creates a conflict on its own, it is the fact of adopting a different ideology than that of the local hegemon's that creates a tension.

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FRANCE, RUSSIA, USA: ON HEGEMONY, REVOLUTIONS AND WARS

Summary

The mainstream literature on revolutions points to the conclusion that following the onset of a revolution the probability that a given country will be involved in a military interstate dispute rises dramatically. However, there

are no clear conclusions regarding the probability of becoming an instigator or a target of a conflict. The article examines the types of military actions that the post-revolutionary state becomes involved in. The geopolitical and military factors, which shape a given state's influence within its immediate international surrounding, play a pivotal role. The hegemonic revolutions of regional powers are rare and lead to powerful conflicts during which the hegemon spreads the new ideology and institutions in the international surrounding. The peripheral revolutions of weaker states, on the other hand, typically lead to post-revolutionary military targeting by local hegemons that see any changes to the status quo as a threat to their influences and fear revolutionary contagion. All revolutions seem to make the leadership more risk-acceptant. The article is a part of a larger research project that will include a quantitative analysis of peripheral revolutions. However, at this point it examines three case studies: one hegemonic revolution (France after 1789) and two cases of peripheral revolutions and ensuing wars (the recent Russian activities in Ukraine and the Caucasus and the U.S. Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961). The research uses Mill's comparative method of agreement seeking to present cases from very different historical contexts, it also strives to avoid ideological bias when defining key terms and events. The general conclusions suggest that all revolutionary states are in an extremely precarious situation in spite of different, specific dangers that they may face.

Key words: revolutions, USA, France, Russia, wars, target, instigating

FRANCJA, ROSJA, USA: O HEGEMONII, REWOLUCJACH I WOJNACH

Streszczenie

Literatura dotycząca rewolucji sugeruje, że po rozpoczęciu rewolucji prawdopodobne jest, iż dany kraj będzie uczestniczył w wojskowym sporze międzypaństwowym. Nie ma jednak jasnych wniosków co do prawdopodobieństwa bycia inicjatorem lub celem agresji. W artykule omówiono rodzaje działań wojennych, w które zaangażowane może być państwo po rewolucji. Czynniki geopolityczne i wojskowe, kształtujące wpływ danego państwa, w jego bezpośrednim otoczeniu międzynarodowym, odgrywają kluczową rolę. Hegemoniczne rewolucje regionalnych potęg są rzadkie i prowadzą do silnych konfliktów, podczas których hegemon stara się rozprzestrzenić nową ideologię i instytucje. Peryferyjne rewolucje słabszych państw zazwyczaj pro-

wadzą do wojskowych interwencji pod wodzą lokalnych hegemonów, którzy postrzegają wszelkie zmiany status quo jako zagrożenie dla swoich wpływów i obawiają się rewolucyjnego zakażenia innych państw. Wszystkie rewolucje zdają się sprawiać, że polityczni przywódcy stają się bardziej otwarci na ryzykowne zachowania. Artykuł jest częścią większego projektu badawczego, który obejmie analizę ilościową rewolucji peryferyjnych. Ten tekst rozpatruje jednak tylko trzy studia przypadku: jedną rewolucję hegemoniczną (Francja po 1789 r.) oraz dwa przypadki interwencji po rewolucjach peryferyjnych (ostatnie rosyjskie działania na Ukrainie i na Kaukazie oraz amerykańską inwazję w Zatoce Świń w 1961 r.). Badania wykorzystują klasyczną millowską metodę porównawczą, tzw. metodę „różnicy”. Studia przypadku są bowiem dobrane tak, aby reprezentowały jak najbardziej odmienny kontekst historyczny. Opisując i definiując pojęcia autor stroni też od wszelkich ideologicznych konotacji. Badania opisane w artykule pokazują, że wszystkie rewolucyjne państwa znajdują się w podobnie niepewnej sytuacji, pomimo różnych konkretnych zagrożeń, jakie mogą napotkać.

Słowa kluczowe: Rewolucje, USA, Francja, Rosja, wojny, cel, agresja

Франция, Россия, США: о гегемонии, революциях и войнах

Резюме

В предметной литературе, касающейся революции, содержится тезис о том, что после начала революции в той или иной стране, повышается вероятность того, что данная страна будет участвовать в военном конфликте международного уровня. Нет, однако, четких выводов о том, будет ли эта страна инициатором или жертвой агрессии. В статье рассмотрены виды военных действий, в которых может участвовать государство после революции. Ключевую роль в этом вопросе играют геополитические и военные факторы, формирующие степень влияния данного государства в его непосредственном международном окружении. Гегемонические революции в региональных державах – редкое явление, которое может привести к серьезным конфликтам, в ходе которых гегемон стремится распространять новую идеологию и вводить новые институты. Периферийные революции в более слабых государствах обычно приводят к военным вмешательствам под руководством местной гегемонии, которые воспринимают любые изменения статус-кво как угрозу их влиянию и опасаются революционной «заразы» со стороны других стран.

В результате любых революций, по всей вероятности, политические лидеры становятся более открытыми и готовыми к рискованному поведению. Статья является частью более крупного исследовательского проекта, который будет охватывать количественный анализ периферийных революций. Данный текст посвящен только трем тематическим исследованиям: одна гегемонистская революция (Франция после 1789 года) и два случая вмешательства после периферийных революций (российские действия последних лет в Украине и на Кавказе и американское вторжение в Залив Свиней в 1961 году). В исследовании используется классический сравнительный метод Милиана, так называемый *метод разностей*. Тематические исследования подобраны таким образом, чтобы они могли представлять в максимальной степени разнообразный исторический контекст. Описывая и характеризуя понятия, автор в то же время избегает любого рода идеологических коннотаций. Исследования, описанные в статье, показывают, что все революционные государства находятся в одинаково неопределенной ситуации, несмотря на различия в том, с какими конкретными угрозами они могут столкнуться.

Ключевые слова: революции, США, Франция, Россия, войны, цель, агрессия

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